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Medical records have been moving from paper-based systems to electronic form in recent
decades. This evolution to electronic health records (EHRs) brings new benefits and pos-
sibilities for healthcare providers, physicians and patients. Involved users can easily and
flexibly deal with EHRs: they can broadcast and share the data amongst themselves rather
than share on an individual to individual basis. The data can be moved from limited local
storage systems at hospitals to externally hosted systems which enable multiple parties to
access and maintain these records. However, with the change arise new practical, legal,
ethical and financial challenges. EHRs contain sensitive personal medical information,
and thereby demand that integrity and confidentiality are assured. Nevertheless, EHR-
based systems improve individual outcomes and cut implementation costs. Stored data
has to be accessible only to authorised users and always available especially in the case
of emergencies.
EHR-based access and storage is a wide topic with numerous issues, including secu-
rity and privacy concerns as well as efficiency and practical matters. At a first sight, one
would look to design a solution that solves all of these problems. However, it is difficult
to find a satisfactory solution with strong user autonomy and guarantees confidentiality
along with flexibility and computational efficiency. Therefore, we propose dividing the
general EHR-based context into subcases and studying each individually, defining them
through concrete scenarios and to present specific solutions. We believe these solutions
will be more effective in both security and utility compared to approaches which look at
the EHR environment as a whole and aim to deliver a single solution.
Access control and storage services are the two main categories we studied. On one
hand, we focus on the data accessibility. Since privacy of both user identities and data
must be guaranteed and there is a threat of compromise by malicious actors, we have to
ensure that only authorised users can access and manipulate EHR contents. On the other
hand, we concentrate on storage of the data. We want to enable authorised users to be
able to upload EHRs to cloud servers, selectively request access to stored data, and finally
update and selectively share EHRs with other authorised people. Because it is difficult to
iv
design a single fully secure and effective EHR-based system which handles all of these
actions, we divide the problem into different situations. We adopt an assumption that
cloud servers are not fully trustworthy and design accordingly. This increases flexibility
for healthcare providers when selecting a cloud service provider.
In this thesis, we outline various realistic scenarios, focus on their functional, security
and practical requirements, and we then propose cryptographic primitives to address the
requirements and issues.
We first present two primitives which involve broadcast encryption with member-
ship and certificate-based broadcast encryption to enable secure and efficient broadcast
and sharing of EHRs among the involved users. The first primitive allows hospital staff
members authorised by a medical institute to access EHRs encrypted by the hospital.
The second primitive enables staff members authorised by the hospital and holding valid
certificates delivered by health legislators to access EHRs.
We then propose a primitive involving certificate-based encryption with keyword
search to enable secure and efficient access and retrieval of EHRs stored on cloud servers.
This primitive allows hospital staff members to search for EHRs stored on a cloud server
using a trapdoor that embeds a keyword describing the contents of the records and a valid
certificate.
We also design two primitives involving on-line/off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-
based proxy re-encryption and ciphertext-policy DNA-based encryption to securely ad-
dress patient privacy in an efficient manner by reducing the computation and communi-
cations resources needed. The first primitive enables the hospital to pre-encrypt an EHR
regarding credentials and lets the patient finalise the encryption using other credentials.
A staff member recovers the EHR if and only if s/he satisfies at least the patient’s creden-
tials. The second primitive considers DNA sequences for their uniqueness and closeness.
A first patient encrypts his/her EHR using his/her DNA sequence and a second patient
can retrieve the EHR if and only if his/her DNA sequence is close enough to that of the
first patient.
v
Finally, we propose the primitive which involves dynamic provable data possession
with public verifiability and data privacy to enable secure and efficient management of
EHRs in cloud computing. This primitive allows hospital staff members to upload and
update non-encrypted EHRs to a cloud server. A third party auditor is required to check
that the cloud server correctly stores the EHRs by regular auditing.
vi
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Electronic health records (EHRs) are the digital form of medical information. They have
been emerging in the last decades as the evolution of traditional paper records in the
healthcare environment. EHRs offer the possibility of sharing the medical information
among various users, such as healthcare providers, physicians and patients, as well as to
archive them over a long period of time. Ideally, EHR systems should be designed to ben-
efit clinical, organisational and societal outcomes, such as reducing frequency of medical
error, decreasing financial costs and improving the general population health [154].
The medical information contained within EHRs is personal and sensitive, and thus
EHRs have to ensure that availability, integrity, confidentiality and acknowledgement are
guaranteed [200]. EHR-based models have been expanded nationally with the aim to
protect patient autonomy, privacy and confidentiality. However, they have irredeemably
brought practical, legal, ethical and financial challenges [107, 211]. In particular, analysing
the financial costs for implementing EHR systems in primary care remains essential de-
spite EHR systems noticeably improving the quality of patient care and reducing medical
errors [234, 85].
EHRs should integrate personal medical information from different sources, and pro-
vide a complete and correct personal health and medical summary through the Internet
and on portable electronic devices. For instance, EHRs could be fragmented and dis-
tributed to several healthcare related sites to address the needs and obligations of the
involved users. Designing EHR structure and ownership of EHR information impacts on
patient access control and privacy. Therefore, carefully defining a framework is impor-
tant to control threats to accessibility and security, and to maintain the privacy of patients
[151]. EHR information exchange systems allow users to autonomously store, access
and share medical information recorded in EHRs. In addition to medical information
exchange, functionalities offered by EHR systems include clinical decision support and
structured data entry [194].
One implementation option for EHR systems involves a cloud-based environment.
Cloud computing enables EHR systems to transfer and store the medical information on
servers hosted by a third party which are accessible via the Internet. A cloud solution can
deliver gains in flexibility and reduce operational costs. However, a cloud environment
increases patient privacy challenges because the cloud infrastructure and service provider
should not be fully trusted.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
In each chapter, we provide scenarios describing specific recurrent situations that
appear in EHR systems. To help with interpreting the figures, we provide lists of users
and objects to illustrate the scenarios. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict these lists.
Hospital staff members 











Figure 1.1: List of Users. Let us consider first the hospital staff members: they can be either
medical staff members (e.g. general practitioners (GP), surgeons, anesthetists, gynaecologists,
etc), or paramedical staff members (e.g. nurses, physiotherapists, etc), or administrative staff
members (e.g. secretaries, accountants, IT technicians, etc). We also suppose the existence of
medical patients: Bob that holds a public and private key pair, and Alice and her son Charles.
Then, several places come into the scenarios: the hospital and the medical institute (seen as a
health legislator). The hospital is the place where the users act and the medical institute plays
the role of group manager and/or certifier (i.e. distributing public and private key pairs and/or the
certificates respectively). In addition, we take into account a third party auditor (TPA) that can
help the patients during some processes to be determined, and a proxy or a cloud server that steps
in the protocols as an interface. In particular, the cloud server is linked to a database as its local
storage.
1.1 Scenarios
At first glance, storing sensitive information outside the owner’s local storage seems haz-
ardous since information leakage might compromise the patient privacy and interruption
to communication networks might threaten the owner’s accessibility. Medical informa-
tion includes patients EHRs as well as administrative and financial documents owned by
a hospital, all of them being stored on an external server (such as a private cloud server)
and thus are subject to leakage risks. Without losing meaning, we employ the expression
medical documents to denote all the documents held by the hospital, that is the health
documents (containing medical information), the administrative documents (containing





Public and Private Key Pair
Certificate
Re-Encryption Key
Ask for Help!Check Process Request
Plain Documents
Figure 1.2: List of Objects. Electronic health records (EHRs) can be medical and personal
documents. They can be found in: 1) the plain form (a user can see them in clear); 2) the
encrypted form (a user has encrypted them using some parameters to be determined), that we call
a ciphertext. A user tries to decrypt a ciphertext and can meet one of the following results: 1)
the user retrieves the original plain EHRs, meaning that the decryption is successful; 2) the user
retrieves a fake EHRs, meaning that the decryption fails. Each of the main characters involved
in the protocols will receive a public and private key pair. Moreover, a user may receive the
following items from another party: 1) a certificate (that can represent a license for instance); 2)
an access token or a trapdoor embedding some specific elements such that a keyword or a date
(e.g. an object containing the security credentials for a login session and identifying the user and
his/her privileges); 3) a re-encryption key in order to change the decryption rights. DNA can be
seen as a key since each user has his/her own DNA sequence that makes this key unique (except
for some cases to be specified). Finally, some symbols illustrate actions as follows: a party can
ask to check some process done by another party; 2) a party may ask for help to another party
(for instance, a party does not have enough resources to do the task, thus asks to another party
that is more able to do it); 3) a party can forward a request to another party.
financial and organisational information), and any other kinds of documents related to the
hospital.
Studying the storage and access management of EHRs is a wide topic: it is difficult to
define a single scenario and then design a solution that addresses all of the situations that
patients, medical institutes and hospitals can encounter when dealing with EHRs. Indeed,
we require the solution to be an EHR-based protocol that is efficient, practical, secure and
addresses privacy matters.
At first sight, we can see an EHR as a simple message that can be encrypted and de-
crypted indefinitely. This means that public-key cryptographic primitives and its deriva-
tives can simply be applied in this case. We can also combine all the EHRs, and hence,
treat them as big data (i.e. data sets that are large or complex and for which traditional
data processing applications are inadequate). Studies on big data are widespread in the
literature. Therefore, if we consider EHRs as basic data (i.e. one EHR is a simple message
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and all the EHRs together form a big data set), then we observe that numerous existing
cryptosystems have been proposed as solutions for such a problem. However, EHRs are
a particular kind of data that contains highly sensitive personal information which should
be kept secret from most people. It introduces specific problems that need to be solved
one by one. These problems relate to preservation of the privacy and soundness of the
EHR-based protocols.
In this thesis, we propose splitting the general EHR-based context into subcases that
are related to particular problems, and present solutions for each of them. By choosing
this study direction, we are able to design satisfactory cryptographic primitives, such that
computational and communication costs are not a bottleneck and security and privacy re-
quirements are achieved.
We start by dividing the wider EHR-based context into subcases by considering the
format in which EHRs are stored and exchanged among users. We examine the two
following cases:
1. The medical documents are encrypted before being uploaded to a cloud server,
so that the server gets no information about the contents being stored. Therefore,
data security and privacy are ensured. However, this design is cumbersome as it
requires an encryption/decryption process for each document, especially each time
the contents have to be updated (i.e. added, deleted or modified).
2. The medical documents are uploaded to the cloud server in plain, meaning that
the content is accessible from the cloud server. This is easy for the data owner
to add, delete or modify the content of the document, since s/he does not need to
download it to a local storage; instead s/he can request the cloud server to do the
task. To ensure that the cloud server stores and updates the documents as expected,
audit processes are required. This means that any unexpected behaviour can be
detected. For instance, if the cloud server adds, deletes or modifies parts of the
content without being asked to do so. The audit processes should be conducted by
an external party since the data owner is unlikely to have sufficient capability to do
this adequately.
We propose cryptographic primitives that implement each of these cases in the elec-
tronic Health (e-Health) context. The first case ensures that EHRs are hidden from non-
authorised users’ view, however computation and communication costs might increase.
The second case allows data owners to easily manage their data stored on a cloud server,
however the content can be learnt from the cloud server. Thus, in this particular case, we
also enable data owners to be able to externally check the integrity of this data.
Storage issues are not the only problems we encounter, the other class of problems
relates to access control. Since we want to restrict access to EHRs only to users that are
explicitly authorised, how should we control for non-authorised users? Here, another two
problems emerge. Firstly, we must avoid the case where a non-authorised user manages
to intercept some of the stored data and discovers its contents. Secondly, we do not want
the cloud server to be able to manipulate the data without being detected.
To describe the access control framework, we need only to consider the situation
where the documents are stored in their encrypted form on the cloud server. We have
to ensure that only authorised users have access to the medical information, and so are
eventually able to retrieve it in plain after decryption. Since the medical documents are
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encrypted, their contents are inaccessible to non-authorised users and to the cloud servers.
To guarantee access control efficacy, we have decided to provide users with private keys
which correspond to public keys that were used to encrypt the medical documents on
their behalf. However, we also decided that this is not sufficiently robust since users
keys can be compromised, lost or stolen, and thereby used to gain unauthorised access to
EHRs. We therefore further divide the access control problem into four subcases. Each of
which uses one or two special features along with a private key in order to access EHRs.
Additionally, these feature options can be combined to further enhance access control.
1. Personal and professional credentials are required to encrypt and decrypt medical
documents. For instance, personal credentials include details related to the identity
of the user, while professional credentials contain information on the user’s position
within the organisation. The document may only be decrypted with credentials
matching those which were used to encrypt it.
2. Certificates are delivered to users by a trusted authority. The document may only
be decrypted by a user with a valid certificate.
3. A group of authorised users are nominated during the encryption of a document.
The document may only be decrypted by one of the nominated users.
4. Some metadata related to the encrypted medical document is asked to the user at-
tempting decryption. This could be a keyword that briefly describes the contents
of the document. The document may only be decrypted by correctly specifying the
metadata.
We will present a design using cryptographic primitives to implement these features based
on encrypted medical documents. Some primitives will implement a single feature while
others will address more than one.
1.2 Context Description
The following users contribute into the storing, accessing and sharing processes: a medi-
cal institute and possibly other health legislators (for instance, the government), a hospital
and its staff members, and a private cloud server operated by the hospital. Possibly, pa-
tients might intervene into the processes.
Hospital staff members include administrative staff (e.g. secretaries, accountants, IT
technicians, etc), paramedical staff (e.g. nurses, physiotherapists, etc) and medical staff
(e.g. general practitioners (GP), surgeons, anesthetists, gynaecologists, etc). Throughout
this thesis, a practitioner is either a member of the paramedical group or the medical
group.
Medical institutes and other health legislators deliver public and private key pairs and
certificates to hospital staff of a given hospital with their authorisation to let them practise.
A legislator is responsible for giving rights (e.g. access) and privileges (e.g. credentials)
to hospital staff.
The hospital maintains a preferably private cloud server for storing EHRs. Depending
on the function being described the EHR may or may not be encrypted.
When practitioners or administrative staff are authorised, they are able to upload (en-
crypted or non-encrypted) medical documents to the cloud server, access stored ones and
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retrieve original ones. Medical documents can be shared amongst hospital staff only when
previously specified requirements are met. The requirements include the access rights, the
credentials and other characteristics that a staff member satisfies personally and/or pro-
fessionally.
Hospital staff must satisfy controls before being granted access to a requested medical
document. More precisely, staff should be first identified (for instance, they provide their
name, their working registration number, etc), then authenticated (for instance, they use
their private key and/or their certificate(s)) and finally authorised (for instance, their right
to access the medical document is verified). Should a clinician, Dan, wish to access a
medical document stored on the cloud server, he must satisfy three steps:
1. Identification: where Dan says who he is (e.g. with a login user name);
2. Authentication: where Dan proves his identification given in the first step (e.g. with
a password or a PIN number);
3. Authorisation: where Dan’s access rights are verified.
Patient EHRs and other documents held by the hospital contain sensitive information
that must be kept private from non-authorised users. Specifically, only an authorised
user can be permitted to access and discover their contents. The patients may be granted
restricted access to some of their medical information. Consider a patient, Alice, being
able to modify her EHR, and if she has a blood test to indicate illicit drug use, she should
be prevented from being able to modify the results for legal reasons.
Access controls and restrictions are not the only issues to take into account. Avail-
ability and access to the cloud server cannot be guaranteed. The following scenarios are
examples where this might be a problem.
• A patient may have poor or no access to the Internet. Whether transitory due to
inadequate or failed technology, or because of socio-economic reasons. There must
be a means for the patient to deal with his/her EHR in these circumstances.
• The hospital will from time to time encounter failures and interruptions with net-
work infrastructure, theirs and upstream, which will cause communication with the
cloud server to be unavailable.
One of our goals is to avoid these issues as much as possible. For instance, we will pro-
pose allowing users to perform most of the data encryption processes off-line, and then
finalising them on-line when possible.
We now describe the trust level assigned to each user. Since the cloud server is not
assumed to be fully trusted, one solution is to encrypt the medical documents before
uploading to the cloud server, in order to hide their contents from its view. Another
solution is to leave the medical document in plain, and regularly audit the cloud server
to verify that medical documents are correctly stored and that no unrequested updates
(additions, deletions, modifications) have occurred. For instance, the cloud server might
delete medical documents that are not often requested in order to save storage space and
so, might propose its services to other hospitals and increase its business profits.
Hospital staff must be restricted from accessing medical documents for which they
are not authorised. For instance, a physiotherapist does not need to know that his/her
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patient suffered from depression few years ago. Access rights and privileges control the
access to the medical information for each hospital staff member.
Medical institutes and other legislators are fully trusted; indeed they are responsible
for delivering public and private key pairs and possibly certificates to the hospital staff
members. This means that they hold secret components and should carefully deliver them
to the intended recipients. Public and private key pairs and certificates are randomized to
ensure that these elements are unique. If two hospital staff members were to receive the
same certificate and do not have the same access rights, then one of them will be able to
access more information than allowed.
In Figure 1.3, we summarize the functions of the above users in the e-Health context.
generates delivers
possesses uploads
Figure 1.3: Occupations of the Users. The medical institute generates the certificates and/or
the public and private key pairs and distributes them to all hospital staff members (and possibly
to the patients). The hospital, on behalf of the hospital staff, gets a large amount of medical
information, such as the patients EHRs, administrative documents, financial documents, and so
on. The hospital uploads them, either in plain or encrypted, to a private cloud server that holds
enough database resources.
1.3 Existing Work
1.3.1 Published Literature on Health Records
Ferreira et al. [83] reviewed material published in the literature on access control in
healthcare between 1996 and 2006. This review reveals that most of the access control
systems are just studies or prototypes in which healthcare professionals and patients did
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not participate in the definition of the access control policies, models or mechanisms.
In addition, the authors noticed obstacles to successful integration within the healthcare
practice. These obstacles affect the security and costs due to time and effort, and may be
induced by relational and educational issues.
Thereafter, Alemán et al. [7] gave a literature review on security and privacy in
EHRs. They selected 49 papers that followed standards or regulations related to privacy
and security of EHRs, and enhanced the promulgation of directives concerning security
and privacy in EHR systems. The authors observed that the most recurrent access control
model is role-based access control (RBAC): 27 papers focus on this model. In addition,
they noticed that the standards and regulations should be further adopted in the existing
access control models and security of EHR-based systems should be enhanced.
More recently, Rezaeibagha et al. [185] reviewed 55 selected studies on security and
privacy in EHRs, published between 1998 and 2013. Highlighted features were system
and application access control, compliance with security requirements, interoperability,
integration and sharing, consent and choice mechanisms, policies and regulation, appli-
cability and scalability and cryptography techniques. The authors noticed the importance
of materials that include mandated access control policies and consent mechanisms that
provide patients’ consent, scalability through proper architecture and frameworks, and in-
teroperability of health information systems, to EHR security and privacy requirements.
1.3.2 Access Control
We enable a user to carry out specific tasks and actions on EHRs by giving him/her ac-
cess to these EHRs. Since EHRs contain sensitive personal information, controlling their
access is crucial. Medical information should be accessible to authorised users as well as
be available when needed in life-critical situations (e.g. emergencies). Along with basic
access controls, various derivatives, such as discretionary access control (DAC), manda-
tory access control (MAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) can be found in the
literature.
Bos [44] first used digital signatures to exchange medical information. Thereafter,
Mavridis et al. [153] proposed a certificate-based encryption (CBE) protocol where the
access to medical data is controlled through a public key setting. Users require their cre-
dentials to access the medical data and receive three certificates, namely identity certifi-
cates for authentication, attribute certificates for authorisation and access-rule certificates
for propagation of access control policy. Meanwhile, Ueckert et al. [220, 219] proposed
granular access control mechanisms where patients grant reading and/or writing access to
their EHRs. A special case of read access is enabled for emergencies. Ruotsalainen [199]
proposed a cross-platform model to allow secure EHR access and sharing. The platform
provides automatic security negotiation services to enable access to EHRs inside con-
nected domains.
Røstad and Edsberg [193] studied the access logs from a EHR system with extensive
use of exception-based access control. The authors observed that exception mechanisms
were used too frequently. They suggested designing a more structured and fine-grained
logging in order to analyse access logs efficiently and to learn how to reduce the need
for exception-based access. Then, Win et al. [238] studied the access control security
of EHR-based systems and recommended users to require PIN, password and credentials
to access these documents. Dekker and Etalle [69] presented an access control system
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where the authentication process is performed in two steps: an authorisation request or an
authentication credential corresponding to a logical formula is first given, and the autho-
risation or authentication decision corresponding to a proof of the formula is then created.
Meantime, France et al. [87] designed an access control protocol to exchange medical
information using digital signatures and electronic identification cards. Al-zharani et al.
[6] gave an EHR access control model such that authentication is possible using digital
signatures, login and password.
Afterwards, Alhaqbani and Fidge [8] reviewed the security models for discretionary
access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC) and role-based access control
(RBAC). By using a case study, they showed that none of the aforementioned access con-
trols is sufficient in a federated healthcare environment, in terms of security data level.
They also demonstrated that this level can be reached by combining the three access con-
trols. In a parallel work, Alhaqbani and Fidge [9] proposed a privacy-preserving access
control system using pseudonym identifiers. Authentication is possible based on digital
signatures and public key infrastructure. A special emergency access policy is agreed
between the patient and health provider.
Later, Benaloh et al. [28] constructed an EHR privacy-preserving access-control
based system. The patients select both their medical documents and the users to share
these documents with. Huang et al. [119] presented a privacy-preserving access con-
trol scheme where authentication is based on digital signatures, logins and passwords.
Narayan et al. [171] used an attribute-based encryption (ABE) framework to implement
a system that preserves EHR privacy. Their system requires mutual user authentication
such that each user is associated with a username that is needed to define the access poli-
cies that are managed by the patients. The patients have the control over the medical
information access and hospital staff members can delegate access to other hospital staff
members.
More recently, Haas et al. [111] designed an access control system where privacy
policies are defined and checked by the patients. Access policies are bypassed in the
case of emergencies. Quantin et al. [182] implemented medical search engines using
pseudonymised patient identity to obtain a distributed database between healthcare insti-
tutions. Jian et al. [125] proposed an access control protocol for Taiwanese patients and
hospital staff members. In order to access their EHRs, the patients are given an initial
password and non-authorised users cannot view the EHRs. Gajanayake et al. [90] com-
bined the four existing access control models (DAC, MAC, RBAC and purpose-based
access control (PBAC)) to obtain a new access control model that satisfies patient privacy
requirements, confidentiality of private information and the need for flexible access for
health professionals for EHRs.
Futhermore, Khan and McKillop [129] suggested a patient-centric access control in
order to enforce patient privacy preferences. Such solution permits medical data ex-
changes across several systems under different administrative domains. The authors ad-
dressed the problem by using logic such that each access control decision taken at system
level can be automated and independently verified for validity and correctness. Flores
Zuniga et al. [86] approached the problem of exchanging medical information by de-
signing an ABE system. Confidentiality of patient information during the exchange of
EHRs among healthcare providers is preserved by reinforcing the access policies, while
non-authorised access to this sensitive information is reduced.
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Role-Based Access Control. One of the methods widely spread in the literature is the
role-based access control (RBAC). Such access control enables the regulation of access to
devices or networks according to the roles of users within an organisation. For instance, in
the EHR-based context, the organisation can be a hospital and roles can be defined based
on the positions in the organisational hierachy including the privileges and responsibilities
within the hospital.
While basic access controls accord and withdraw user access on a rigid and static
basis, RBAC authorises and regulates users to perform tasks and actions, regarding their
roles. Observe that these roles are easily determined, modified or removed with the evo-
lution of the organisation, without the needs to update them for each user.
Motta et al. [165] developed a contextual RBAC authorisation model for EHRs.
This model is based on an organisational role-tree hierarchy that allows authorisation
inheritance, positive and negative authorisations, static and dynamic separation of duties
based on weak and strong role conflicts. Tsiknakis et al. [218] suggested a RBAC system
to securely access and share life-long multimedia EHRs. Meanwhile, Reni et al. [184]
focused on the Italian case for RBAC-based EHR systems. In case of emergencies, a read
only option is available. A chief medical officer (CMO) defines the roles, and patients
and the CMO grant access to EHRs.
Thereafter, Yu and Chekhanovskiy [244] suggested a RBAC protocol using Smart-
Card and EHRs. Authentication is possible using digital signatures and public key infras-
tructure. The patients grant access to their EHRs. In a national context (United Kingdom),
Slevin and Macfie [212] studied the applicability of a RBAC system within an existing
medical database in the Oncology Department at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital in London.
Moreover, Agrawal and Johnson [2] proposed an efficient RBAC system where patients
grant access permissions regarding policies defined by health organisations.
Subsequently, Riedl et al. [191, 190, 189] presented RBAC systems where roles are
defined by health providers and authentication is performed with a security token that
contains the access keys. Bouwman et al. [46] studied right management for EHR sys-
tems based on RBAC. Users are authenticated by their digital certificates. A specific role
is defined for emergencies. Meantime, Røstad [192] presented a RBAC system where
roles are defined in two different ways: either as system roles such as patient, provider, re-
searcher and so on, or as user roles that are determined by the user him/herself. Moreover,
the patients decide which users can access their data. In addition, Kahn and Sheshadri
[128] suggested a RBAC protocol in a digital environment. The roles are determined by
healthcare organisations and include employees, administrative staff, health (medical and
paramedical) staff and information technology (IT) staff. Users are identified individually
before accessing medical information. Choe and Yoo [61] suggested a multi-agent archi-
tecture based on web services as a RBAC and exchange of the medical information. Each
hospital has the capability to define its own security policies and assign roles.
Later, Daglish and Archer [67] reviewed the security and privacy problems in access
control-based systems. They gave RBAC schemes where roles are given beforehand to
users. The patients are able to refine roles’ definitions and the access to their data. Two
access control methods are suggested: either authentication through physical location or
combination of web and trusted organisations’ certificate. Van der Linden et al. [222]
gave a inter-organisational RBAC protocol. They assumed that either patients implicitly
give their consent for access permissions or they explicitly determine which users cannot
access their EHRs.
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Then, Elger et al. [76] focused on the case of secondary, cross-institutional clinical re-
search and proposed authentication through tokens in their RBAC. Hembroff and Muftic
[113] implemented a RBAC system called SAMSON (secure access for medical smart
cards over networks). Authentication is done given a health card PIN and the patient’s
fingerprint. They also adapted their scheme in case of emergencies: the access is allowed
by using a PIN of a staff member’s card as well as the patient’s fingerprint. Moreover,
Zhang and Liu [248] presented a RBAC system such that roles are related to the position
of the hospital staff members. The use of anonymous digital credentials allows users to be
authenticated for accessing medical information stored on cloud servers. Data exchange
is done through secure connection, such as SSL (secure sockets layer), TLS (transport
layer security) or IPsec (internet protocol security). Sun and Fang [216] proposed a dis-
tributed EHR system based on RBAC where roles are defined regarding the hospital staff
members’ positions and are used for access delegation, and based on proxy signature to
achieve fine-grained access control. Meanwhile, Al Faresi et al. [5] gave a RBAC pro-
tocol created regarding the HIPAA privacy regulations. EHR access is managed by the
patients and patients’ access preferences may be controlled by medical and paramedical
staff members. Ardagna et al. [11] designed a RBAC system such that access control is
done using policy spaces. The patients are able to access their EHRs as well as to manage
the access control by a notification mechanism. Access control models are bypassed in
case of emergencies. Jafari et al. [121] constructed a scheme based on RBAC and licenses
that indicate access permissions. Roles comprise leader, researcher and assistant. Patients
must consent to give their medical information for research purposes. In addition, Su-
curovic [215, 214] designed a hierarchical RBAC protocol that allows decomposition of
policy engines into components. Authentication and authorisation are done through digi-
tal signatures, public key certificate and RSA cryptosystem. There are several hierarchies,
such as of roles, professions, regions, and so on.
Afterwards, Neubauer and Heurix [172] presented a RBAC scheme where authen-
tication is done through login and password and roles are defined beforehand. Patients
fully control their EHRs since they are able to create data access authorisations and grant
full access rights. Horvath et al. [116] designed the DEDUCE guided query tool based
on RBAC. Roles are established in the EHR system beforehand. Their tool authenticates
users using Microsoft Active Directory accounts. Moreover, Lemaire et al. [138] created
a RBAC system to handle the situation of accessing medical information of patients with
traumatic brain injury. Roles are defined in the EHR system beforehand and certificate
authentication is performed upon log-in.
Recently, Zhang et al. [249] presented a role-based and time-bound access control
model (RBTBAC). This model embeds a privacy-aware and dynamic-key structure focus-
ing on the consistency of access authorisation (including data and time interval) with the
activated role of user, that enables a role-based privacy-aware access and the management
of EHR data. It also uses a time-tree method for generating time granule values, offering
fine granularity of time-bound access authorisation and control.
Situation-Based Access Control. Pelega et al. [178] defined a new access control
model called situation-based access control (SitBAC). This model comprises scenarios
where patients data access is permitted or denied, by using an object process method-
ology. The situation-based model creates a pattern consisting of the following users and
their features: data requestor, patient, EHRs, access task, legal authorisation and response,
along with their properties and relations.
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1.3.3 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing in an EHR-based context is an important topic since the medical records
are in the process of being stored digitally on cloud servers. Cloud-based EHRs enable
medical information to be stored externally to the hospital’s IT infrastructure and shared
and updated by users from any location. Compared with traditional EHR storage systems
cloud computing promises higher levels of availability and accessibility. The EHRs are
practically available and accessible to all users all the time.
Jafari et al. [122] proposed a patient-centric digital rights management protocol that
protects the privacy of the EHRs stored on a cloud storage from the service provider.
Meanwhile, Stingl and Slamanig [211] approached the issue of storing highly sensitive
health data in the cloud and protecting patients’ privacy based on anonymous communi-
cation and authentication, anonymous yet authorised transactions, and pseudonymisation
of databases.
Then, Huang et al. [118] combined identity-based encryption (IBE) and attribute-
based encryption (ABE) to obtain a cloud computing based system that satisfies data
privacy, fine-grained access control and scalable access between different clouds. The au-
thors also overcame the issue of improper data access caused by a user with multiple roles
and access rights to an EHR. Chen et al. [58] presented a system in healthcare clouds to
enable sharing and integration of EHR information, and so provide professional medical
programs with consultancy, evaluation, and tracing services and improve accessibility to
the public receiving medical services or medical information at remote sites. Meantime,
Chen and Hsieh [56] suggested a solution to support patient-controlled encryption and
privacy-preserving keyword search. They combined ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE)
and public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) schemes to implement their so-
lution satisfying patients’ concerns in security, privacy and trust. Furthermore, Chen et
al. [57] proposed a patient-centered access control in a cloud computing environments in
order to store, access and share personal medical records. The authors constructed their
scheme using the Lagrange interpolation polynomial framework and proved it flexible
and secure. Their protocol effectively corresponds to real-time appending and deleting
user access authorisation and appending and revising EHRs. Wu et al. [240] suggested
a systematic access control mechanism to support selective sharing of composite EHRs
aggregated from various healthcare providers in clouds. The authors ensured that pri-
vacy concerns are accommodated for processing access requests to patients’ healthcare
information in their system.
Thereafter, Singh et al. [210] proposed a trusted based dynamic reputation system
that restricts the access of sensitive medical data stored on the cloud. This system follows
ABE framework. Li et al. [144] exploited the cloud-based multi-authority ABE primitive
to allow dynamic modification of access policies or file attributes, supports efficient on-
demand user/attribute revocation and break-glass access under emergency scenarios. In
particular, the authors focused on the multiple data owner scenario, and divided the users
in the EHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key manage-
ment complexity for owners and users.
More recently, Wang et al. [231] presented a new model for cloud computing, called
fair remote retrieval (FRR) and based on fair multi-member key exchange and homomor-
phic privately verifiable tags. This model allows fairly retrieving encrypted private medi-
cal records outsourced to remote untrusted cloud servers in the case of medical accidents
and disputes. The FRR construction is proved secure in the random oracle model.
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1.3.4 Architecture
Van der Haak et al. [221] developed and implemented a cross-institutional architecture
for EHRs in a national context (Germany). The authors first identified the specific legal
requirements concerning data security and data protection of patient health data. Then,
Aljarullah and El-Masri [10] proposed an EHR system for a national integration. Their
system is implemented following a semi-centralised approach as an intermediate solution
between the centralised architecture and the distributed architecture that has the benefits
of both approaches. Khan and Sakamura [130] developed a robust authentication scheme
and a hybrid access control model for healthcare informatics following the fact that au-
thentication is an indispensable precursor to access control. Later, Bouhaddou et al. [45]
focused their study in the particular example of the US department of veterans affairs
(VA) such that a formal organisation within VA is responsible for helping to develop and
implement standards. The authors reviewed the adoption of four standards in the cate-
gories of security and privacy, terminology, health information exchange, and modelling
tools. More recently, Murray et al. [166] studied insurance portability and use of national
guidelines for electronic health communication in a national context (United States).
1.4 Research Questions
We now present our research questions that will be solved through this thesis.
Broadcasting and Sharing Electronic Health Records among the Involved Users. How
to enable a user to broadcast a medical document and share it with other users (pos-
sibly pre-authorised) without having to upload it to a cloud server? To be more
precise, we want this user to be able to send an encrypted medical document to
multiple recipients (broadcasting) without needing to upload it to a cloud server,
and we want to ensure that only some of these recipients (authorised in any way by
the sender) can successfully recover the medical document in plain (sharing).
The user can be either a patient that wants to share his/her EHR with his/her clin-
ician, or can be a practitioner that wants to share medical documents with related
patients and colleagues, or any other member of the hospital staff that needs to share
medical information with other users.
Noting that sharing medical documents containing sensitive information must be
done securely: we do not wish a non-authorised user to get any information about
the contents. Broadcasting should also be carefully executed: if we wish to send the
encrypted documents to a broad range of recipients, then the authorised ones should
be able to successfully recover the data in plain, while the non-authorised ones must
not learn anything about the data (except perhaps who the authorised users are).
Accessing and Retrieving Electronic Health Records from Data Storage Servers. How
to allow a user to access and retrieve a medical document stored on a cloud server,
where the medical document has been encrypted by someone else? More precisely,
we want a user that asks for a medical document encrypted and stored on a cloud
server to be able to get access to it and to obtain the plain version. Moreover, the
cloud server should easily and quickly find the requested medical document.
The user can be either a patient that wishes access to his/her EHR, or a practitioner
that needs to get access to medical documents, or any other member of the hospital
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staff that requires access to the medical information.
The medical documents are encrypted by the hospital staff members or the patients,
and stored on a cloud server. Browsing all the documents to find the one that is re-
quested is a burden, even if we can assume that the cloud server has huge resources
to store and search. Imagine that the cloud server has to check the medical doc-
uments that it stores one by one until it finds the one than the user has requested.
This situation needs to be avoided and a solution enabling efficient search must be
found.
Ensuring Patient Privacy and Saving Resources in Electronic Health Records-based
Storage using Limited Resource Devices and Tools. How to ensure identity pri-
vacy and data privacy of encrypted documents stored on a cloud server, while sav-
ing resources? To be more precise, we want to ensure that the privacy regarding
the identity of the patient and the contents of his/her EHR are preserved while the
EHR is stored on a cloud server. Meeting this requirement could have a significant
computation and communications cost and we wish to keep it minimal.
The user can be either a patient that wants his/her identity and data not leaked to
a non-authorised user, or a practitioner that manipulates medical documents and
wishes to protect patients’ and colleagues’ privacy, or any other member of the
hospital staff that requires to preserve the user identity and data privacy.
Observe that enhancing privacy in EHR systems leads to an increased workload.
Moreover, we have to keep in mind that involved users might have limited comput-
ing and communications resources. A patient may have an old or low end personal
device with limited storage or processing power or have a low bandwidth internet
connection. Hospitals too can be constrained with communications infrastructure
and some users have limited IT literacy. The tools must solve the identity and data
privacy requirements whilst being easy to use and not requiring excessive resources.
Managing Electronic Health Records in Cloud Computing. How to allow a user to
easily manage his/her medical documents stored on a cloud server? To be more
precise, we want a user to be able to upload all his/her medical data to a cloud
server, and be easily able to change it over time (by adding, deleting or modifying
documents), while ensuring their integrity.
The user can be either a patient with an EHR, or a practitioner with professional
and personal medical documents, or any other member of the hospital staff with
administrative, financial or health documents. To save resources, encryption can be
avoided and so, medical information is stored in plain on the cloud server.
In addition, the user might need to add, delete and modify parts of the stored med-
ical documents. If the user had to download all the medical documents from the
cloud server in order to do this operation and then re-upload all of them, this pro-
cess is cumbersome and inefficient.
In order to confirm that the cloud server has stored the data as expected, the owner
should be able to check its integrity. An audit process can be employed to achieve
this but requires significant computation and communications resources. In many
cases a third party, rather than the hospital, will best be able to do this. Note that
we do not wish this external party to learn any information about the medical infor-
mation stored on the cloud server.
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1.5 Contributions
Firstly, in order to securely and efficiently broadcast and share EHRs between the hos-
pital and the medical staff members, there are two solutions. The first one is to send
the encrypted medical document individually to each recipient, in this case the medical
document is encrypted with the public key of each recipient which allows him/her to re-
cover the medical document in plain by using his/her corresponding private key. Observe
that this process is cumbersome and inefficient. With the second solution the encryptor
chooses a public key and encrypts the medical document and then forwards to all recipi-
ents. The encryptor then gives the corresponding private key to users that s/he authorises.
Note that sending a public and private key pair that is common to several users is not
particularly secure. In addition, the encryptor has to generate a public and private key
pair each time that a medical document has to be encrypted and shared, and this makes
the process onerous. We propose new solutions by designing the following cryptographic
primitives.
Broadcast Encryption with Membership. A medical institute acting as a group man-
ager and a broadcaster, computes the public and private key pairs for all hospital
staff members. Then, a hospital chooses a group G of hospital staff members and
delivers a token P(G) to the medical institute. The medical institute uses P(G) to
compute a ciphertext C that encrypts a medical document for group G, and forwards
it to the hospital staff members. A hospital staff member can recover the medical
document if and only if s/he belongs to G.
We observe the following features:
• the medical institute delivers the public and private key pairs;
• some (possibly all) hospital staff members belong to a group G chosen by the
hospital;
• the token P(G) is computed on input G, although P(G) hides G from the
medical institute’s view;
• the medical institute is not aware of the chosen group G, but encrypts medical
information according to it by using the token P(G) provided by the hospital;
• only hospital staff members belonging to the group G and using the private
key can correctly recover the data.
Certificate-Based Broadcast Encryption. A hospital acting as a broadcaster, encrypts
some medical information according to a group G of hospital staff members that it
has selected, and forwards it to all hospital staff members. A medical institute and
other health legislators (such as the government for instance) acting as certifiers,
deliver certificates (seen as licenses) to the hospital staff members. A hospital staff
member can recover the medical information if and only if his/her certificate is valid
at the time of the decryption process and s/he belongs to the group G determined
by the hospital.
We observe the following features:
• the health legislators deliver the certificates, such as each legislator generates
and returns a unique certificate to each medical staff member;
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• the hospital encrypts the medical information according to a group G of hos-
pital staff members, and forwards the resulting ciphertext to all hospital staff
members;
• only hospital staff members that are authorised by the hospital (meaning that
they belong to G) and that hold certificates valid at the current time, can re-
cover the medical information.
Secondly, in order to securely and efficiently access and retrieve EHRs stored on
cloud servers, we propose the following cryptographic primitive.
Certificate-Based Encryption with Keyword Search. A medical institute acting as a
certifier, first generates certificates for all hospital staff members. It also computes
update keys according to groups of hospital staff members, such that only a hos-
pital staff member belonging to a specified group can successfully refresh his/her
certificate. These certificates contain labels that can be seen as a description of the
access rights given to the hospital staff members.
The hospital encrypts medical information and uploads the resulting ciphertexts to
a cloud server. For each encrypted document, the hospital chooses a keyword that
can be seen as a summary of the contents of the document, encrypts it and appends
the resulting ciphertext to the encrypted document.
When a hospital staff member wants to retrieve a document, s/he sends a request
to the cloud server in the form of a trapdoor that was generated with a keyword
and his/her most refreshed certificate (that encrypts a valid label). The cloud server
checks that the keyword and the label embedded into the trapdoor match the key-
word appended to the encrypted document and the current label that it sustains.
We observe the following features:
• the medical institute delivers the certificates to all hospital staff members;
• each hospital staff member encrypts medical documents, and has to append
an encrypted keyword component to each of them, the keyword acting as a
description of the document contents;
• the cloud server on behalf of the hospital stores a current label regarding cur-
rent law, administrative and financial situations;
• a hospital staff member has to provide a trapdoor containing a keyword and
a valid certificate (embedding a label) in order to access and retrieve medical
information.
Then, in order to securely and efficiently ensure patient privacy and save computa-
tional and communications resources in EHR-based storage, while these resources are
limited, we propose the following cryptographic primitives.
On-line/Off-line Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption. The med-
ical institute acting as a certifier, generates the public and private key pairs for all
hospital staff members. The hospital pre-encrypts a patient EHR with some creden-
tials that results in an intermediate ciphertext IntC. Note that this step can be done
off-line, and so can be executed at any time. Then, it uploads IntC to a cloud server
acting as a proxy.
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Later, this patient comes to the hospital for either an emergency or a check-up visit.
Once a patient has decided which requirements the practitioner needs to satisfy,
s/he sends a re-encryption key rk to the cloud server containing the credentials
corresponding to these requirements. The cloud server re-encrypts IntC with these
credentials and results in a final ciphertext C. Finally, a hospital staff member
can recover the medical document if and only if his/her credentials match the ones
embedded into C, and so s/he is authorised to meet the patient. This step is done
on-line; however, it does not need many resources from the patient.
We observe the following features:
• the medical institute delivers the public and private key pairs to all hospital
staff members;
• each hospital staff member can upload a patient EHR to the server, encrypted
beforehand with some credentials such that encryption is available off-line;
• the patient can finalise the encryption on-line by specifying the credentials
that s/he wants the recipient to satisfy;
• the cloud server is not fully trusted: it can re-encrypt the uploaded encrypted
document, possibly with other credentials than the ones used for the first en-
cryption. However, it should obtain neither information about the contents of
the encrypted document nor information about the credentials.
Ciphertext-Policy DNA-Based Encryption. In order to design this primitive, we turn
towards encryption (public) and decryption (private) keys using natural features that
rely on both uniqueness and closeness. We offer a tool easy to find (since it does
already exist), that is unique for each user but can be close enough to someone else’s
tool. More precisely, this tool is based on DNA sequences. Except for twins and
other specific cases, each user has his/her own DNA sequence, that is a combination
of his/her mother’s DNA sequence and his/her father’s DNA sequence. This means
that the DNA sequence of a given user is unique but is closely related to his/her
parents’ DNA sequences. Even if this primitive applies for really specific situations,
we include it here since it does satisfy the privacy-preserving and resource-saving
requirements arisen above.
A patient, Alice, encrypts a medical document in a particular way, using her DNA
sequence and uploads the resulting ciphertext C to a cloud server acting as a proxy.
The server has to keep C on its local storage until a token is released (for instance, as
soon as Alice becomes unable to proceed by herself). When this happens, the cloud
server forwards the ciphertext C to the patient Charles, Alice’s son. Charles uses
his DNA sequence (close enough to Alice’s one) to retrieve the medical document.
We observe the following features:
• the DNA sequence satisfies the properties of uniqueness and closeness: each
user has his/her own DNA sequence (except for twins) while this is close
enough to his/her relatives;
• the medical document cannot be retrieved if the DNA sequence of the decryp-
tor is not close enough to the DNA sequence of the encryptor (a closeness
metric has to be defined);
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• the cloud server should not obtain any information on the data that it is storing
and on the identities of the encryptor and the decryptor.
Finally, in order to securely and efficiently manage EHRs in cloud computing, we
propose the following cryptographic primitive.
Dynamic Provable Data Possession with Public Verifiability and Data Privacy. The hos-
pital staff members upload the medical information in plain to a cloud server. They
can easily add, delete and modify contents without retrieving all the docuemts by
requesting the cloud server to process the data operations. A third party auditor
(TPA) is required to regularly verify that the cloud server does not misbehave and
correctly stores the medical information. To make the audit possible, the hospital
staff member who uploaded a document to the cloud server, generates a verification
metadata and appends it to this document. Using both the document and the cor-
responding verification metadata, the cloud server can prove that it properly stores
this document when it is challenged by the TPA on behalf of the medical staff mem-
ber. We require that no information on the stored data is leaked to the TPA when
the TPA is auditing the cloud server.
We observe the following features:
• the medical information is stored in plain on the cloud server, along with a
verification metadata that is used to check that the cloud server correctly stores
the medical information;
• the medical information does not need to be downloaded from the cloud server
and then entirely re-uploaded when a staff medical member wants to add,
delete or modify some contents;
• the cloud server is not fully trusted: a TPA audits it to verify that it correctly
stores the medical information and has correctly done the data operations re-
quested by the hospital staff members.
• the TPA is not fully trusted: we must avoid that the TPA obtains some infor-




N denotes the set of natural numbers {1,2, · · ·} and Z denotes the set of integers {· · · ,−2,
−1,0,1,2, · · ·}. Zp refers to the set {0, · · · , p−1} and Z∗p is the set {k|1≤ k≤ p and gcd(k,
p)= 1}, i.e. the set of positive integers smaller than or equal to p and relatively prime to p.
When p is a prime, we get that Z∗p = {1, · · · , p−1}. [1,n] denotes the set {1,2, · · · ,n} of
natural numbers smaller than or equal to n∈N. [1,n) denotes the set {1,2, · · · ,n}\{n}=
{1,2, · · · ,n−1} of natural numbers smaller than n ∈N. Given a,b ∈N, the notation a | b
denotes a divides b, meaning that there is an element c ∈ N such that a · c = b. On the
other side, the notation a - b says that a does not divide b.
The security parameter is denoted by λ ∈ N. If S is a set (possibly called a group),
then |S| is its cardinality. If S is a non-empty set, then we can write a ∈ S to mean that is
an element belonging to S. Generally, given a set S with identity element 1S, we let S∗ be
the set S\{1S}. If s1,s2 ∈ {0,1}∗ are strings, then s1||s2 ∈ {0,1}∗ is the concatenation of
binary strings s1 and s2.
A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm will be named in short as PPT algorithm.
If S is a non-empty set, then x ∈R S denotes that x has been randomly and uniformly
chosen in S. Additionally, if Alg is an (PPT) algorithm, then x← Alg( ) means that Alg
has been executed on some specified inputs and its (random) output has been assigned
to the variable x. In the security proofs, we denote by A a PPT adversary that wants to
break the security of a given scheme, while we denote by B the challenger that interacts
with A with goal to break the related security problem.
Let O be the notation to sort algorithms by how they respond to changes in input size
when analysising them. A function g(·) written inside the notation O(·) is selected to be
as simple as possible, omitting constant factors and lower order terms. Let f and g be
two functions defined on some subset of the real numbers. We write f (x) = O(g(x)) as
x→∞, if and only if there is a positive constant c such that for all sufficiently large values
of x, the absolute value of f (x) is at most c multiplied by the absolute value of g(x). More
precisely, f (x) = O(g(x)) if and only if there exists a positive real number c and a real
number x0 such that
| f (x)| ≤ c|g(x)| for all x≥ x0.
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In the protocol constructions, we let g be an element of the multiplicative cyclic group
G1 of prime order p when considering symmetric pairings, while we let g1,g2 be elements
of the multiplicative groups G1 and G2 of prime order p when considering asymmetric
pairings. If < g >= G1, we say that g generates the group G1, such that< g > is the
cyclic subgroup of the powers of g and so, G1 is a cyclic group. Saying that an element g
generates a group G1 is equivalent in saying that < g > equals the entire group G1. For
a finite group G1 of order p as we consider, it is also equivalent to say that g has order
|G1|= p.
An exponential function is a function of the form f (x) = ax, in which the input vari-
able x occurs as an exponent. The natural exponential function exp(·) maps x to the value








The logarithm is the inverse operation to exponentiation, such that the logarithm of a num-
ber is the exponent to which another fixed value, the base, must be raised to produce that
number. More precisely, the logarithm of x to base a, denoted as loga(x), is the unique
real number y such that ay = x. We simply denote by log(·) the natural logarithmic func-
tion log2(·) of base 2. Therefore, for any real value x, we have the following property:
exp(log(x)) = log(exp(x)) = x.
Let M be a matrix with l rows and n columns, such that l,n ≥ 1. Let mi, j be the
elements of the matrix M, for i ∈ [1, l] and j ∈ [1,n]. We let MT denote the transpose
of the matrix M, such that MT has n rows and l columns. Let mTj,i be the elements of
the matrix MT , for i ∈ [1, l] and j ∈ [1,n]. Therefore, for all i, j ∈ [1, l]× [1,n], we have
mTj,i = mi, j.
2.2 Mathematical Tools
In this section, we define the mathematical concepts that base our cryptosystems and their
security. Mathematical notions include group theory and number theory.
2.2.1 Groups
A group is a set G along with an operation ·, that we call the group law of G, that combines
any two elements g and h to create another element that we denote g · h. We sometimes
write this element gh for short. The pair of set and operation (G, ·) must satisfy the
follwoing group axioms to be a group:
1. Closure: For all elements g,h ∈G, the result of the operation g ·h is also in the set
G.
2. Associativity: For all elements g,h1,h2 ∈G, (g ·h1) ·h2 = g · (h1 ·h2).
3. Identity Element: There exists 1G ∈G such that for every element g ∈G, the equa-
tion 1G ·g = g ·1G = g holds. This elements 1G is unique.
4. Inverse Element: For every g∈G, there exists an element h∈G, denoted g−1, such
that g ·h = h ·g = 1G, where 1G is the identity element.
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In some group (G, ·), another property may be met: for all elements g,h ∈ G, the
equation g · h = h · g holds. This property is called commutativity. Groups for which the
commutativity equation g ·h = h ·g always holds are called abelian groups. Observe that
the equation g · h = h · g may not be true since the result of an operation may depend on
the order of the operands: the result of combining an element g with an element h may
not yield the same result as combining the element h with the element g.
The set G is called the underlying set of the group (G, ·). We use the underlying set
G as a short name for the group (G, ·).
Bijection
A bijection is a mapping that is both one-to-one (called an injection) and onto (called a
surjection). This means that a bijection is a function which relates each element of a set S
(called the domain) to a separate and distinct element of another set S′ (called the range),
where each element in S′ also has a corresponding element in S.
Homomorphisms and Variants
Let two groups be (G1, ·) and (G2,∗). A group homomorphism from (G1, ·) to (G2,∗)
is a function η : G1→G2 such that, for all g,h ∈G1, we get that η(g ·h) = η(g)∗η(h)
where the group operation on the left hand side of the equation is that of G1 and on the
right hand side that of G2.
From this property, one can deduce that η maps the identity element 1G1 of G1
to the identity element 1G2 of G2, and it also maps inverses to inverses as follows:
η(g−1) = η(g)−1. Therefore, η is saied to be compatible with the group structure.
An endomorphism is a homomorphism from a mathematical object to itself. For
instance, an endomorphism of a group G is a group homomorphism η : G→ G. An
isomorphism is a homomorphism that admits an inverse. Two mathematical objects are
isomorphic if an isomorphism exists between them. An automorphism is an isomorphism
whose domain and range coincide. For instance, an isomorphism a group homomorphism
η : G1→G2 such that η is a bijective function, an automorphism is a group G is a group
homomorphism η : G→G such that η is a bijective function.
Consequences of the Group Axioms
Uniqueness of the Identity Element and Inverses. Two consequences of the group
axioms are the uniqueness of the identity element 1G and the uniqueness of inverse ele-
ments. There is only one identity element in a group, and each element in a group has
exactly one inverse element.
We now prove the uniqueness of an inverse element of g as follows. We suppose that
g has two inverses h1 and h2 in a group (G, ·). Using the group axioms 2, 3 and 4,
h1 = h1 ·1G = h1 · (g ·h2) = (h1 ·g) ·h2 = 1G ·h2 = h2.
Thus, there is only one inverse element of g. Similarly, we prove that the identity element
of a group is unique by assuming that (G, ·) is a group with two identity elements 1(1)G and
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Group Action. If (G, ·) is a group and S is a set, then a (left) group action φG,S of G on
S is a function
φG,S : G×S → S
(g,x) → φG,S(g,x) = g · x
that satisfies the two following axioms:
1. Identity: For all x ∈ S, 1G · x.
2. Compatibility: For all g,h ∈G, for all x ∈ S, (g ·h) · x = g · (h · x).
The group (G, ·) is said to act on S on the left. The set S is called a left G-set.
From the two axioms, we get that for every g ∈ G, the function which maps x ∈ S
to g · x is a bijective map from S to S. The inverse of this function is the function which
maps x to g−1 · x. Hence, another definition of a group action of G on S is as a group
homomorphism from G into the symmetric group Sym(S) of all the bijections from S to
S.
In a similar way, we can define a right group action of G on S as an operation S×G→
S mapping (x,g) to x ·g and satisfying the two following axioms:
1. Identity: For all x ∈ S, x ·1G.
2. Compatibility: For all g,h ∈G, for all x ∈ S, x · (g ·h) = (x ·g) ·h.
The difference between left and right actions is in the order in which a product like g · h
acts on x. For a left action, h acts first and is followed by g, while for a right action, g acts
first and is followed by h. Because of the formula (g ·h)−1 = h−1 ·g−1, we can construct
a left action from a right action by composing with the inverse operation of the group.
Moreover, a right action of G on S is the same thing as a left action of its opposite group
Gop on S. Thus, it is sufficient to only consider left actions without any loss of generality.
Division. In a group (G, ·), the invertibility of the group action means that division is
possible: given two elements g,h∈G, there is exactly one solution g1 ∈G to the equation
g1 ·g= h. More precisely, multiplying the equation on its right side with the inverse g−1 of
the element g gives g1 = g1 ·g ·g−1 = h ·g−1. In the same way, there is exactly one solution
g2 ∈ G to the equation g · g2 = h, and so g2 = g−1 · h. If the operation · is commutative,
then we get that g1 = g2. If the operation · is not commutative, then we may get that g1
and g2 are not equal.
Therefore, multiplying by a group element g is a bijection. Specifically, if g ∈ G,
then there is a bijection from G to itself called left translation byg sending h ∈G to g ·h.
Similarly, right translation by g is a bijection from G to itself sending h to h · g. If G is
abelian, then left and right translations by a group element are the same.
2.2.2 Elliptic Curves
We start by considering elliptic curves over real numbers. In this case, an elliptic curve E
is a plane curve given by an equation of the form y2 = x3 +Ax+B for some real numbers
A,B. Such equation is called a Weierstrass equation.
To ensure that the elliptic curve is non-singular, the discriminant ∆ = 4 ·A3 +27 ·B2
should be non-zero. In other words, the polynomial P(x) = x3+Ax+B has distinct roots.
A non-singular elliptic curve means that the graph has neither cusps nor self-intersections
nor isolated points.
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Field
A field is a set K that is a commutative group with respect to two compatible operations,
usually called addition and multiplication (where ”compatible” is formalized by the prop-
erty of distributivity) and denoted + and · respectively, and such that the additive identity
element 0 and the multiplicative identity element 1 have to be distinct.
• Closure of K under addition and multiplication: For all A,B ∈ K, both A+B and
A ·B are in K (meaning that + and · are binary operations on K).
• Associativity of addition and multiplication: For all A,B,C ∈K, we get the follow-
ing: A+(B+C) = (A+B)+C and A · (B ·C) = (A ·B) ·C.
• Commutativity of addition and multiplication: For all A,B ∈K, we get the follow-
ing: A+B = B+A and A ·B = B ·A.
• Existence of additive and multiplicative identity elements: There exists an element
of K, called the additive identity element 0, such that for all A in K, A+0 = A. In
addition, there is an element, called the multiplicative identity element 1, such that
for all A in K, A ·1 = A. Note that the additive identity element and the multiplica-
tive identity element are required to be distinct.
• Existence of additive inverses and multiplicative inverses: For every A ∈ K, there
exists an element−A in K such that A+(−A) = 0. Similarly, for any A∈K, A 6= 0,
there exists an element A−1 in K such that A ·A−1 = 1. The elements A+(−B) and
A ·B−1 are also denoted A−B and A/B, respectively, meaning that subtraction and
division operations exist.
• Distributivity of multiplication over addition: For all A,B,C ∈ K, we get the fol-
lowing: A · (B+C) = (A ·B)+(A ·C).
A field is thus an algebraic structure (K,+, ·,−,−1 ,0,1) consisting of two abelian groups
that are K under (+,−,0) and K\{0} under (·,−1 ,1) such that 0 6= 1 and with · distribut-
ing over +.
Group Law
We first define a group structure on a smooth cubic curve in the projective plane. We
consider two cases: the cubic curve is in Weierstrass normal form or is not.
First Case. The cubic curve in Weierstrass normal form has an additional point at infinity
1 which serves as the identity element of the group. Thus, the elliptic curve E is the
set E = {(x,y) : y2 = x3 +Ax+B}∪{1}.
Since the curve E is symmetrical about the x-axis, for any point g1, we say that g−11
is the point opposite it. For the point at infinity, we assume that 1 = 1−1.
Let g1 and g2 be two points on the curve E. Thus, we can get a unique third point
g1 · g2 as follows. Firstly, we draw a live between the two points g1 and g2. By
doing so, the cubic is generally intersected at a third point g3. Then, we let g1 · g2
to be g−13 , i.e. the point opposite g3.
Now, let one of the two points be the point at infinity 1. Therefore, we define
g1 ·1 = g1 = 1 ·g1 and so, 1 is the identity element of the group. We now consider
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that g1 and g2 are opposites of each other, and we define g1 · g2 = 1. In addition,
if g1 = g2, then we have only one point, meaning that we cannot define the line
between g1 and g2. Instead, we need the tangent line to the curve at the point
g1 = g2. Observe that in general, the tangent intersects a second point g3, and as
above, we can use its opposite g−13 . Nevertheless, when g1 is an inflection point
(that is, a point where the concavity of the curve changes), we have to take g3 to be
g1 and so, g1 ·g1 is the point opposite it.
Second Case. The cubic curve not in Weierstrass normal form can still have a group
structure defined by designating one of its nine inflection points as the identity
element 1. In the projective plane, each line will intersect a cubic at three points
when accounting for multiplicity. For instance, given a point g1, the opposite g−11
is defined as the unique third point passing through the identity element 1 and g1.
Therefore, given any two points g1 and g2 of the curve E, the point g1 ·g2 is defined
as g−13 such that g3 is the unique third point on the line containing both g1 and g2.
Let K be a field and let E be the curve defined on K. This means that the equation
y2 = x3+Ax+B of the curve E has coefficients A and B in K. Thus, the K-rational points
of E are the points on E whose coordinates are in K, including the point at infinity 1. Let
the set of the K-rational points be denoted as E(K). This set forms a group; indeed, one
can show that if g1 is in E(K), then g−11 is also in E(K), and if two points in {g1,g2,g3}
are in E(K), then the third one is in E(K) too. Morevoer, if K is a subfield of K′, then
E(K) is a subgroup of E(K′).
The above group E(K) can also be described as follows. Let the curve E be of
equation y2 = x3 +Ax+B over the field K, such that the characteristic is assumed to be
neither 2 nor 3, and let two points be g1 with coordinates (x1,y1 and g2 with coordinates
(x2,y2 on the curve E. We first assume that x1 6= x2. Let h be the slope of the line
containing g1 and g2, then we get that h =
y1−y2
x1−x2 . Note that h is well defined because K is
supposed to be a field. Let us define g3 with coordinates (x3,y3) be equal to (g1 ·g2)−1 as
follows:
x3 = h2− x1− x2
y3 = y1 +h(x3− x1)
On the other side, if x1 = x2, then
• if y1 =−y2 (that includes the case y1 = y2 = 1), then g3 is defined as 1 and so, the
inverse of each point on the curve E is found by reflecting it across the x-axis;







y3 = y1 +h(x3− x1)
The Group E(Fq)
A prime field Fq, for a prime number q, is a finite field of order q and easily constructed
as the integers modulo q. More precisely, we can represent the elements of Fq by the
integers in the range 0, · · · ,q−1.
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We observe that the group E(Fq) is a finite group since points on E have coordinates
in Fq.
Theorems. We first recall three theorems before going forward. The first one was es-
tablished by Poincaré: Let K be a field. We suppose that an elliptic curve E is given by an
equation of the form y2 = x3 +Ax+B with A,B ∈ K. Let E(K) denote the set of points
of E with coordinates in K, i.e. E(K) = {(x,y) ∈ E : x,y ∈ K}∪ {1}. Then E(K) is a
subgroup of the group of all points of E.
The second theorem is the following: Working over a finite field, the group of points
E(Fq) is always either a cyclic group or the product of two cyclic groups.
A third theorem enunciated by Hasse precises: Let E be an elliptic curve given by an
equation of the form E : y2 = x3+Ax+B with A,B∈ Fq. Then |#E(Fq)−(q+1)| ≤ 2√q.
Consequences. The group E(Fq) has no more than 2q+ 1 points. More precisely, for
each x ∈ Fq, the value of f (x) = x3 + Ax + B is a square in F∗q with probability 1/2.
In addition, if f (x) = y2 is a square, then two points (x,y) and (x,−y) can be found in
E(Fq). We recall that the point 1 at infinity belongs to E(Fq) too. Therefore, E(Fq)
roughly contains #E(Fq)' 12 ·2 ·q+1 = q+1 points.
2.2.3 Weil Pairing
The Weil pairing is a mapping that is efficiently computable using Miller’s algorithm
[160], and thus suitable for designing cryptosystems. Such algorithm works for super-
singular elliptic curves defined over a prime field Fq with q > 3. We note that the curve
y2 = x3+1 over Fq with q= 2 mod 3 is an example of these supersingular elliptic curves.
What is stated below can be generalized to other elliptic curves. Follow some prop-
erties about these curves [209]:
1. Let q > 3 and n|q+1. A supersingular curve E/Fq contains q+1 points in Fq. Let
1 be the point at infinity. The group of points over Fq forms a cyclic group of order
q+1. Let g ∈ E(Fq) be a point of order p.
2. The group of points E(Fq2) contains a point h of order p such that h is linearly
independent of the points in E(Fq). Therefore, E(Fq2) contains a subgroup that is
isomorphic to the group Z2p. The group is generated by g ∈ E(Fq) and h ∈ E(Fq2).
Let this group be denoted E[p].
Then, GT denotes the subgroup of F∗q2 of order p. The Weil pairing e that we consider
maps pairs of points in E[p] to GT : we can write e : E[p]×E[p]→ GT [135]. Let g and
h be two points in E(F2q).
Divisors. A divisor is a formal sum of points on the curve E(F2q). Let a divisor be
defined as D = ∑g dg(g) where dg ∈ Z and g ∈ E(F2q). In particular, D = 3(g1)−2(g2)−
(g3) is a divisor. In our case, divisors D = ∑g dg(g) such that ∑g dg = 0 are considered.
Functions. A function f on the curve E(F2q) can be seen as a rational function f (x,y) ∈
F2q(x,y). For any point g = (x,y) ∈ E(F2q), we write f (g) = f (x,y).
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Divisors of functions. Given a function f on the curve E(F2q), its divisor is defined as
( f ) = ∑g ordg( f ) · (g). Note that ordg( f ) denotes the order of the zero that f gets at the
point g.
In particular, if ax+by+ c = 0 is the line passing through the points g1,g2 ∈ E(F2q)
with g1 6= +/− g2, then this line intersects the curve at a third point g3 ∈ E(F2q). In
addition, the function f (x,y) = ax+by+ c has three zeroes g1,g2,g3 and a pole of order
3 at infinity. ( f ) = (g1)+(g2)+(g3)−3(1) is thus the divisor of the function f .
Principal divisors. We consider a divisor D. We assume that f is function such that
its divisor satisfies ( f ) = D, then D is said to be a principal divisor. Moreover, D =
∑g dg(g) is a principal divisor if and only if ∑g dg = 0 and ∑g dgg = 1. Note that the
second condition requires the group action on the curve. If D is a principal divisor, then a
unique function f (up to constant multiples) does exist such that (D) = ( f ).
Equivalence of divisors. Two divisors D,D′ are said to be equivalent if their difference
D−D′ is a principal divisor. Moreover, any divisor D = ∑g dg(g) such that ∑g dg = 0 is
equivalent to a divisor of the form D0 = (h)− (1) for some h ∈ E. We finally note that
h = ∑g dgg
Notations
Let f be a function and D = ∑g dg(g) be a divisor. Let f (D) be defined as f (D) =
∏g f (g)dg . We know that ∑g dg = 0 which means that f (D) remains unchanged: for in-
stance, instead of f , one considers c f for any c ∈ Fq2 .
We now show that the Weil pairing is well defined. Let two points g,h ∈ E[n]. Let Dg
be a divisor which is equivalent to the divisor (g)− (1). Since pDg is a principal divisor,
meaning that this divisor is equivalent to the principal divisor p(g)− p(1), a function fg
does exist such that ( fg) = pDg. In addition, we can define Dh and fh in the same way.
The Weil pairing of g and h is defined as ẽ(g,h) = fg(Dh)fh(Dg) , assuming that no division
by zero occurred. If this ratio is undefined (i.e. there is a zero at the denominator), one
requires different divisors Dg and Dh in order to determine ẽ(g,h).
We have to show that the element of ẽ(g,h) is independent of the choice of the divisor
Dg (respectively Dh) as long as Dg (respectively Dh) is equivalent to (g)− (1) (respec-
tively (h)− (1)) and Dg (respectively Dh) leads to a well defined value.
We specify D′g as a divisor equivalent to Dg and we denote f
′
g as a function such that
( f ′g) = pD
′
g. Therefore, we get that D
′
g = Dg +( f0) and f
′
g = fg · f p0 for some function
f0. Moreover, let us recall the Weil reciprocity as follows: for any two functions f , f0,









· f0(pDh)fh(( f0)) =
fg(Dh)
fh(Dg)
· f0(( fh))fh(( f0)) =
fg(Dh)
fh(Dg)
. We can thus conclude that the Weil pairing is
well defined.
Properties
The number q is prime such that q = 2 mod 3 and the number p > 3 is a prime factor of
q+1. The elliptic curve E is defined by the equation y2 = x3+1 over Fq. E(Fqr) specifies
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 27
the group of points on E defined over Fqr for some r ∈ N. Follow some properties about
E [209, 41]:
1. x3 + 1 is a permutation on Fq. Thus, the group E(Fq) contains q+ 1 points. We
recall that the point at infinity is written as 1. In addition, g ∈ E(Fq) is a point of
order q and then, G1 is the subgroup of points generated by g.
2. If y0 ∈ Fq, then (x0,y0) is a unique point on E(Fq), namely x0 = (y20−1)1/3 ∈ Fq.
Let (x,y) be a random non-zero point on E(Fq). Therefore, y is uniform in Fq.
3. ζ ∈ Fq2 such that ζ 6= 1 is a solution of x3− 1 = 0 in Fq2 . Moreover, the map
ϕ(x,y) = (ζ x,y) is an automorphism of the group of points on the curve E. If
g with coordinates (x,y) ∈ E(Fq), then ϕ(g) ∈ E(Fq2), but ϕ(g) /∈ E(Fq). Thus,
g ∈ E(Fq) is linearly independent of ϕ(g) /∈ E(Fq2).
4. We know that the points g ∈ G1 and ϕ(g) are linearly independent. Hence, they
generate a group isomorphic to Zp×Zp. This group of points is denoted as E[p].
Moreover, GT refers to the subgroup of F∗q2 of order p. Therefore, the Weil pairing
on the curve E(Fq2) is the mapping ẽ : E[p]× E[p] → GT such that it satisfies
e(h,h′) = 1 given h,h′ ∈ E(Fq). This means that the Weil pairing is degenerate on
E(Fq), and so it is degenerate on the group G1. To get a non-degenerate map, we
define the modified Weil pairing e : G1×G1→GT as e(g,h) = ẽ(g,ϕ(h)).
As a summary, the Weil pairing has the following properties for points in E[p]:
• For all g ∈ E[p], we have ẽ(g,g) = 1.
• Bilinearity: ẽ(g ·g′,h) = ẽ(g,h) · ẽ(g′,h) and ẽ(g,h ·h′) = ẽ(g,h) · ẽ(g,h′).
• If g,h ∈ E[p] are collinear then ẽ(g,h) = 1. Similarly, ẽ(g,h) = ẽ(h,g)−1.
• p-th root: For all g,h ∈ E[p], we have ẽ(g,h)p = 1, i.e. ẽ(g,h) ∈GT .
• Non-degeneracy in the following sense: If g ∈ E[p] satisfies ẽ(g,h) = 1 for all h ∈
E[n], then g = 1.
As suggested above, one can use the modified Weil pairing e(g,h) = ẽ(g,ϕ(h)) to obtain
a non-degenerate map, where ϕ is an automorphism on the group of points of E.
The Modified Weil Pairing
Let G1 and GT be defined as in the previous section. The modified Weil pairing satisfies
the following properties (in addition of non-degeneracy):
1. Bilinear: For all g,h ∈G1 and for all a,b ∈ Z, we have e(ga,hb) = e(g,h)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: If g is a generator of G1, then e(g,g) ∈ Fq2 is a generator of GT .
3. Computable: Given g,h ∈G1, there is an efficient algorithm due to Miller [160] to
compute e(g,h) ∈GT . Its running time is comparable to exponentiation in Fq.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 28
2.2.4 Tate Pairing
There are a lot of curves, in general Abelian varieties, that can support the mappinge :
G1×G1→GT . In particular, let a prime number q = 3 mod 4. Then, the curve defined
by the equation y2 = x3 + x over Fq and its endomorphism φ : (x,y)→ (−x, iy) where
i2 =−1. For instance, Galbraith [91] proposed to take supersingular elliptic curves over a
field of small characteristic in order to reduce the component size in [41]. Other Abelian
varieties are proposed by Rubin and Silverberg [198].
The Tate pairing [88] is another bilinear pairing with the required properties for cryp-
tosystems. The modified Tate pairing [41] can be expressed as follows. Let two points




where fg and Dh are de-
fined as in the section about the Weil pairing. Thus, we obtain the computable bilinear
pairing T : E[p]×E[p]→GT .
2.3 From Mathematical Tools to Cryptography
Public-key cryptography is based on the intractability of mathematical problems that we
express below. The first public-key cryptosystems were shown to be secure by relying
on the difficulty of factoring a large integer as the multiplication of two or more large
prime factors. Then, for cryptosystems based on elliptic curves, finding the discrete log-
arithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a publicly known base point is
assumed to be infeasible. Such assumption is called the Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm (ECDLP) problem. Thus, The security of elliptic curve-based systems depends on
the ability to compute a point multiplication and the inability to compute the multiplicand
given the original and product points. Moreover, the size of the elliptic curve determines
the difficulty of the problem.
We first introduce elliptic curves in cryptography as a highlight of the concept. We
then present group theory in cryptography, where we give more details on intractable
mathematical problems required for public-key cryptography.
2.3.1 Elliptic Curves in Cryptography
In 1985, Miller [160] first suggested elliptic curves as a cryptographic tool. By the fact
that elliptic curves have a group structure, these curves can replace groups used in Discrete
Logarithm (DL)-based cryptosystems (for instance, Diffie-Hellman systems and ElGamal
systems). In addition, since no algorithm does exist to compute the discrete logarithms
on elliptic curves, then high security levels with (relatively) short keys can possibly be
reached.
Later, Mezenes et al. [155] found that a type of elliptic curves, called supersingular,
are weaker than general elliptic curves. Indeed, some properties specific to these curves
enable an attacker to reduce the DL problem to a finite field such that more efficient algo-
rithms can be found in order to compute the DL. Since supersingular elliptic curves had
been chosen for cryptosystems, the community became concerned about this discovery.
However, some papers [88, 91, 223, 197, 62] showed that cryptosystems can be based
on weak elliptic curves such that these curves contain additional properties that are used
as properties of the underlying systems.
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Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) Problem
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem is the Discrete Logarithm (DL)
problem for the group of points on an elliptic curve E over a finite field K. The best




Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq, with equation E : y2 = x3 +
Ax+B, where A,B ∈ Fq. Let g and h be two points in E(Fq). The problem is to find an
integer a so that h = ga. We call the (smallest) integer a such that h = ga the DL of h with
respect to g and we denote it as a = logg(h). Let p be the order of g in the group E(Fq).
Then, the map logg : (subgroup of E generated by g)→ Z/pZ is a group isomorphism,
and the inverse of a is ga.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of order p for some large prime p. Let a bilinear
map e : G1×G2→GT . We can determine three types of bilinear pairing [92], namely:
1. Symmetric pairing or Type 1 pairing, such that G1 = G2. Such pairing can be
expressed on supersingular curves.
2. Asymmetric pairing or Type 2 pairing, such that G1 6=G2 and there is an efficiently
computable isomorphism ψ : G2→ G1 with ψ(g2) = g1 where g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈
G1. Such pairing can be expressed on ordinary curves.
3. External asymmetric pairing or Type 3 pairing, such that G1 6= G2 and there is
no known isomorphism ψ between G2 and G1. Such pairing can be expressed on
ordinary curves.
No advantage was observed in using an asymmetric (type 2) pairing over an external
asymmetric (type 3) pairing. Moreover, when converting a protocol from a symmetric
(type 1) pairing to an external asymmetric (type 3) pairing, some tradeoffs may have to
be made based on the performance.
2.3.2 Group Theory in Cryptography
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [72]
from an idea proposed by Merkle [156]. The protocol allows two parties to communicate
by establishing a shared private key over an insecure public channel, without requiring
any prior knowledge of each other. Before this work, two parties could initiate a secure
encrypted communication by exchanging keys through a secure physical channel. There
exists a variant of the above DHKE protocol based on elliptic curves, called the elliptic
curve DiffieHellman (ECDH) [136].
ElGamal [75] presented the ElGamal encryption scheme which is a public-key en-
cryption scheme based on the DHKE protocol. The security of this system relies on the
difficulty of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. This problem is related to
discrete logarithms in the cyclic group G1 of prime order p. However, this scheme does
not satisfy the non-malleability property (the definition of this notion can be found in
Section 3.3.4).
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Cramer and Shoup [65] then gave a public-key encryption scheme, called the Cramer-
Shoup system and proven secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack using standard
cryptographic assumptions (the definition of this notion can be found in Section 3.3.5).
The security is based on the computational intractability of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption. This scheme can be seen as an improvement of the ElGamal system
since non-malleability is achieved.
Bilinear Pairings
Symmetric Bilinear Pairings. Let G1 and GT be two cyclic groups of order p for some
large prime p. A symmetric bilinear map e : G1×G1→ GT must satisfy the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: e is bilinear if e(ga,hb) = e(g,h)ab for all g,h ∈G1 and a,b ∈ Zp.
2. Non-degenerate: e is non-degenerate if e does not send all pairs in G1×G1 to the
identity in GT . We know that G1 and GT are groups of prime order, so that if g is a
generator of G1, then e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
3. Computable: e is computable if there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g,h)
for any g,h ∈G1.
A bilinear map e that fulfills the three aforementioned conditions is said to be an ad-
missible bilinear map. We recall that G1 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of
points of an elliptic curve E/Fq and GT is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a
finite field F∗q2 . The existence of this bilinear map e leads to the MOV reduction [155]
and the easiness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [34], as explained below.
The name symmetric bilinear pairings come from the fact that the bilinear map e :
G1×G1→GT is symmetric: e(g,h) = e(h,g) for all g,h ∈G1.
Asymmetric Bilinear Pairings. Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of order p
for some large prime p. A asymmetric bilinear map e : G1×G2→ GT must satisfy the
following properties:
1. Bilinear: e is bilinear if e(ga1,h
b
2) = e(g1,h2)
ab for all g1 ∈ G1, h2 ∈ G2 and a,b ∈
Zp.
2. Non-degenerate: e is non-degenerate if e does not send all pairs in G1×G2 to the
identity in GT . We know that G1, G2 and GT are groups of prime order, so that if
g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2, then e(g1,g2) is a generator of
GT .
3. Computable: e is computable if there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1,h2)
for any g1 ∈G1 and h2 ∈G1.
A bilinear map e that fulfills the three aforementioned conditions is said to be an admis-
sible bilinear map.
Basic Algorithmic Problems
We recall the definitions of well-known mathematical Diffie-Hellman problems. These
problems are defined over the multiplicative cyclic group G1 of prime order p.
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Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem. We define the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem
as follows. Let G1 be a multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈ N
is the security parameter. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga ∈G1, the problem is to
output a, for a ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the DL problem if
Pr[A (g,ga) = a]≥ ε.
The DL assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in solving
the DL problem in G1.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. We define the Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem as follows. Let G1 be a multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit
prime order p, where λ ∈ N is the security parameter. Let g be a generator of G1. Given
g,ga,gb ∈G1, the problem is to output gab, for a,b ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the CDH problem if
Pr[A (g,ga,gb) = gab]≥ ε.
The CDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in solv-
ing the CDH problem in G1.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem. We define the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem as follows. Let G1 be a multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order
p, where λ ∈N is the security parameter. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga,gb ∈G1,
the problem is to decide either Z = gab or Z = gz ∈R G1, for a,b,z ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the DDH problem if
|Pr[A (g,ga,gb) = gab]−Pr[A (g,ga,gb) = gz]| ≥ ε.
The CDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in solv-
ing the CDH problem in G1.
Consequences and Issues
The MOV Reduction. In 1993, Menezes et al. [155] showed that the DL problem in
the group G1 is no harder than the DL problem in the group GT . To be more precise, we
consider two elements g,h ∈G1 as an instance of the DL problem in G1 such that g and h
have order p. The goal is to find an element a ∈ Zp such that h = ga. From the properties
satisfied by a symmetric bilinear map e : G1×G1→GT , we observe the following:
1. By bilinearity of e, we know that e(h,g) = e(g,g)a.
2. By non-degeneracy of e, both e(g,g) and e(h,g) have order p in GT .
Therefore, we reduce the DL problem in G1 to a DL problem in GT . Note that we should
select the security parameter λ in such a way that the DL is hard in GT , so we get that the
DL hard in G1.
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The Easiness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem. The Decision Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem [34] in G1 is to decide either the output is equal to gab or gc
given g,ga,gb, where a,b,c ∈R Zp and g ∈R G1. Joux and Nguyen [126] pointed out
that the DDH problem is easy in G1. To see why, note that c = ab mod p⇔ e(g,gc) =
e(ga,gb) given g,ga,gb,gc ∈G1, where e : G1×G1→GT is a symmetric bilinear map.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 is to output gab given
g,ga,gb where a,b∈R Zp and g∈R G1. This problem is still hard in G1. Joux and Nguyen
[126] provided symmetric bilinear maps e : G1×G1 → GT where the CDH problem is
believed to be hard in G1 even though the DDH problem is easy in G1.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem
In this section, we give details about the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in
(G1,GT ) [41]. Since the DDH problem is easy in G1, the DDH assumption cannot be
used to build cryptosystems in the group G1 and prove them secure. Instead, the security
of cryptosystems can be based on a variant of the CDH assumption, called the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption.
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is as follows. As above, we consider the
two cyclic groups G1 and GT of λ -bit prime order p as well as the admissible symmetric
bilinear map e : G1×G1→GT and the generator g ∈G1. Given (g,ga,gb,gc), the BDH
problem is to output e(g,g)abc ∈GT for some a,b,c ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the BDH problem in (G1,GT ) if
Pr[A (g,ga,gb,gc) = e(g,g)abc]≥ ε,
where the probability is over the random choice of a,b,c ∈ Zp, the random choice of
g ∈ G1, and the random bits of A . The BDH assumption holds in (G1,GT ) if no PPT
algorithm A has advantage non-negligible ε in solving the BDH problem in (G1,GT ).
BDH Parameter Generator G . Let a randomized algorithm G be a BDH parameter
generator with the following properties:
1. G takes a security parameter λ ∈ N.
2. G runs in polynomial time in λ .
3. G outputs a prime number p, the description of two groups G1 and GT and the
description of an admissible symmetric bilinear map e :G1×G1→GT . Let G (λ )=
(p,G1,GT ,e) denote G ’s output.
We recall that the security parameter λ is used to determine the size of the λ -bit prime p.
For instance, p could be a random λ -bit prime. Moreover, the description of the group
G1 (respectively of the group GT ) is supposed to contain polynomial time (in λ ) algo-
rithms to generate the group action in G1 (respectively in GT ) and to contain a generator
g of G1 (respectively a generator e(g,g) of GT ). The generator g of G1 (respectively the
generator e(g,g) of GT ) allows to output uniformly random elements in G1 (respectively
in GT ). Similarly, the description of e is assumed to embed a polynomial time algorithm
for computing e.
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The security parameter is λ ∈ N such that λ > 2. The BDH parameter generator G
selects a random λ -bit prime p and outputs the smallest prime q such that q = 2 mod 3,
p | q+1 and p2 - q+1. Let q = l p+1 for an integer l. G1 is the subgroup of order p of the
group of points on the supersingular elliptic curve E defined by the equation y2 = x3 +1
over Fq, and GT is the subgroup of order p of F∗q2 . Let e : G1×G1→GT be the modified
Weil pairing as defined previously. The BDH parameter generator G is believed to satisfy
the BDH assumption asymptotically. Nevertheless, values q and p have to be chosen
carefully to make the BDH problem sufficiently hard in practice. First, one should start
to get the DL problem sufficiently hard in G1. As mentioned above, the DL problem in
G1 is efficiently reducible to DL in GT [155, 88]. Therefore, the DL computation in F∗q2
is sufficient for the DL computation in G1. In the reality, primes q that are at least 512-
bits long are required to ensure the security of the DL assumption in F∗q2 since the group
size will be at least 1024-bits long. In other words, the aforementioned BDH parameter
generator G can be used with primes p that are longer than 512-bits.
Definition of the BDH Problem. G is a BDH parameter generator as defined above.
An algorithm A is said to have advantage ε in solving the BDH problem for G if for any
sufficiently large λ , we get:
Pr[A (p,G1,GT ,e,g,ga,gb,gc)= e(g,g)abc|(p,G1,GT ,e)←G (λ ),g∈G1,a,b,c∈Zp]≥ ε.
G is said to satisfy the BDH assumption if for any randomized PPT algorithm A , we have
that the advantage of A is a negligible function. We say that the BDH problem is hard in
groups generated by G when G satisfies the BDH assumption.
Hardness of the BDH Problem. The BDH problem in (G1,GT ) is currently said to
be no harder than the CDH problem in G1 or GT . This means that an algorithm for the
CDH problem in G1 or GT is sufficient to solve the BDH problem in (G1,GT ). However,
the converse is not true and still an open problem: is an algorithm for the BDH problem
sufficient to solve the CDH problem in G1 or in GT ?
The isomorphisms from G1 to GT induced by the bilinear map e : G1×G1→GT are
supposed to be one-way functions. In other words, for h ∈ G1, let the isomorphism fh :
G1→GT be defined as fh(g) = e(g,h).
Suppose that there is one of these isomorphisms that is invertible. Thus, this gives us
that the BDH problem is easy in (G1,GT ). In addition, if an efficient algorithm that inverts
fh for some value h exists, then an efficient algorithm that solves the DDH problem in GT
does exist. In all our protocols, the DDH problem is assumed to be hard in the group GT ,
and so all the isomorphisms fh : G1→GT induced by the bilinear map e : G1×G1→GT
are assumed to be one-way functions.
Extension to Asymmetric Bilinear Pairings Nothing changes with what was written
above, except that the BDH assumption in (G1,GT ) has to be modified to get the co-BDH
aassumption in (G1,G2,GT ). The co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (co-BDH) problem is as
follows. As above, we consider the three cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of λ -bit prime
order p as well as the admissible asymmetric bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT and the
generators g1 ∈G1 and g2 ∈G2. Given (g1,ga1,gb1,gc1,g2,ga2,gb2,gc2), the co-BDH problem
is to output e(g1,g2)abc ∈GT for some a,b,c ∈R Zp.
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where the probability is over the random choice of a,b,c∈Zp, the random choices of g1 ∈
G1 and g2 ∈G2, and the random bits of A . The BDH assumption holds in (G1,G2,GT )
if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible ε in solving the BDH problem in
(G1,G2,GT ).
We assume that the co-BDH assumtpion is accepted, and instead of supersingular
curves, we can use elliptic curves over Fq for q> 3 proposed by Miyaji et al. [163]. These
non-supersingular curves E/Fq have the property that if p||E(Fq)| then E[p] ⊆ E(Fq6).
Remember that E[p] is the group containing all point in E of order dividing p.
These curves can be used as follows. Let G2 to be a cyclic subgroup of E(Fq) of
order p and G1 to be a different cyclic subgroup of E(Fq6) of the same order p. We
obsserve that the bilinear map e can be the Weil or Tate pairings on G1×G2 as defined
previously. Another option is to let G1 be a subgroup of order p of E(Fq) and G2 be a
different subgroup of E(Fq6) of the same order.
Diffie-Hellman Problems
We recall the definition of mathematical Diffie-Hellman problems derived from the DDH
and CDH problems, that we require to prove the security of the schemes presented in this
thesis. These problems are defined over the multiplicative cyclic group G1 of prime order
p.
s-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DHI) Problem. Mitsunari et al. [161] presented this prob-
lem by calling it the s-weak Diffie-Hellman (wDH) problem in G1. Boneh and Boyen [37]
showed that the s-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DHI) assumption implies the s-Generalized
Diffie-Hellman (GenDH) assumption [213, 169, 31]. In other words, cryptosystems re-
lying on the s-GenDH assumption can instead rely on the s-DHI assumption since this
appears to be a more natural complexity assumption.
We define the s-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DHI) problem as follows. Let G1 be a
multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈N is the security parameter.
Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga, · · · ,ga
s
, the problem is to output g1/a, for a ∈R Z∗p
and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DHI problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas) = g1/a]≥ ε.
The s-DHI assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-DHI problem in G1.
s-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Problem. Boneh and Boyen [35] introduced the s-
Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem in G1. To prove the s-SDH assumption, the au-
thors provided a lower bound on the computational complexity of the s-SDH problem for
generic groups following Shoup’s work [208].
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We define the s-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem as follows. Let G1 be a mul-
tiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈ N is the security parameter.
Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga, · · · ,ga
s
, the problem is to output (b,g
1
a+b ), for
a,b ∈R Zp, a+b 6= 0 mod p, and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-SDH problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas) = (b,g 1a+b )]≥ ε.
The s-SDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-SDH problem in G1.
Strong Decisional Diffie-Hellman (SDDH) Problem. Pfitzmann and Sadeghi [179]
first gave the Strong Decisional Diffie-Hellman (SDDH) problem.
We define the Strong Decisional Diffie-Hellman (SDDH) problem as follows. Let
G1 be a multiplicative cyclic groups of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈ N is the security
parameter. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga,gb,g1/b, the problem is to decide either
Z = gab or Z = gz ∈R G1, for a,z ∈R Zp and b ∈R Z∗p.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the SSDH problem if
|Pr[A (g,ga,gb,g1/b) = gab]−Pr[A (g,ga,gb,g1/b) = gz]| ≥ ε.
The SSDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the SSDH problem in G1.
s-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) Problem. The s-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE)
probem in G1 was proposed in [239, 131, 49].
We define the s-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) problem as follows. Let G1 be a
multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈N is the security parameter.




, · · · ,ga2s , the problem is to output
ga
s+1
, for a ∈R Zp and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DHE problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s) = gas+1 ]≥ ε.
The s-DHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-DHE problem in G1.
Truncated Version. To prove the security of one of the schemes presented in this
thesis, we need a truncated form of the s-DHE problem. More precisely, the s-DHE




, · · · ,ga2s are missing).
s-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DDHE) Problem. We define the s-Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DDHE) problem as follows. Let G1 be a multiplica-
tive cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈ N is the security parameter. Let g




, · · · ,ga2s , the problem is to decide either
Z = ga
s+1
or Z = gz ∈R G1, for a,z ∈R Zp and s ∈R N.
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An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DDHE problem if
|Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2 , · · · ,ga2s)= gas+1]−Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2 , · · · ,ga2s)= gz]| ≥ ε.
The s-DDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-DDHE problem in G1.
Variant Version. To prove the security of one of the schemes presented in this thesis,
we need a variant form of the s-DDHE problem. More precisely, the s-DDHE assumption
still holds in G1 by giving g1,ga1, · · · ,ga
s
1 ∈G1 and g2,ga2 ∈G2 (the values ga
s+2
1 , · · · ,ga
2s
1 ∈
G1 are missing and the values g2,ga2 ∈G2 are given).
( f ,s)-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) Problem. Guo et al. [110] first proposed the
( f ,s)-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) problem in G1. The ( f ,s)-Diffie-Hellman Expo-
nent (DHE) problem is a modified version of the s-DHE problem [49].
We define the ( f ,s)-Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) problem as follows. Let G1 be a
multiplicative cyclic group of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈N is the security parameter.
Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga, · · · ,ga
s
, the problem is to output ( f (x),g f (a)) for
a ∈R Zp, s ∈R N and f (x) ∈ Zp[x] is a s′-degree polynomial function for s′ > s.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the ( f ,s)-DHE problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas) = ( f (x),g f (a))]≥ ε.
The ( f ,s)-DHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible
in solving the ( f ,s)-DHE problem in G1.
Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) Problem. The Symmetric External Diffie-
Hellman (SXDH) problem is an extension of the DDH problem in (G1,G2) such that
G1 6=G2. The SXDH assumption holds if and only the DDH assumption holds in both in
G1 and G2. The problem was first suggested in [202, 39] and formally enunciated in [22].
We define the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) problem as follows. Let
G1,G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of λ -bit prime order p, where λ ∈ N is the
security parameter. Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. The problem
can be split into two subproblems.
Given g1,ga1,g
b
1, the first subproblem is to decide either Z1 = g
ab
1 or Z1 = g
z1
1 ∈R G1,
for a,b,z1 ∈R Zp.
Given g2,ga2,g
b
2, the second subproblem is to decide either Z2 = g
ab
2 or Z2 = g
z2
2 ∈R G2,
for a,b,z2 ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the SXDH problem if
|Pr[A (g1,ga1,gb1) = gab1 ]−Pr[A (g1,ga1,gb1) = gz11 ]| ≥ ε
and
|Pr[A (g2,ga2,gb2) = gab2 ]−Pr[A (g2,ga2,gb2) = gz22 ]| ≥ ε.
The SXDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the SXDH problem in G1 and in G2.
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Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problems
We give the mathematical bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems derived from the BDH prob-
lem, that we require to prove the security of the schemes presented in this thesis. These
problems are defined over three multiplicative cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of prime
order p (with possibly G1 = G2) and with the bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT . Note
that we first express the problem definitions based on symmetric bilinear pairings, and we
sometimes extend them to the asymmetric bilinear pairing context.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem. The hardness of the Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption enables to prove the security of the identity-
based encryption scheme in [41].
We define the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem as follows. Given
a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,e)
that outputs the description of symmetric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as well
as an admissible symmetric bilinear map e. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga,gb,gc,
the problem is to decide either Z = e(g,g)abc or Z = e(g,g)z ∈R GT , for a,b,c,z ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the DBDH problem if
|Pr[A (g,ga,gb,gc) = e(g,g)abc]−Pr[A (g,ga,gb,gc) = e(g,g)z]| ≥ ε.
The DBDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the DBDH problem in (G1,GT ).
Asymmetric Bilinear Pairings. We now give the definition of the DBDH problem in
the asymmetric pairing context. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) prob-
lem is as follows. Given a security parameter λ ∈N, there is a group generator algorithm
G (λ )→ (p,G1,G2,GT ,e) that outputs the description of asymmetric bilinear groups of
λ -bit prime order p as well as an admissible asymmetric bilinear map e. Let g1 be a
generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. Given g1,ga1,gb1,gc1 and g2,ga2,gb2,gc2, the
problem is to decide either Z = e(g1,g2)abc or Z = e(g1,g2)z ∈R GT , for a,b,c,z ∈R Zp.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the DBDH problem if
|Pr[A (g1,ga1,gb1,gc1,g2,ga2,gb2,gc2) = e(g1,g2)abc]
−Pr[A (g1,ga1,gb1,gc1,g2,ga2,gb2,gc2) = e(g1,g2)z]| ≥ ε.
The DBDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the DBDH problem in (G1,G2,GT ).
Truncated Version. To prove the security of one of the schemes presented in this
thesis, we need a truncated form of the DBDH problem. More precisely, the DBDH
assumption still holds in (G1,G2,GT ) by giving g1,ga1,gb1,g2,gb2,gc2 (the values gc1 and ga2
are missing).
s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI) Problem. Boneh and Boyen [37] intro-
duced the s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI) problem over the bilinear map
e : G1×G1→GT .
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We define the s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI) problem as follows. Given
a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,e)
that outputs the description of symmetric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as well as
an admissible symmetric bilinear map e. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g,ga, · · · ,gs,
the problem is to output e(g,g)1/a, for a ∈R Z∗p and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-BDHI problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gs) = e(g,g)1/a]≥ ε.
The s-BDHI assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-BDHI problem in (G1,GT ).
s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) Problem. Boneh et al. [38] first de-
fined the s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) problem over the bilinear map
e : G1×G1→GT .
We define the s-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) problem as follows. Given
a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,
e) that outputs the description of symmetric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as
well as an admissible symmetric bilinear map e. Let g be a generator of G1. Given
g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s,gb, the problem is to output e(g,g)as+1·b, for a,b ∈R Zp and
s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-BDHE problem if
Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s,gb) = e(g,g)as+1·b]≥ ε.
The s-BDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-BDHE problem in (G1,GT ).
Asymmetric Bilinear Pairings. We now give the definition of the s-BDHE problem
in the asymmetric pairing context. The s+1-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE)
problem is as follows. Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator al-
gorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,G2,GT ,e) that outputs the description of asymmetric bilinear
groups of λ -bit prime order p as well as an admissible asymmetric bilinear map e. Let g1
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as+1·b, for a,b∈R
Zp and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-BDHE problem if




















The s-BDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-BDHE problem in (G1,G2,GT ).
s-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) Problem. We define the
s-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) problem as follows. Given a
security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,e)
that outputs the description of symmetric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as well as
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, · · · ,ga2s,gb, the problem is to decide either Z = e(g,g)as+1·b or Z = e(g,g)z ∈R GT ,
for a,b,z ∈R Zp and s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DBDHE problem if
|Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2 , · · · ,ga2s,gb) = e(g,g)as+1·b]
−Pr[A (g,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s,gb) = e(g,g)z]| ≥ ε.
The s-DBDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-DBDHE problem in (G1,GT ).
Asymmetric Bilinear Pairings. We now give the definition of the s-DBDHE prob-
lem in the asymmetric pairing context. The s-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Ex-
ponent (DBDHE) problem is as follows. Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is
a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,G2,GT ,e) that outputs the description of
asymmetric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as well as an admissible asymmet-
ric bilinear map e. Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. Given
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An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DBDHE problem if








































The s-DBDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-DBDHE problem in (G1,G2,GT ).
Truncated Version. To prove the security of one of the schemes presented in this
thesis, we need a truncated form of the s-DBDHE problem. More precisely, the s-DBDHE
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2 ∈G2 are missing).
s-Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DPBDHE) Problem Wa-
ters [237] first gave the definition of the s-Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (DPBDHE) problem and proved the hardness of the assumption in the generic
group model. Note that this assumption can be viewed as a generalization of the BDHE
problem.
We define the s-Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DPBDHE)
problem as follows. Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a group generator algo-
rithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,e) that outputs the description of symmetric bilinear groups
of λ -bit prime order p as well as an admissible symmetric bilinear map e. Let g be a
generator of G1. Given g and the tuple Y containing the following elements
gc,ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s
∀ j ∈ [1,s], gc·b j ,ga/b j , · · · ,gas/b j ,gas+2/b j , · · · ,ga2s/b j
∀ j,k ∈ [1,s],k 6= j, ga·c·bk/b j , · · · ,gas·s·bk/b j
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the problem is to decide either Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·c or Z ∈R GT , for a,b1, · · · ,bs,c ∈R Zp and
s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-DPBDHE problem if
Pr[A (g,Y ) = e(g,g)a
s+1·c]≥ ε.
The s-DPBDHE assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible
in solving the s-DPBDHE problem in (G1,G2,GT ).
s-type Problem Rouselakis and Waters [195] first studied the hardness of the s-type
assumption. This s-type assumption in G1 is similar to the DPBDHE assumption [237].
We define the s-type problem as follows. Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, there is
a group generator algorithm G (λ )→ (p,G1,GT ,e) that outputs the description of sym-
metric bilinear groups of λ -bit prime order p as well as an admissible symmetric bilinear
map e. Let g be a generator of G1. Given g and the tuple Y containing the following
elements
gc
∀i, j ∈ [1,s], gai,gb j ,gc·b j ,gai·b j ,gai/b2j
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j ∈ [1,s], i 6= s+1, gai/b j
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j,k ∈ [1,s], j 6= k, gaib j/b2k
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j,k ∈ [1,s], j 6= k, gc·aib j/bk ,gc·aib j/b2k
the problem is to decide either Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·c or Z ∈R GT , for a,b1, · · · ,bs,c ∈R Zp and
s ∈R N.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving the s-type problem if
Pr[A (g,Y ) = e(g,g)a
s+1·c]≥ ε.
The s-type assumption holds if no PPT algorithm A has advantage non-negligible in
solving the s-type problem in (G1,G2,GT ).
Relations between the Algorithmic Problems of Group Theory
Given two problems P1 and P2, we denote by P1 → P2 if the problem P2 can be solved
in polynomial time with polynomially many queries to the oracle solving the problem P1.
We recall the acronyms of the above algorithmic problems:
• DL: Discrete Logarithm;
• CDH: Computational Diffie-Hellman;
• DDH: Decisional Diffie-Hellman;
• SXDH: Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman;
• DHI: Diffie-Hellman Inversion;
• GenDH: Generalized Diffie-Hellman;
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• SDH: Strong Diffie-Hellman;
• BDHI: Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion;
• BDHE: Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent;
• DPBDHE: Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent.









Figure 2.1: Relations between the various problems defined in the previous section.
Chapter 3
Cryptographic Primitives and Security
Notions
3.1 Public-Key Cryptography
In a public-key encryption setting, cryptosystems comprise two keys: a public key that is
known to everyone and a private key that is only known to the recipient of the message.
For instance, let Alice and Bob be respectively a sender and a recipient. Alice encrypts
the message that she wants to forward to Bob using Bob’s public key. Then, Bob uses his
private key to decrypt it. Follow some properties:
1. Public and private keys are linked. More precisely, for a public key used to encrypt
a message, only the corresponding private key can be used to decrypt it.
2. Given a public key, it should be impossible in practice to deduct the corresponding
private key.
Public-key encryption offers various advantages. Unlike symmetric encryption (where
the private key is used for both encryption and decryption), the distribution of the public
keys used for encryption is easy and the publication of such keys is available. In addition,
digital signatures can be designed in a public-key setting. Digital signatures enable a user
that receives a message to verify that this message is really sent from another particular
user, whereas this user can detect if the message was modified in transit. Finally, signing
a message by using a digital signature is an approval of this message that the user sending
it cannot deny.
Nevertheless, public-key encryption also present several disadvantages. A first dif-
ficulty encountered in public-key cryptosystems is that we have to know the public key
of a recipient to encrypt a message for him/her. Thus, public keys have to be registered
and made available to all the users. Moreover, these keys have to be authenticated before
use to ensure that they belong to the correct users. Then, public-key encryption is slower
and requires more computer resources than symmetric encryption. Finally, if an attacker
is able to successfully guess the private key of a user, then the messages received by this
user can all be read, while if this user loses his/her private key, then s/he cannot decrypt
the received ciphertexts.
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3.1.1 Public-Key Encryption and Public-Key Encryption with Key-
word Search
Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is composed of the following four algorithms
[66]:
• Setup(λ )→ params. On input a security parameter λ , output the public parameters
params.
• KeyGen(params)→ (ek,dk). On input the public parameters params, output an
encryption (public) key ek and a decryption (private) key dk.
• Encrypt(params,ek,m)→C. On input the public parameters params, the encryp-
tion key ek and a message m, output a ciphertext C.
• Decrypt(params,dk,C)→ m/ ⊥. On input the public parameters params, the de-
cryption key dk and a ciphertext C, output the message m for a valid ciphertext;
output ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a public-key encryption scheme is correct if for any λ ∈N,
params← Setup(λ ), (ek,dk)← Keygen(params) and C← Encrypt(params,ek,m), we
have that Decrypt(params,dk,C) = m.
Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search
Public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) enables a server to search for a key-
word from a collection of encrypted information contents, given a trapdoor provided by a
receiver.
PEKS was designed as a solution to the problem of searching encrypted information
using a public-key setting. In more details, the data is private, stored in their encrypted
form on databases and organised in a random way that is not controlled by the receiver.
Existing Work. Boneh et al. [40] introduced the notion of public-key encryption with
keyword search (PEKS) in order to solve the problem of searching on encrypted informa-
tion in a public-key environment. They provided a scheme that is secure against adaptive
chosen-keyword attacks in the random oracle model. Then, Baek et al. [20] combined
the PEKS scheme presented in [40] and a variation of the ElGamal encryption scheme
[75]. Byun et al. [47] pointed out vulnerabilities present in existing PEKS schemes due
to the fact that keywords might not have high min-entropy and receivers might choose
well-known keywords to search information (off-line keyword-guessing attacks).
Thereafter, Bellare et al. [25] presented database encryption techniques that achieve
fast search (in logarithmic time) while provably reaching strong privacy. Fuhr and Paillier
[89] introduced the concept of searchable encryption which enables decryption, since
PEKS schemes do not allow the receiver to decrypt keywords. In parallel, Gu et al. [106]
proposed a new PEKS scheme based on bilinear pairings in the random oracle model.
Their scheme is computationally consistent and there is no pairing operation involved in
the encryption procedure.
CHAPTER 3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES AND SECURITY NOTIONS 44
Subsequently, Baek et al. [21] improved the concept of PEKS by noticing several
issues that were not considered in [40]. They defined the notion of secure-channel-free
PEKS (SCF-PEKS) and gave a construction in the random oracle model. The same year,
Abdalla et al. [1] studied the consistency in PEKS schemes. Consistency refers to the
extent to which false positives are produced. Fang et al. [81] constructed the first SCF-
PEKS scheme that does not require random oracle and that is proven secure according to
the security model defined in [20]. The same year, Rhee et al. [187] defined the concept
of PEKS with a designated tester (dPEKS) that is similar to SCF-PEKS. They improved
the security model given in [20] in order to enhance the adversary’s ability.
Later, Rhee et al. [188] introduced the notion of trapdoor indistinguishability that
suffices to oppose keyword-guessing attacks. They constructed a dPEKS scheme proven
secure against keyword-guessing attacks. Rhee et al. [186] gave generic transformations
to construct a dPEKS scheme using IBE schemes. Yau et al. [242] stressed a keyword
guessing attack by an outsider on existing dPEKS schemes [187, 188]. They showed that
their attack is generic and applies to all existing dPEKS schemes that claim to be secure
against keyword-guessing attacks by an outsider. Then, Fang et al. [82] pointed out the
security vulnerabilities found in the existing schemes [20, 81, 187, 188] and gave a SCF-
PEKS scheme that is secure against chosen-keyword attacks, chosen-ciphertext attacks
and keyword-guessing attacks without random oracle.
Recently, Boldyreva and Chenette [33] defined the notion of efficiently fuzzy search-
able encryption (EFSE) in order to solve the problem of fuzzily searching on encrypted
information in symmetric key systems. Informally, a receiver may mispell keywords or
provide noisy information in the query and a server should be still able to locate the in-
formation containing the requested keywords.
Definition. A public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme is composed
of the following five algorithms [40]:
• Setup(λ )→ params. On input a security parameter λ , output the public parameters
params.
• KeyGen(params)→ (pk,sk). On input the public parameters params, output an
poublic key ek and a private key sk.
• Encrypt(params, pk,w)→C. On inputs the public parameters params, the public
key pk and a keyword w, output a ciphertext C.
• TrapGen(params,sk,w′)→C. On inputs the public parameters params, the private
key sk and a keyword w′, output a trapdoor T .
• Test(params,C,T )→ true/ f alse}. On inputs the public parameters params, a
ciphertext C for a keyword w and a trapdoor T for a keyword w′, output true if
w = w′; output f alse otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a public-key encryption with keyword search scheme
is correct if for any λ ∈ N, params ← Setup(λ ), (pk,sk) ← Keygen(params), C ←
Encrypt(params, pk,w) and T←TrapGen(params,sk,w′), we have that Decrypt(params,
dk,C) = true.
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3.1.2 Identity-Based Encryption, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption and Derivatives
Identity-Based Encryption
Identity-based encryption (IBE) allows a party to encrypt a message using the recipient’s
identity as a public key. The ability to use identities as public keys avoids the need to
distribute public-key certificates. This can be very useful in applications such as email
where the reicever is often off-line and unable to present a public-key certificate while the
sender encrypts a message.
The main advantage of IBE is that the public keys of the recipients do not need to
be obtained since the recipients’ identities are used for their generation and so for the
encryption. Obserrve that the recipient does not even need to be in the possession of the
private key related to his/her identity when the ciphertext is produced.
Observe that in a public-key setting, the users generate their public and private keys
locally, publish the public key and keep the private key secret. Conversely, in the identity-
based setting, the public and private keys are generated by a trusted authority, that is an
inherent key escrow, i.e. this authority may decrypt the user’s ciphertexts and/or may
issue signatures on behalf of these users.
We recall that the identity used for the public key is some information that all the
users originally know, for instance an email address. Nevertheless, if the corresponding
private key is compromised, then a solution is to choose an new identity (e.g. a new
email address), but this does not seem practical. Therefore, an identity should contain
additional information, for instance a key expiration date. However, the related public
key is no longer well known by all the users and meet public-key setting disadvantages
(i.e. distribution and publication of the public keys).
Existing Work. Shamir [206] introduced the idea of identity-based encryption (IBE)
and Boneh and Franklin [41] presented the first secure and efficient scheme based on
bilinear maps. Meanwhile, Cocks [63] constructed a identity-based encryption system
based on quadratic residues. Canetti et. al. [51] defined a weaker model of security for
identity-based encryption, called selective-ID model, in which the adversary must first
declare which identity it wishes to be challenged on before the parameters are generated.
The authors gave a system provably secure in this selective-ID model without random
oracles. Boneh and Boyen [37] provided a more efficient scheme that is secure in the
selective-ID model, in the standard model. Finally, Boneh and Boyen [36] proposed a
scheme that is fully secure without random oracles. However, their construction is too
inefficient to be of practical use. Then, Waters [235] described an efficient identity-based
encryption system that is fully secure in the standard model.
The notion of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) was introduced by Hor-
witz and Lynn [117]. In a HIBE system, users’ identities are arranged in a hierarchy
and a party can use its own private key to issue a private key to any of its descendants.
Thus, HIBE is an IBE extension in which key delegation is included. The first HIBE
construction was given by Gentry and Silverberg [96]; the scheme was proved secure in
the random oracle model. Selectively secure systems in the standard model were then
proposed in [51, 37, 38]. Later, Gentry [94] presented a security proof for an IBE sys-
tem outside of the partitioning paradigm; however at the cost of employing a q-based
assumption. Then, Gentry and Halevi [95] extended the techniques to provide the first
fully secure HIBE system to allow a hierarchy of polynomial depth.
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Definition. A identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is composed of the following
four algorithms [206]:
• Setup(λ )→ (params,msk). On input a security parameter λ , output the public
parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk, id) → skid . On inputs the public parameters params, the
master secret key msk and an identity id, output a private key skid , such that skid is
associated with the identity id.
• Encrypt(params, id,m)→CAS. On inputs the public parameters params, an iden-
tity id and a message m, output a ciphertext C.
• Decrypt(params, id,skid,C)→ m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
identity id, the corresponding private key skid and a ciphertext C, output m for a
valid ciphertext; output ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a identity-based encryption scheme is correct if for any
λ ∈ N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ), skid ← KeyGen(params,msk, id) and C← Encrypt(
params, id,m), we have that Decrypt(params, id,skid,C) = m.
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) allows parties to encrypt and decrypt messages based
on recipient attributes. This can be seen as a generalisation of IBE and can effectively
increase the flexibility of data sharing such that only parties satisfying specific policy are
allowed to access the data.
The advantage to using ABE over IBE is that a document can be stored on an un-
trusted storage server, instead of relying on a trusted one, in order to make authentication
verifications to deliver this document.
Two main disadvantages are met in ABE. Unfortunately, ABE is non-efficient and
does not offer a mechanism for attribute revocation. More precisely, the computational
costs for encryption and key generation are due to the complexity of the access policy
or the number of attributes. Then, revocation is more challenging in an attribute-based
setting, since that each attribute may belong to several users, while in a public-key setting,
a public and private key pair is uniquely associated to one user. In ABE, note that the
attributes should be revoked, unlike the users or the keys. In addition, problems from
dealing with the keys are encountered, such as key coordination, key escrow and key
revocation.
Existing Work. Sahai and Waters [201] introduced the idea of attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE). The notion of key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) emerged in [104]. In a KP-ABE
system, the ciphertexts are associated to an attribute set and each of the private keys is
related to an access policy over the attributes. Bethencourt et al. [30] proposed the first
ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) in which the ciphertexts are related with an access pol-
icy and each of the private keys corresponds to a set of attributes. CP-ABE and KP-ABE
selectively secure constructions followed in [181, 30, 60, 176, 103, 237]. Except for [176]
(in which negation is possible), the ABE schemes only work for non monotonic access
structures.
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Thereafter, Waters [237] proposed the first fully secure CP-ABE systems in the stan-
dard model. Other fully secure constructions in the standard model were given by Lewko
et al. [140], using the dual pairing vector space framework. However, these schemes
are less efficient that the ones in [237]. Meanwhile, Lewko and Waters [142] proposed
the first large universe KP-ABE construction in the standard model, using composite or-
der groups. Based on the techniques initiated by Okamoto and Takashima [175], Lewko
[139] formalized the first large universe KP-ABE scheme in prime order groups. Re-
cently, Rouselakis and Waters [195] proposed two large universe ABE constructions in
the prime order group setting. The schemes are proven selectively secure in the standard
model under two q-based assumptions.
Subsequently, Lewko and Waters [143] suggested a CP-ABE scheme that is proven
fully secure while achieving similar efficiency of selectively secure ABE systems. At-
trapadung et al. [16] presented the first KP-ABE schemes allowing for non-monotonic
access structures with constant ciphertext size. Moreover, Attrapadung et al. [15] offered
the first ABE scheme allowing for truly expressive access structures and with constant
ciphertext size. The authors constructed a CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts
for threshold access policies. They also provided a KP-ABE construction supporting non-
monotonic access structures with short ciphertexts.
The concept of an ABE setting with multiple central authorities was addressed by
Chase [53]. However, the scheme relied on a central authority and was limited to ex-
pressing a strict “AND” policy over a predetermined set of authorities. Chase and Chow
[54] achieved to remove the central authority using a distributed pseudorandom function;
however, the same limitations of an “AND” policy of a determined set of authorities re-
mained.
Definition. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme is com-
posed of the following four algorithms [201]:
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an attribute
universe U , output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. On inputs the public parameters params, the mas-
ter secret key msk and an attribute set S, output a private key skS, such that skS is
associated with the attribute set S.
• Encrypt(params,AS,S,m)→ CAS. On inputs the public parameters params, an
access structure AS for attributes over U , a set of attributes S satisfying the access
structure AS and a message m, output a ciphertext CAS.
We assume that the access structure AS is included in the ciphertext CAS.
• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and a ciphertext CAS, output m if
S satisfies AS; output ⊥ otherwise, indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not
satisfy AS.
Correctness. We require that a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is
correct if for any λ ∈ N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,U ), skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S)
and CAS←Encrypt(params,AS,S,m), and if S satisfies AS, we have that Decrypt(params,
S,skS,CAS) = m.
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On-line/Off-line Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
On-line/Off-line ABE (OO-ABE) is a natural extension of ABE that splits the computa-
tion for the encryption and the user key generation into two phases:
• a preparation phase that does most of the work: encrypting a message or creating a
private key before the message or the pair (attribute list,access control policy) that
will be used is known.
• a finalisation phase can then rapidly assemble an ABE ciphertext or key when the
elements become known.
OO-ABE implies that not only the message is unknown during the preparation phase (as
for classic on-line/off-line encryption), but also the attribute lists and the access policies.
We recall that one drawback from ABE is that encryption and key generation are too
inefficient for some applications. On-line/off-line attribute-based setting appears to be a
solution to overcome the above issue, by divinding the computation of encryption and key
generation into the preparation phase and the finalisation phase.
An application of OO-ABE is for mobile device technology. Indeed, imagine that the
preparation work is performed such that the phone is connected to a power source (thus,
the device has the necessary computational resources), then the finalisation phase with
the ABE operations is performed such that the phone is not longer plugged to the source
while the battery of this phone is not significantly consumed.
Existing Work. Even et al. [78] introduced the notion of on-line/off-line cryptography
in the context of signatures. Later, Shamir and Tauman [207] generalized the notion by
using chameleon hash functions [134]. Guo et al. [109] applied the concept for IBE and
obtained an off-line encryption system for IBE. Recently, Hohenberger and Waters [115]
developped new techniques for OO-ABE encryption and gave solutions in both key-policy
context and ciphertext-policy context.
Definition. A on-line/off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (OO-CP-ABE)
scheme is composed of the following five algorithms [115]:
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an attribute
universe U , output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. On inputs the public parameters params, the mas-
ter secret key msk and an attribute set S, output a private key skS, such that skS is
associated with the attribute set S.
• OffEncrypt(params,m)→ IntC. On inputs the public parameters params and a
message m, output an intermediate ciphertext IntC.
• OnEncrypt(params,AS,S, IntC)→CAS. On inputs the public parameters params,
an access structure AS for attributes over U , a set of attributes S satisfying the
access structure AS and an intermediate ciphertext IntC, output a ciphertext CAS.
We assume that the access structure AS is included in the ciphertext CAS.
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• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and a ciphertext CAS, output m if
S satisfies AS; output ⊥ otherwise, indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not
satisfy AS.
Correctness. We require that a on-line/off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-based en-
cryption scheme is correct if for any λ ∈N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,U ), skS←KeyGen(
params,msk,S), IntC← OffEncrypt(params,m) and CAS ← OnEncrypt(params,AS,S,
IntC), and if S satisfies AS, we have that Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS) = m.
3.1.3 Broadcast Encryption and Membership Encryption
Broadcast Encryption
Broadcast encryption (BE) allows a party to encrypt a message to a set of recipients such
that only the recipients within this set can decrypt it. Observe that the set of recipients
is chosen by the party at the time of encryption. In BE cryptosystems, any subset of
recipients can be included in a broadcast, however successful decryption of encrypted
messages is only possible for recipients included in the broadcast using their own private
keys.
In context with large number of recipients, BE is particularly efficient. Moreover,
such primitive has applications in secure database system, digital right management (DRM)
and group communications.
In a broadcast-encryption setting, a master secret key is set at the beginning of the
protocol, and allows to generate the recipients’ public and private keys. Thus recipients
can be added through the protocol without the need to reset the protocol. Nevertheless,
this also means that there is a central authority (CA) holding this master secret key, while
PKE does not need such requirement.
One drawback is that the ciphertext has to embed information on the set of recipients
used for its generation. This means that a recipient knows the composition of the set
since it has to use his/her private key as well as the public keys of the other recipients
belonging to the set in order to decrypt the ciphertext. Observe that successful decryption
by colluding unauthorised recipients should be impossible when desiging a BE scheme.
Moreover, BE is efficient and fast since the process works from one encryptor to a set
of authorised decryptors, while PKE only allows a one-to-one process. Another advantage
is for the key revocation: this is easy to revoke a user by not including him/her in any set
used for the generation of ciphertexts, and thus his/her private key becomes useless.
Existing Work. Broadcast encryption (BE) was introduced by Fiat and Naor [84]. Their
scheme is a private-key scheme proved secure against an upper bounded number of col-
luders. Fully collusion secure private-key BE was first proposed by Naor et al. [167] and
public-key BE was first formalized [73]. In [167, 73], schemes are constructed based on
the subset cover framework. Later, Boneh et al. [42] presented the first fully collusion-
resistant public-key BE where ciphertexts have constant size, while in all the previous
schemes, the size of the ciphertext was linear in the size of the target set. The authors in
[42] proposed two schemes that are proved selectively CPA and CCA secure, respectively.
Thereafter, a dynamic BE system was proposed in [71] where its security is only
partially adaptive. In addition, the scheme can be seen a revocation one such that the set
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of revoked users is selected at the time of encryption, and any user outside of this set is
able to decrypt. Delerablée [70] suggested an identity-based BE (IBBE) construction that
is proven selectively CPA secure.
Adaptive security was first proposed by Gentry and Waters [97]. The authors gave
several systems achieving adaptive CPA security in the random oracle model, in particular
BE schemes and IBBE schemes. They also managed to get constant-size ciphertexts for
their constructions.
Lewko et al. [141] gave a revocation scheme and identity-based revocation scheme
where private keys have small size. Waters [236] offered an efficient BE using dual system
encryption framework. In [141, 236], the systems are secure under static assumptions,
whereas the previous schemes are proved secure based on q-based assumptions.
More recently, the first adaptive CCA secure BE schemes were suggested by Phan et
al. [180], where both the private keys and the ciphertexts achieve constant size.
Definition. A broadcast encryption (BE) scheme is composed of the following four al-
gorithms [84]:
• Setup(λ ,s)→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and the total num-
ber of users s, output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk)→ {ski}i∈[1,s]. On input the public parameters params and
the master secret key msk, output the user private keys sk1, · · · ,sks.
• Encrypt(params,S)→ (Hdr,K). On inputs the public parameters params and a
subset S ⊆ [1,s], output a pair (Hdr,K) where Hdr is the header, referred as the
broadcast ciphertext, and K is a symmetric key chosen from a finite key set.
Let m be a message to be broadcast that should be decipherable precisely by the
recipients in S. Let Cm be the encryption of m under the symmetric key K. The
broadcast consists of (S,Hdr,Cm). The pair (S,Hdr) is often called the full header
and Cm is often called the broadcast body.
• Decrypt(params,Hdr,S, i,ski)→ K/ ⊥. On inputs the public parameters params,
the header Hdr, the subset S ⊆ [1,s], a user i ∈ [1,s] and its private key ski, output
K if i ∈ S; output ⊥ otherwise.
Then, the user i can use K to decrypt the broadcast body Cm and obtain the message
body m.
Correctness. We require that a broadcast encryption scheme is correct if for any λ ∈N,
(params,msk)← Setup(λ ,s), {ski}i∈[1,s]← Keygen(params) and (Hdr,K)← Encrypt(
params,S), and if i ∈ S, we have that Decrypt(params,Hdr,S, i,ski) = K.
Membership Encryption
Let P(G) denote a group token generated from a group G of users and a secret token
S. Membership encryption (ME) implies that decryption satisfies the privacy-preserving
group membership A ∈ G given the token P(G).
We suppose that the encryption takes a user A and the group token P(G) as inputs.
Thus, the decryption succeeds if and only if the recipient knows the group G of users and
the secret token S, and the statement A ∈ G is true.
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A membership encryption can be converted into a membership proof. Indeed, given A
and P(G), decrypting a membership encryption with success means that A ∈ P(G). In ad-
dition, a membership proof A ∈ P(G) from a membership encryption is non-transferable,
since the membership proof A ∈ P(G) does not need to be published, and thus the privacy
of P(G) is not compromised. Another advantage is that membership encryption is effi-
cient since it combines two steps into one: a membership proof that is implicitly checked
and the encryption of a message. Finally, observe that membership encryption can be
used for oblivious transfer protocol.
Existing Work. Privacy-preserving membership proof enables to prove that a user A
belongs to a group G of users while the privacy is protected. Follow two directions taken
by membership proof:
• Set membership proof for a user A ∈ G given a token P(A) [64, 50, 48]. The token
P(A) and the users in G are known by a verifier. The goal for a prover is to show
that a user in P(A) is in G without disclosing the identity of this user to the verifier.
Note that the privacy is preserved for the involved user.
• Accumulator for witness for a user A ∈ G given a token P(G) [29, 23, 173, 108,
49, 17, 110]. The token P(G) and a user A are known by a verifier. The goal for a
prover is to show that A belongs to the group of users in P(G) without disclosing the
identities of the other users in G to the verifier. Note that the privacy is preserved
for the non-involved users.
ME was introduced by Guo et al. [110] as an application for accumulator for witness.
Their provably secure scheme contains the following features:
• the group token P(G) has constant size with the maximum number accountability
on users and does not depend on the number of users in G;
• the upper bound number of users in P(G) is accountable;
• the ciphertext has constant size with the maximum number accountability on users
and is linearly dependent on the length of security parameter.
Definition. A membership encryption (ME) scheme is composed of the following five
algorithms [110]:
• Setup(λ ,s,{Ai}i∈[1,s])→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ , an in-
teger s and all the attributes {A1, · · · ,As}, output the public parameters params and
the master secret key msk.
• GroupGen(params,msk,G)→ (P(G),sk). On inputs the public parameters params,
the master secret key msk and a group attribute G = {Ai}i∈[1,k] for k ∈ [1,s], output
a group token P(G) and a private key sk.
• Verify(params,P(G),k)→ true/ f alse. On inputs the public parameters params,
a group token P(G) and an integer k, output true if the attribute number in P(G)
satisfies |P(G)| ≤ k; output f alse otherwise.
• Encrypt(params,A,P(G),m)→ C. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute A, a group token P(G) and a message m, output a ciphertext C.
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• Decrypt(params,A,G,sk,C)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, the
attribute A, the group attribute G, the private key sk and a ciphertext C, output the
message m for a valid ciphertext; output ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a membership encryption scheme is correct if for any
λ ,s∈N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,s,{Ai}i∈[1,s], (P(G),sk)←GroupGen(params,msk,G)
and C← Encrypt(params,A,P(G),m), and if A ∈G, we have that Decrypt(params,A,G,
sk,C) = m.
3.1.4 Proxy Re-Encryption and Derivatives
Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed under Al-
ice’s public key into one that can be opened by Bob’s private key. An application of such
primitive can be described as follows: Alice wants to temporarily forward her encrypted
emails to Bob without giving him her private key. Thus, Alice, called the delegator, can
ask a proxy to re-encrypt her emails into a format that Bob, called the delegatee, can de-
crypt using his own private key. Since the proxy is untrusted, PRE enables Alice to not
provide her private key to the proxy.
PRE offers various properties including:
1. Directionality: unidirectional PRE allows re-encryption in one way while bi-directional
PRE enables re-encryption in both ways.
2. Interactivity: Re-encryption keys are generated with the intervention of a third party
and/or with some interactions between Alice and Bob.
3. Transitivity: The proxy can re-delegate decryption rights.
4. Transferability: The proxy and any set of colluding delegatees can re-delegate de-
cryption rights.
5. Transparency: Neither the sender of ciphertexts nor any of the delegatees are aware
of the existence of the proxy.
PRE schemes can decide to satsify some of the above properties and not the other ones.
More important, a property can be met at the price of another one. Therefore, different
advantages and disadvantages appear in function of the property choices.
Existing Work. Mambo and Okamoto [150] introduced the concept of decryption rights
delegation. No long after, Blaze et al. [32] formalized the notion of “atomic proxy cryp-
tography” where a semi-trusted proxy computes a function that converts ciphertexts for
Alice into ciphertexts for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. Their scheme is
bidirectional: ciphertexts can be diverted from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice. Mor-
ever, the delegation in this scheme is transitive, meaning that the proxy alone can create
delegation rights between two parties that have never agreed on this.
Jakobsson [123] proposed a quorum-based protocol in which the proxy is divided
into sub-components, each controlling a share of the re-encryption key. Thus, the keys of
the delegator are safe as long as some of the proxies are honest. Zhou et al. [250] used a
similar way to construct their re-encryption protocol.
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Thereafter, Ivan and Dodis [120] suggested precise definitions of bidirectional and
unidirectional proxy functions. The authors presented an unidirectional proxy encryption
by sharing the user’s private key between two parties. They also achieved to overcome
the issue of the proxy alone by assigning new delegation rights. However, their systems
do no change ciphertexts for Alice into ciphertexts for Bob such that Bob can decrypt
them with his own private key. Instead, decryption is delegated by requiring Bob to store
additional secrets.
Ateniese et al. [14] improved the re-encryption schemes by using bilinear maps and
obtained that the master secret key of the delegator is safeguarded from a colluding proxy
and delegatee. They constructed three unidirectional PRE schemes proven CPA secure.
More recently, Canetti and Hohenberger [52] achieved CCA security for PRE systems.
Simultaneously, Green and Ateniese [105] gave an identity-based PRE (IB-PRE) scheme
that achieves CCA security.
Definition. A (unidirectional) proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme is composed of the
following six algorithms [32]:
• Setup(λ )→ params. On input a security parameter λ , outptut the public parame-
ters params.
• KeyGen(params)→ (pk,sk). On inputs the public parameters params, output the
public and private key pair (pk,sk).
• Encrypt(params, pkA,m)→CA. On inputs the public parameters params, a public
key pkA and a message m, output a ciphertext CA.
• Decrypt(params,skA,CA) → m/ ⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, a
private key skA and a ciphertext CA, output m for a valid ciphertext; output ⊥ other-
wise.
• RekeyGen(params, pkA,skA, pkB,skB)→ rkA→B. On inputs the public parameters
params, a public key pkA and the corresponding private key skA, and another public
key pkB and the corresponding private key skB, output the re-encryption key rkA→B.
The input skB is sometimes omitted; when this happens, we say that ReKeyGen is
non-interactive since the user B does not need to be involved in the generation of
the re-encryption keys. The input skA may in some cases be replaced by the tuple
(rkA→C,skC).
• ReEncrypt(params,rkA→B,CA)→CB. On inputs the public parameters params, the
re-encryption key rkA→B and a ciphertext CA, output another ciphertext CB.
Correctness. We require that a proxy re-encryption scheme is correct if for any λ ∈ N,
params← Setup(λ ), (pkA,skA)← Keygen(params) and (pkB,skB)← Keygen(params),
• Given CA← Encrypt(params, pkA,m), we have that Decrypt(params,skA,CA) =m.
• Given rkA→B←RekeyGen(params, pkA,skA, pkB,skB) and CB←ReEncrypt(params,
rkA→B,CA), we have that Decrypt(params,skB,CB) = m.
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Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) extends the notion
of PRE by permitting a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext under an access pol-
icy to another ciphertext encrypting with the same plaintext under another access policy.
Since CP-AB-PRE is a combination of PRE and CP-ABE, advantages and disadvan-
tages of both primitives are encountered. We recall the ABE is derived from IBE and
enhances the flexibility of message sharing such that only users satisfying specific pol-
icy are able to recover the message. In CP-ABE, private keys are labeled with attribute
sets and ciphertexts are associated with access structures that specify which kinds of pri-
vate keys the receiver has to retain. We also recall that PRE extends PKE to support the
delegation of decryption rights.
Existing Work. Liang et al. [146] introduced the primitive ciphertext-policy attribute-
based proxy re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE). The authors extended the CP-ABE scheme
given in [60] to obtain a CP-AB-PRE system, in which “AND” gates on positive and
negative attributes are supported. Mizuno and Doi [164] offered a hybrid PRE construc-
tion such that it can bridge ABE and IBE: ciphertexts generated in the ABE setting can
be converted to ciphertexts which can be decrypted in the context of IBE. Later, Luo et
al. [149] gave a CP-AB-PRE scheme such that “AND” gates on multivalued and negative
attributes are supported. All the aforementionned papers only obtained CPA secure CP-
AB-PRE systems. Liang et al. [145] proposed the first CP-AB-PRE construction that is
proved CCA secure and supports any monotonic access policy.
Definition. A (single-hop unidirectional) ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption
(CP-AB-PRE) scheme is composed of the following six algorithms [146]:
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an attribute
universe U , output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. On inputs the public parameters params, the mas-
ter secret key msk and an attribute set S, output a private key skS, such that skS is
associated with the attribute set S.
• Encrypt(params,AS,m)→ CAS. On inputs the public parameters params, an ac-
cess structure AS for attributes over U and a message m, output a ciphertext CAS.
We assume that the access structure AS is included in the ciphertext CAS.
• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and a ciphertext CAS, output m if
S satisfies AS; output ⊥ otherwise, indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not
satisfy AS.
• RekeyGen(params,S,skS,AS′)→ rkS→AS′ . On inputs the public parameters params,
an attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and an access structure AS′ for
attributes over U , output a re-encryption key rkS→AS′ that can be used to transform
a ciphertext under AS to another ciphertext under AS′ such that S satisfies AS.
Note that AS and AS′ are disjoint: for any attribute x satisfying AS, x does not
satisfy AS′.
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• ReEncrypt(params,rkS→AS′,CAS)→CAS′ . On inputs the public parameters params,
the re-encryption key rkS→AS′ and a ciphertext CAS, output another ciphertext CAS′
if S satisfies AS; output ⊥ indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not satisfy AS.
Correctness. We require that a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is
correct if for any λ ∈ N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,U ), skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S)
and skS′ ← KeyGen(params,msk,S′),
• Given CAS ← Encrypt(params,AS,m), if S satisfies AS, we have that Decrypt(
params,S,skS,CAS) = m.
• Given rkS→AS′ ← RekeyGen(params,S,skS,AS′) and CAS′ ← ReEncrypt(params,
rkS→AS′,CAS), if S
′ satisfies AS′, we have that Decrypt(params,S′,skS′,CAS′) = m.
3.1.5 Certificate-Based Encryption
The notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE) involves a certificate, that can be seen
as a signature, to act not only as a certificate but also as a decryption key. Thus, a recip-
ient needs both its private key and the most recent certificate, received from a certificate
authority (CA), to decrypt a message. In other words, CBE is inspired by IBE through
implicit certification and by PKE in that there is no escrow.
In a certificate-based setting, certificate revocation lists (CRL) or certificate status
protocols can be used to check whether a private key has been compromised.
One drawback is that the CA can always produce valid certificates for users and thus
sign on their behalf, meaning that users’ decryption capabilities is affected. In addition,
CBE equires a public-key infrastructure (PKI) that can increase the cost of setting up the
protocol.
Existing Work. Micali [158] proposed a public-key infrastructure (PKI) system, called
“Novomodo”. The system involves a certificate authority (CA), one or more directories to
distribute the certification information and users. The efficiency of “Novomodo” is better
than the ones obtained by the PKI certificate revocation list (CRL) and online certificate
status protocol. Following Micali’s solution, Naor and Nissim [168] and Aiello et al.
[3] simultaneously presented hash-based systems. Both of these protocols require binary
trees to reduce the computation of the CA and the communication between the CA and a
directory.
Gentry [93] introduced the concept of certificate-based encryption (CBE) that can be
used to construct an efficient PKI while requiring less infrastructure than for the afore-
mentionned systems. This primitive constrains a user to use both its private key and
an up-to-date certificate delivered from some CA to decrypt the ciphertext. The author
constructed a CBE scheme that was proved CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Thereafter, Sur et al. [217] proposed the first multi-receiver CBE (MR-CBE) system to
avoid the built-in key escrow problem while preserving the inferred certification of the
multi-receiver IBE (MR-IBE). However, no formal security proof was provided. More
recently, Fan et al. [79] improved the previous scheme and obtained an anonymous MR-
CBE scheme. They defined proper security models and gave formal CPA security and
user anonymity proofs in the random oracle model.
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Definition. A certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme is composed of the following
six algorithms [93]:
• Setup(λ1, t) → (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ1 and the total
number of time periods t, output the public parameters params and the master secret
key msk.
The public parameters params include a description of a string space S .
• KeyGen(λ2, t)→ (pk,sk). On inputs a security parameter λ2 and (optionally) the
total number of time periods t, output the user public and private key pair (pk,sk).
• Upd1(params,msk, pk, l,n)→Cert ′l . On inputs the public parameters params, the
master secret key msk, the user public key pk, a time period l and a string n ∈S ,
output a certificate Cert ′l at the start of l.
• Upd2(params, l,Cert ′l ,Certl−1)→Certl . On inputs the public parameters params,
a time period l, a certificate Cert ′l and (optionally) a certificate Certl−1, output a
certificate Certl at the start of l.
• Encrypt(params, pk,m, l,n)→C On inputs the public parameters params, the user
public pk, a message m, a time period l and a string n ∈S , output a ciphertext C.
• Decrypt(params,sk,Certl,C, l)→ m/ ⊥ On inputs the public parameters params,
the user public key pk, the certificate Certl , a ciphertext C and a time period l,
output m if Certl is a valid certificate; output ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a certificate-based encryption scheme is correct if for any
λ1,λ2, t ∈N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ1, t), (pk,sk)←KeyGen(λ2, t), Cert ′l←Upd1(params,
msk, pk, l,n), Certl←Upd2(params, l,Cert ′l ,Certl−1) and C←Encrypt(params, pk,m, l,n),
we have that Decrypt(params,sk,Certl,C, l) = m.
3.1.6 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures (DS) are electronic tokens that create binding between a user and a
message, in order to validate and authenticate the message. Validating a message means
certifying the contents of this message, and authenticating a message denotes certifying
the sender of the document.
DS encounter various properties. First, they enable the recipient of a message to
verify the sender (authenticity of the sender). Then, a digitally signed messagecannot be
altered without invalidating the signature (authenticity of the message). Finally, a DS is
used as a a sign of acknowledgement of a message (non-repudiation). Therefore, if a
sender has digitally signed a message, s/he cannot deny this message.
Since a DS cannot be altered, committing fraud and forging signature are not possible.
Given a DS of a message, we prove that this message is a valid one, and thus the recipient
is ensured that the message is not forged or fake. DS enahnces security but is an additional
cost when combined with another primitive.
Related Work. Signatures used to be a conventional way for authentication. Hellman
and Diffie introduced the notion of public-key cryptography that developped the first prac-
tical method of distributing cryptographic keys over an unprotected public network [72].
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Definition. The notion of digital signature (DS) was first proposed by Diffie and Hell-
man [72]. A digital signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(λ )→ params. On input a security parameter λ , output the public parameters
params.
• KeyGen(params)→ (vk,sk). On input the public parameters params, output a ver-
ifying (public) key vk and a signing (private) key sk.
• Sign(params,sk,m)→ σ . On inputs the public parameters params, the signing key
sk and a message m, output a signature σ .
• Verify(params,vk,m,σ)→ true/ f alse. On input the public parameters params,
the verifying key vk, the message m and the signature σ , output true if σ is a valid
signature; output f alse otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a digital signature scheme is correct if for any security pa-
rameter λ ∈N, params← Setup(λ ), (vk,sk)←Keygen(params) and σ← Sign(params,sk,
m), we have that Verify(params,vk,m,σ) = true.
3.1.7 Provable Data Possession
A provable data possession (PDP) allows a client to check the integrity of its data stored
at an untrusted server without retrieving the entire document.
A basic PDP can be improved by adding various features, including:
1. Data dynamics: Basic PDP work on static data, such that the client is not able
to update his/her stored data. Thus, one extension of basic PDP is to allow data
operations, such as data insertion, data deletion and data modification.
2. Reduced computational complexity: The complexities generated by data integrity
verifications should be reduced and even constant on both client’s and server’s sides,
since auditing the untrusted server is crucial. Given constant complexities, the client
can perform data integrity verifications regularly with less required computational
resources.
3. Block-less verification: The data are divided into blocks and these blocks are then
uploaded on the server. In order to check the stored data integrity, the client sends a
challenge on some data blocks to the server. The property of block-less verification
enables the challenged blocks to be efficienctly and securely retrieved by the client
(as the verifier) during the audit of the server.
4. Unboundedness: Since integrity of the stored data is critical, the client should not be
limited on the number of times that s/he can process the data integrity verifications.
Indeed, the client should be able to audit the server as much as s/he wants or needs.
5. Communication or network overhead: A PDP should reduce the network com-
munication overhead as much as possible, since data integrity verifications imply
exchanges of parts of the data.
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6. Public verifiability: Basic PDP require that the client himself/herself audits the
server to check the data integrity. The property of public verifiability allows every-
one to proceed the data integrity verifications.
7. Privacy preservation: When the data integrity verification is proceeded by a third
party auditor (that is not the client), then PDP must ensure that this third party
auditor learns nothing on the challenged data blocks.
The above features are desirable or not regarding of which problem the PDP primitive
should solve. Note that some properties can be satisfied at the price of other ones.
Existing Work. Ateniese et al. [12] introduced the notion of provable data possession
(PDP) and presented a scheme in which the verification metadata are homomorphic au-
thenticators. The scheme is only designed for static data and the precomputation of the
verification metadata imposes heavy computation overhead. Thereafter, Ateniese et al.
[13] proposed symmetric key-based schemes to improve the scalability and the efficiency
of the audit process compared to the scheme given in [12]. In addition, these shemes
partially support dynamic data operations (updates, deletions and appends at block level);
however, they are privately verifiable and limited in number of verification requests.
Subsequently, several works were presented following the models given in [12, 13].
Wang et al. [230] combined homomorphic authenticators based on the Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham signature scheme [43] with Merkle hash trees [157] to achieve a public auditing
protocol with fully dynamic data. Yu et al. [243] joined the techniques of ABE, PRE and
lazy re-encryption (LRE) [19, 18] to obtain a scheme that guarantees fine-grainedness,
scalability and data confidentiality of the access control. Hao et al. [112] designed a
dynamic public auditing system based on RSA cryptosystem. However, the authors did
not provide any proof of security; their scheme was shown not to be secure with respect
to data privacy in [245]. Consequently, Yu et al. [245] improved the scheme given [112]
that is proved to be data private. Erway et al. [77] proposed a fully dynamic PDP (DPDP)
scheme based on rank-based authenticated dictionaries [102]. Unfortunately, their con-
struction is very inefficient. Zhu et al. [252] used index hash tables to sustain fully
dynamic data and achieved to construct a zero-knowledge PDP. Zhu et al. [251] created
a dynamic audit service based on fragment structure, random sampling and index hash
tables that supports timely anomaly detection. Wang et al. [229] proposed a system to en-
sure the correctness of user data stored on multiple servers by requiring homomorphic to-
kens and erasure codes in the auditing process. Le and Markopoulou [137] constructed an
efficient dynamic remote data integrity checking scheme based on homomorphic message
authentication code (MAC) [99, 100] and CPA secure encryption. Note that this scheme
is specifically designed for network coding based storage cloud. Wang et al. [228] gave a
flexible distributed storage integrity auditing protocol utilizing a homomorphic token and
distributed erasure-coded data.
Later, Wang et al. [225] designed a privacy-preserving protocol, called “Oruta”, that
allows public auditing on shared data stored in the cloud. They exploited ring signa-
tures to compute the verification information needed to audit the integrity of shared data.
The scheme allows public auditing and identity privacy; nevertheless, it fails to support
large groups and traceability. In a parallel work, Wang et al. [224] presented a privacy-
preserving auditing system, called “Knox”, for data stored in the cloud and shared among
a large number of users in the group. The authors used group signatures [55] to construct
homomorphic authenticators. The scheme permits identity privacy, large number of users
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and traceability but is only for private auditing. Note that in [225, 224], the identity of the
user signing each block in the shared data is kept private from a third party auditor (TPA),
while this TPA is still able to verify the integrity of the shared data without retrieving the
entire document. However, Yu et al. [247] investigated the active adversary attacks in
existing auditing protocols for shared data in the cloud, including the two identity privacy
preserving auditing systems “Oruta” [225] and “Knox” [224], along with the above dis-
tributed storage integrity auditing system [228]. More precisely, the authors showed that
these schemes become insecure when active adversaries are involved in the cloud storage
(i.e. they can alter the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the verifica-
tion phase). Yang et al. [241] presented a survey of the previous works on data auditing.
Subsequently, Wang et al. [227] proposed another privacy-preserving scheme with public
auditing. Nevertheless, Fan et al. [80] showed that this scheme cannot guarantee that
information is not leaked since indistinguishability is not achieved. The authors then gave
a new definition of data privacy based on indistinguishability, along with an improved
version of the aforementioned scheme [227] that satisfies the new security model.
Wang et al. [226] suggested a protocol, called “Panda”, that achieves user revoca-
tion by using proxy re-signature[32]. Their scheme also reaches public verifiability, data
dynamicity (by using index hash tables) and batch auditing. However, Yu et al. [246]
showed that the system “Panda” is not secure since a server can hide data loss without
being detected. The authors in [246] proposed a solution to overcome the issue that keeps
the properties of “Panda”.
Definition. A provable data possession (PDP) scheme is composed of the following
four algorithms [12]:
• KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk). On input the security parameter λ , output the public and
private key pair (pk,sk).
• TagGen(pk,sk,m)→ Tm. On inputs the public key pk, the private sk and a document
m, output a verification metadata Tm.
The client splits the document m into data blocks and stores all of them in an ordered
collection F and the corresponding verification metadata Tm in an ordered collection
E. It forwards these two collections to a server and deletes them from its local
storage.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν . On inputs the public key pk, an ordered collection
F ⊂ F of data blocks, a challenge chal and an ordered collection Σ ⊂ E which are
the verification metadata corresponding to the data blocks in F , output a proof of
data possession ν for the data blocks in F that are determined by the challenge chal.
• CheckProof(pk,sk,chal,ν)→ treu/ f alse. On inputs the public key pk, the private
key sk, the challenge chal and the proof of data possession ν , output true if ν is
a correct proof of data possession for the data blocks determined by chal; output
f alse otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a provable data possession scheme is correct if for any λ ∈
N, (pk,sk)←KeyGen(λ ), Tm←TagGen(pk,sk,m) and ν←GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ), we
have that CheckProof(pk,sk,chal,ν) = true.
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Public Verifiability
Public verifiability implies that everyone can check that the proof of data possession ν
generated by the server is a correct one, meaning that the private key sk is no longer
required in the algorithm CheckProof. For instance, a third party auditor (TPA), on behalf
of the client, can be asked to verify that the server correctly stores the documents. The
algorithm CheckProof is modified as follows [204]:
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ true/ f alse. On inputs the public key pk, the challenge
chal and the proof of data possession ν , output true if ν is a correct proof of data
possession for the data blocks determined by chal; output f alse otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a provable data possession scheme is correct if for any λ ∈
N, (pk,sk)←KeyGen(λ ), Tm←TagGen(pk,sk,m) and ν←GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ), we
have that CheckProof(pk,chal,ν) = true.
Remarks. A first challenge chalC might be generated by the client and forwarded to the
TPA. Then, the TPA, on behalf of the client, generates a challenge chal based on chalC
and sends it to the server. If the client wants to check the integrity of its document without
the help of the TPA, then chalC = chal.
Dynamicity
Dynamicity implies that the client can ask the server to perform data operations on data
blocks, namely insertion, deletion and modification. The client can then check that
the server has correctly done the data operations. A dynamic provable data possession
(DPDP) scheme is composed of the four aforementioned algorithms KeyGen, Tag Gen,
GenProof and CheckProof, along with the two following algorithms [77]:
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o)→ (F′,E′,ν ′). On inputs the public key pk, the previous
collection F of all the data blocks, the previous collection E of all the corresponding
verification metadata, and the data operation details in f o given by the client, output
the updated verification metadata collection F′, the updated verification metadata
collection E′, and the updating proof ν ′.
The element in f o specifies the data operation to be performed (insertion, deletion
or modification), along with other information like the rank where the operation
has to be performed (if the data blocks are ordered), the data block itself and the
corresponding metadata.
• CheckOp(pk,sk,ν ′)→ true/ f alse. On inputs the public key pk, the private key sk
and the updating proof ν ′, output true if ν ′ is a correct updating proof; otherwise it
outputs f alse.
Correctness. We require that a provable data possession scheme is correct if for any
λ ∈ N, (pk,sk)← KeyGen(λ ), Tm← TagGen(pk,sk,m), and
• if (F′,E′,ν ′)← PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o), we have that CheckOp(pk,sk,ν ′) = true;
• if ν ← GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ), we have that CheckProof(pk,sk,chal,ν) = true.
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Remarks. Public verifiability can apply for DPDP schemes. In this case, the private
key sk is not taken as input in both algorithms CheckOp and CheckProof.
3.2 Cryptographic Tools
3.2.1 Hash Functions
A hash function H : {0,1}∗→{0,1}n is an algorithm that can map data of arbitrary length
to data of a fixed length n. In this thesis, we require that hash functions have to be collision
resistant. A family of collision resistant hash functions is a set of hash functions with the
following properties [68]:
1. There is a PPT algorithm, which on input a security parameter λ selects uniformly
and randomly a member of the family with the given value attached.
2. All functions in the family are computable in polynomial time.
3. The problem of finding x 6= y such that h(x) = h(y) for a given h in the family is
computationally impossible to solve.
The random oracle model, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [27] as a paradigm
for designing efficient protocols, assumes that all parties including the adversary have
access to a public, truly random hash function H. In practice, this ideal hash function
H is instantiated as a concrete cryptographic hash function. Hence, from a theoretical
perspective, a security proof in the random oracle model is only a heuristic indication of
the security of the system. When instantiated with a specific hash function, this model is
extremely useful for designing simple, efficient and highly practical solutions for many
problems. On the contrary, in the standard model, i.e. without random oracles, there is
no idealized oracle access, and the security is proven using only the standard complexity
assumptions. Hence, from a security point of view, a proof in the standard model is
preferable to a proof in the random oracle model.
Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions
Target collision resistant (TCR) hash functions were introduced by Cramer and Shoup
[66].
A TCR hash function H guarantees that given a random element x which is from the
valid domain of H, a PPT adversary A cannot find y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y). We let
AdvTCRH,A = Pr[(x,y)← A (λ ) : H(x) = H(y), x 6= y, x,y ∈ D] be the advantage of A in
successfully finding collisions from a TCR hash function H, where D is the valid input
domain of H and λ is the security parameter. If a hash function is chosen from a TCR
hash function family, then AdvTCRH,A is negligible.
Waters’ Hash Function
Let H : {0,1}n → G1 be the hash function used in Waters’ IBE and Signature schemes
[235]. First, pick at random n+1 exponents e0,e1, · · · ,en ∈R Zp and then compute hi = gei
for i∈ [0,n]. Let h= (h0,h1, · · · ,hn)∈Gn+11 be the public description of the hash function
H.
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The algebraic hash function H : {0,1}n→ G1 is evaluated on a keyword string w =
(w1, · · · ,wn)∈{0,1}n as the product h(w)= e0+∑ni=1(ei ·wi) and H(w)= h0 ·∏ni=0(hwii )=
gh(w)1 . The part h(w) can be seen as the private key that protects the keyword.
In [235], Waters compared his IBE scheme with the Boneh and Boyen’s IBE system
[35] in terms of security. Let u be a random element in G1 and id be an identity. In
Boneh and Boyen’s scheme, id is seen as an element in Zp whereas in Waters’ scheme,
id = (id1, · · · , idn) ∈ {0,1}n. Boneh and Boyen evaluated the element u ·gid1 while Waters
considered the element u ·∏i∈S idi where S ⊂ [1,n] is the set of all i for which idi = 1.
This difference makes that Waters’ scheme is fully secure whereas Boneh and Boyen’s
scheme is only selectively secure.
3.2.2 Access Structure
The definition of access structure (AS) was introduced by Beimel [24].
Let {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a set of parties. A collection AS ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if the
following implication is satisfied for all B,C: if B ∈ AS and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ AS. An
(monotone) access structure is a (monotone) collection AS⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} \{ /0}. We define
the sets in AS as the authorised sets (we say also that these sets satisfy AS) and the sets
not in AS as the unauthorised sets.
In this thesis, the role of the parties will be taken by the attributes. Thus, the access
structure AS will contain the authorised sets of attributes.
3.2.3 Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme
Beimel first defined the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) [24].
Let Π be a secret-sharing scheme (SSS) over a set of parties P. Π is said linear over
Zp if:
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There is a l×n matrix M (the share-generating matrix for Π). For all i ∈ [1, l], the
i-th row of M, written as Mi, is labeled by a party ρ(i), where ρ : [1, l]→ P. Let
v = (s,r2, · · · ,rn) be a column vector, where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and
r2, · · · ,rn ∈Zp be randomly chosen. Thus, M ·v is the vector of l shares of the secret
s according to Π. The share (M · v)i belongs to the party ρ(i).
A linear SSS (LSSS) satisfies the following linear reconstruction property. Let Π be
a LSSS for the access structure AS, S ∈ AS be any authorised set (i.e. S satisfies AS),
and I = {i}ρ(i)∈S ⊂ [1, l]. Therefore, there exist constants {wi}i∈I in Zp satisfying the
following implication: if {λi}i∈I are valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then
∑i∈I wi ·λi = s.
Convention. The vector (1,0, · · · ,0) is the target vector for any LSSS. Let I be a set
of rows of M. If I is an authorised set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is in the span of I. If I is a
unauthorised set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is not in the span of I. There is a vector w such that
w · (1,0, · · · ,0) =−1 and ∀i ∈ I, we have that w ·Mi = 0.
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3.3 Security Models
We succinctly present the security models for public-key cryptosystems. The schemes
presented in this thesis will be proven secure according to the attacks defined below
through games based on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problems. The goal of an
attacker,that we call an adversary, in a given security game is to obtain information which
reduces the security of a scheme. Note that a security model will be clearly exposed for
each protocol given in this thesis.
3.3.1 Semantic security
Goldwasser and Micali [101] defined the notion of semantic security to capture the intu-
ition that an adversary should not be able to get any piece of information about a plaintext
given the resulting ciphertext. Plaintext are any messages, documents, file contents, etc,
seen in plain (i.e. not encrypted). More precisely, even if the adversary has seen a ci-
phertext (i.e. the encrypted form of the plaintext), it cannot compute anything about the
corresponding plaintext (and it could not computed it by itself beforehand). Such re-
quirement should hold even if the adversary has some pieces of information about the
plaintext.
Nevertheless, secrecy is guaranteed if and only if the adversary is completely passive;
this means that it can only eavesdrop. In other words, semantic security does not offer
any guarantee of secrecy if the adversary can trigger an active attack; this means that it
can inject messages or influence the behavior of parties in the network.
3.3.2 Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)
A chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is a security model such that an adversary can obtain the
ciphertexts for arbitrary plaintexts. More precisely, the adversary is allowed to interact
with an encryption oracle viewed as a black box to query a ciphertext as an encryption
of a given plaintext. CPA security does not enable an adversary to obtain decryption of
ciphertexts of its choice (as in a chosen-ciphertext attack security).
3.3.3 Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
Rackoff and Simon [183] introduced the notion of security against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks (CCA2) to deal with active adversarys. More precisely, if an adversary
can inject plaintexts into a network, then these plaintexts may actually be ciphertexts, and
so the adversary might be able to extract some information about the corresponding plain-
texts through its interactions with the parties in the network. The security model enables
an adversary to get decryptions of its choice by calling a decryption oracle. Note that
given a challenge ciphertext, the adversary should not obtain any piece of information
about the corresponding plaintext by restricting the adversary’s power. In other words,
it cannot give the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle but some ciphertexts that
might be related to the challenge ciphertext.
Naor and Yung [170] first gave the security model in terms of (non-adaptive) chosen-
ciphertext attacks (CCA1) where the adversary has access to the decryption oracle only
prior to obtaining the challenge ciphertext. As above, the adversary’s goal is to get infor-
mation about the encrypted plaintext.
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More precisly, CCA1 enables an adversary to obtain the plaintexts for arbitrary ci-
phertexts under an unknown key. The adversary is allowed to interact with a decryption
oracle viewed as a black box to query a plaintext as a decryption of a given ciphertext.
Thus, the adversary can try to recover the hidden private key used for decryption. Then,
CCA2 differs from CCA1 in that the adversary forwards ciphertexts to be decrypted to
the decryption oracle and uses the resulting plaintexts to send next ciphertexts. The adver-
sary’s goal is to progressively obtain pieces of information about plaintexts or even about
the decryption (private) key.
Observe that in the public-key encryption context, CCA2 applies when ciphertexts are
malleable; this means that a ciphertext can be changed in certain ways to give a predictable
effect on its decryption and the resulting plaintext.
3.3.4 Non-Malleability
If an adversary is able to modify a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts a
related plaintext, then we say that the encryption is malleable. In other words, by using
the ciphertext of a plaintext m and without necessarily knowing m, we can create another
ciphertext that is the encryption of another plaintext F(m), where F denotes a known
function.
Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [74] first presented the notion of non-malleability. In this
context, the adversary has access to a decryption oracle and submits a challenge cipher-
text. The adversary’s goal is to generate a ciphertext as the encryption of a plaintext such
that this plaintext should be related to the one with its encryption equal to the challenge
ciphertext.
Non-malleability and security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack were shown
to be equivalent [26].
3.3.5 Indistinguishability
Indistinguishability (regarding the ciphertext) in a cryptosystem ensure that an adversary
will not be able to distinguish two different ciphertexts based on the plaintext they encrypt.
Indistinguishability under CPA is equivalent to semantic security, and so is the first
requirement for public-key cryptosystems to be proven secure. Indistinguishability under
CCA1 or CCA2 is a stronger requirement that can be reached by some cryptosystems.
We say that a cryptosystem is secure in terms of indistinguishability if no adversary
can determine what is the chosen plaintext with probability significantly greater than the
random guessing probability (which is equal to 1/2), given a ciphertext that encrypts a
plaintext randomly chosen between two plaintexts submitted by the adversary. In other
words, we want to ensure that the adversary should not be capable to do better than if it
guesses randomly.
If an adversary successfully distinguishes the chosen ciphertext with a probability
significantly greater than 1/2, then we say that the adversary has advantage in distin-
guishing the ciphertext, and thus the scheme is not secure in terms of indistinguishability.
We observe that the above definition includes the fact that the adversary should not learn
any information from the challenge ciphertext.
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Goldwasser and Micali [101, 159, 98, 100] proved that semantic security is equivalent
to the notion of indistinguishability. These models imply security even when the adversary
can trigger a CPA to obtain encryptions of plaintexts that it has chosen.
Indistinguishability under CPA (IND-CPA)
Indistinguishability under CPA (IND-CPA) is defined by the following game between an
adversary and a challenger. For schemes based on computational security, the adversary
is designed as a PPT Turing machine, meaning that it must complete the game and output
a guess µ ′ within a polynomial number of time steps. We use the notations from the
definition of a public-key encryption scheme in Section 3.1.1.
1. The challenger generates a key pair (ek,dk) based on some security parameter λ
and gives ek to the adversary. The challenger keeps dk secret.
2. The adversary may perform any number of queries to the encryption oracle based
on arbitrary plaintexts, or it may perform any number of other operations.
3. Eventually, the adversary submits two distinct chosen plaintexts (messages) m0 and
m1 of equal length to the challenger.
4. The challenger selects a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and sends the challenge ciphertext C =
Encrypt (params,ek,mµ) to the adversary.
5. The adversary performs again any number of additional queries and operations.
6. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ .
We define the advantage of the adversary A in winning the above game as Pr[µ = µ ′]−
1/2. A scheme is IND-CPA secure if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in
winning the above game.
Indistinguishability under CCA (IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2)
Indistinguishability under CCA (IND-CCA1 for the non-adaptive case and IND-CCA2
for the adaptive case) uses a definition similar to IND-CPA, except that the adversary
is given access to a decryption oracle which decrypts arbitrary ciphertexts at the adver-
sary’s request and returns the corresponding plaintexts, in addition to have access to an
encryption oracle.
In the non-adaptive definition, the adversary is allowed to query the decryption oracle
only up until it receives the challenge ciphertext. In the adaptive definition, the adversary
may continue to query to the decryption oracle even after it has received a challenge
ciphertext, with the restriction that it cannot query the challenge ciphertext itself for de-
cryption (otherwise, the definition would be trivial).
1. The challenger generates a key pair (ek,dk) based on some security parameter λ
and gives ek to the adversary. The challenger keeps dk secret.
2. The adversary may perform any number of queries to the encryption oracle based
on arbitrary plaintexts and to the decryption oracle based on arbitrary ciphertexts,
or it may perform any number of other operations.
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3. Eventually, the adversary submits two distinct chosen plaintexts (messages) m0 and
m1 of equal length to the challenger.
4. The challenger selects a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and sends the challenge ciphertext C =
Encrypt (params,ek,mµ) back to the adversary.
5. The adversary performs again any number of additional queries and operations.
6. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ .
We define the advantage of the adversary A in winning the above game as Pr[µ = µ ′]−
1/2. A scheme is IND-CCA1/IND-CCA2 secure if no adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in winning the above game.
N.B. In our security models, we write A-IND-CCA as a shorthand for IND-CCA2,
where the letter “A” stands for “adaptive”.
Selective Indistinguishability under CCA (S-IND-CCA). A third model is well pre-
sented in the literature, called selective indistinguishability under CCA. In this security
model, the adversary is given access to an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle, but
with the constraint to submit the challenge at the beginning of the game played between
the challenger and the adversary, before the challenger sets the keys used in the protocol.
The challenger answers to the adversary’s queries according to this challenge.
3.3.6 Relations between the Security Models
The notation P1 ⇒ P2 means that property P1 implies property P2, the notation P1 ⇔ P2
means that properties P1 and P2 are equivalent, and the notation P1 6⇒ P2 means that prop-
erty P1 does not necessarily imply property P2. Let NM-CPA define non-malleability
under chosen-plaintext attack and NM-CCA2 refer to non-malleability under adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attack. The following list recalls some (non) implications and equiva-
lences:
• IND-CPA⇔ semantic security under CPA.
• NM-CPA⇒ IND-CPA.
• NM-CPA 6⇒ IND-CCA2.
• NM-CCA2⇔ IND-CCA2.
Chapter 4
Broadcasting and Sharing Electronic
Health Records among the Involved
Users
Electronic health records (EHRs) are a powerful tool to help the hospital staff members to
obtain the necessary information to medically intervene. Therefore, hospital staff mem-
bers naturally wish to be able to broadcast and share among them the medical information.
Nevertheless, an implementation of the above situation is not straightforward. Indeed, we
have to ensure that the hospital staff members can efficiently and easily proceed when
dealing with EHRs among them, as well as that the security of the EHRs is maintained
since some members and outsiders might misbehave.
We present two primitives to enable the hospital staff members to broadcast and share
among them EHRs and other medical documents. The first one allows a user to broadcast
medical information to everyone, such as only a receiver able to prove his/her belonging
to group specially chosen for this broadcast can recover the information The second one
enables a user to broadcast medical information to everyone, such as only a receiver
belonging to a group specified for this broadcast and being granted with an up-to-date
license delivered by a health legislator can recover the information.
Observe that the two above primitives require more than just forwarding encrypted
EHRs to a group of selected hospital staff members. Indeed, the hospital staff members
have to bring extra evidence of either their belonging to the group or certifying that they
are authorised as of today.
4.1 Broadcast Encryption with Membership
Let us consider the following scenario. A medical institute has the responsibility to dis-
tribute private keys to the staff members of a hospital. These components will enable the
hospital staff members to deal with the medical institute on retrieving patients’ EHRs and
other medical documents in the future.
Regularly, the hospital delivers a membership list to the medical institute. This list
contains the identities and possibly extra information of some staff members working at
the hospital and can be seen as an authorisation to access medical information. For in-
stance, the list might contain only the identities of the medical staff members from the
traumatology service (including surgeons, anesthetists, nurses, physiotherapists, ...). We
assume that the list does not reveal the identities or any related information of the autho-
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rised hospital staff members to the medical institute. More precisely, only the hospital gets
the personal information of the staff members that it has selected, along with the number
of these staff members that should not be greater than a bound chosen beforehand.
Then, based on this hidden list, the medical institute encrypts some requested EHRs
and medical documents that the authorised hospital staff members need to access and
retrieve. Note that the resulting encrypted documents are forwarded to all the hospital
staff members, i.e. the staff members authorised by the list and the non-authorised staff
members. Upon receiving the encrypted documents, a hospital staff member will be able
to successfully decrypt using his/her private key if and only if s/he is an authorised staff
member of the aforementioned list. We depict such scenario in Figure 4.1.
If belongs to
Figure 4.1: Broadcast Encryption with Membership. A medical institute, acting as a group
manager and a broadcaster, computes the public and private key pairs for all the hospital staff
members. Then, a hospital chooses a group G of hospital staff members and delivers a token
P(G) to the medical institute. The latter used P(G) to compute a ciphertext C that encrypts a
message m regarding the group G, and forwards it to all the hospital staff members. A hospital
staff member can recover m if and only if s/he belongs to G.
4.1.1 Contributions
We introduce the notion of broadcast encryption with membership (BEM) to implement
the above scenario. In a BEM system, a sender generates the public and private key pairs
for all the users. A not-fully-trusted third party selects some users and hides their identities
in a token that is given to the sender. The latter then encrypts a message according to this
token and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext for all the users. Only the selected users are
enable to successfully decrypt the ciphertext.
We provide a BEM construction that is inspired by Gentry-Waters broadcast encryp-
tion (BE) scheme [97] and by Guo et al.’s membership encryption (ME) scheme [110],
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with some subtle changes. We should note that a trivial combination between these two
schemes will result to an insecure scheme. We also prove that the BEM construction is
semi-statically IND-CCA secure, preserves the privacy and guarantees the property of
maximum number accountability in the standard model.
Semi-static IND-CCA security model comes from Gentry and Waters’ paper [97].
The authors proved their BE scheme secure regarding this model. In this model, an ad-
versary must commit to a group G at the beginning of the security game played with a
challenger. The adversary can only attack any group G∗ ⊆G. Note that the adversary has
more flexibility than in the static IND-CCA security model. Gentry and Waters [97] also
proposed a way to transform a semi-statically secure BE scheme into an adaptively secure
BE scheme. We apply such transformation to our BEM scheme.
4.1.2 Protocol Definition
A broadcast encryption with membership (BEM) scheme is composed of the folowing six
algorithms:
• Setup(λ ,s)→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an integer s,
output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,{Ai}i∈[1,s])→{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s]. On input the public parame-
ters params, the master secret key msk and all the users {Ai}i∈[1,s], output the user
public and private key pairs (pk1,sk1), · · · ,(pks,sks).
• GroupGen(params,msk,G,{pki}i∈G) → P(G). On inputs the public parameters
params, the master secret key msk, a user group G = {Ai}i∈[1,k] for k ∈ [1,s] and
the public keys pk1, · · · , pkk of the users in G, output a group token P(G).
• Verify(params,P(G),k)→ true/ f alse. On inputs the public parameters params,
a group token P(G) and an integer k < s, output true if the user number in P(G)
satisfies |P(G)| ≤ k; output f alse otherwise.
• Encrypt(params,P(G),m)→C. On inputs the public parameters params, a group
token P(G) and a message m, output a ciphertext C.
• Decrypt(params,Ai,(pki,ski),G,C)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params,
a user Ai for i ∈ [1,s], the public and private key pair (pki,ski) of this user Ai, the
user group G and a ciphertext C, output the message m if Ai ∈ G; output ⊥ other-
wise.
Correctness. We require that a broadcast encryption with membership scheme is cor-
rect if for any λ ,s∈N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,s), {(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s]←KeyGen(params,
msk,{Ai}i∈[1,s]), P(G)←GroupGen(params,msk,G,{pki}i∈G) and C←Encrypt(params,




Recent BE systems [97, 180, 147] achieve adaptive IND-CCA security in the standard
model. In the corresponding security game, the adversary is allowed to see the public
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parameters and the user public keys, and then adaptively requests user private keys before
choosing the challenge user group G∗ that it wishes to attack.
Nevertheless, in this section, we consider a weaker security definition, that is semi-
static IND-CCA security. This notion was introduced by Gentry and Waters [97] to prove
the security of their BE scheme. They also provided a generic technique to transform a
semi-statically secure BE to an adaptively secure scheme. We note that their transfor-
mation is also applicable to BEM schemes, and so from the semi-statically secure BEM
system presented below, we are able to extend it to a BEM system that is adaptively se-
cure. We provide the transformation from semi-static security to adaptive security at the
end of this section.
In the semi-static security game, the adversary must commit to a group G of users
in an initialization phase that precedes the setup phase. The adversary cannot query a
private key for any user Ai ∈G, and it must choose a challenge group G∗ for the challenge
ciphertext such that G∗ ⊆ G.
In the following, we define the security notion for semi-static indistinguishability
against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). A BEM scheme is semi-statically IND-
CCA secure if no PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advan-
tage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the adversary A as follows:
Initialization. The adversary gives to the challenger a group G⊆ {Ai}i∈[1,s] of users that
it wishes to be challenged on.
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to obtain the public param-
eters and the public keys of users, and sends these elements to the adversary.
Query Phase 1. The adversary issues private key queries for users in {Ai}i∈[1,s] \G. The
challenger answers by sending back to A the private keys {ski}{Ai}i∈[1,s]\G←KeyGen(
params,msk,{Ai}i∈[1,s] \G).
Challenge. The adversary chooses a challenge group G∗⊆G, such that all the private key
queries correspond to users Ai /∈ G∗. The challenger runs the algorithm GroupGen
with input the group G∗ and obtains the group token P(G∗). B then encrypts a
message m under P(G∗) to obtain the ciphertext C0. Let C1 be a random ciphertext
from the ciphertext space. It sets µ ∈R {0,1} and gives C∗ =Cµ to the adversary.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ , and wins the game if µ ′ = µ .
We define the advantage of the adversary A as AdvSemiSBEM,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 1/2|. A
BED scheme is semi-statically IND-CCA secure if for any PPT adversary, its advantage
AdvSemiSBEM,A (λ ) is a negligible function in λ .
Privacy Model
We consider the following requirements. Let the broadcaster be the one who encrypts a
message m according to a group G of users and distributes the resulting ciphertext to all
the users. The broadcaster knows the identities of all the users A1, · · · ,As since it generates
their public and private key pairs (meaning that it runs the algorithm KeyGen). However,
it does not know the identities of the users in the group G = {Ai}i∈[1,k] since it does not
select them (meaning that the algorithm GroupGen is run by another party). Instead, the
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broadcaster only knows the maximum number of users in G since it gives the constraint
that k has to be smaller than s (meaning that it runs the algorithm Verify).
The term “privacy” here does not refer to the complete anonymity towards the users.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that the users chosen to be in G are ensured that their identi-
ties are kept secret from the broadcaster.
We require that a BEM system preserves the privacy of group users. Essentially,
given a group token P(G) where G represents a group of users, and two user groups G0 =
{Ai}i∈[1,k0] and G1 = {A′i}i∈[1,k1], it is computationally hard to decide whether G = G0 or
G = G1.
In the following, we define the security notion for privacy. A BEM scheme is privately
secure if no PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage.
Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the adversary A as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to generate the public pa-
rameters params and the public keys pk1, · · · , pks, and sends these elements to the
adversary.
Challenge. The adversary gives the challenger two user groups G0 = {Ai}i∈[1,k] and G1 =
{A′i}i∈[1,k] for k < s. The challenger responds by choosing a bit µ ∈R {0,1} at
random, and by generating the token P(Gµ) for the user group Gµ . Finally, B
sends P(Gµ) to the adversary.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} of µ , and wins the game if µ ′ = µ .
We define the advantage of the adversary A as AdvPrivacyBEM,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 1/2|. A
BEM scheme preserves the privacy of the group users if for any PPT adversary, its advan-
tage AdvPrivacyBEM,A (λ ) is a negligible function in λ . We say the BEM scheme unconditionally
preserves the privacy of the group users if AdvPrivacyBEM,A (λ ) = 0.
Maximum Number Accountability Model
The property of maximum number accountability ensures that given a group token P(G)
for a user group G of cardinality equal to s, the broadcaster is guaranteed that the en-
crypted contents will only be decipherable by a maximum number s of users. Intuitively,
a BEM system verifies the property of maximum number accountability if it is computa-
tionally hard to generate a group token P(G) for G such that |G| = s, and the algorithm
Verify outputs |G| ≤ k for k < s chosen by the broadcaster.
In the following, we define the security notion for maximum number accountabil-
ity. A BEM scheme guarantees the property of maximum number accountability if no
PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a
challenger that plays the game with the adversary A as follows:
Challenge. The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to generate the public
parameters params and the public keys pk1, · · · , pks. It also chooses a value k < s,
and sends all these elements to the adversary.
Win. The adversary outptus (P(G),G) and wins the game if G contains s users but the
algorithm Verify outputs true, meaning that |G| ≤ k.
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We define the advantage of the adversary as AdvMaxNubAccBEM,A (λ ). A BEM system guarantees
the property of maximum number accountability if for any PPT adversary, its advantage
AdvMaxNubAccBEM,A (λ ) is a negligible function in λ .
4.1.4 Construction
Let G be an algorithm that, on input the security parameter λ , outputs a pairing group
tuple (p,G1,GT ,e,g), where G1 and GT are two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p, the map e : G1×G1→GT is bilinear and g is a generator of G1.
• Setup(λ ,s)→ (params,msk). First, run (p,G1,GT ,e,g)← G (λ ). Then, choose
α,β ,γ ∈R Zp and h ∈R G1 at random. Compute e(gγ ,g), ui = hγα
i
and vi = hγβα
i
for i ∈ [0,s].
The public parameters params are set as (p,G1,GT ,e,g,h,e(gγ ,g),u0, · · · ,us,v0, · · · ,
vs) and the master secret key msk is set as (α,β ,γ).
• KeyGen(params,msk,{Ai}i∈[1,s])→ {(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s]. Randomly choose xi,si ∈R
Zp and fi ∈R G1. Compute the private key ski = (di0, · · · ,dis,) as follows:
di0 = g−si, dii = gγ f
si
i , and for i 6= j, di j = f sij .
Set the public key pki as (xi +α, fi).


















• Verify(params,P(G),k) → true/ f alse. First, verify that w2 = wβ1 by checking
e(w1,v0) = e(w2,u0). If the last equality holds, and if e(w2,us) = e(w3,uk), then
accept |G| ≤ k and output true; otherwise, output f alse.
• Encrypt(params,P(G),m)→C. First, verify that w2 = wβ1 by checking e(w1,v0) =
e(w2,u0). If the last equality holds, then proceed; otherwise, abort. Then, randomly
choose r ∈R Zp. Given a message m, compute the ciphertext C = (C0,C1,C2,C3) as
follows:
C0 = wr1 = h
rγt·∏Ai∈G(xi+α)
C1 = wr5 = g
rt
C2 = wr4 = ∏
Ai∈G
f rti
C3 = m ·wr6 · e(C0,g) = m · e(g,g)rtγ · e(hrγt·∏Ai∈G(xi+α),g)
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• Decrypt(params,Ai,(pki,ski),G,C)→ m/ ⊥. First, check the cardinality of the
group G. If |G| ≤ k, then proceed; otherwise, abort. Then, compute the pairing
e1 = e(dii · ∏
A j∈G\{Ai}
di j,C1) · e(di0,C2)
= e(gγ · f sii · ∏
A j∈G\{Ai}
f sij ,g
rt) · e(g−si, ∏
A j∈G
f rtj )
= e(gγ ,grt) · e( ∏
A j∈G
f sij ,g




Retrieve m by computing
e−11 ·C3 · e(hγ·∏Ai∈G(xi+α),C1)
= e(gγ ,grt)−1 ·m · e(gγ ,g)rt · e(C0,g) · e(hγ·∏Ai∈G(xi+α),C1)




Intuitively, an adversary A must recover e(gγ ,g)rt in order to decrypt the ciphertext C.
To do this, A must pair C1 = grt from the ciphertext with the components from some
private keys ski of a user Ai ∈ G∗, where G∗ is the challenge group chosen by A . This




an unknown exponent b ∈ Zp. This value val can cancel out if and only if the user has the
correct key components. Since the hiding value val is randomized with the exponent b
from the private keys of users Ai ∈ G∗, the attack of A will be successful with negligible
probability.
Theorem. Suppose that the s-DBDHE assumption holds in (G1,GT ), then the BEM
scheme is semi-statically IND-CCA secure in the standard model.
Suppose there is an adversary A who can break the semi-statically IND-CCA secu-
rity of the BEM scheme with advantage AdvSemiSBEM,A (λ ) ≥ ε . We then construct a chal-
lenger B that can decide whether Z is either equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·b or to a random element
in GT . The simulator B plays the semi-statically IND-CCA game with A as follows.





, · · · ,ga2s,gb,Z) where Z is either equal to e(g,g)as+1·b or to a random element in GT .
Initialization. A commits to a group G⊆ {Ai}i∈[1,s] of users.
Setup. First, B randomly selects y0, · · · ,ys ∈R Zp, and computes f j = gy j for A j ∈G and
f j = gy j+a
j
for A j ∈ {Ai}i∈[1,s] \G. In addition, B implicitly sets γ = y0 · as+1. It
picks at random h,vi ∈R G1 and α,τ ∈R Zp, and sets ui =(gb)τ·α
i
for i∈ [0,s]. It sets
the public parameters params as (p,G1,GT ,e,g,h,e(gγ ,g),u0, · · · ,us,v0, · · · ,vs),
where e(gγ ,g) can be computed as e(ga,ga
s
)y0 .
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Second, for i ∈ [1,s], it calculates xi +α for a random exponent xi ∈R Zp. It set the
public keys pki as (xi +α, fi). Finally, B sends params and {pki}i∈[1,s] to A .
Query Phase 1. A is allowed to query private keys for users in {Ai}i∈[1,s] \G. To answer
the query, B randomly selects zi ∈R Zp, computes si = zi− y0 ·as+1−i, and sets the
private keys ski as (di0, · · · ,dis), where
di0 = g−si, dii = gγ · f sii , and for j 6= i, di j = f sij .
B can compute all these components from the problem instance. For instance,
dii = gγ · f sii = gy0·a
s+1+(yi+ai)(zi−y0·as+1−i)
can be computed since the term as+1 in the exponent cancels out.
Challenge. A chooses a group G∗ ⊆ G and selects two messages m0 and m1 of equal
length. B picks at random a bit µ ∈R {0,1}, and sets b = rt for unknown exponents
r, t ∈Zp. We observe that ∏Ai∈G∗(xi+α)=∑Ai∈G∗ Xiα i for Xi ∈Zp. The challenger
lets the challenge ciphertext C∗ be (C0,C1,C2,C3), where C0 = ∏Ai∈G∗ u
Xi
i , C1 = g
b,
C2 = ∏Ai∈G∗ f
b
i and C3 = mµ ·Zy0 · e(C0,g). It sends C∗ to A .
B can compute these components from the problem instance as C1 and C3 come
directly from it. Moreover, since B knows the logarithm DLg( fi) for all Ai ∈ G∗, it
can compute C2 as ∏Ai∈G∗ f
b
i = ∏Ai∈G∗ g
yi·b = gb·∑Ai∈G∗ yi . The challenger can also
compute C0 as ∏Ai∈G∗ u
Xi
i = ∏Ai∈G∗(g
bτ·α i)Xi = gbτ(∑Ai∈G∗ α
i·Xi).
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess µ ′ for µ . The adversary wins if µ ′ = µ .
Analysis. The public and private keys are appropriately distributed since γ and the val-
ues DLg( fi) and si are uniformly random and independent.
When Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·b, the ciphertext C∗ is generated according to the same distribu-
tion as in the real scheme. Indeed, the component C3 is equal to mµ · e(g,g)γ·b · e(C0,g),
where γ = y0 ·as+1, and thus the challenge ciphertext is valid under the randomness b= rt.
Then, the adversary must satisfy |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | ≥ ε .
When Z ∈R GT , the ciphertext C∗ = (C0,C1,C2,C3) is generated as follows: the com-
ponent C3 is equal to mµ ·Z · e(C0,g) for Z ∈R GT . Thus, we get Pr[µ ′ = µ] = 12 .
It follows that we have AdvDBDHEB,GT (λ )≥ ε .
Privacy Proof
We prove that given P(G), it is hard to know the users in G0 = {Ai}i∈[1,k]. To do so, we
consider another user group G1 = {A′i}i∈[1,k] such that |G0| = |G1|. We show that P(G0)
is a group token for both G0 and G1.
Theorem. Suppose that the DL assumption holds in G1, then the BEM scheme is pri-
vacy preserving in the standard model.
Let A be an adversary who breaks the property of unconditional privacy with advan-
tage AdvUncPrivBEM,A (λ ). Then, we construct a challenger B that solves the DL problem in G1
by interacting with A as follows.
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B takes as inputs (p,g,G1,GT ,e)← G (λ ) and a DL instance containing the tuple
(g,gt).
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithms Setup and KeyGen to generate the public pa-
rameters params and the public keys pk1, · · · , pks, and sends these elements to the
adversary.
Challenge. The adversary gives the challenger two user groups G0 and G1 such that
|G0|= |G1|= k < s. The challenger then chooses a bit µ ∈R {0,1} at random, and


















where t ∈R Zp. Finally, B sends P(Gµ) to the adversary.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} of µ , and wins the game if µ ′ = µ .
Analysis. If the adversary can provide the random exponent t chosen by B, then it can
provide the group Gµ given P(Gµ). Since the adversary selects G0 and G1, it can generate
the token P(Gν), for ν ∈ {0,1}, if it knows the randomness t. Thus, if P(Gν) = P(Gµ),
then the adversary knows that µ = ν ; otherwise, it knows that µ = 1−ν .
Therefore, guessing µ is as guessing t from P(Gµ). In other words, finding t from
w5 = gt is as solving the DL problem in G1.
Maximum Number Accountability Proof
Intuitively, for users in G = {Ai}i∈[1,k] for k < s, we have





From the algorithm Verify, the exponent in w3 contains αs−k which is known by the
verifier. We have that w1 = h
γt·∏Ai∈G(xi+α), where the polynomial ∏Ai∈G(xi+x) is at most
of degree k. Otherwise, computing w3 requires hγβα
s+1
, · · · ,hγβαs
′
for s′ > s and these
components are not generated during the algorithm Setup.
Theorem. Suppose that the ( f ,s)-DHE problem holds in G1, then the BEM scheme
guarantees the property of maximum number accountability in the standard model.
Let A be an adversary who breaks the property of maximum number accountability
with advantage AdvMaxNubAccBEM,A (λ ). Then, we construct a challenger B that solves the
( f ,s)-DHE problem in G1 by interacting with A as follows.
B takes as inputs (p,g,G1,GT ,e)← G (λ ) and a ( f ,s)-DHE instance containing the
tuple (g,ga, · · · ,gas).
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Challenge. B generates the public components as follows. It first chooses β ,γ ∈R Zp at
random, and implicitly makes α equal to a. It then randomly picks y ∈R Zp, and
sets h = gy. Thus, we obtain:











For i ∈ [1,s], the challenger randomly chooses si,xi ∈R Zp and fi ∈R G1. It implic-
itly sets the public key pki as (xi +α, fi) = (xi + a, fi) and the private key ski as
(di0, · · · ,dis), where di0 = g−si , dii = gγ f sii and for j 6= i, di j = f sij .
Note that all the terms are computable from the problem instance. B sends the
public parameters and the public keys to A .
Win. A outputs (P(G),G) where G = {Ai}i∈[1,k].
Analysis. Suppose that the algorithm Verify accepts |G| ≤ k < s and outputs true. Let
P(G) = (w1,w2,w3,w4,w5,w6). If the algorithm Verify outputs |G|= k′ < k, then we can
write P(G) as:





Moreover, we get w1 = h
t·∏Ai∈G(α+xi) = gy·t·∏Ai∈G(a+xi). Finally, B sets f (x) = yβ t ·
xs−k
′
∏Ai∈G(xi + x), which is a (s+ k− k′)-degree polynomial function in Zp[x], and out-
puts ( f (x),w3) as the solution to the ( f ,s)-DHE problem.
Remarks. Note that the elements w1,w2,w3 are involved in the verification of the group
size, while the elements w1,w4,w5,w6 are involved in the generation of the ciphertext.
Therefore, the component w1 is common in both P(G) and C and allows us to avoid
the following situation. Imagine that w1 is only computed for P(G) but not used for C,
meaning that there is no common component. Thus, a dealer might compute w1,w2,w3
for less than k selected users while it might calculate w4,w5,w6 for more than k selected
users, without being noticed by the broadcaster. In addition, during the decryption, a user
is able to check the size of the group G: if |G| > k, then the dealer’s cheating behaviour
is detected. This means that the broadcaster does not have any control on observing
cheating behaviours and has to wait for users’ notices to realize that the dealer is not
acting honestly.
By involving w1 in both the verification of the group size and the generation of the
ciphertext, we enable the broadcaster to keep full control on dealers’ behaviour.
4.1.6 From Semi-Static Security to Adaptive Security
We recall that in a semi-static security game, the adversary has to limit its queries before
the setup phase. This requirement is not found in an adaptive security game, where the
adversary can “adaptively” query a challenger. Gentry and Waters [97] showed how to
extend a semi-statically secure BE scheme into an adaptively secure BE scheme. To ob-
tain such transformation, they applied the two-key methodology. In a two-key scheme, a
trusted authority generates two private keys for a user, while it forwards only one of the
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two keys to this user. Another user has to encrypt twice a message, i.e. one encryption for
each key. Note that the encryptor does not know which key was delivered to the first user.
Let the tuple BEMSS =(SetupSS,KeyGenSS,GroupGenSS,VerifySS,EncryptSS,DecryptSS)
be a semi-statically secure BEM scheme. Let EDSym be a semantically secure symmetric
scheme, where EncryptSym and DecryptSym are the two algorithms for symmetric en-
cryption and symmetric decryption respectively. We construct an adaptively secure BEM
scheme BEMA = (SetupA,KeyGenA,GroupGenA,VerifyA,EncryptA,DecryptA) as follows:
• SetupA(λ ,s)→ (params,msk). Run (params,msk′)← SetupSS(λ ,2s). Pick at ran-
dom ζ ∈R {0,1}s. Set msk = (msk′,ζ ).
• KeyGenA(params,msk,{Ai}i∈[1,s])→{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s]. Run {(pki,sk′i)}i∈[1,s]←Key-
GenSS(params,msk,{A2i−ζi}i∈[1,s]). Set ski = (sk′i,ζi) for i ∈ [1,s].
• GroupGenA(params,msk,G,{pki}i∈G)→ P(G). Create a random set of |G| bit as
follows: τi ∈R {0,1} for i ∈ G and then, τ = {τi}i∈G. Let G0 = {2i− τi}i∈G and
G1 = {2i− (1− τi)}i∈G. Run P(G0)← GroupGenSS(params,msk,G0,{pki}i∈G0)
and P(G1)←GroupGenSS(params,msk,G1,{pki}i∈G1). Set P(G)= (P(G0),P(G1),
τ).
• VerifyA(params,P(G),k)→ true/ f alse. Run true/ f alse←VerifySS(params,P(G0),
d k2e) and true/ f alse← VerifySS(params,P(G1),d k2e). Note that if k is odd, the
maximum number becomes k+1.
• EncryptA(params,P(G),m)→ C. Parse P(G) as (P(G0),P(G1),τ). Pick at ran-
dom η0,η1 from the message space. Run EncryptSS(params,P(G0),η0)→C0 and
EncryptSS(params,P(G1),η1)→C1. Then, run C′0← EncryptSym(params,η0,m)
and C′1← EncryptSym(params,η1,m) (η0 and η1 play the roles of the symmetric
keys). Set C = (C0,C′0,C1,C
′
1,τ).
• DecryptA(params,Ai,(pki,ski),G,C)→m/⊥. Set G0 and G1 as above. Parse C as
(C0,C′0,C1,C
′
1,τ) and ski as (sk
′
i,ζi). Run ηζi⊕τi←DecryptSS(params,Ai,(pki,ski),
Gζi⊕τi,Cζi⊕τi). Then, run m← DecryptSym(params,ηζi⊕τi,C′ζi⊕τi).
Theorem. Suppose that the BEM scheme BEMSS = (SetupSS,KeyGenSS,GroupGenSS,
VerifySS,EncryptSS,DecryptSS) is semi-statically secure, then the BEM scheme BEMA =
(SetupA,KeyGenA,GroupGenA,VerifyA,EncryptA,DecryptA) is adaptively secure (given
that EDSym is a semantically secure symmetric scheme).
Let A be an adaptive adversary that attacks the adaptive BEM scheme BEMA. Then,
there exists four challengers B1, B2, B3 and B4 that play the security game with A .
The proof is constructed as a sequence of games. Let Ei be the event that A wins the
game Gamei, for i ∈ [0,4].
Game0. The game Game0 is identical to the adaptive IND-CCA security game. There-
fore, we obtain that |Pr[E0]−1/2|= AdvA−IND−CCABEMA,A (λ ).
Game1. The game Game1 is identical to the game Game0, except that the challenger C1
randomly chooses P(G0) when constructing the challenge ciphertext. There exists
a challenger B1 that breaks the security of the scheme BEMSS as follows. First, B1
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picks at random ζ ∈R {0,1}s and sets the group G̃ as the set {2i− (1− ζi)}i∈[1,s].
It then forwards G̃ to C1, which gives back the public parameters params. B1 then
sends params to the adversary A .
When the adversary A makes queries on the private keys of the BEM scheme
BEMA, for i ∈ [1,s], the challenger B1 makes queries on the private keys of the
BEM scheme BEMSS, for 2i− ζi. The challenger C1 answers by sending back sk′i
to B1, and then B1 answers by sending back ski = (sk′i,ζi) to A .
Later, A asks for a challenge ciphertext on a group G∗ ⊆ [1,s]. B1 computes
τ = {τi = 1−ζi}i∈G∗ and then, sets G0 = {2i−τi}i∈G∗ and G1 = {2i−(1−τi)}i∈G∗ .
It also asks for a challenge ciphertext on G0 to the challenger C1. C1 answers by
choosing at random a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by giving back (C0)µ←EncryptSS(params,
(P(G0))µ ,(η0)µ) and (η0)µ . Then, the challenger B1 picks at random η1 from the
message space, and runs EncryptSS(params,P(G1),η1)→C1. B1 also chooses two
messages of equal length m0 and m1 and picks at random a bit µ† ∈R {0,1}. In addi-
tion, B1 runs C′0←EncryptSym(params, (η0)µ ,mµ†) and C′1←EncryptSym(params,




1,τ) and gives it to
the adversary A .
Eventually, A gives a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} as a guess for µ . If µ ′ = µ†, then B1 sends 0
to C1; otherwise, it sends 1 to C1.
If µ = 0, then the adversary’s view is as in the game Game0. The private keys sent
by B1 are appropriately distributed. The element τ is uniformly random from the
adversary’s view, since the private key queries made by A only reveal the values ζi
for i /∈G∗. Moreover, (C0)0 (generated with input (P(G0))0) is correctly generated,
and the depedent values are also correctly generated. If µ = 1, then the adversary’s
view is as in the game Game1. Therefore, |Pr[E1]−Pr[E0]| ≤ AdvSS−IND−CCABEMSS,B1 (λ ).
Game2. The game Game2 is identical to the game Game1, except that the challenger C2
randomly chooses P(G1) when constructing the challenge ciphertext. The analysis
is similar to the one above, and so there exists a challenger B1 that breaks the
security of the scheme BEMSS. Following the above methodology, we can conclude
that |Pr[E2]−Pr[E1]| ≤ AdvSS−IND−CCABEMSS,B2 (λ ).
Game3. The game Game3 is identical to the game Game2, except that the challenger C3
randomly chooses a message m0 from the message space. Then, the challenger
computes C′0 ← EncryptSym(params,η0,m0). There exists a challenger B3 con-
structed as an adversary that attacks the semantic security of EDSym. Thus, we get
that |Pr[E3]−Pr[E2]|= AdvSemSecEDSym,B3(λ ).
Game4. The game Game4 is identical to the game Game3, except that the challenger C4
randomly chooses a message m1 from the message space. Then, the challenger
computes C′1 ← EncryptSym(params,η1,m1). There exists a challenger B4 con-
structed as an adversary that attacks the semantic security of EDSym. Thus, we get
that |Pr[E4]−Pr[E3]|= AdvSemSecEDSym,B4(λ ).
Since the ciphertext C is independent of mµ , for µ ∈ {0,1}, and so of µ , we obtain
that |Pr[E4]−1/2|= 0.
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We conclude by giving the upper bound of the adversary’s advantage:
AdvA−IND−CCABEMA,A (λ ) ≤ Adv
SS−IND−CCA
BEMSS,B1






In the following table, we evaluate the efficiency of our BEM symmetric pairing-based
scheme. We use results of cryptographic operation implementations (group exponenti-
ations of a random group element with a random exponent and pairing operations on
random group elements) using the MIRACL framework [203, 196] for a 128-bit secu-
rity level. All the following experiments are based on a dual core IntelR XeonR CPU
W3503@2.40GHz with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04. The elliptic curve utilised
for all the benchmarks was the super-singular symmetric curve y2 = x3 + 1 mod p with
embedding degree 2 for suitable primes p.
We do not take into account multiplication/division in G1 and GT as well as expo-
nentiation in GT as these operations have timings negligible compared to the ones for
exponentiation in G1 and pairing operation.








Table 4.1: Timings for our BEM symmetric pairing-based system. Times are in mil-
liseconds. We assume that there are s = 100 users.
We note that the total time in the algorithms Setup and KeyGen is substantial, but we
recall that these algorithms should be run only once to generate the public parameters and
the static private keys for all the users. In the algorithm GroupGen, it requires 3,754.2
milliseconds since the group G contains up to s = 100 users. Finally, in the algorithms
Verify, Encrypt and Decrypt, it takes 353,2 milliseconds, 456.5 milliseconds and 176.6
milliseconds respectively, mainly due to the cost of pairing computations: these results
remain the same for every execution of the protocol, since the number of group exponen-
tiation and pairing operation is constant.
4.1.8 Conclusion
We introduced the notion of broadcast encryption with membership (BEM). We presented
a realistic scenario taking place in a e-Health context that requires such primitive. Further-
more, we defined a BEM scheme along with the security models. Subsequently, we pre-
sented a BEM construction which is provably semi-statically IND-CCA secure, privacy
preserving and maximum number accountability secure in the standard model. Finally,
we gave a possible way to transform a semi-statically IND-CCA secure BEM scheme into
an adaptively secure BEM scheme.
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4.2 Certificate-Based Broadcast Encryption
EHRs have become of paramount interest to health and security communities, due to
their size as well as their security issues and sensitivity. We propose a framework that
enables secure communication among medical staff members (general practitioners (GP),
surgeons, anesthetists, gynaecologists, etc). The communication channel enabled here
will allow medical staff members to communicate among themselves as well as to review
the patients’ EHRs and other medical documents. Additionally, it allows the hospital to
broadcast any important sensitive information to the medical staff members working in
that hospital, and this information will only be made available to them. The issue is that
the staff members have their own rights in a hospital, delivered by a medical institute and
other health legislators. Therefore, our framework should be able to specify which are the
medical staff members that have access to the documents by updating their license as au-
thorised in that hospital. To generalize this scenario, we decouple several entities involved
in this scenario, namely the hospital (as the document owner), the medical institute and
the other health legislators (as the certifiers) who grant the license for the medical staff
members (as the users) to work in that hospital.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 4.2. We note that the hospital would be the entity
that generates the encrypted documents for the medical staff members, which includes
all important information that the latters need to access. Additionally, any other hopsital
staff members (i.e. the staff members that do not belong to the medical staff, such as the
administration staff members and the paramedical staff members) and the patients should
also be able to send any information to the medical staff in that hospital. For instance, it
represents the case when a patient provides his/her X-ray or his/her blood test results to
the hospital.
4.2.1 Contributions
Based on the above scenario, we present a new cryptographic notion called certificate-
based broadcast encryption (CBBE). In this system, there are four entities, namely the
group manager, a group of certifiers, a group of users and the rest of the universe. Follow-
ing the aforementioned scenario, the group manager represents the hospital, the certifiers
represent a medical institute and other health legislators who grant the rights to some
medical staff members to work in the given hospital. The group of users are the main
players in this setting and represent the medical staff. The rest of the universe includes
the patients and the other hospital staff members (that do not belong to the medical staff)
and any other players who are not captured in the above description.
We also provide sound security models to capture this scenario. We request that a
CBBE system should be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover, we require
a CBBE scheme to be collusion resistant, which follows the original security requirement
for broadcast encryption (BE) systems. More precisely, even if all the users in the system
collude, only the users in the group chosen by the broadcaster and with valid certificates
can recover the plaintext.
One may think that a CBBE scheme could be achieved easily by combining the two
cryptographic primitives, namely certificate-based encryption (CBE) and BE schemes.
Unfortunately, this is false. The primary difficulty of building such a scheme is due to the
requirement of achieving short size ciphertexts, in comparison to merely combining the
CBE ciphertexts and the BE ciphertexts into one with linear size in both the number of
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Figure 4.2: Certificate-Based Broadcast Encryption. A hospital, as a broadcaster, encrypts
some medical information and forwards them to the medical staff members. A medical institute
and other health legislators, as certifiers, deliver licenses to the medical staff members working
in the aforementioned hospital. A medical staff member can recover the information in plain if
and only if his/her licenses are up-to-date.
users and the number of certifiers.
Furthermore, the notion of CBE usually allows a sender to interact with only a single
receiver, with the help of a certifier. Hence, a simple combination of the existing CBE
and BE schemes will lead to a construction with a linear size of ciphertext (in the number
of both users and certifiers), which is undesirable. Otherwise, it would be better for the
broadcaster to just simply encrypt each ciphertext individually for each user. Therefore,
using a subtle combination of CBE and BE systems, we achieve to obtain an efficient and
practical CBBE construction with short ciphertexts, private keys and certificates, in the
random oracle model.
In this chapter, we present two CBBE constructions as a combination of BE and CBE
systems The first one is a trivial scheme CBBEbasic such that the ciphertext size is linear
in the number of both users and certifiers involved in the system and the security is the
adaptive IND-CCA one in the standard model assuming that both the BE and the CBE
schemes are adaptively IND-CCA secure in the standard model. Conversely, the CBBE
scheme CBBEe f f ic is efficient with short ciphertexts, private keys and certificates, and
is selectively IND-CCA secure and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle
model. This scheme combines Boneh et al.’s BE [42] and Gentry’s CBE [93] systems.
In Table 4.2, we compare the components’ size and the security level between existing
schemes and ours.
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4.2.2 Protocol Definition
A certificate-based broadcast encryption (CBBE) scheme is composed of the following
four algorithms:
• Setup(λ ,s,k)→ (params,{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s],{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈[1,k]). On inputs the se-
curity parameter λ , the total number s of users and the total number k of certifiers,
output the public parameters params and the public and private key pairs (pki,ski)
for users i ∈ [1,s] (note that an algorithm KeyGen - to generate the keys of the
involved entities - is implicitly embedded in the algorithm Setup).
We suppose that the public and private key pairs (pkc j ,skc j) for certifiers j ∈ [1,k]
are generated by the certifiers themselves.
• Certif(params,Sc,{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈Sc , pki, l)→ {Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc . On inputs the pub-
lic parameters params, the group Sc⊆ [1,k] of certifiers selected by the broadcaster,
the certifier c j’s public and private key pair (pkc j ,skc j) for all j ∈ Sc, a user i’s pub-
lic key pki for i ∈ [1,s] and a time period l, output the certificates Certi fi, j,l for i, j
and l.
• Encrypt(params,Su,Sc,{pki}i∈Su,{pkc j} j∈Sc , l)→ (Hdr,K). On inputs the public
parameters params, a group Su ⊆ [1,s] of users selected by the broadcaster, a group
Sc ⊆ [1,k] of certifiers selected by the broadcaster, the user i’s public key pki for all
i ∈ Su, the certifier c j’s public key pkc j for all j ∈ Sc and the time period l, output
the header Hdr and the session key K.
• Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,Hdr)→ K/ ⊥. On inputs the
public parameters params, the group Su⊆ [1,s] of users selected by the broadcaster,
the group Sc ⊆ [1,k] of certifiers selected by the broadcaster, the time period l, the
user i’s public and private key pair (pki,ski) and the certificates Certi fi, j,l for all
i ∈ [1,s], j ∈ Sc and l, and the header Hdr, output the session key K if i ∈ Su and all
the Certi fi, j,l are valid for time period l; otherwise ⊥.
Correctness. We require that a certificate-based broadcast encryption scheme is correct
if for any λ ,s,k ∈ N, (params,{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s],{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈[1,k]) ← Setup(λ ,s,k),
{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ← Certif(params,Sc,{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈Sc , pki, l) and (Hdr,K)← Encrypt(
params,Su,Sc,{pki}i∈Su,{pkc j} j∈Sc , l), and if i ∈ Su and all the Certi fi, j,l are valid for a
time period l and j∈ Sc, we have that Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,
Hdr) = K.
N.B. Obersve that, in the algorithm Certif, a group of certifiers c j such that j∈ Sc⊆ [1,k]
is required, and this group is the same one than the one used to generate the header and the
session key. This means that a user needs exactly the certificates delivered by the certifiers
belonging to a group determined by the broadcaster to be able to decrypt the message.
4.2.3 Security Models
Indistinguishability Chosen-Ciphertext Attack Model
We present the definitions for indistinguishability chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA)
security models. We adopt the security definitions from the CBE system given in [93].
CHAPTER 4. BROADCASTING AND SHARING EHR AMONG USERS 84
There are two attacks which may be launched by either an uncertified user (i.e. a user
with no valid certificate) or by an untrusted certifier that we capture in the following two
games. In Game 1, the adversary plays the role of an uncertified user: it first proves
that it knows the private key of the uncertified user and then, it can make decryption and
certification queries. In Game 2, the adversary plays the role of a trusted certifier: it
first proves that it knows the private key of the certifier and then, it can make decryption
queries. Eventually, we say that the CBBE system is secure if no adversary can win either
Game 1 or Game 2.
Game 1. In the following, we define the adaptive IND-CCA security notion against
uncertified users. A CBBE scheme is adaptively IND-CCA secure if no PPT adversary
A1 can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that
plays the game with the adversary A1 as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup on input the tuple (λ ,s,k) to obtain the
public parameters params, the public keys pki for users i∈ [1,s] and the public keys
pkc j for certifiers c j such that j ∈ [1,k], and gives them to A1.
Query Phase 1. The adversary can adaptively make the following queries:
• Certification Query < l, i,Sc >. Given a time period l, a user i ∈ [1,s] and
certifiers c j such that j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k], the challenger first checks that the ele-
ment ski is the private key corresponding to the public key pki. If so, it runs
the algorithm Certif and returns Certi fi, j,l to the adversary A1; otherwise, it
returns ⊥.
• Decryption Query < l, i,Sc,Hdr >. Given a time period l, a user i∈ [1,s], cer-
tifiers c j such that j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] and a header Hdr, the challenger first checks
that the element ski is the private key corresponding to the public key pki. If
so, it returns K ← Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,Hdr)
to the adversary A1; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Challenge. Given a time period l∗, A1 outputs a challenge group S∗u ⊆ [1,s]. For a user
i ∈ S∗u, the challenger first checks that the element sk∗i is the private key corre-
sponding to the public key pk∗i . If so, it chooses a group S
∗
c ⊆ [1,k] and computes
(Hdr∗,K∗)← Encrypt(params,S∗u,S∗c ,{pk∗i }i∈S∗u ,{pk∗c j} j∈S∗c , l∗). It then chooses a
random bit µ ∈R {0,1}, sets Kµ = K∗, picks at random K1−µ in the key space, and
gives (Hdr∗,K0,K1) to the adversary A1. Otherwise, it gives ⊥.
Query Phase 2. The phase is similar to the query phase 1, except that (l∗, i,S∗c), such that
i ∈ S∗u, is not subject to any valid certification query and (l∗, i,S∗c ,Hdr∗), such that
i ∈ S∗u, is not subject to a valid decryption query.
Guess. The adversary A1 outputs its guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ and wins the game if µ ′= µ ,
We define A1’s advantage in attacking the CBBE scheme following Game 1 as AdvGame1CBBE,A1
(λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 |.
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Game 2. In the following, we define the adaptive IND-CCA security notion against
untrusted certifiers. A CBBE scheme is adaptively IND-CCA secure if no PPT adversary
A2 can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that
plays the game with the adversary A2 as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup on input the tuple (λ ,s,k) to obtain the
public parameters params, the public keys pki for users i∈ [1,s] and the public keys
pkc j for certifiers c j such that j ∈ [1,k], and gives them to A2.
Query Phase 1. The adversary can adaptively make the following queries:
• Decryption Query < l, i,Su,Sc,Hdr >. Given a time period l, a user i ∈
[1,s],a group Su ⊆ [1,s] of user such that i ∈ Su, certifiers c j such that j ∈
Sc ⊆ [1,k] and a header Hdr, the challenger first checks that the element
skc j is the private key corresponding to the public key pkc j . If so, it returns
K ← Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,Hdr) to the adver-
sary A2; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Challenge. Given a time period l∗, A2 outputs a challenge group S∗c ⊆ [1,k]. For a certi-
fier c j such that j ∈ S∗c , the challenger first checks that the element sk∗c j is the private
key corresponding to the public key pk∗c j . If so, it chooses a group S
∗
u ⊆ [1,s] and
computes (Hdr∗,K∗)← Encrypt(params,S∗u,S∗c ,{pk∗i }i∈S∗u ,{pk∗c j} j∈S∗c , l∗). It then
chooses a random bit µ ∈R {0,1}, sets Kµ = K∗, picks at random K1−µ in the key
space, and gives (Hdr∗,K0,K1) to the adversary A2. Otherwise, it gives ⊥.
Query Phase 2. The phase is similar to the query phase 1, except that (l∗, i,S∗u,S∗c ,Hdr∗),
such that i ∈ S∗u, is not subject to a valid deryption query.
Guess. The adversary A2 outputs its guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ and wins the game if µ = µ ′
We define A2’s advantage in attacking the CBBE scheme following Game 2 as AdvGame2CBBE,A2
(λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 |.
We say that a CBBE scheme is adaptively IND-CCA secure if no PPT algorithm A
that plays the two games by making at most qc f certification queries (in Game 1) and
qd = qd1 + qd2 decryption queries (in the Game 1 and Game 2 respectively), has non-
negligible advantage in either Game 1 or Game 2, i.e. AdvGame1CBBE,A (λ )+Adv
Game2
CBBE,A (λ ) =
AdvA−IND−CCACBBE,A (λ ) is negligible.
N.B. We prove that our efficient CBBE scheme is selectively secure. Note that the
selective IND-CCA security model is weaker than the adaptive IND-CCA security model.
In this case, an adversary A provides the group S∗u ⊆ [1,s] as the one that it wishes to be
challenged on at the beginning of the security game 1, before the setup phase, as well as
the group S∗c ⊆ [1,k] as the one that it wishes to be challenged on at the beginning of the
security game 2, before the setup phase.
Selective Collusion Resistance Model
In the following, we define the security notion for selective collusion resistance. A CBBE
scheme is selectively collusion resistant if no PPT adversary A can win the game be-
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low with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the
adversary A as follows:
Initialization. The adversary A outputs a group Su,s′ ⊆ [1,s] of colluding users, such that
|Su,s′ |= s′ ≤ s.
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup on input the tuple (λ ,s,k) to obtain the
public parameters params, the public and private keys pairs (pki,ski) for users i ∈
Su,s′ and the public and private keys pair (pkc j ,skc j) for the certifier c j such that
j ∈ [1,k]. B gives params, {pki,ski}i∈Su,s′ and {pkc j} j∈[1,k] to the adversary A and
keeps {skc j} j∈[1,k].
B then runs the algorithm Certif to obtain the certificates Certi fi, j,l for a user i ∈
Su,s′ , a certifier c j such that j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] (for a group Sc that the challenger has
chosen) and a time period l, and gives them to the adversary A .
Challenge. The challenger returns (Hdr,K)←Encrypt(params,Su,Sc,{pki}i∈Su,{pkc j} j∈Sc ,
l′) for a group Su ⊆ [1,s] such that Su∩Su,s′ = /0, for a group Sc ⊆ [1,k] and a time
period l′ such that l′ 6= l. B gives the header Hdr to the adversary A and keeps the
session key K.
Win. The adversary A outputs
K∗ ← Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l′,( f ({pki}i∈S′), f ({ski}i∈S′)),
f ({Certi fi, j,l}i∈S′, j∈Sc),Hdr)
where S′ ⊆ Su,s′ and f is a sujective function that takes as input either the public
keys or private keys or the certificates, and outputs either a new public key or a
new private key or a new certificate as a combination of public keys, private keys or
certificates respectively. The adversary A wins the game if K∗ = K.
We define A ’s advantage in attacking the CBBE scheme following the above game as
AdvS−CollResCBBE,A (λ ) = Pr[A succeeds].
A CBBE scheme is selectively collusion resistant if no PPT A has non-negligible
advantage AdvS−CollResCBBE,A (λ ) in winning the above game.
4.2.4 Basic Construction: CBBEbasic
We consider a simple and straightforward combination between a BE scheme and a CBE
scheme to obtain a CBBE scheme. Suppose that we are given an adaptive IND-CCA
secure BE system with algorithms (SetupBE ,KeyGenBE ,EncryptBE ,DecryptBE) and an
adaptive IND-CCA secure CBE system with algorithms (SetupCBE ,KeyGenCBE ,Upd1CBE ,
Upd2CBE ,EncryptCBE ,DecryptCBE). Then, we build an adaptive IND-CCA secure CBBE
scheme CBBEbasic with algorithms (Setup,Certif,Encrypt,Decrypt) as follows.
• Setup(λ ,s,k)→ (params,{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s],{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈[1,k]). First run (params,
msk)← SetupBE(λ ,s) and then {skBEi }i∈[1,s]← KeyGenBE(params,msk).
Second run SetupCBE(λ , t)→ (params j,msk j) for j∈ [1,k], and then (pki,skCBEi )←
KeyGenCBE(λ , t) for i ∈ [1,s].
Finally, return the public parameters params, the user i’s public and private key pair
(pki,ski) = (pki,(skBEi ,sk
CBE
i )) for i ∈ [1,s], and the certifier c j’s public and private
key pair (pkc j ,skc j) = (params j,msk j) for j ∈ [1,k].
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• Certif(params,Sc,{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈Sc, pki, l)→{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc . We recall that (pkc j ,
skc j) = (params j, msk j). Run Cert
′
i, j,l ← Upd1CBE(params j,msk j, pki, l,n) for a
string n from the string space, a user i ∈ [1,s], a certifier c j such that j ∈ Sc and
a time period l. Run Certi, j,l ← Upd2CBE(params j, l, Cert ′i, j,l,Certi, j,l−1). Finally,
return the certificate Certi fi, j,l for all j ∈ Sc.
• Encrypt(params,Su,Sc,{pki}i∈Su,{pkc j} j∈Sc , l)→ (Hdr,K). Let a group Su⊆ [1,s]
of users and a group Sc ⊆ [1,k] of indices j such that c j is a certifier.
First run (HdrBE ,K)←EncryptBE(params,Su). Split HdrBE in |Sc| parts as HdrBE,1,
HdrBE,2, · · · ,HdrBE,|Sc|. Second run Ci, j←EncryptCBE(params j, pki,HdrBE, j, l,n)
for a string n from the string space, a user i ∈ Su, a certifier c j for j ∈ Sc, and a time
period l. Set Ci = {Ci, j} j∈Sc . Finally, return Hdr = {Ci}i∈Su .
A label L can be included in the header Hdr and contains information about how
Ci is associated with user i and how Ci, j is associated with certifier c j.
• Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,Hdr)→ K/⊥.
For i∈ Su and j∈ Sc, run HdrBE, j←DecryptCBE(params j,skCBEi ,Certi fi, j,l,Ci, j, l),
concatenate the |Sc| values HdrBE, j to obtain HdrBE , and then run K←DecryptBE(
params,HdrBE ,Su, i,skBEi ).
Correctness. The correctness of the CBBE system simply follows from the correctness
of both the BE system and the CBE system.
4.2.5 Security Proofs for CBBEbasic
Theorem. A basic CBBE scheme CBBEbasic achieves adaptive IND-CCA security in
the standard model if the BE scheme and the CBE scheme are both adaptively IND-CCA
secure in the standard model.
Let A be an adversary that attacks the basic CBBE scheme. Then, there exist a
challenger B1 attacking the BE system and a challenger B2 attacking the CBE system,
such that AdvA−IND−CCACBBEbasic,A (λ )≤ Adv
A−IND−CCA
BE,B1
(λ )+AdvA−IND−CCACBE,B2 (λ ).
We present the security proof as a sequence of games. Let Ex be the event that A
wins the game Gamex, for x ∈ [0,2].
Game0. Game0 is identical to the real adaptive security game defined previously. Thus,
|Pr[E0]− 12 |= AdvA−IND−CCACBBEbasic,A (λ ).
Game1. Game1 is identical to Game0, except that the challenge session key K is chosen
at random from the key space by a challenger C1 that plays the adaptive IND-CCA
game with B1 against the BE scheme. Therefore, |Pr[E1]−Pr[E0]|=AdvA−IND−CCABE,B1 (λ ).
The challenger C1 sets the public parameters params and the users’ public keys pki
as in the real BE scheme and forwards them to B1 who then sends them to A . The
challenger C2 sets the certifiers’ public keys params j as in the real CBE scheme
and forwards them to B2 who then sends them to A .
When A asks for a user CBBE private key for i ∈ [1,s], B1 queries the challenger
C1 to obtain a BE private key for i. The challenger C1 sends back skBEi to B1 that
gives it to the adversary. Moreover, B2 queries the challenger C2 to obtain a CBE
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private key for i. The challenger C2 sends back skCBEi to B2 that gives it to the
adversary. Finally, A sets ski = (skBEi ,sk
CBE
i ).
When A asks for a CBBE certificate for i ∈ [1,s], j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] and a time period
l, B2 queries the challenger C2 to obtain the CBE certificate. C2 sends Certi fi, j,l to
B2 that forwards it to A .
A also calls a decryption oracle by sending requests of the form (l, i,Sc,Hdr) for a
time period l, a user i, Sc ⊆ [1,k] and some header Hdr, which are answered using
the relevant private key ski and the certificates Certi fi, j,l for j ∈ Sc.
Once the query phase is over, A submits a challenge group S∗u ⊆ [1,s]. B1 queries
the challenger C1 for a challenge header and session key pair on S∗u. The challenger
responds by computing (HdrBE ,K0)← EncryptBE(params,S∗u) and by choosing
K1 at random from the key space. It then generates a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and gives
(HdrBE ,Kµ) to B1 who sends it to A .
Thereafter, A splits HdrBE in |Sc| parts as HdrBE,1,HdrBE,2, · · · ,HdrBE,|Sc|, and
submits to B2. The latter queries the challenger C2 for a challenge ciphertext
on HdrBE,1,HdrBE,2, · · · ,HdrBE,|Sc|. C2 replies by computing Ci, j← EncryptCBE(
params j, pki,HdrBE, j, l,n) and setting Ci = {Ci, j} j∈Sc , and sends back Hdr = {Ci}i∈S∗u
to B2 that gives it to A .
Eventually, A outputs a bit µ ′ as a guess for µ , and wins if µ ′ = µ .
If µ = 0, then A ’s view is as in Game0. We notice that the private keys and the
certificates from B1 and B2 are appropriately distributed, and the session key K0 is
correctly generated. If µ = 1, then A ’s view is as in Game1 since K1 is chosen at
random from the key space.
Game2. Game2 is identical to Game1, except that the BE header HdrBE is chosen at ran-
dom from the header space and splitted into |S∗c | parts HdrBE, j for j∈ S∗c . Moreover,
the CBBE header is set as follows: Hdr = {Ci}i∈S∗u for a challenge group S∗u cho-
sen by the adversary A such that Ci, j ← EncryptCBE(params j, pki,HdrBE, j, l,n).
Therefore, |Pr[E2]−Pr[E1]|= AdvA−IND−CCACBE,B2 (λ ).
The challenger C1 sets the public parameters params and the users’ public keys pki
as in the real BE scheme and forwards them to B1 who then sends them to A . The
challenger C2 sets the certifiers’ public keys params j as in the real CBE scheme
and forwards them to B2 who then sends them to A .
When A asks for a certifier CBBE private key for j ∈ [1,k], B2 queries the chal-
lenger C2 to obtain a CBE master secret key for j. The challenger C2 sends back
msk j to B2 that gives it to the adversary.
When A asks for a CBBE certificate for i ∈ [1,s], j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] and a time period
l, B2 queries the challenger C2 to obtain the CBE certificate. C2 sends Certi fi, j,l to
B2 that forwards it to A .
A also calls a decryption oracle by sending requests of the form(l, i,Sc,Hdr) for a
time period l, a user i, Sc ⊆ [1,k] and some header Hdr, which are answered using
the relevant private key ski and the certificates Certi fi, j,l for j ∈ Sc.
Once the query phase is over, A submits two challenge sets S∗u ⊆ [1,s] and S∗c ⊆
[1,k]. B1 asks the challenger C1 for the challenge pair of header and session key by
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submitting S∗u. C1 answers by computing (Hdr
BE ,K)← EncryptBE(params,S∗u),
by setting HdrBE0 = Hdr
BE and by choosing at random HdrBE1 from the header
space. C1 sends back (HdrBE0 ,Hdr
BE
1 ,K) to B1.
Then, B2 is challenged on HdrBE0 and Hdr
BE
1 that are forwarded to C2. The lat-
ter responds by flipping a bit µ ∈R {0,1}, by dividing HdrBEµ into |S∗c | parts and by
sending back to B2 the components (Ci, j)µ←EncryptCBE(params j, pki,HdrBE, jµ , l,
n) to B2 for j ∈ S∗c . Then, B2 sets (Ci)µ = {(Ci, j)µ} j∈Sc and gives (Hdrµ =
{(Ci)µ}i∈S∗u ,K) to A .
Eventually, A outputs a bit µ ′ as a guess for µ .
If µ = 0, A ’s view is as in Game1. We notice that the private keys and the certifi-
cates are appropriately distributed, and the header HdrBE0 is correctly generated. If
µ = 1, A ’s view is as in Game2 since the header HdrBE1 is a random element from
the header space.
The theorem follows since in Game2, both the header and the session key are independent
elements from the bit µ , meaning that |Pr[E2]− 12 |= 0.
4.2.6 Efficient Construction: CBBEe f f ic
The following CBBE construction CBBEe f f ic is an effective combination of the Boneh et
al.’s (BGW) BE scheme [42] and the Gentry’s CBE scheme [93]. Notice that the Gen-
try’s CBE scheme is designed for a communication between one sender and one receiver.
Therefore, applying this scheme directly to the Boneh et al.’s scheme will lead to head-
ers with linear size in both the number of users and the number of certifiers, which is
impractical. However, we manage to overcome this issue and achieve constant size for
headers, private keys and certificates. Moreover, the efficient CBBE scheme CBBEe f f ic is
proved selective IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model using the standard trans-
formation from the REACT scheme proposed by Okamoto and Pointcheval [174], as well
as selectively collusion resistant.
• Setup(λ ,n,k)→ (params,{(pki,ski)}i∈[1,s],{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈[1,k]). First, run (p,G1,
GT ,e,g)←G (λ ). Pick at random a∈R Zp and compute ga
i
for i= [1,s]∪ [s+2,2s].
Pick at random γ ∈R Zp and compute v = gγ . Choose three hash functions H1 :
G1×{0,1}∗→G1, H2 : G21→G1 and H3 : GT ×G41→{0,1}λ .





user i’s public key pki be ga
i
for i = [1,s].
Independently, for j ∈ [1,k], a certifier c j computes its own public and private key
pair as follows. First, choose at random an exponent σ j ∈R Zp and then compute
the public key pkc j as w j = g
σ j . Set the private key skc j as dc j = σ j.




, · · · ,ga2s,v,w1,
· · · ,wk,H1,H2,H3).
• Certif(params,Sc,{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈Sc , pki, l)→{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc . Let the time period
l be represented as a string in {0,1}∗. Pick at random ri, j,l ∈R Zp, for j ∈ Sc⊆ [1,k],
and compute the user i’s certificate Certi, j,l = ei, j,l = (ei, j,l,1,ei, j,l,2) as follows:
ei, j,l,1 = (ga
i
)σ j ·H1(w j, l)∑ j∈Sc ri, j,l = wa
i
j ·H1(w j, l)∑ j∈Sc ri, j,l
ei, j,l,2 = gri, j,l
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• Encrypt(params,Su,Sc,{pki}i∈Su,{pkc j} j∈Sc , l)→ (Hdr,K). First, pick at random
an exponent t ∈R Zp, compute the session key K = e(ga
s
,ga)t and set the header





C3 = (v ·∏
j∈Sc







• Decrypt(params,Su,Sc, l,(pki,ski),{Certi fi, j,l} j∈Sc ,Hdr)→ K/ ⊥. Let a user i ∈
Su have a private key ski = di and the certificates Certi, j,l = ei, j,l = (ei, j,l,1,ei, j,l,2)
for j ∈ Sc. Let a header Hdr be parsed as (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5). First, check whether
e(C1,H2(C1,C3))
?




,C3) · e(∏ j∈Sc ei, j,l,2,C2)






Then, compute C′5 = H3(K,C1,C2,C3,C4). If C
′
5 = C5, then return K; otherwise,
return ⊥.




for any i, i′. Given a time period l, a user
i ∈ Su ⊆ [1,s] with a private key ski = di and certificates Certi, j,l = ei,l, j for j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k],




,C3) · e(∏ j∈Sc ei, j,l,2,C2)






,(v ·∏ j∈Sc w j ·∏i′∈Su ga
s+1−i′
)t) · e(∏ j∈Sc gri, j,l ,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l)t)
e(vai ·∏ j∈Sc wa
i






,(v ·∏ j∈Sc w j ·∏i′∈Su\{i} ga
s+1−i′
)t) · e(∏ j∈Sc gri, j,l ,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l)t)
e(vai ·∏ j∈Sc wa
i

















∑ j∈Sc ri, j,l ,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l)
t)
e(∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l)







N.B. In the above construction, when the algorithm Certif is run, the certifiers c j for
indices j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] have to generate the certificates together for a given user i ∈ [1,s].
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More precisely, for j ∈ Sc, each certifer c j picks at random an exponent ri, j,l ∈R Zp and
shares it with the other selected certifiers. We assume that this sharing is done securely
and efficiently.
4.2.7 Security Proofs for CBBEe f f ic
Selective IND-CCA Security Proof
Theorem. Suppose that the s-DBDHE problem and the k-DBDHE problem hold in
(G1,GT ), then the efficient CBBE scheme CBBEe f f ic is selectivey IND-CCA secure in
the random oracle model.
Game 1. We assume there exists an adversary A1 that breaks the selective IND-CCA se-
curity against uncertified users of the efficient CBBE scheme with advantage AdvS−IND−CCACBBEe f f ic,A1(λ )
greater than ε1 by making qH1 , qH2 and qH3 random oracle queries, qc f certification queries
and qd1 decryption queries. We construct a challenger B that can break the s-DBDHE
problem in (G1,GT ) by interacting with the adversary A1 as follows.
B first receives the output (p,G1,GT ,e)← G (λ ), a generator g of G1 and a problem
intance (ga, · · · ,gas,gas+2, · · · ,ga2s,h = gb) and Z that is either equal to e(gas+1 ,h) or to
a random element in GT . B makes use of the three random oracles H1, H2 and H3 and
holds three corresponding hash lists L1, L2 and L3, initially set as empty, to store all the
query-answer pairs.
Initialization. A1 outputs a group S∗u ⊆ [1,s] of users that it wishes to be challenged on.
Setup. B generates the public parameters params, the private keys ski = di for users
i /∈ S∗u and the private keys skc j = dc j for certifiers c j such that j ∈ [1,k] as follows. It
chooses random elements x,y1 · · · ,yk ∈R Zp and sets v= gx/∏i′∈S∗u ga
s+1−i′
, w j = gy j






















, · · · ,ga2s,v,w1, · · · ,wk,H1,H2,H3), where H1, H2 and H3 are controlled by B
as follows:
• Upon receiving a query (w j, l j) to the random oracle H1 for some j ∈ [1,qH1]:
– If ((w j, l j),u j,U j) exists in L1, then return U j.
– Otherwise, choose u j ∈R Zp at random and compute U j = gu j . Put ((w j, l j),
u j,U j) in L1 and return U j as answer.
• Upon receiving a query (W1 j,W2 j) to the random oracle H2 for some j ∈
[1,qH2]:
– If ((W1 j,W2 j),X j) exists in L2, then return X j.
– Otherwise, choose X j ∈R G1 at random. Put ((W1 j,W2 j),X j) in L2 and
return X j as answer.
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• Upon receiving a query (K j,C1 j,C2 j,C3 j,C4 j) to the random oracle H3 for
some j ∈ [1,qH3]:
– If ((K j,C1 j,C2 j,C3 j,C4 j),C5 j) exists in L3, then return C5 j.
– Otherwise, choose C5 j ∈R {0,1}λ at random. Put (K j,C1 j,C2 j,C3 j,C4 j),
C5 j) in L3 and return C5 j as answer.
Query Phase 1. B answers A1’s queries as follows.
• Certification Query < li′, i,Sc >. Given li′ for i′ ∈ [1,qc f ], if ((wi′, j, li′),ui′, j,Ui′, j)
exists in L1, then return the pair (ui′, j,Ui′, j) for j ∈ [1,k]. Otherwise, choose
ui′, j ∈R Zp at random, compute Ui′, j = gui′, j and put ((wi′, j, li′), ui′, j,Ui′, j) in
L1.
Then, given i ∈ [1,s] and c j such that j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k], pick at random ri, j,li′ ∈R
Zp and return the certificate Certi, j,li′ = ei, j,li′ = (ei, j,li′ ,1, ei, j,li′ ,2) where
ei, j,li′ ,1 = (g
ai)y j ·U∑ j∈Sc
ri, j,li′
i′, j = g
y j·ai · (gui′, j)∑ j∈Sc ri, j,li′
= gy j·a
i ·H1(wi′, j, li′)∑ j∈Sc ri, j,li′ = wa
i
i′, j ·g
∑ j∈Sc ri, j,li′ ·ui′, j
ei, j,li′ ,2 = g
ri, j,li′
• Decryption Query < li′, i,Sc,Hdri′,>. Given li′ for i′ ∈ [1,qd1], i ∈ [1,s], Sc ⊆
[1,k] and a header Hdri′ parsed as (C1i′,C2i′,C3i′,C4i′,C5i′),
– if ((Ki′,C1i′,C2i′,C3i′,C4i′),C5i′) exists in L3, then first compute H1(wi′, j, li′)
using the simulation of H1 as above and check whether e(C2i′,g)
?
= e(C1i′,
∏ j∈Sc H1(wi′, j, li′)) for j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k]. If not, return ⊥. Otherwise, com-
pute H2(C1i′,C3i′) using the simulation of H2 as above and check whether
e(C1i′,H2(C1i′,C3i′))
?








e((gai)x+∑ j∈Sc y j ·∏ j∈Sc H1(wi′, j, li′),C1i′)
If the above equation holds, then return Ki′ . Otherwise, return ⊥;
– else, return ⊥.
Challenge. B generates the challenge header and session key pair according to the chal-
lenge group S∗u as follows. First, B sets C
∗
1 = h and searchs in L1 to get u that
corresponds to (w j, l) such that j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k]. Then, it computes C∗2 = hu. It also
computes C∗3 = h
x+∑ j∈Sc y j . Informally, we write h = gt for an unknown t ∈ Zp.




t . Second, it randomly chooses a bit µ ∈R {0,1}, sets Kµ = Z and



















as the challenge to A1.
If Z = e(ga
s+1
,h), then (Hdr∗,K0,K1) is a valid challenge header and session key
pair for A1’s view as in the real attack. Indeed, if we write h = gt for an unknown
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t ∈ Zp, then



























































,h) = Z = Kµ , and thus (Hdr∗,K0,K1)
is a valid challenge to A1. If Z ∈R GT , then K0 and K1 are random independent
elements in GT .
Query Phase 2. B responds to the certification and decryption queries as in the query






4) is asked to the random oracle H3, then
the value C∗5 created in the simulation of the challenge phase is returned.
Guess. The adversary A1 outputs its guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ . The adversary wins if
µ ′ = µ .
Analysis. The simulations to generate the private keys and the certificates are perfect
since the responses are correct regarding A1’s view.
The simulation of the random oracle H1 is not entirely perfect. Let QueryH1 be the
event that A1 has queried (w∗j , l
∗) to H1 for j ∈ [1,k] before the challenge phase. This
event happens with probability k/p. Except for the case above, the simulation of H1 is
perfect.
The simulations of the random oracles H2 and H3 are not entirely perfect. Let
QueryH2 and QueryH3 be the events that A1 has queried (C∗1 ,C
∗







C∗4) to H3 before the challenge phase. These two events happen with probability 1/p and
1/2λ respectively. Except for the cases above, the simulations of H2 and H3 are perfect.
The simulation of the decryption oracle is nearly perfect, except that a valid header
can be rejected sometimes. Indeed, in the simulation of the decryption oracle, if (K,C1,C2,
C3,C4) has not been queried to H3, then the header is rejected. This leads to two cases:
1. A1 uses the value C∗5 , which is part of the challenge, as a part of its decryption
query.
2. A1 has guessed a right value for the output of H3 without querying it.






4) and Kµ are provided as input to H3, the
decryption query that A1 would ask is the same as the challenge, which is not allowed
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to query. The second case may happen but with negligible probability 1/2λ . Let DecO
denote the event that A1 correctly guesses the output of H3. Therefore, if B does not
correctly guess the output of H3, A1’s view in the simulation is identical to the one in the
real attack.
Thus, we have




By definition of A1’s advantage, we have |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | > ε1−Pr[QueryH1]−
Pr[QueryH2]−Pr[QueryH3]−Pr[DecO], that gives us









Since A1 makes qH1 , qH2 and qH3 random oracle queries during the attack, therefore
Pr[QueryH1]≤ k ·qH1/p, Pr[QueryH2]≤ qH2/p and Pr[QueryH3]≤ qH3/2λ . In the same
way, since A1 makes qd1 decryption queries during the attack, we get that Pr[DecO]






Game 2. The security proof for Game 2 is rouglhy the same than the one above for
Game 1, except that the adversary, playing the role of an untrusted certifier, cannot make
queries to the certification oracle.
We assume there exists an adversary A2 that breaks the selective IND-CCA security
against uncertified users of the efficient CBBE scheme with advantage AdvS−IND−CCACBBEe f f ic,A2(λ )
greater than ε2 by making qH1 , qH2 and qH3 random oracle queries and qd2 decryption
queries. We construct a challenger B that can break the k-DBDHE problem in (G1,GT )
by interacting with the adversary A2.







Selective Collusion Resistance Proof
Theorem. Suppose that the s-BDHE assumption holds in (G1,GT ), then the efficient
CBBE scheme CBBEe f f ic is selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model.
We assume there exists an adversary A that breaks the selective collusion resistance
of the CBBE scheme with advantage AdvS−CollResCBBEe f f ic,A (λ ). We construct a challenger B
that interacts with A as follows.
Initialization. A chooses a subgroup Su,s′ ⊆ [1,s] of colluding users such that |Su,s′| =
s′ ≤ s.
Setup and Query Phase. B runs Setup on input the tuple (λ ,s,k) to obtain the public




, · · · ,ga2s,v,w1, · · · ,wk,H1,H2,
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H3), the private keys ski = di = va
i
for users i ∈ Su,s′ and the public keys pkc j =
w j = gσ j for certifiers c j such that j ∈ [1,k]. It gives these elements to A and
keeps the certifier c j’s private key skc j = dc j = σ j for j ∈ [1,k]. It also runs Certif
on input the tuple (params,Sc,{(pkc j ,skc j)} j∈Sc , pki, l) to obtain the certificates
Certi, j,l = ei, j,l = (ei, j,l,1 = wa
i
j ·H1(w j, l)∑ j∈Sc ri, j,l , ei, j,l,2 = gri, j,l) for user i ∈ Su,s′ ,
index j ∈ Sc ⊆ [1,k] and time period l. It gives these elements to A .
Challenge. B chooses a group S⊆ [1,s] of users such that S∩Su,s′ = /0, a time period l′ 6=
l and a group Sc⊆ [1,k]. It runs (Hdr,K)← Encrypt(params,S,Sc, l′) and forwards
Hdr = (C1 = gt ,C2 = ∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l
′)t ,C3 = (v ·∏ j∈Sc w j ·∏i′∈S ga
s+1−i′
)t ,C4 =




Output. A computes a new private key skχ = dχ and a new certificate Certχ, j,l = eχ, j,l
from the private keys and the certificates of users in Su,s′ that it has previously






= v fχ (a)
eχ, j,l,1 = ∏
i′∈Su,s̄
ei′, j,l,1 = w
∑i′∈Su,s̄ a
i′
j ·H1(w j, l)
∑ j∈Sc ∑i′∈Su,s̄ ri′, j,l
= w fχ (a)j ·H1(w j, l)∑ j∈Sc rχ, j,l
eχ, j,l,2 = g
∑i′∈Su,s̄ ri′, j,l = grχ, j,l
where fχ(a) = ∑i′∈Su,s̄ a
i′ .
Analysis. For a user i belonging to S, some terms cancel out as follows:
e(ga
i
,(v ·∏ j∈Sc w j ·∏i′∈S\{i} ga
s+1−i′
)t)





· e(∏ j∈Sc g
rχ, j,l ,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l
′)t)
e(∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l)
∑ j∈Sc rχ, j,l ,gt)
=
e(g,va
i ·∏ j∈Sc wa
i
j )
e(v fχ (a) ·∏ j∈Sc w
fχ (a)
j ,g)
· e(g,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l
′))
e(∏ j∈Sc H1(w j, l),g)
The ratio
e(g,va
i ·∏ j∈Sc wa
i
j )
e(v fχ (a)·∏ j∈Sc w
fχ (a)
j ,g)




j should be wiped out. We should get that fχ(a) = ∑i′∈Su,s̄ a
i′ = ai mod p. In
other words, a is a root of the polynomial P(x) = ∑i′∈Su,s̄ x
i′ − xi = of degree s̄+ 1. This
happens with probability Pr[ fχ(a) = ai mod p]≤ (s̄+1)/p.
We now consider the ratio e(g,∏ j∈Sc H1(w j,l
′))
e(∏ j∈Sc H1(w j,l),g)
. Let us suppose that l 6= l′ and that the
hash function H1 is a random oracle. Therefore, the probability that the two outputs are
equal is equal to Pr[H1(w j′, l′) = H1(w j, l)]≤ 1/p, given two indices j, j′ ∈ [1,k]. Finally,
A has negligible advantage AdvS−CollResCBBEe f f ic,A (λ )≤ (s̄+2)/p to retrieve the session key K.
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4.2.8 Discussion
We constructed our efficient CBBE scheme based on Boneh et al.’s BE [42] and Gentry’s
CBE [93] schemes since:
• the Boneh et al.’s BE scheme is fully collusion resistant and has short ciphertexts
and private keys (their sizes are constant in the number of users),
• the Gentry’s CBE scheme achieves adaptive IND-CCA security in the random ora-
cle model.
In Table 4.3, we compare the sizes of the public parameters, the private keys and the
headers in the basic and efficient schemes respectively. Let n be the number of users in
the system and Su be the group of users selected by the broadcaster. Let k be the number
of certifers in the system and Sc be the group of certifers selected by the broadcaster. The
public components PC comprise the public parameters params, the public keys pki of
the users and the public keys pkc j of the certifiers. The private keys SK refer to ski,skc j ,
the certificates Cert refer to Certi, j,l and the header Hdr simply refers to Hdr in the
construction.
CBBEbasic CBBEe f f ic
Size of PC O(k · s) O(k · s)
Size of SK O(1) O(1)
Size of Cert O(1) O(1)
Size of Hdr O(|Sc|× |Su|) = O(k · s) O(1)
Security Model adaptive IND-CCA selective IND-CCA
in the standard model in the random oracle model
Table 4.3: Comparative table between the basic scheme CBBEbasic and the efficient
scheme CBBEe f f ic. Let PC denote the public components (including the public parame-
ters and the public keys), SK denote the private keys of both the users and the certifiers,
Cert denote the certificates and Hdr denote the headers. We consider the size of one
private key for one user or one certifier, the size of one certificate for one user given
one certifier, and the size of one header given one message and two groups of users and
certifiers respectively.
The basic construction CBBEbasic is a simple combination of BE and CBE systems
such that the header Hdr has size linear in the number of users in group Su and the number
of certifers in group Sc, which is impractical. We notice that the efficient construction
CBBEe f f ic yields constant size for the private key, the certificate and the header, which is
really practical.
If the BE and CBE schemes are assumed to be adaptively IND-CCA secure in the
standard model, then the basic scheme CBBEbasic is adaptively CCA secure in the standard
model. However, these hypotheses are quite strong compared to the existing schemes for
BE and CBE systems. Gentry’s CBE [93] achieves adaptive IND-CCA security in the
random oracle model, and a practical BE with short ciphertexts and private keys, which is
due to Boneh et al. [42], is selectively IND-CPA secure in the standard model. Based on
these two schemes, our efficient CBBE scheme CBBEe f f ic reaches selective IND-CCA
security in the random oracle. Although the adaptive IND-CCA security is the strongest
existing model, we feel that selective security achieves a good level of security and can
be more conceivable for better efficiency and performance in some cases.
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4.2.9 Performance
In the following table, we evaluate the efficiency of our efficient CBBE symmetric pairing-
based scheme. We use results of cryptographic operation implementations (group expo-
nentiations of a random group element with a random exponent and pairing operations
on random group elements) using the MIRACL framework [203, 196] for a 128-bit se-
curity level. All the following experiments are based on a dual core IntelR XeonR CPU
W3503@2.40GHz with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04. The elliptic curve utilised
for all the benchmarks was the super-singular symmetric curve y2 = x3 + 1 mod p with
embedding degree 2 for suitable primes p.
We do not take into account multiplication/division in G1 and GT as well as expo-
nentiation in GT as these operations have timings negligible compared to the ones for
exponentiation in G1 and pairing operation.






Table 4.4: Timings for our efficient CBBE symmetric pairing-based system CBBEe f f ic.
Times are in milliseconds. We assume that there are s = 100 users and k = 20 certifiers.
We note that the total time in the algorithm Setup is substantial, but we recall that this
algorithm should be run only once to generate the public parameters and the static private
keys for both users and certifiers. In the algorithm Certif, it requires 2,064 milliseconds
since up to k = 20 certificates are created. Finally, in the algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt,
it takes 324.2 milliseconds and 706.4 milliseconds respectively, mainly due to the cost of
pairing computations: these results remain the same for every execution of the protocol,
since the number of group exponentiation and pairing operation is constant.
4.2.10 Conclusion
We presented a CBBE primitive to answer the problematic arisen by the above scenario.
We demonstrated that this primitive is very practical in enabling a secure communication
among medical staff members in a hospital. We properly defined the scheme definition
as well as the security requirements. We constructed a basic CBBE scheme that reaches
adaptive IND-CCA security in the standard model but with components’ size linear in the
number of involved entities, and an efficient CBBE scheme with short ciphertexts, private
keys and certificates, and proved it selectively IND-CCA secure and selectively collusion
resistant in the random oracle model.
Chapter 5
Accessing and Retrieving Electronic
Health Records Stored on Cloud
Servers
Since EHRs are numerous and computationally heavy, the hospital and the patients cannot
afford to keep them on their private personal storage devices. Thus, our solution is to
store the EHRs on external storages such that hospital staff members and patients should
be able to deal with them easily and efficiently. Nevertheless, we have to ensure that
EHRs are securely and privately stored, as well as their access is restricted to authorised
hospital staff members regarding rights and privileges carefully attributed beforehand.
Moreover, we should not allow the hospital staff members to retrieve more documents
than the ones they request. This means that another token should be brought by the
members to complete their authorisation.
We propose to store the EHRs under their encrypted form, so that the cloud server
almost knows nothing on the contents of the stored EHRs. By “almost”, we mean that
the cloud server might learn some pieces of information on the requested EHRs since we
should guarantee that the hospital staff members precise their document search through a
token. We also suggest to let the cloud server be the party who verifies the access rights
and privileges, in order to avoid other computational and communication costs due to an
external verifier.
5.1 Certificate-Based Encryption with Keyword Search
Authorising hospital staff members to access and retrieve medical documents brings se-
curity and privacy issues. In Figure 5.1, we highlight the general context as follows: each
hospital staff member receives his/her access right from a medical institute (or any other
health legislator, such as the government). The hospital staff member’s access right can
evoluate over the time with the help of the medical institute.
An access right allows a hospital staff member to access and retrieve medical infor-
mation, such as EHRs, that are stored on a local cloud server maintained by the IT team
of the hospital (that belongs to the administration staff). When a hospital staff member
desires to collect some patients’ medical documents, s/he sends a request containing a
keyword, as a description of the medical documents that s/he is looking for, along with
his/her access right component. The local cloud server then checks the elements sent by
the hospital staff member, and if both the keyword and the acces right are accepted regard-
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ing some requirements, then the cloud server releases the requested medical documents





Figure 5.1: Certificate-Based Encryption with Keyword Search. A medical institute, acting
as a certifier, first generates certificates for all the hospital staff members. It also computes update
keys according to some groups of hospital staff members, such that only a hospital staff member
in such groups can successfully refresh its certificate. These certificates contain labels as a de-
scription of the access rights given to the hospital staff members. Then, a hospital staff member
wants to retrieve a document and sends a request to the cloud server under the form of a trap-
door that was generated regarding a keyword and his/her most refreshed certificate. The cloud
server checks that the elements embedded in the trapdoor match the ones found in the requested
document using the database.
We present three scenarios that describe the authorisation process in a hospital to
enable its staff members to acquire access to patients’ EHRs. Let us consider our first
scenario as follows. A patient, Alice, visits the hospital for a gyneacological checkup.
She requests that the checkup will be conducted by a female clinician. On her arrival,
a nurse, Daisy, takes Alice’s blood sample and records this information “securely” in
Alice’s EHR, which is stored on the local server of the hospital. The security of the EHR
is done by encrypting this information prior to uploading it to the local server. Once this
is done, Alice will need to wait until she is called by the available female gyneacologist
as requested.
Let Fanny be a female gyneacologist in the hospital. She has to access Alice’s EHR,
and in particular the blood sample report, in order to discuss with the patient on some
potential issues. To do so, Fanny sends a request to the server that contains a descriptive
keyword for the record that she needs to access (e.g. “Alice”) and some information about
her access right (e.g. she is a gyneacologist in the hospital). The information will only be
delivered (or decryptable) by Fanny if her access right is valid and the documents that she
is looking for (i.e. Alice’s EHR) is available on the local server. This scenario is depicted
in Figure 5.2.
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Do the keywords w and w' match?




Figure 5.2: Daisy uploads Alice’s EHR on the local cloud server of the hospital. The records
contain an encryption of the keyword w′ that she has chosen to describe them. Fanny sends a
file encrypting her keyword w and her label L (corresponding to her access right) as a request
to retrieve Alice’s records. The server holds a label L′ according to the hospital regulation. If
the keywords and the labels respectively match, then the server released the requested records to
Fanny.
Our second scenario takes place in pediatrics and kids hospital. A child, Charles,
has contracted chickenpox and his parents decide to bring him to the hospital to check
his condition. Since this disease is also contagious to adults and other children, Charles
has to been examined by a pediatrician who is immune against chickenpox. Thus, this
requirement has to be added to the clinician’s access right to let this clinician be able to
retrieve Charles’s EHR. At the end of the diagnosis, the clinician will also need to store
the result of the examination in Charles’s EHR. This scenario is depicted in Figure 5.3.
Our last scenario is due to the communciation difficulty. Eva, who is a Russian tourist
and currently visiting her 80-year-old uncle in Australia, visits the emergency department
due to her broken ankle. Unfortunately, Eva does not speak English but Russian, and she
requires a clinician that speaks her language. Fortunately, an orthopedist, Frank, satisfies
this requirement. By providing his access right that includes this linguistic feature and a
descriptive keyword, Frank will be able to retrieve Eva’s EHR. This scenario is depicted
in Figure 5.4.
These scenarios illustrate a required framework to authorise hospital staff members
to access and retrieve the necessary medical documents to conduct their job. As illus-
trated earlier, there are two essential information pieces required, namely the access right
of a hospital staff member that has to be in accordance with the hospital requirements
(regarding the patients’ specific requirements for instance) and a keyword selected by the
hospital staff member as the description of the requested medical documents.
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Figure 5.3: A sick child, Charles, is associated with an EHR that can be found in the hospital’s
database. A pediatrician is chosen among other clinicians because of his position (i.e. he has a
medical degree related to kids) as well as the fact that he has already contracted the chickenpox.
5.1.1 Contributions
In order to capture the above scenarios, we consider four entities:
1. An uploader that transfers the contents of medical information (e.g. EHRs) to a
server;
2. A server that stores the uploader’s encrypted contents of medical information and
delivers these contents to the receivers if and only if certain conditions are met;
3. Several receivers, that ask the server to retrieve some contents of the medical infor-
mation;
4. A certifier that delivers certificates to the receivers according to their access right
status.
In practice, the receivers are the hospital staff members, while the uploader can be anyone,
the certifier is the IT team of the hospital (that belongs to the administration staff) and the
server is the hospital database linked to a private cloud server. The assumption is that
we do not want the administrator of the server to be able to read the medical documents
without proper consents, and therefore the medical information that will be encrypted and
stored. Hence, we adopt the honest-but-curious model for the server.
We suppose that Daisy, a nurse working at the hospital, needs to access some medical
documents. To do so, Daisy chooses a keyword wR describing the documents that she
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Figure 5.4: A Russian tourist, Eva, is associated with an EHR that can be found in the hospital’s
database. A clinician, Frank, is able to speak Russian, and thus this feature permits him to be
selected among other medical staff members to auscultate Eva.
wants to retrieve, creates a trapdoor that is a function of the keyword wR and a certificate,
and sends this trapdoor to the server as an access request.
Daisy is equipped with a valid certificate in order to conduct this operation. Daisy’s
certificate is updated regularly from the broadcasted information provided by the certifier.
The update key is created given a group S of hospital staff members and a label LR.
Note that the update key is broadcasted to all the people working in the hospital but only
people belonging to the group S can successfully update their certificates. In addition, the
label LR refers to information such as access rights and other privileges and features, and
enables the hospital staff members in S to access and retrieve some documents. Note that
the certificate needs to be refreshed since the label LR and/or the group S might change
over the time.
When Daisy sends the trapdoor to the server, the latter checks it with a ciphertext
encrypting a keyword wS that describes the requested documents (the keyword wS was
chosen by the person who encrypted the documents) and the current label LS (the label LS
is determined by the hospital). The server is actually verifying whether the keywords and
the labels match respectively (i.e. whether wR = wS and LR = LS). If so, then the server
releases the encrypted documents to Daisy; otherwise, the server keeps them on its local
storage.
We illustrate our certificate-based encryption with keyword search (CBEKS) proto-
col in Figure 5.5 such that the four users are depicted. First, the certifier generates the
first certificate given to each receiver as an encryption of a label LR1 . It also computes
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update keys that are sent to all the receivers. Receivers can successfully refresh their cer-
tificates using the update keys if and only if they belong to a group S j specified by the
certifier. Then, the uploader computes a ciphertext CwS for a keyword w
S and transmits
it to the server. Each receiver computes a trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj according to a keyword w
R
i
and the most recent certificate encrypting the label LRj ; the receiver then forwards it to
the server. At last, the server checks whether the two keywords match and whether the
label embedded into the trapdoor is equal to the current label LSl , i.e. w
R
i =w






























Figure 5.5: A certifier C generates a first certificate CertLR1 ,i for a label L
R
1 , and gives it to
a receiver i, where i ∈ [1,s]. Thereafter, C computes an update key UKLRj for L
R
j and a group
S j ⊆ [1,s] of receivers, and gives it to i. Then, i uses UKLRj to obtain a refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i
if and only if i ∈ S j. Afterwards, the uploader U generates a ciphertext CwS for a keyword wS,
and transfers it to a server S. With inputs wRi and CertLRj ,i for L
R
j , i computes a trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj
and forwards it to S. Finally, given LSl , CwS and TrapwRi ,LRj , S tests whether w





Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [104] is a cryptographic primitive that involves at-
tributes to generate private keys and ciphertexts. Attributes can be seen as the components
describing the access right of a receiver. Observe that no certificate is delivered and no
key update is possible in an ABE system. Instead, private keys are created with respect to
each attribute taken individually and have to be re-generated from scratch each time that
an attribute is added, deleted or modified. We note that treating the attributes individually
each time is cumbersome and inefficient. Moreover, an ABE system is not equipped with
searching capability: no keyword or other requirement is necessary to complete the au-
thorisation step. Thus, such primitive does not seem suitable to satisfy the medical criteria
cited above.
In Section 4.2, we proposed a certificate-based broadcast encryption (CBBE) pro-
tocol. This protocol enables medical staff members (receivers) to communicate among
themselves, as well as to retrieve medical documents such that authorisation is given
through licences (i.e. certificates) that allow the medical staff to practice in the given hos-
pital. We observe that a CBBE system does not satisfy the medical scenario described in
this section. First, certificates cannot be collectively updated, but have to be individually
re-generated in case of access right changes. Moreover, a receiver does not search for
medical documents, but acquires access to all of them after successful authorisation (even
the ones that this receiver is not interested to acquire).
In this section, we address the problem of authorising receivers in a sensitive envi-
ronment to let them access and retrieve medical documents securely. In order to access
medical information encrypted by an uploader and stored on a server, a receiver has to
provide a trapdoor that embeds two elements: a keyword that describes the targeted in-
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formation and a certificate that includes a label as the access right of the receiver. The
receiver will retrieve the encrypted information if and only if the keyword that it has cho-
sen is the same than the one defined by the uploader and if the label specifying the access
right of the receiver is the same than the current one held by the server. To do so, we
define the CBEKS primitive. We also specify the corresponding security models, namely
computational consistency, indistinguishability against chosen keyword and ciphertext at-
tacks, indistinguishability against keyword-guessing attacks and collusion resistance. We
provide a CBEKS construction that is proven secure in the standard model with respect
the aforementioned security models.
At a glance, by just simply observing the name of the primitive certificate-based
encryption with keyword search, one may think that this is a trivial combination between
a certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme and a public-key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS). Unfortunately, this is not the case. This is due to the fact that a CBE
scheme [93] requires an interaction between one single certifier and one single receiver.
This is not suitable for CBEKS as we involve many receivers. Furthermore, the certificates
cannot be refreshed using update keys, but rather they need to be re-generated every time.
Hence, the direct use of CBE scheme will not be satisfactory. More importantly, the
CBE scheme in [93] only works in the random oracle model, and to make our CBEKS
scheme useful in practice, the scheme must be proven secure in the standard model (i.e.
to guarantee the security since CBEKS deals with sensitive data). Another attempt is to
combine Fang et al.’s secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) scheme [82] and the CBBE
scheme from Section 4.2, which provides the broadcast mechanism. Again, the resulting
scheme will not suffice to satisfy the requirements in CBEKS with a simple modification,
and more importantly, if the modification is successul then the scheme will again be only
secure in the random oracle model.
We summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the aforementioned primitives
and combinations of primitives in Table 5.1. Observe that our CBEKS system satisfies all
the requirements and features highlighted previously.
Cryptographic Primitive Certificate Broadcast Key Update Keyword
ABE [104] 5 5 5 5
CBBE [Sec. 4.2] 3 3 5 5
PEKS [82] + CBE [93] 3 5 5 3
PEKS [82] + CBBE [Sec. 4.2] 3 3 5 3
CBEKS 3 3 3 3
Table 5.1: Comparisons of the new primitive CBEKS, the existing primitives ABE and
CBBE and the combination of the primitive PEKS with the primitives CBE and CBBE
respectively.
5.1.2 Protocol Definition
In the definition of the protocol, a label is a reference to some information about access
rights (e.g. privileges and features). This label is supposed to be a unique element in Zp,
for a prime number p, meaning that it refers to only one collection of rights and two labels
with different collections cannot be equal.
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We assume that the certifier and the server know the labels; however, none of the
receivers should get any information about these elements. We presume that the certi-
fier and the server communicate securely to agree on all the possible labels. We do not
consider how they communicate in this protocol by making the hypothesis that they can
proceed easily and naturally. For instance, in a hospital, let the certifier be the IT team
and the server be the database center, meaning that they both belong to the administration
staff of the hospital. Thus, there exists a way for the certifier and the server to share the
information about the labels, since they are allowed to know the access rights and the
privileges given to the hospital staff members.
A certificate-based encryption with keyword search (CBEKS) scheme is composed
of the following seven algorithms:
• Setup(λ ,s)→ (params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s]). On inputs a security parameter λ
and a total number of receivers s, output the public parameters params, the server’s
private key skS, the certifier’s private key skC and the receivers’ private keys {skR,i}i∈[1,s].
As suggested above, the server and the certifier might receive information about the
label framework. The public parameters params include the public keys of all the
involved users.
• Encrypt(params,wS)→ CwS . On inputs the public parameters params and a up-
loader’s keyword wS, output the ciphertext CwS for w
S.
Note that the keyword wS is chosen by the uploader that encrypts the message m
(e.g. a patient’s EHR) and uploads the resulting ciphertext Cm along with CwS on
the server. In this section, we do not focus on the encryption-decryption process for
Cm but rather on the encryption-decryption process for CwS .
• CertGen(params,skC,LR1 , i)→ CertLR1 ,i. On inputs the public parameters params,
the certifier’s private key skC, a label LR1 and a receiver i, output the receiver i’s first
certificate CertLR1 ,i for L
R
1 .
The certifier might keep some elements used to generate CertLR1 ,i, such that the label
LR1 and additional information, on its local storage in order to create the update key
UKLR2 . Let AILR1 be the auxiliary information that the certifier stores.
• UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILRj−1,L
R
j ,S j)→UKLRj . On inputs the public parameters
params, the certifier’s private key skC, the auxiliary information AILRj−1 , a label L
R
j
where 1 < j and a group S j of receivers, output the update key UKLRj for L
R
j and S j.
The certifier might keep some elements used to generate UKLRj , such that the label
LRj and additional information, on its local storage in order to create the update key
UKLRj+1 . Let AILRj be the auxiliary information that the certifier stores.
The algorithm UpdtKeyGen is run in three cases:
1. There is a new label LRj replacing L
R
j−1 while S j = S j−1;
2. There is a new group S j replacing S j−1 while LRj = L
R
j−1;
3. There are a new label LRj replacing L
R
j−1 and a new group S j replacing S j−1.
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In all cases, we write AILRj−1 , L
R
j and S j as the inputs for the algorithm UpdtKeyGen,
such that AILRj−1 was computed given L
R
j−1 and S j−1. For j = 2, AILR1 corresponds to
the auxiliary information from CertLR1 ,i, for i ∈ [1,s]. We assume that a description
of the group S j cam be found in UKLRj .
• UpdtCert(params,CertLRj−1,i,UKLRj )→ CertLRj ,i. On inputs the public parameters
params, the receiver i’s previous certificate CertLRj−1,i for L
R
j−1 and the key update
UKLRj for L
R
j where 1 < j, output the receiver i’s refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i for L
R
j
if i ∈ S j; output ⊥ otherwise.
• TrapGen(params,skR,i,wRi ,CertLRj ,i)→ TrapwRi ,LRj . On inputs the public parameters
params, the receiver i’s private key skR,i, a receiver i’s keyword wRi and a receiver
i’s certificate CertLRj ,i for L
R




• Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl ,TrapwRi ,LRj )→ true/ f alse. On inputs the public parame-
ters params, the server’s private key skS, the ciphertext CwS for w
S, a label LSl where




j where 1 ≤ j, ouptut
true if [wS = wRi ]∧ [LSl = LRj ]; output f alse otherwise.
Correctness. For any λ ∈ N, (params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s])← Setup(λ ,s), let a ci-
phertext be CwS ← Encrypt(params,wS) for a keyword wS. Let a receiver i ∈ [1,s] have a
first certificate CertLR1 ,i← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i) for a label L
R
1 . Given an update key
UKLRj ← UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILRj−1,L
R
j ,S j) such that i ∈ S j ⊆ [1,s], and a previous
certificate CertLRj−1,i for a label L
R
j−1, the certificate is refreshed as follows: CertLRj ,i ←
UpdtCert(params,CertLRj−1,i,UKLRj ) for a label L
R
j where 1 < j. Then, let the receiver i
create a trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj ←TrapGen(params,skR,i,w
R
i ,CertLRj ,i) for a keyword w
R
i and
the label LRj . If j = 1, then we simply use CertLR1 ,i← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i) during
the trapdoor generation.
We require that a public-key encryption with keyword search scheme is correct if for a
label LSl , [w
S = wRi ]∧ [LSl = LRj ] where 1≤ j, l, then Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl , TrapwRi ,LRj )
outputs true; otherwise, Test(params,skS,CwS ,L
S
l ,TrapwRi ,LRj ) outputs f alse.
N.B. We combine the algorithms Setup and KeyGen into an unique algorithm Setup.
5.1.3 Security Models
Before describing the security levels that we expect for our scheme, we recall the existing
security models in the literature. In [82], the SCF-PEKS scheme is proven secure against
chosen keyword and ciphertext attacks (IND-CKCA) and against keyword-guessing at-
tacks (IND-KGA) in the standard model, as well as proven computationally consistent.
More precisely, the scheme proposed in [82] is proven secure in terms of indistinguisha-
bility under chosen keyword and ciphertext attacks, meaning that
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1. the server that has not obtained the trapdoors for given keywords cannot tell which
ciphertext encrypts which keyword;
2. the receiver that has not obtained the server’s private key cannot make any decisions
about the ciphertexts, even though it gets all the trapdoors for the keywords that it
holds.
In addition, a security proof is given in [82] to cover the notion of indistinguishability
under keyword-guessing attack, that guarantees that an outsider (neither the server nor the
receiver) that has obtained the trapdoor for a challenge keyword cannot observe the link
between the trapdoor and any keywords. We will demonstrate that our CBEKS scheme
reaches similar security notions regarding keywords and ciphertexts that we adapt to deal
with labels and certificates.
In [42], a Broadcast Encryption (BE) scheme achieves fully collusion resistance (CR).
More precisely, this system can broadcast a session key to any group of receivers and re-
mains secure even if malicious non-authorised receivers collude. Such a property should
be achieved to deal with the fact that the certifier forwards an update key to all the re-
ceivers, such that only a group of authorised receivers will successfully refresh their cer-
tificates.
We now give an overview of the threats and attacks that our CBEKS system should
elude:
Security against the Server: The server handles the labels for the test process, meaning
that it can obtain information from the certificates about the access rights given
to the receivers. However, the server should learn nothing about the uploader’s
keyword (through the ciphertext) and the receivers’ keyword (through the trapdoor),
except whether they match or not. This is formalized in the indistinguishability
against chosen keyword and ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA) game played by the
server.
Security against the Certifier: As the server, the certifier knows the labels since it has
the task to create the first certificates and update keys. Nevertheless, it should not
be able to update itself the receivers’ certificates. Moreover, even if intercepting
ciphertexts and trapdoors, the certifier should not get any information about the
keywords chosen by the uploader and the receivers respectively. This is formalized
in the IND-CKCA game played by the certifier.
Security against the Receiver: The receiver gets the first certificate from the certifier,
along with update keys, such that the latters can be efficiently used if and only
if the receiver has been authorised by the certifier. The receiver should not be
able to learn anything about the labels and so, the access rights embedded into
its first certificate and the subsequent update keys. Note that the receiver can guess
whether his/her refreshed certificate is a correct one or a fake one, since we suppose
that the group of authorised receivers is contained in clear into each update key.
Even waylaying a ciphertext, a receiver should not have the capability to know the
embedded uploader’s keyword, and even check that whether the keywords match.
This is formalized in the IND-CKCA game played by the receiver.
Moreover, observe that the trapdoor is generated given a keyword and a certificate
to avoid the following collusion attack. We suppose that the trapdoor only encrypts
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a keyword and that a receiver has to provide both his/her trapdoor and his/her certifi-
cate to the server in order to verifiy the matches of the keywords and the labels. In
this scenario, we can let a first receiver compute the trapdoor encrypting a keyword
and have only obsolete certificates, and a second receiver get a recent certificate
that is still valid. Thus, these two receivers can manage to pass the test by sending
to the server the trapdoor and the fresh certificate respectively.
Security against an Outsider: An outsider is neither the server nor the certifier nor a re-
ceiver. This outsider will guess keywords (for instance, keywords with low entropy)
and check its choices in an off-line way. If the outsider has successfully initiated
a keyword-guessing attack, then it can learn which keywords were chosen by the
uploader and by the receivers, and so the security of the protocol might be bro-
ken. This is formalized in the indistinguishability against keyword-guessing attack
(IND-KGA) game.
Collusion Resistance: The update keys are delivered by the certifier in order to let a
group of authorised receivers to resfresh their certificates, regarding either a new
label or a new group or both. This group is supposed to be included into the update
key in clear, and the latter is sent to all the receivers. One important feature that the
update key should satisfy is its collusion resistance: even if all the non-authorised
receivers collude, they cannot generate a well-formed refreshed certificate from the
update key. This is formalized in the collusion resistance game.
We provide several security games where the adversary plays the role of either the server
or the certifier or a receiver. We also give a security game when the adversary acts as
an outsider (neither the server nor the certifier nor a receiver) or as a group of colluding
receivers.
The security models that we define below are computational consistency, indistin-
guishability against chosen keyword and ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA), indistinguisha-
bility against keyword-guessing attack (IND-KGA) and collusion resistance (CR). Com-
pared to the IND-CKCA and IND-KGA models given in [82], the adversary has access
to more oracles in our case, in order to satisfy the label-based situation of our protocol.
Informally, in addition to the trapdoor queries and the test queries, the adversary can
make first certificate queries, update key queries and refreshed certificate queries. If the
adversary makes an update key query or a refreshed certificate query for a label LRj , then
the challenger computes the requested element using the previous queried label LRj−1 or a
random label LRj−1 for a first query.
In the collusion resistance game, we let the adversary select a group S∗ ⊆ [1,s] of
receivers beforehand, and the challenger will reply to the adversary’s queries according
to this group S∗.
In summary, depending on the role that it is playing, the adversary is given access to
different oracles:
• First certificate query: the adversary can ask the challenger for a first certificate
query by giving a label L. The challenger responds by sending back a first certificate
Cert for L to the adversary.
• Update key query: the adversary can ask the challenger for an update key query by
giving a label L. The challenger chooses a group of receivers S and responds by
sending back an update key UK for L and S to the adversary.
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• Refreshed certificate query: the adversary can ask the challenger for a refreshed
certificate query by giving a label L. The challenger responds by sending back a
refreshed certificate Cert for L to the adversary.
• Trapdoor query: the adversary can ask the challenger for a trapdoor query by giving
a keyword w and a label L. The challenger responds by sending back a trapdoor
Trap for w and L to the adversary.
• Test query: the adversary can ask the challenger for a test query by giving a cipher-
text C, a keyword w and two labels L,L′. The challenger responds by sending back
the result (either true or f alse) to the adversary.
Consistency Model
The definition of consistency follows the ones given in [82, 1] except that the adversary
has to choose more elements along with the two keywords: along with the uploader’s
keyword wS, it selects a corresponding label LSl where 1≤ l, and along with the receiver’s
keyword wRi , it first selects a receiver i∈ [1,s] and then a label LR1 as well as an index 1 < j
indicating the number of times that the certificate should be refreshed.
Let λ be the security parameter and s the total number of receivers. Suppose there
exists an adversary A that wants to make consistency fail. The consistency is formally
















( j−1)(params,skR,i,CertLR1 ,i,UKLRj );
TrapwRi ,LRj ← TrapGen(params,skR,w
R
i ,CertLRj ,i);
If i ∈ Sk for all 1≤ k ≤ j, (LSl = LRj ), (wS 6= wRi ) and Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl ,
TrapwRi ,LRj )→ true then return 1,else return 0.
The advantage of A is defined as follows AdvConsCBEKS,A (λ ) = Pr[Exp
Cons
CBEKS,A (λ ) = 1].
The scheme is said to be computationally consistent if any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A wins the above experiment with negligible advantage.
N.B. The notation UpdtKeyGen( j−1) denotes that the algorithm UpdtKeyGen is run j−1
times on inputs LR2 ,L
R
3 , · · · ,LRj respectively, and the notation UpdtCert( j−1) denotes that
the algorithm UpdtCert is run j−1 times on inputs UKLR2 ,UKLR3 , · · · ,UKLRj respectively.
Note that ExpConsCBEKS,A (λ ) = 1 can be formulated as ”A succeeds“.
Remark. Jeong et al. [124] noticed that the consistency of a SCF-PEKS scheme turns
this scheme to not be secure against keyword-guessing attacks, in case the adversary is the
server. Nevertheless, as suggested in [82], this attack should not be considered. Instead,
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we regard the keyword-guessing attacks launched by an outsider (neither the server nor
the certifier nor a receiver).
Indistinguishability of CBEKS against Chosen Keyword and Ciphertext Attack Model
Let λ be the security parameter, KeywS be the keyword space, LabS be the label space
and CiphS be the ciphertext space. Let an adversary A and a challenger B play the
following three games GameS, GameC and GameR.
Game played by the Server: GameS.
The adversary A is assumed to be the server (inside attacker).
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup on inputs λ and s to obtain params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s].
The challenger sends params and skS to A .
Query Phase 1. A makes the queries as follows:
• First Certificate Query < LR1 >. A can adaptively ask B for the first certificate
query for any label LR1 ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger answers by giving
the first certificate CertLR1 ,i← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i) to A for which i ∈
[1,s].
• Update Key Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the update key
query for any label LRj ∈ LabS. The challenger first makes a first certificate
query on LRj−1 to get AILRj−1 , and answers by giving the update key UKLRj ←
UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILRj−1,L
R
j ,S j) to A for which S j ⊆ [1,s].
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the re-
freshed certificate query for any label LRj ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger
first makes a first certificate query on LRj−1 to get CertLRj−1,i for which i ∈ [1,s]
and an update key query on LRj to get UKLRj , and answers by giving the re-
freshed certificate CertLRj ← UpdtCert(params,skR,i,UKLRj ,CertLRj−1,i) to A .
• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the trapdoor query
for any keyword wRi ∈ KeywS and any label LRj ∈ LabS of its choice. The
challenger first makes a first certificate query or a refreshed certificate query
on LRj to get CertLRj ,i for which i ∈ [1,s], and answers by giving the trapdoor
TrapwRi ,LRj ← TrapGen(params,skR,i,w
R
i ,CertLRj ,i) to A .
• Test Query < CwS ,wRi ,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query
for any ciphertext CwS ∈ CiphS, any keyword wRi ∈ KeywS and any labels
LSl ,L
R
j ∈ LabS of its choice. The challenger first makes a first certificate
query or a refreshed query on LRj to get CertLRj ,i and then a trapdoor query
on wRi to get TrapwRi ,LRj for which i ∈ [1,s], and answers by giving the result
Test(params,skS,CwS ,L
S
l ,TrapwRi ,LRj ) to A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a chal-
lenge keyword pair (w0,w1) such that neither w0 nor w1 has been queried to obtain
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a corresponding trapdoor in the query phase 1. Upon receiving this pair, B answers
by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by computing a challenge ciphertext
Cwµ ← Encrypt(params,wµ). The challenger sends Cwµ to the adversary. Note that
the challenger randomly selects the bit µ: we assume that the challenger cannot
submit the same bit over and over.
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-
tion is that < wRi ,L
R








































Guess. The adversary output the guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if µ ′ = µ .
We define the adversary’s advantage in GameS by Adv
GameS
CBEKS,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]−1/2|.
Game played by the Certifier: GameC.
The adversary A is assumed to be the certifier (outside attacker).
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup on input λ and s to obtain params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s].
The challenger sends params and skC to A .
Query Phase 1. A makes the queries as follows:
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the re-
freshed certificate query for any label LRj ∈ LabS of its choice. The chal-
lenger first gets a first certificate CertLRj−1,i for which i ∈ [1,s] and an update
key UKLRj for L
R
j , and answers by giving the refreshed certificate CertLRj ←
UpdtCert(params,skR,i,UKLRj ,CertLRj−1,i) to A .
• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the trapdoor query
for any keyword wRi ∈KeywS and any label LRj ∈LabS of its choice. The chal-
lenger first makes a refreshed certificate query on LRj to get CertLRj ,i for which
i ∈ [1,s], and answers by giving the trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj ← TrapGen(params,
skR,i,wRi ,CertLRj ,i) to A .
• Test Query < CwS ,wRi ,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query
for any ciphertext CwS ∈ CiphS, any keyword wRi ∈ KeywS and any labels
LSl ,L
R
j ∈ LabS of its choice. The challenger first makes a refreshed certificate
query on LRj to get CertLRj ,i and then a trapdoor query on w
R
i to get TrapwRi ,LRj
for which i∈ [1,s], and answers by giving the result Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl ,
TrapwRi ,LRj ) to A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a chal-
lenge keyword pair (w0,w1) such that neither w0 nor w1 has been queried to obtain
a corresponding trapdoor in the query phase 1. Upon receiving this pair, B answers
by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by computing a challenge ciphertext
Cwµ ← Encrypt(params,wµ). The challenger sends Cwµ to the adversary. Note that
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the challenger randomly selects the bit µ: we assume that the challenger cannot
submit the same bit over and over.
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-
tion is that < wRi ,L
R








































Guess. The adversary output the guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if µ ′ = µ .
We define the adversary’s advantage in GameC by Adv
GameC
CBEKS,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]−1/2|.
Game played by the Receiver: GameR.
The adversary A is assumed to be the receiver (outside attacker).
Initialization. A begins by selecting an index i∗ ∈ [1,s] of the receiver that it wants to
play.
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup on input λ and s to obtain params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s].
The challenger sends params and skR,i∗ to A .
Query Phase 1. A makes the queries as follows:
• First Certificate Query < LR1 >. A can adaptively ask B for the first certificate
query for any label LR1 ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger answers by giving
the first certificate CertLR1 ,i∗ ← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i
∗) to A .
• Update Key Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the update key
query for any label LRj ∈ LabS. The challenger first makes a first certificate
query on LRj−1 to get AILRj−1 , and answer by giving the update key UKLRj ←
UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILRj−1 ,L
R
j ,S j) to A for a group S j of receivers that
includes i∗.
• Test Query < CwS ,wRi∗,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query
for any ciphertext CwS ∈ CiphS, any keyword wRi∗ ∈ KeywS and any labels
LSl ,L
R
j ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger first makes a first certificate query
on LRj to get CertLRj ,i∗ and generates TrapwRi∗ ,LRj . and answers by giving the
result Test(params,skS,CwS ,L
S
l ,TrapwRi∗ ,LRj ,CertLRj ,i∗) to A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a chal-
lenge keyword pair (w0,w1) such that neither w0 nor w1 has been queried to obtain
a corresponding trapdoor in the query phase 1. Upon receiving this pair, B answers
by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by computing a challenge ciphertext
Cwµ ← Encrypt(params,wµ). The challenger sends Cwµ to the adversary. Note that
the challenger randomly selects the bit µ: we assume that the challenger cannot
submit the same bit over and over.
CHAPTER 5. ACCESSING AND RETRIEVING EHR FROM CLOUD STORAGE113
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-




























Guess. The adversary output the guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if µ ′ = µ .
We define the adversary’s advantage in GameR by Adv
GameR
CBEKS,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]−1/2|.
Definition. The CBEKS scheme is said to be IND-CKCA secure if AdvGameSCBEKS,A , Adv
GameC
CBEKS,A
and AdvGameRCBEKS,A are all negligible.
Indistinguishability of CBEKS against Keyword-Guessing Attack Model
Let λ be the security parameter, KeywS be the keyword space, LabS be the label space
and CiphS be the ciphertext space. Let A be an outside adversary that is neither the
server nor the certifier nor the receiver and that makes the keyword-guessing attack by
interacting with a challenger B. We consider the following game.
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup on input λ and s to obtain params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s].
The challenger sends params to A .
Query Phase 1. A makes the queries as follows:
• First Certificate Query < LR1 >. A can adaptively ask B for the first certificate
query for any label LR1 ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger answers by giving
the certificate CertLR1 ,i← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i) to A for which i∈ [1,s].
• Update Key Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the update key
query for any label LRj ∈ LabS. The challenger first makes a first certificate
query on LRj−1 to get AILRj−1 , and answer by giving the update key UKLRj ←
UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILRj−1,L
R
j ,S j) to A for which S j ∈ [1,s].
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the re-
freshed certificate query for any label LRj ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger
first makes a first certificate query on LRj−1 to get CertLRj−1,i for which i ∈ [1,s]
and an update key query on LRj to get UKLRj , and answers by giving the re-
freshed certificate CertLRj ← UpdtCert(params,skR,i,UKLRj ,CertLRj−1,i) to A .
• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the trapdoor query
for any keyword wRi ∈ KeywS and any label LRj ∈ LabS of its choice. The
challenger first makes a first certificate query or a refreshed certificate query
on LRj to get CertLRj ,i for which i ∈ [1,s], and answers by giving the trapdoor
TrapwRi ,LRj ← TrapGen(params,skR,i,w
R
i ,CertLRj ,i) to A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a chal-
lenge keyword pair (w0,w1) such that neither w0 nor w1 has been queried to obtain
a corresponding trapdoor in the query phase 1. Upon receiving this pair, B answers
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by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and a label LRj , and by computing a chal-
lenge trapdoor Trapwµ ,LRj ← TrapGen(params,skR,i,wµ ,CertLRj ,i) where CertLRj ,i is
the certificate issued for LRj . The challenger sends Trapwµ ,LRj to the adversary. Note
that the challenger randomly selects the bit µ: we assume that the challenger cannot
submit the same bit over and over.
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restriction is
that < wRi ,L
R












Guess. The adversary output the guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if µ ′ = µ .
We define the adversary’s advantage in the above game by AdvIND−KGACBEKS,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ =
µ]−1/2|.
Definition. The CBEKS scheme is said to be IND-KGA secure if AdvIND−KGACBEKS,A (λ ) is
negligible.
Collusion Resistance Model
Let λ be the security parameter, KeywS be the keyword space, LabS be the label space
and CiphS be the ciphertext space. Let A be a group of colluding receivers that attacks
the collusion resistance of the update keys by interacting with a challenger B. We con-
sider the following game.
Initialization. A begins by selecting a group S∗ ⊆ [1,s] of receivers that it wants to be
challenged on.
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup on input λ and s to obtain params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s].
The challenger sends params and {skR,i}i∈[1,s]\S∗ to A .
Query Phase 1. A makes the queries as follows:
• First Certificate Query < LR1 >. A can adaptively ask B for the first certificate
query for any label LR1 ∈LabS of its choice. The challenger answers by giving
the certificate CertLR1 ,i← CertGen(params,skC,L
R
1 , i) to A for which i ∈ S ⊆
S∗.
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the re-
freshed certificate query for any label LRj ∈ LabS of its choice. The chal-
lenger first makes a first certificate query on LRj−1 to get CertLRj−1,i for which
i ∈ S ⊆ S∗, then computes an update key UKLRj for L
R
j , and answers by giving
the refreshed certificate CertLRj ←UpdtCert(params,skR,i,UKLRj ,CertLRj−1,i) to
A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a chal-
lenge label pair (L0,L1) such that neither L0 nor L1 has been queried to obtain a
corresponding certificate or trapdoor in the query phase 1. Upon receiving this pair,
B answers by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by computing a challenge up-
date key UKLµ ← UpdtKeyGen(params,skC,AILµ−1,Lµ ,S∗). The challenger sends
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UKLµ to the adversary. We denote by Lµ −1 the label preceding the label Lµ . Note
that the challenger randomly selects the bit µ: we assume that the challenger cannot
submit the same bit over and over.
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restriction is
that < LRj > are not allowed to be queried as first certificate or refreshed certificate
queries if < LRj >=< L0 > or < L
R
j >=< L1 >.
Guess. The adversary output the guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins if µ ′ = µ .
We define the adversary’s advantage in the above game by AdvCollResCBEKS,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ =
µ]−1/2|.
Definition. The CBEKS scheme is said to be collusion resistant if AdvCollResCBEKS,A (λ ) is
negligible.
5.1.4 Construction
The following CBEKS construction is inspired from the Boneh et al.’s broadcast encryp-
tion (BE) scheme [42]. A BE scheme allows a sender to forward encrypted information
to all the recipients such that only a group of recipients selected by the sender can recover
the original information in plain. Such property is useful to let the certifier to send en-
crypted update keys to all the receivers, while only some of them are able to successfully
retrieve these update keys regarding the selection of the certifier. Thus, we let the certifier
choose a group of receivers when it is generating an update key, such that only the re-
ceivers in this group will be able to correctly update their certificate. Therefore, it seems
natural that the construction will lead to BE schemes. The main advantage of the Boneh
et al.’s scheme is the constant size of both the receiver’s private keys and the ciphertexts.
The scheme is proved collusion resistant and selectively secure against chosen-ciphertext
attacks in the standard model.
The construction below is also established on Waters’ IBE scheme [235], where
the algorithm KeyGen in the IBE scheme corresponds to the algorithm TrapGen in our
CBEKS scheme. We let each receiver choose a keyword and generate a corresponding
trapdoor that is given to the server in order to check that the receiver’s keyword matches
the uploader’s one. Waters’ scheme is efficient in that the private key and the cipher-
text have constant size, and the decryption only involves two pairing computations. The
scheme is proved semantically secure in the standard model. Observe that Abdalla et
al. [1] showed that Waters’ IBE scheme is not anonymous (meaning that the ciphertext
might reveal the identity of the recipient). Moreover, Boneh et al. [40] presented a trans-
formation of an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme. Nevertheless, the authors noticed that
the IBE scheme is required to be anonymous in order to provide a PEKS scheme against
chosen message attacks. Therefore, such issue directly applied to our CBEKS scheme;
however we manage to overcome it as follows.
First, note that in addition to the keywords that have to match, a receiver should
provide a label LRj that corresponds to the label L
S
l held by the server for a successful test
outcome. This means that a receiver meets two verification steps through the label and
the keyword that enhance the security of the CBEKS scheme.
We now assume that the label of the receiver LRj matches the label of the server L
S
l .
As noticed by Fang et al. [82], we have to ensure that an adversarial receiver cannot
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modify a ciphertext CwS into a new valid ciphertext C
′
wS without knowing the keyword w
S.
However, this adversarial receiver would be able to generate a trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj for a
guessed keyword wRi using its private key, and so could obtain the relation between the
modified ciphertext C′wS and the trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj through interacting with the server
as in a real environment. For this reason, Fang et al. [82] suggested to introduce a test
query in the security model, as well as a strongly unforgeable one-time signature σ =
Sign(ssk,(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)) on the tuple (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5) such that C4 = gκ1 and C5 =
(AsvkB)κ for a random exponent κ ∈R Zp and a verification key svk.
Moreover, Waters’ IBE scheme takes place in the standard model. Indeed, Waters
provided a hash function H : {0,1}n→G1 that is collision resistant, while is not seen as
a random oracle.
Our CBEKS construction is as follows:
• Setup(λ ,s)→ (params,skS,skC,{skR,i}i∈[1,s]). Let λ be the security parameter and
(p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) be the bilinear map parameters. Pick at random A,B∈R G2
and let OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature
scheme. Pick at random α ∈R Zp and compute gα
i
1 for i ∈ [1,s]∪ [s+2,2s] and gα
i
2
for i ∈ [1,s]. Pick at random β ∈R Zp and compute gβ1 and g
β
2 . Pick at random
γ ∈R Zp and compute gγα
i
1 for i ∈ [0,s]. Pick at random δ1, · · · ,δs,ξ ,ω ∈R Zp and


















1 ,OTS). Set the receiver




1 ) for i ∈ [1,s]. Set the server’s private
key as follows: skS = ξ . Set the certifier’s private key as follows: skC = (ω,g
γ
1).
• Encrypt(params,wS)→ CwS . Let the keyword space be KeywS = {0,1}n where
2n << p. Choose n+1 random elements e0,e1, · · · ,en ∈R Zp and compute hk = gek1
for k ∈ [0,n]. Set h = (h0,h1, · · · ,hn) as the public description of the hash function
H : {0,1}n→G1, and e = (e0,e1, · · · ,en) is kept secret by the uploader.
Second, select a one-time signature key pair (ssk,svk) ← KeyGen(λ ). Pick at









































ωr1LR1 ,gr12 ) to the receiver and
the latter calculates (gr12 )
δi (where δi is one of the components of the receiver i’s
private key skR,i). Moreover, the certifier keeps AILR1 = g
r1LR1
1 on its local storage. Fi-









j ,S j)→UKLRj . Let AILRj−1 = g
r j−1LRj−1
1 and S j ⊆
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[1,s]. Pick at random s j,r j ∈R Zp and compute









s j ,e(gα1 ,g
αs
2 )















s j · e(gω1 ,gξ2 )
r jLRj−r j−1LRj−1
The certifier keeps AILRj = g
r jLRj
1 on its local storage. Finally, set the update key as






1 ·∏k∈S j gα
s+1−k
1 )








• UpdtCert(params,CertLRj−1,i,UKLRj )→CertLRj ,i. Suppose that i∈ S j. First, parse the







2 ) and the






1 ·∏k∈S j gα
s+1−k
1 )




s j · e(gω1 ,g
ξ
2 )










e((gγ1 ·∏k∈S j gα
s+1−k
1 )
s j ,gαi2 )
e(gγα
i






























Then, compute (uk j,2)δi = (g
r j
2 )
δi (where δi is one of the components of the receiver
i’s private key skR,i) and
cert j−1,1 · (e(gω1 ,gξ2 )
r jLRj−r j−1LRj−1)δi = e(gδi1 ,g
ξ
2 )










ωr jLRj ,gδir j2 ).
• TrapGen(params,skR,i,wRi ,CertLRj ,i)→TrapwRi ,LRj . First, parse the certificate CertLRj ,i





ωr jLRj ,gδir j2 ). Pick at random v,x,z ∈R Zp and com-
pute
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• Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl ,TrapwRi ,LRj )→ true/ f alse. First, parse the ciphertext CwS









svkB)κ ,σ) and the




















Second, test if Verify(C0,σ ,(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)) = true and e(C4,AC0B) = e(g1,C5).
Then, check that Tj,1 = e(gω1 ,Tj,5)
ξ LSl · (Tj,2)ξ and e(Tj,3,C3)e(C1,Tj,4) = e(Tj,6,C2)
ξ . If the
above equations hold, then output true; otherwise, output f alse.
Correctness. First, we get that
e(C4,AC0B) = e(gκ1 ,A
svkB) = e(g1,(AsvkB)κ) = e(g1,C5).














ξ LSl · (e(H(wRi ),g2)δix)ξ
= e(gω1 ,Tj,5)































































Proof of the Consistency Security
Theorem. Suppose that the DL assumption holds in G1 and G2, then the CBEKS
scheme is computationally consistent in the standard model.
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that attacks the computational consistency
of the CBEKS scheme. A challenger B tries to solve the DL problem by playing the
consistency game with the adversary A as follows.
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2 ), such that g1 is a generator of G1
and g2 is a generator of G2, and has to output δi in Zp. Let AdvDLB,G1(λ ) be the advantage
function that B solves the DL problem in G1 and AdvDLB,G2(λ ) be the advantage function
that B solves the DL problem in G2.




1 , j, i) be the tuples that A returns in the consistency exper-
iment. Let a ciphertext CwS be (C0 = svk,C1 = g
h(ws)y
1 ,C2 = g
(β−wS)y
2 ,C3 = g
ξ y
2 ,C4 =
gκ1 ,C5 = A
svkB)κ), for a one-time signature key pair (ssk,svk)← KeyGen(λ ), two ele-






ωr jLRj ·e(H(wRi )δi,g
ξ
2 )







ξ z,Tj,5 = (g
δi
2 )
r j ,Tj,6 = gv1), for random exponents ξ ,ω,r j,v,x,z in Zp. We let
H(wRi )
δi be computed as (gδi1 )
h(wRi ).
We assume that the algorithm CertGen was run with input LR1 and that the algorithms
UpdtKeyGen and UpdtCert were called j−1 times to obtain CertLRj ,i and then TrapwRi ,LRj
since the receiver i is supposed to belong to Sk for all 1≤ k ≤ j. In addition, we suppose
that LRl = L
R
j ; however, we do not need this hypothesis in our proof.
We suppose that the uploader’s keyword and the receiver’s keyword differ, i.e. wS 6=
wRi . The adversary wins exactly when
e(Tj,3,C3)
e(C1,Tj,4)
































⇔ (β −wRi )vξ y+(h(wRi )−h(wS))δizξ y = (β −wS)vξ y mod p
We suppose that ξ ,y 6= 0 mod p (the event that both ξ and y are equal to 0 mod p
happens with probability 1/p2), so that (β −wRi )v + (h(wRi )− h(wS))δiz = (β −wS)v
mod p.
• Case 1: h(wRi ) = h(wS) 6= 0 mod p. In this situation, we get that (β −wRi )v =
(β −wS)v, and so wRi = wS such that v 6= 0 mod p (with probability 1−1/p). We
thus obtain a contradiction as we have assumed that wS 6= wRi .
• Case 2: h(wRi ) 6= h(wS). In this situation, we get that (h(wRi )−h(wS))δiz = v(β −
wS−β +wRi ) mod p, and so δi =
wRi −wS
h(wRi )−h(wS)
· vz mod p, meaning that we have a
solution to the DL problem.
• Case 3: h(w) = 0 mod p for w = wRi ∨wS. Let us fix a keyword w. The exponents
e0,e1, · · · ,en are randomly selected in Zp. Note that the total number of possibilities
for w is 2n. Then, we have that the probability that h(w) = 0 mod p is equal to
2n/p.
Finally, if i ∈ Sk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ j, LSl = LRj , wS 6= wRi and Test(params,skS,CwS ,LSl ,
TrapwRi ,LRj )→ true, the advantage of A is upper bounded as follows:
AdvConsCBEKS,A (λ ) =Pr[Exp
Cons
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To complete the above proof, authors in [82] mentioned that the private key of an
identity id in Waters’ IBE scheme [235] is computed as (gs·αH(id)r,g), for random ex-
ponents r,s∈Zp, where gs·α corresponds to the master secret key of the protocol. Where-
fore, if h(id) = 0, then one can retrieve the master secret key gs·α , which threatens the
robutness of this system.
Proof of the IND-CKCA Security
Theorem. Suppose that the SXDH assumption holds in G1 and G2 and that OTS is a
strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme, then the CBEKS scheme is IND-CKCA
secure in the standard model.
The proof of this theorem will result from the proofs of the three lemmas. These
lemmas represent GameS (server), GameC (certifier) and GameR (receiver), respectively.
Game played by the Server: GameS
Lemma. Suppose that the SXDH assumption holds, then the CBEKS scheme is seman-
tically secure against a chosen keyword and ciphertext attack in GameS in the standard
model.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A in GameS that can attack the CBEKS
scheme in the standard model with advantage AdvGameSCBEKS,A (λ )≥ ε . We build a challenger
B that has advantage at least ε in solving the SXDH problem in (G1,G2). B receives a






2,Z) where Z is either g
ab
2 or a random
element in G2, such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. We let the
challenger proceed as follows.
Setup. B computes the public parameters params and the server’s private key skS as
follows.
First, B chooses at random α ∈R Zp and generates gα
i
1 for i ∈ [1,s]∪ [s+ 2,2s]
and gα
i
2 for i ∈ [1,s]. It also randomly chooses δ1, · · · ,δs,ξ ,ω ∈R Zp and computes






1 . In addition, the challenger picks at random A,B ∈R G2 and
chooses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,
Verify).











1 ,OTS) and the server’s
private key skS = ξ . Note that since the exponents in Zp are uniformly chosen at
random, these public parameters have an identical distribution to that in the actual
construction and that B has all the necessary values to compute the private key skS.
Let the keyword space KeywS be {0,1}n. B chooses n + 1 random elements
e0,e1, · · · ,en in Zp and computes hi = gei1 for i ∈ [0,n]. Let h = (h0,h1, · · · ,hn)
be the public description of the hash function H. The algebraic hash function
H : {0,1}n → G1 is evaluated on a keyword string w = (w1, · · · ,wn) ∈ {0,1}n as
h(w) = e0 +∑ni=1(ei ·wi) and H(w) = h0 ·∏ni=1(hwii ) = g
h(w)
1 .
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Query Phase 1. A makes the following queries:
• First Certificate Query < LR1 >. If A queries LR1 to the first certificate query




and gr1δi2 . It sends these two elements to A as the first certificate CertLR1 ,i.
• Update Key Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the update key generation










s j for S ⊆ [1,s], and e(gα1 ,gα
s
2 )
s j · e(gω1 ,g
ξ
2 )
r jLRj−r1LR1 . The chal-
lenger forwards these elements to A as the update key UKLRj .
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the refreshed cer-




ωr jLRj and gδir j2 to A as the refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i.
• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. If A queries (wRi ,LRj ) to the trapdoor genera-












1 ·H(wRi )δiz, (g
ξ
2 )
δiz, gδir j2 and g
v
1
as the trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj , and gives these elements to A
• Test Query < CwS ,wRi ,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query






j . The challenger first makes a refreshed certificate




j , and responds to A
by sending the result Test(params,skS,CwS ,L
S
l ,TrapwRi ,LRj ).
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a key-
word pair (w0,w1). The challenger answers by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1}
and by letting the challenge keyword be w∗ = wµ . Then, it selects a one-time sig-
nature key pair (ssk∗,svk∗)← KeyGen(λ ) and an exponent κ ∈R Zp, and sets C0 =
svk∗, C4 = gκ1 and C5 = (A
svk∗B)κ . It also sets C1 = (gb1)
h(w∗), C2 = Z ·(gb2)(−w
∗) and
C3 = (gb2)
ξ , and generates a one-time signature σ = Sign(ssk∗,(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)).
The challenger sends the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C0,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ) to the
adversary.
When Z = gab2 , then C
∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext to A as in the real attack.
When Z is random in G2, then C2 = Z · (gb2)(−w
∗) is a uniform element in G2, and
thus the ciphertext gives no information about the challenger’s bit µ .
Query Phase 2. A continues to make queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-
tion is that < wRi ,L
R

















j > are not




















Guess. The adversary outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. If µ = µ ′, then B outputs 1 meaning that
Z = gab2 ; otherwise, B outputs 0 meaning that Z is a random element in G2.
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Analysis. When Z = gab2 , then the adversary must satisfy |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | ≥ ε . When
Z ∈R G2, then C2 = Z · (gb2)(−w
∗) is uniformly random in G2, and thus Pr[µ ′ = µ] = 12 . It
follows that we have AdvSXDHB,G1,G2(λ )≥ ε .
Game played by the Certifier: GameC
Lemma. Suppose that the SXDH assumption holds, then the CBEKS scheme is seman-
tically secure against a chosen keyword and ciphertext attack in GameC in the standard
model.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A in GameC that can attack the CBEKS
scheme in the standard model with advantage AdvGameCCBEKS,A (λ )≥ ε . We build a challenger
B that has advantage at least ε in solving the SXDH problem in (G1,G2). B receives a






2,Z) where Z is either g
ab
2 or a random
element in G2, such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. We let the
challenger proceed as follows.
Setup. B computes the public parameters params and the certifier’s private key skC
as follows. First, B chooses at random β ∈R Zp and computes gβ2 . It then se-
lects at random α ∈R Zp and generates gα
i
1 for i ∈ [1,s]∪ [s+ 2,2s] and gα
i
2 for
i ∈ [1,s]. It also randomly chooses γ ∈R Zp and sets gγ1. Futhermore, it picks at ran-




1 . In addition, the challenger
picks at random A,B ∈R G2 and chooses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature
scheme OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify).









1 }i∈[1,s],ga2,gω1 ,OTS) and the certifier’s
private key skC = (ω,g
γ
1). Note that since the exponents in Zp are uniformly cho-
sen at random, these public parameters have an identical distribution to that in the
actual construction and that B has all the necessary values to compute the private
key skC.
Let the keyword space KeywS be {0,1}n. B chooses n + 1 random elements
e0,e1, · · · ,en in Zp and computes hi = gei1 for i ∈ [0,n]. Let h = (h0,h1, · · · ,hn)
be the public description of the hash function H. The algebraic hash function
H : {0,1}n→G1 is evaluated on a keyword string w = (w1, · · · ,wn) ∈ {0,1}n as








(hwii ) = g
h(w)
1 .
Query Phase 1. A makes the following queries:
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the refreshed cer-




ωr jLRj and gδir j2 to A as the refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i.
• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. If A queries (wRi ,LRj ) to the trapdoor genera-

















the trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj , and gives these elements to A .
• Test Query < CwS ,wRi ,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query






j . The challenger first makes a refreshed certificate




j , and responds to A
by sending the result Test(params,skS,CwS ,L
S
l ,TrapwRi ,LRj ).
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a key-
word pair (w0,w1). The challenger answers by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1}
and by letting the challenge keyword be w∗ = wµ . Then, it selects a one-time
signature key pair (ssk∗,svk∗)← KeyGen(λ ) and an exponent κ ∈R Zp, and sets
C0 = svk∗, C4 = gκ1 and C5 = (A
svk∗B)κ . It also sets C1 = (gb1)
h(w∗), C2 = (gb2)
(β−w∗)
and C3 = Z, and generates a one-time signature σ = Sign(ssk∗,(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)).
The challenger sends the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C0,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ) to the
adversary.
When Z = gab2 , then C
∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext to A as in the real attack.
When Z is random in G2, then C3 = Z is a uniform element in G2, and so C∗ gives
no information about the challenger’s bit µ .
Query Phase 2. A continues to make queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-
tion is that < wRi ,L
R

















j > are not




















Guess. The adversary outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. If µ ′ = µ , then B outputs 1 meaning that
Z = gab2 ; otherwise, B outputs 0 meaning that Z is a random element in G2.
Analysis. When Z = gab2 , then the adversary must satisfy |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | ≥ ε . When
Z ∈R G2, then C3 = Z is uniformly random in G2, and thus Pr[µ ′ = µ] = 12 . It follows
that we have AdvSXDHB,G1,G2(λ )≥ ε .
Game played by the Receiver: GameR
Lemma. Suppose that the SXDH assumption holds and that OTS is a strongly unforge-
able one-time signature scheme, then the CBEKS scheme is semantically secure against
a chosen keyword and ciphertext attack in GameR in the standard model.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A in GameR that can attack the CBEKS
scheme in the standard model with advantage AdvGameRCBEKS,A (λ )≥ ε . We build a challenger
B that has advantage at least ε in solving the SXDH problem in (G1,G2). B receives






2,Z) where Z is either g
ab
2 or a random
element in G2, such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2.
Let C∗=(svk∗,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ) be the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary
















5)) = true. In the query phase 1, the
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adversary does not have any information on svk∗. Thus, the probability of a pre-challenge
occurrence of EvOT S does not exceed qto ·Bound where qto denotes the total number of
queries made to the test oracle and Bound is the maximum probability that any one-time
verification key svk∗ is output by KeyGen (which does not exceed 1/p by assumption).
In the query phase 2, EvOT S produces an algorithm that breaks the strong unforgeability
of the one-time signature. Thus, the probability Pr[EvOT S] ≤ qto/p+AdvOT S, where
AdvOT S denotes the probability defined for a one-time signature (that should be negligible
by assumption).
We let the challenger proceed as follows.
Initialization. A selects a receiver i∗ ∈ [1,s] as the one it wants to be challenged on.
Setup. B computes the public parameters params and the private keys skR,i∗ of the re-
ceiver i∗ as follows. First, B chooses at random β ∈R Zp and computes gβ1 ,g
β
2 .
It then selects at random α ∈R Zp and generates gα
i
1 for i ∈ [1,s]∪ [s+ 2,2s] and
gα
i
2 for i ∈ [1,s]. It also randomly chooses γ ∈R Zp and sets g
γα i
∗
1 . Futhermore, it




1 . In addition, the
challenger picks at random A,B∈R G2 and chooses a strongly unforgeable one-time
signature scheme OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify).









1 }i∈[1,s],ga2,gω1 ,OTS) and the receiver





1 ). Note that since the exponents in Zp are uni-
formly chosen at random, these public parameters have an identical distribution to
that in the actual construction and that B has all the necessary values to compute
the private keys skR,i∗ .
Let the keyword space KeywS be {0,1}n. B chooses n + 1 random elements
e0,e1, · · · ,en in Zp and computes hi = gei1 for i ∈ [0,n]. Let h = (h0,h1, · · · ,hn)
be the public description of the hash function H. The algebraic hash function
H : {0,1}n→G1 is evaluated on a keyword string w = (w1, · · · ,wn) ∈ {0,1}n as








(hwii ) = g
h(w)
1 .
Query Phase 1. A makes the following queries:
• First Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the first certificate query
generation oracle, then B picks at random r1 ∈R Zp and computes e(gδi∗1 ,ga2)ωr1L
R
1
and gr1δi∗2 . It sends these two elements to A as the first certificate CertLR1 ,i∗ .
• Update Key Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the update key generation ora-













s j · e(gω1 ,ga2)r jL
R
j−r1LR1 . The challenger forwards these elements
to A as the update key UKLRj .
• Test Query <CwS ,wRi∗ ,LSl ,LRj >. A can adaptively ask B for the test query for






j . The challenger first makes a first certificate query on
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C′4,C
′
5)) = true and e(C
′
4,A














′) and C∗=(C0,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ), then
the challenger meets two cases:
1. If C′0 = svk
′≡ svk∗=C0, then we get that the tuples (C′1,C′2,C′3,C′4,C′5,σ ′)
and (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ) are not equal. Thus, the challenger sees an oc-
currence of the event EvOT S and aborts.
2. If C′0 = svk
′ 6= svk∗ = C0, then we get that e(C′4,AC
′
0B) = e(g1,C′5) such
that C′5 = (A
svk′B)κ since the ciphertext is supposed to be valid.
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a key-
word pair (w0,w1). The challenger answers by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1}
and by letting the challenge keyword be w∗ = wµ . Then, it selects a one-time
signature key pair (ssk∗,svk∗)← KeyGen(λ ) and an exponent κ ∈R Zp, and sets
C0 = svk∗, C4 = gκ1 and C5 = (A
svk∗B)κ . It also sets C1 = (gb1)
h(w∗), C2 = (gb2)
(β−w∗)
and C3 = Z, and generates a one-time signature σ = Sign(ssk∗,(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)).
The challenger sends the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C0,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,σ) to the
adversary.
When Z = gab2 , then C
∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext to A as in the real attack.
When Z is random in G2, then C3 = Z is a uniform element in G2, and thus the
ciphertext gives no information about the challenger’s bit µ .
Query Phase 2. A continues to make queries as in the query phase 1. The restric-


























Guess. The adversary outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. If µ ′ = µ , then B outputs 1 meaning that
Z = gab2 ; otherwise, B outputs 0 meaning that Z is a random element in G2.
Analysis. If the event EvOT S does not occur and when Z = gab2 , then the adversary must
satisfy |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | ≥ ε . When Z ∈R G2, then C3 = Z is uniformly random in G2, and
thus Pr[µ ′ = µ] = 12 . It follows that we have Adv
SXDH




Proof of the IND-KGA Security
Theorem. Suppose that the DBDH assumption holds (G1,G2,GT ), then the CBEKS
scheme is IND-KGA secure in the standard model.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A that can trigger a keyword-guessing
attack against the CBEKS scheme in the standard model with advantage AdvIND−KGACBEKS,A (λ ).
We build a challenger B that plays the DBDH game in (G1,G2,GT ) by interacting with







outputs a bit ν ′ ∈ {0,1} as a guess to decide whether Z is either equal to e(g1,g2)abc or a
random element in GT , such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2.
The proof is divided into four games, namely Game1, Game2, Game3 and Game4,
that differ by slight modifications. In each game, the challenger will output a bit ν ′ that is
well defined. Let Ei be the event that the adversary is successful in Gamei, for i ∈ [1,4].
Such process will allow us to conclude.
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Game1. This game is simply the same than the original IND-KGA security game. In the
following, we describe the simulation of the challenger.
At the start of Game1, B chooses three random exponents a, b and c uniformly







2 along with either Z = e(g1,g2)
abc or Z ∈R GT for the security game
simulation.
The adversary and the challenger play Game1 following several steps as in the defini-
tion of the IND-KGA security game. First, the challenger generates the public parameters
params and gives them to A . Then, the adversary initiates the query phase 1 and has ac-
cess to the various oracles: A can make first certificate, update key, refreshed certificate
and trapdoor queries. After this first phase of queries, the adversary chooses a challenge
keyword pair (w0,w1). The challenger chooses a bit µ ∈R {0,1} at random and sets the
challenge keyword as w∗ = wµ . Thereafter, A makes other queries to the same oracles
such that the trapdoors resulting from trapdoor queries have to embed a keyword that
differs from w∗. Eventually, the adversary returns a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} as a guess for µ . If
µ ′= µ , then B returns ν ′= 1; otherwise, it returns ν ′= 0. This completes the description
of the challenger’s simulation in Game1.
We give now more details about the trapdoor queries that A makes, for some key-
word w and label L. Let qtd ∈ N be the total number of trapdoor queries. Let W̄ be
the set containing all the keywords selected for the trapdoor queries. We assume that the
challenge keyword does not belong to W̄ since the restriction during the challenge phase
specifies that w∗ has not been and will not be queried in the query phase 1 and the query
phase 2, respectively. Let W ⊆ W̄ be the subset of the requested keywords such that all
multiples from W̄ are removed. We suppose that |W | = q0 ≤ qtd = |W̄ | such that two
keywords in W are necessarily different. Finally, we define W ∗ = W ∪{w∗}.
Game2. This game is almost identical to Game1 except that the challenger sets some
elements differently.
The challenger computes M = 2qtd and randomly chooses k ∈R [1,n]. B then selects
at random a tuple x = (x0,x1, · · · ,xn) where xi ∈R [0,M− 1] for i ∈ [1,n], and a tuple
y = (y0,y1, · · · ,yn) where yi ∈R Zp for i ∈ [1,n]. We assume that these elements are kept
secret by the challenger.
Given a keyword of the form w = (w1, · · · ,wn), let us define three functions as fol-
lows:











The challenger generates the hash function H with public description h=(h0,h1, · · · ,hn)∈










yi for i ∈ [1,n]. Observe
that such setting does not affect the distribution of the outputs of the hash function H.
We now describe the techniques employed in [235, 82] to construct the security proof.
As in [82], let V IEWA be the adversary’s random tape and the transcript of its interactions
with its oracles in the simulation of Game2. In other words, let us fix all the random ele-
ments that A is able to learn during its execution, including its random coin tosses. More
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precisely, we fix the public parameters params, the challenge bit µ and the randomness
used in answering the trapdoor and other queries. This means that A can be seen as a
deterministic algorithm, and thus the set W ∗ can be seen as fixed.
Let Ȳ = (y0,y1, · · · ,yn,k) where the elements are distributed as above. Therefore, if
V IEWA is fixed and the game is conducted again, then Ȳ has the same distribution as
for a run of the game without having V IEWA as fixed. This happens due to the random
“masking” values xi.
• Forced Abort: Let FAbort be the event that one of the following conditions is true:
1. A asks a trapdoor query for a keyword w and a label L such that y(w) = 0
mod p;
2. A chooses a keyword pair (w0,w1) such that neither w0 nor w1 is equal to
0 mod p. If FAbort occurs then the challenger aborts and ν ′ is chosen at
random.
We will modify the next games in order to force the challenger to abort each time that the
above event happens (so we call the event a forced abort). For every fixed V IEWA , we
define τ(V IEWA ) = PrȲ [¬FAbort] where ¬FAbort denotes the complementary event of
FAbort.
Let ζlow and ζup be the lower and upper bounds on τ(V IEWA ) respectively. We get
the following lemma:





ζlow ≤ τ(V IEWA )≤ ζup.
This lemma is also (partly) used in [132, 235, 82]. Note that a proof of these two
bounds can be found in [82]. We write the proof of this lemma at the end of this section.
We now explicit the modifications made between Game1 and Game2. We assume that
V IEWA is fixed since we assume that the adversary has terminated the execution. Two
events occuring in Game2 but not in Game1 can be described as follows:
• Forced Abort: After the output of the adversary’s bit µ ′ as a guess for µ , check
whether FAbort happens or not. If it occurs, then a random bit ν ′ is returned and
the challenger aborts; otherwise, the challenger keeps on as before.
• Artificial Abort: To discard some unwanted dependency on probabilities, some ar-
tificial aborts are added such that the challenger always aborts with probability ap-
proximately equal to 1−ζlow and independently of V IEWA . More precisely, after
the output of the adversary’s bit µ ′ as a guess for µ , check whether FAbort happens
or not. If it occurs, then a random bit ν ′ is returned and the challenger aborts; other-
wise, the challenger keeps on as follows. B first samples an estimate τ ′(V IEWA )
of the probability τ(V IEWA ) that FAbort does not occur. Remember that V IEWA
is fixed now, thus the sampling does not involve running the adversary again. This
estimate τ ′(V IEWA ) is defined as a random variable and only depends on the key-
words belonging to W ∗ and the randomness used to sample.
We now explicit the two cases that the challenger can encounter:
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1. If τ ′(V IEWA )≤ ζlow, then we assume that B keeps on as before;
2. If τ ′(V IEWA )> ζlow, then the challenger aborts and outputs a bit ν ′ with probabil-
ity equal to 1− ζlow
τ ′(V IEWA )
. In other words, the challenger does not abort and keeps
on as before with probability equal to ζlow
τ ′(V IEWA )
.
The description of Game2 is now completed.
The following claim is postulated in [132] and proved by Fang et al. [82]. It enables
to bound the probabilities of E1 and E2. We recall its proof at the end of this section.
Claim 1. We define ρ(λ ) ≡ AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ) · qtd(n + 1) > 0. If the experiment takes
s0(λ ) = O(n2(ρ(λ ))−2 log((nqtd · ρ(λ ))−1)) samples when computing the estimate τ ′(







) ·4qtd(n+1))| ≤ ρ(λ ).
Game3. This game is similar to Game2 except that the public parameters and the trap-
doors are generated differently. We suppose now that Z is equal to e(g1,g2)abc.
Setup. B computes the public parameters params as follows.
First, B chooses at random β ∈R Zp and computes gβ2 . It then selects at random
α ∈R Zp and generates gα
i
1 for i∈ [1,s]∪ [s+2,2s] and gα
i
2 for i∈ [1,s]. Futhermore,




1 . In addition,
the challenger picks at random A,B ∈R G2 and chooses a strongly unforgeable one-
time signature scheme OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify).









1 }i∈[1,s],gc2,gω1 ,OTS). Note that since
the exponents in Zp are uniformly chosen at random, these public parameters have
an identical distribution to that in the actual construction.
The challenger also outputs the public description (h0,h1, · · · ,hn) of the hash func-
tion H as defined in Game2.
Query Phase 1. A can adaptively issue queries as follows.
• First Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the first certificate query
generation oracle, then B picks at random r1 ∈R Zp and computes e(gδi1 ,gc2)ωr1L
R
1
and gr1δi2 for i ∈ [1,s]. It sends these two elements to A as the first certificate
CertLR1 ,i.
• Update Key Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the update key generation










s j , for S j ⊆ [1,s], and e(gα1 ,gα
s
2 )
s j ·e(gω1 ,gc2)r jL
R
j−r1LR1 . The chal-
lenger forwards these elements to A as the update key UKLRj .
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the refreshed cer-




ωr jLRj and gδir j2 to A as the refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i.
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• Trapdoor Query < wRi ,LRj >. Suppose that A queries (wRi ,LRj ) to the trapdoor



















δiz, gδir j2 and g
v
1 as the trapdoor TrapwRi ,LRj ,
and gives these elements to A .
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a key-
word pair (w0,w1). The challenger first chooses a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and
lets the challenge keyword be w∗ = wµ . It also defines a label L∗. It selects v,z
at random in Zp and generates T1 = e(gδi1 ,g
c
2)
ωr jL∗ · e(gb1,gc2)δix(w
∗) ·Zδiy(w∗), T2 =
e(g1,gb2)
δix(w∗) · e(ga1,gb2)δiy(w









2 and T6 = g
v
1 as the elements of the trapdoor Trap
∗. The challenger sends
the challenge trapdoor Trap∗ = (T1,T2,T3,T4,T5,T6) to the adversary.
When Z = e(g1,g2)abc, then Trap∗ is a valid challenge trapdoor to A as in the
real attack. When Z is random in GT , then e(gδi1 ,g
c
2)
ωr jLRj · e(gb1,gc2)δix(w
∗) ·Zδiy(w∗)
is a uniform element in GT , and thus the trapdoor gives no information about the
challenger’s bit µ .
Query Phase 2. A continues to make queries as in the query phase 1. The restriction is
that < wRi ,L
R









Guess. The adversary outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. If µ ′ = µ , then B outputs 1 meaning
that Z = e(g1,g2)abc; otherwise, B outputs 0 meaning that Z is a random element
in GT .
We easily observe that the public parameters and the trapdoors are distributed identically
in Game2 and in Game3. Therefore, we obtain that Pr[E2] = Pr[E3].
Game4. Game4 is similar to Game3 except that the value Z = e(g1,g2)abc is replaced
by a random value Z in GT , which is chosen at the beginning of the game. Therefore,
|Pr[E3]−Pr[E4]| ≤ AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ).






2,Z) is given to the
challenger, where Z is either equal to Z = e(g1,g2)abc or to a random element in GT ,
such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. When Z = e(g1,g2)abc,






δix(w∗) · Zδiy(w∗) is uniformly random in GT , and thus we perfectly simulate the
adversary in Game4. This means that if A can distinguish between Game3 and Game4,
then the two possible values for Z can be distinguished with the same probability. There-
fore, when Z is uniformly random in GT , we have that Pr[E4] = 12 .
Analysis. We have described the simulations of all the games, and now, we can com-
plete the proof by bounding the advantage of the adversary in the IND-KGA security
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game as follows:















|+AdvDBDHB,GT (λ )) ·4qtd(n+1)+ρ(λ )
= AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ) ·4qtd(n+1)+ρ(λ )
where ρ(λ ) = AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ) ·qtd(n+1)> 0. Thus, we obtain that
AdvIND−KGACBEKS,A (λ )≤ AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ) ·5qtd(n+1).
Proof of the Collusion Resistance Security
Theorem. Suppose that the s-DBDHE assumption holds in (G1,G2,GT ), then the CBEKS
scheme is collusion resistant in the standard model.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A that can attack the collusion resistance
of the CBEKS scheme in the standard model with advantage AdvCollResCBEKS,A (λ ) ≥ ε . We
build a challenger B that has advantage at least ε in solving the s-DBDHE problem in
(G1,G2,GT ). B receives a random s-DBDHE problem instance (g1,gb1,g
a





· · · ,ga2s1 ,g2,gb2,ga2, · · · ,ga
s
2 , Z) where Z is either e(g1,g2)
b·as+1 or a random element in GT ,
such that g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2. We let the challenger proceed
as follows.
Initialization. B receives from A the group S∗ of receivers that the adversary wants to
attack.
Setup. B computes the public parameters params and the private keys skR,i of the re-
ceivers in [1,s]\S∗ as follows. First, B chooses at random β ∈R Zp and computes
gβ1 ,g
β




pose that it sets this value equal to gγ1 for an unknown γ . It also picks at random






1 . In addition, the challenger
picks at random A,B ∈R G2 and chooses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature
scheme OTS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify).













1 ,OTS). Note that since
the exponents in Zp are uniformly chosen at random, these public parameters have
an identical distribution to that in the actual construction. Moreover, the exponent
a from the assumption is informally set as equal to the exponent α from the real
construction.
In addition, B forwards A the private keys of the receivers in [1,s]\S∗. For all i /∈



































as required. Moreover, since i /∈ S∗, the product defining the third element of i’s
private key does not include the element ga
s+1
1 . We can so observe that B has all
the necessary values to compute the private keys skR,i for i /∈ S∗.
Query Phase 1. A makes the following queries:
• First Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the first certificate query




and gr1δi2 for i∈ S⊆ S∗. It sends these two elements to A as the first certificate
CertLR1 ,i.
• Refreshed Certificate Query < LRj >. If A queries LRj to the refreshed cer-




ωr jLRj and gδir j2 to A as the refreshed certificate CertLRj ,i for
i ∈ S⊆ S∗.
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the query phase 1 is over, it outputs a label
pair (L0,L1). The challenger answers by choosing a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and by
setting the challenge label L∗= Lµ . B picks at random r j−1,r j ∈R Zp and computes





u, Z · e(gω1 ,g
ξ
2 )
r jL∗−r j−1(L∗−1)). We
denote by L∗−1 the label preceding the label L∗.
Therefore, UK∗ is a valid update key to A ’s view, by writing gb2 = g
s j
2 for an un-
known s j ∈ Zp. Then, we get that gbu1 = (gu1 · (∏k∈S ga
s+1−k
1 )




(gu1 · (∏k∈S ga
s+1−k
1 )




When Z = e(g1,g2)ba
s+1
, then UK∗ is a valid challenge update key to A as in the
real attack. When Z is random in GT , then Z · e(gω1 ,g
ξ
2 )
r jL∗−r j−1(L∗−1) is a uniform
element in GT , and thus the update key gives no information about the challenger’s
bit µ .
Query Phase 2. A issues a number of queries as in the query phase 1. The restriction is
that < LRj > are not allowed to be queried as first certificate or refreshed certificate
queries if < LRj >=< L0 > or < L
R
j >=< L1 >.
Guess. The adversary outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1}. If µ ′ = µ , then B outputs 1 meaning that
Z = e(g1,g2)b·a
s+1
; otherwise, B outputs 0 meaning that Z is a random element in
GT .
Analysis. When Z = e(g1,g2)b·a
s+1
, then the adversary must satisfy |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 | ≥
ε . When Z ∈R GT , then Z · e(gω1 ,g
ξ
2 )
r jL∗−r j−1(L∗−1) is uniformly random in GT , and thus
Pr[µ ′ = µ] = 12 . It follows that we have Adv
s−DBDHE
B,GT (λ )≥ ε .
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5.1.6 Additional Proofs
Proof of the Lemma 1.
We first recall the lemma: For every fixed V IEWA , we define ζlow = 14(n+1)qtd and ζup =
1
2qtd
. Thus, we have that ζlow ≤ τ(V IEWA )≤ ζup.
We assume that V IEWA and the queried keywords in W ∗= {w(1),w(2), · · · ,w(q0),w∗}




(y(w(i)) 6= 0 mod t)∧ y(w∗) = 0 mod t.
So, we get that τ(V IEWA ) = PrȲ [F(p)]. Remember that we have Ȳ = (y0,y1, · · · ,yn,k)
distributed according to the formula y(w) = (p−Mk)+ y0 +∑ni=1(yi ·wi). Let y(w∗) =




M c, and so y(w∗) = p+(k∗−k)M such that k,k∗ ∈ [0,n+1), or this can
be rewritten as 0≤ (k∗− k) ·M < (n+1) ·M < p. Therefore, if y(w∗) = 0 mod M, then
there exists a unique k ∈ [0,n+ 1) such that y(w∗) = 0 mod p. Moreover, if k∗ = k and
y(w∗) = 0 mod M, then y(w∗) = 0 mod p. This can be also formulated as if y(w∗) 6= 0
mod M, then y(w∗) 6= 0 mod p.
Thus, we obtain the following:




PrȲ [F(p)|k∗ = k]
≥ 1
n+1




PrȲ ′[F(M)|k∗ = k]
where the probability space Ȳ ′ contains the random variables (y0,y1, · · · ,yn) that are
distributed according to the formula y(w) = (p−Mk)+y0+∑ni=1(yi ·wi) for a fixed value
k. This means that we consider k as a fixed value from this point in the proof. We define τM
as equal to PrȲ ′[F(M)]. Since τM ≥ τ(V IEWA ), we get that 1n+1τM ≤ τ(V IEWA )≤ τM.
We then have to find an upper and a lower bounds for τM. Let w 6=w′ be two keywords
and C,D be two elements of Z. We show that y(·) and M are pairwise independent as
follows:








The equation 5.1 comes from the fact that, for any choice of (y0,y1, · · · ,yn,k), there is one
choice for y0 that makes the condition to hold. The equation 5.2 follows assuming there is
an index i ∈ [1,n] such that wi = 1 and w′i = 0. By fixing all the values y j for j 6= i, except
yi, so that y(w′) = D. Thus, we get that PrȲ [y(w) =C mod M|y(w′) = D mod M] = 1M .
Note that we can use Bayes to reverse the roles of w and w′ if there is no such index i.
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Then, we lower bound the value τM as follows:
τM = PrȲ ′[
q0∧
i=1
































































Proof of the Claim 1.
We first recall the claim: We define ρ(λ ) = AdvDBDHB,GT (λ ) · qtd(n+ 1) > 0. If the exper-
iment takes s0(λ ) = O(n2(ρ(λ ))−2 log((nqtd · ρ(λ ))−1)) samples when computing the
estimate τ ′(V IEWA ), then |Pr[E1]− (12 +(Pr[E2]− 12) ·4qtd(n+1))| ≤ ρ(λ ).
Let AAbort be the event that the experiment aborts at the end of the simulation in
an artificial way. Let the total of aborts TAbort = FAbort ∨AAbort be the event that the
experiment either aborts in a forced way or aborts in an artificial way. Let us present
another claim:
Claim 2. For any fixed value V IEWA , we get |Pr[¬TAbort]−ζlow| ≤ (ζlow ·ρ(λ ))/2.
We give the proof of the above claim after the proof of the claim 1. The claim 2 holds
for any fixed value V IEWA , thus it also holds for random values V IEWA regarding either
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µ ′ = µ and µ ′ 6= µ .
|Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ = µ]−ζlow| ≤ (ζlow ·ρ(λ ))/2 (5.3)
|Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ 6= µ]−ζlow| ≤ (ζlow ·ρ(λ ))/2 (5.4)
Therefore, we get that
Pr[E2] = Pr[ν ′ = 1∧TAbort]+Pr[ν ′ = 1∧¬TAbort]
= Pr[ν ′ = 1|TAbort](1−Pr[¬TAbort])+Pr[ν ′ = 1∧¬TAbort]
We recall that the challenger outputs a random bit ν ′ in case of an abort. If the challenger
does not abort, then it outputs a bit ν ′ = 1 if µ ′ = µ . Thus, we obtain that








(1− (Pr[µ ′ 6= µ ∧¬TAbort]+Pr[µ ′ = µ ∧¬TAbort]))














(Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ = µ]Pr[µ ′ = µ]−Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ 6= µ]Pr[µ ′ 6= µ])











Pr[E1] · (Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ = µ]+Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ 6= µ])
−1
2
Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ 6= µ]










Pr[E1] · ((Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ = µ]−ζlow)
+(Pr[¬TAbort|µ ′ 6= µ]−ζlow))
−1
2



















≤ ζlow ·ρ(λ )
such that the last equality comes from the fact that Pr[E1] ∈ [0,1].
Proof of the Claim 2.
To prove this claim, we first recall a lemma due to Hoeffding [114]:
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Lemma 2. Let X1,X2, · · · ,Xs0 be independent random variables with Xi ∈ [A,B] and let
X̄ = 1s0 ∑
s0
i=1 Xi. Therefore, for any value t > 0, we have the following inequality:
Pr[|X̄−E(X̄)| ≥ t]≤ 2e−2s0( tB−A )2
such that E(X̄) denotes the expected values of X̄ .
Observe that by construction, the events AAbort and FAbort are independent, and so
we get that Pr[¬TAbort] = Pr[¬FAbort] ·Pr[¬AAbort] = τ(V IEWA )Pr[¬AAbort]. Let
ρ ′(λ ) = 18ρ(λ ) ∈ (0, 18 ]. We obtain s0(λ ) samples such that






= O(n2(ρ(λ ))−2 log((nqtd ·ρ(λ ))−1))
in order to calculate an approximation τ ′(V IEWA ) of τ(V IEWA ). For each sample that is
independently chosen regarding the distribution Ȳ from the equality y(w) = (p−Mk)+
y0 +∑ni=1(yi ·wi), we define each indicator variable Xi as follows: if the event FAbort
occurs, then Xi = 0; otherwise, Xi = 1.
Note that ζlow ≤ Pr[Xi = 1] ≤ ζup by construction. Eventually, we make a majority
decision over all the terms Xi by computing τ ′(V IEWA ) = 1s0(λ ) ∑
s0(λ )
i=1 (Xi). Observe that
E(τ ′(V IEWA )) = τ(V IEWA )≥ ζlow by construction. Using the bound due to Hoeffding
[114, 133] for the estimation τ ′(V IEWA ) of τ(V IEWA ) such that D−C ≤ ζup−ζlow ≤
1
2qtd
, we obtain that






ζlow ·ρ(λ ) ·qtd
s0(λ )
)2)





ζlow ·ρ(λ ) ·qtd
4
)2)
≤ ζlow ·ρ(λ )
8
where T = τ(V IEWA )ρ(λ )·2qtd and ρ ′(λ )= ρ(λ )/8. Let the approximation τ ′(V IEWA )
be seen as (good) if |τ ′(V IEWA )− τ(V IEWA )| ≤ τ(V IEWA )ρ(λ )8 and as (bad) otherwise.
Therefore, we get that Pr[τ ′(V IEWA )(good)] ≤ ζlow ·ρ ′(λ ). We now fix τ ′(V IEWA ) as
(good), written as τ ′(V IEWA )(good), and so
τ(V IEWA )(1−ρ ′(λ ))≤ max{ζlow,τ ′(V IEWA )} ≤ τ(V IEWA )(1+ρ ′(λ )).
Observe that Pr[¬AAbort] = ζlowmax{ζlow,τ ′(V IEWA )} , and thus
ζlow
τ(V IEWA )(1+ρ ′(λ ))
≤ Pr[¬AAbort|τ ′(V IEWA )(good)]≤
ζlow
τ(V IEWA )(1−ρ ′(λ ))
.
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We complete the proof by giving an upper bound on Pr[¬TAbort] as follows
Pr[¬TAbort] = τ(V IEWA )(Pr[¬AAbort|τ ′(V IEWA )(good)] ·Pr[τ ′(V IEWA )(good)]
+Pr[¬AAbort|τ ′(V IEWA )(bad)] ·Pr[τ ′(V IEWA )(bad)])
≤ τ(V IEWA )(
ζlow
τ(V IEWA )(1−ρ ′(λ ))
+ζlow ·ρ ′(λ ))
≤ ζlow(
1
τ(V IEWA )(1−ρ ′(λ ))
+ρ ′(λ ))
≤ ζlow(1+4ρ ′(λ ))
= ζlow(1+(ρ(λ )/2))
5.1.7 Performance
Our CBEKS scheme remains efficient and practical since the size of the ciphertexts and
the trapdoors is constant. In addition, the private keys of the involved entities (namely, the
receivers, the certifier and the server) have constant size. Although the public parameters
have a size linear in the number s of receivers, we observe that these elements are set up
only once, at the beginning of the protocol. Therefore, this is not cumbersome for our
scheme.
We evaluate the efficiency of our scheme CBEKS in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. We con-
sider cryptographic operations such as group multiplication and group division on ran-
dom group elements, group exponentiation of a random group element with a random
exponent, as well as pairing operation on random group elements. We use implemen-
tation results of these operations in the CHARM framework [4, 152] based on Miyaji-
Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT) [162] curves. The benchmarks were executed on a quad
core processor AMD A10-5800K with 16GB of RAM running Fedora 18.
We evaluated the protocol algorithms on the asymmetric bilinear group based on the
MNT elliptic curve provided by CHARM. Complex multiplication is required in order
to find curves of a certain embedding degree with a specified order. In particular, MNT
curves have an embedding degree k = 6.
We assume that there are s= 100 receivers and there are n= 48 bits coding a keyword
string w = (w1, · · · ,wn) ∈ {0,1}n with 6 characters, such as “urgent”.
Expon. in G1 Expon. in G2 Expon. in GT Pairing
Time/operation 0.5895 5.314 1.1 3.798
Setup 178.029 542.028
Encrypt 30.0645 15.942
CertGen 117.9 1062.8 379.8
UpdtKeyGen 2.9475 10.628 11.394
UpdtCert 0.5895 5.314 11.394
TrapGen 2.9475 5.314 7.596
Test 0.5895 5.314 1.1 7.596
Table 5.2: Timings for our CBEKS asymmetric pairing-based system. Times are in
milliseconds. Expon. refers to the group exponentiation operation.
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Multip. in G1 Multip. in GT Divis. in GT




UpdtKeyGen 0.258358 0.006992 0.02108
UpdtCert 0.2558 0.006992 0.02108
TrapGen 0.002558 0.006992
Test 0.006992 0.02108
Table 5.3: Timings for our CBEKS asymmetric pairing-based system based. Times are
in milliseconds. Multip. refers to the multiplication operation and Divis. refers to the
division operation.
We note that the total time in the algorithm Setup is substantial; however this algo-
rithm should be run only once to generate the public parameters and the static private
keys for all the receivers, certifiers and server. The algorithm Encrypt does not require
too many computations from the uploader: the time is mainly a consequence from the fact
that the keyword’s elements have to be hashed. Then, the algorithm CertGen is significant
since we consider the generation of 100 first certificates; nevertheless, the same argument
from Setup applies for CertGen, i.e. first certificates are generated only once. Both the
algorithms UpdtKeyGen and UpdtCert are executed fast, meaning that the certifier and
the receivers can easily create update keys and update the certificates, respectively. The
algorithm TrapGen is relatively efficient, meaning that a receiver can conveniently request
for a medical document. Finally, the total time for running the algorithm Test is mainly
due to the cost of pairing computations, and remains quick.
5.1.8 Observations
We recall that we see a label as a reference to some information about the receivers’ access
rights. More precisely, a label is linked to a collection of rights under the form of a unique
number in Zp. We have to ensure that two labels are distinct if they do not refer to the
same access right collection.
We argue that the certifier and the server know the labels and agree on their use
by securily exchanging information among them, while none of the receivers should be
aware of the labels’ contents. Nevertheless, defining unique labels could turn to be a
bottleneck. A more effective solution will embed time periods instead of labels. Indeed,
the certifier and the server will proceed by using the current time period: the former will
generate the first certificates and update keys by taking as input the current time period,
while the latter will check the keyword and the validity of a receiver’s certificate by using
the ciphertext and the current time period. However, defining time periods does not seem
straightforward at first sight. In fact, we have to ensure that a time period is unique given
a starting date and an ending date and that the receivers are not able to modify their
certificates themselves in order to make them valid. Moreover, a receiver’s certificate can
be valid for a longer time period than the one used during the server’s test; hence, we have
to find a way to make time periods matching as long as the time period used by the server
is strictly included in the time period embedded into the receiver’s certificate.
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We also observe that we give power to the server by letting it know and use labels
for verification processes. One might prefer instead to let the uploader decide the choices
of both the keyword and the label (or the time period according to the above remarks).
Hence, in this case, the server would have just to check that keywords and labels match
without being aware of any pieces of information from these components.
5.1.9 Conclusion
In this section, we introduced the new primitive called certificate-based encryption with
keyword search (CBEKS) in order to tackle the problem of authorising receivers in a sen-
sitive environment to let them access and retrieve medical documents securely. We con-
structed a scheme and proved it secure in the standard model, according to the security
models that we carefully defined. More precisely, our CBEKS construction is computa-
tionally consistent, IND-CKCA secure, IND-KGA secure and collusion resistant in the
standard model.
Chapter 6
Ensuring Patient Privacy and Saving
Computational and Communication
Resources in Electronic Health
Records-based Storage
Electronic health records (EHRs) contain sensitive personal information on patients’ iden-
tity and information contents. One main concern is to ensure patients’ privacy regard-
ing non-authorised users. More precisely, only a hospital staff member who is granted
with the right to access patients’ EHRs knows their identities and information contents,
whereas everyone else should acquire no information. In addition, by guaranteeing pri-
vacy, we should avoid to increase computational and communication burdens. We recall
that the involved parties, namely patients and hospital staff members, have limited tech-
nology and storage resources.
We propose two primitives to enable privacy in EHRs. A first one allows a user to
use the recipient’s credentials to encrypt medical information. A cloud server, acting as a
proxy, is required to re-encrypt the encrypted documents regarding the credentials of an-
other recipient (when the first beneficiary is no longer available for instance). We require
that the proxy receives no information about the identities and the information contents of
the two beneficiaries. In addition of the privacy-preserving feature, the primitive enables
a user to perform the main workload offline (for the first encryption before forwarding to
the cloud server), and finalise the process online (for the second encryption done by the
cloud server).
A second one permits a user to use some personal characteristics to encrypt delicate
medical information. In particular, we focus on the DNA properties: the DNA sequences
are shared between relatives, and such feature helps us to build our protocol. Observe
that we use features already existing in the nature, and thus simple and effortless to use.
A cloud server, acting as a proxy, participates into the process as the entity releasing the
encrypted documents at a given time (that the encryptor decided beforehand). We require
that this proxy gets no information about neither the sender nor the recipient.
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6.1 On-line/Off-line Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy
Re-Encryption
We now focus on the e-Health environment through a hospital staff member oriented ap-
proach. The EHRs could be seen as the solution for better management of an individual’s
health, and as the tool empowering the hospital staff members by giving them the compe-
tences to access the medical history of the patients.
Hospital staff member access to the patients’ records is important while patients’
privacy regarding the sensitive information that they contain, such as the diagnosis, prog-
nosis or implications of diagnostic tests, should be maintained. We are motivated to em-
power EHRs with the emerging cloud computing solution. Especially, we would like to
equip hospital staff members with the ability to control the access to EHRs efficiently and
easily, while they are away from their desktop computing environment.
Let us consider the following scenario. A patient, Alice, comes to the hospital to
have her blood sampled for a test. Later, the clinical laboratory encrypts the result of
this blood test and uploads it on the hospital’s private cloud server. Note that the cloud
server is not able to decrypt this ciphertext without the clinical laboratory’s private key,
which is inaccessible by the cloud server. Technically, we can view this ciphertext as an
intermediate ciphertext.
Now that the blood test result is ready to collect, Alice should take an appointment
with a general practitioner (GP) of her choice, as well as her possible dates, to discuss
about the blood test result. To do so, she creates a re-encryption key based on her re-
quirements and provides it to the cloud server. Note that this re-encryption key does
not enable the cloud server to decrypt the message, but rather lets the cloud server to
“re-encrypt” the intermediate ciphertext such that the resulting ciphertext is decryptable
only by the requested GP, Greg. Thus, the policy that Alice constructs can be something
like {Greg ∧ from Monday 12/09/2016 to Friday 16/09/2016} where the dates specify
the time range that allows the medical practitioner to retrieve the blood test result. Sub-
sequently, the cloud server re-encrypts the intermediate ciphertext under Alice’s policy
and keeps it securely on its storage. Only Greg is able to decrypt this ciphertext in the
determined time range. This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.1.
Moreover, we assume that Alice does not need big computational and communication
resources to send her requirements to the cloud server in order to finalise the encryption
of her blood test result. For instance, we suppose that Alice can proceed on-line, using her
smartphone connected to the hospital network. To enable such property, we require that
much of the encryption of her blood test result is done off-line by the clinical laboratory,
that holds the necessary technical resources.
6.1.1 Contributions
Motivated by the above scenario, we propose a new primitive called on-line/off-line ci-
phertext attribute-based proxy re-encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE). We carefully define this
cryptosystem along with the related security models. Based on the techniques for OO-
CP-ABE systems [115] and the methods for CP-AB-PRE systems [145], we provide a
single-hop unidirectional OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme supporting monotonic access policy
and dealing with on-line/off-line encryption. We then show that the OO-CP-AB-PRE
construction is selectively IND-CCA secure and selectively collusion resistant in the ran-
dom oracle model.




Figure 6.1: On-line/Off-line Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption. The
medical institute, acting as a certifier, generates the public and private key pairs for the hospital
staff members. An intermediate cipertext IntC is computed by one of the hospital staff member
as an encryption of a medical document m and regarding the policy defined by this member. This
intermediate ciphertext IntC is sent to the cloud server. A re-encryption key rk is generated by
another user (either a hospital staff member or a patient) according to another policy, and is also
sent to the cloud server. Finally, the cloud server computes the final ciphertext C using IntC and
rk, and makes it available for all the hospital staff members. A hosptial staff member can retrieve
m if and only if his/her credentials satisfy the policy embedded in rk and so C.
6.1.2 Protocol Definition
An on-line/off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption (OO-CP-AB-
PRE) scheme is composed of the following six algorithms:
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an attribute
universe U , output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. On inputs the public parameters params, the mas-
ter secret key msk and an attribute set S, output a private key skS, such that skS is
associated with the attribute set S.
Note that skS may contain a description of the attribute set S.
• OffEncrypt(params,m)→ IntC. On inputs the public parameters params and a
message m, output an intermediate ciphertext IntC.
• ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,AS)→ rkS→AS. On inputs the public parameters params,
a attribute set S, a private key skS associated with S, and an access structure AS for
attributes over U , output a re-encryption key rkS→AS that can be used to transform
an intermediate ciphertext to a ciphertext under AS, such that the attribute S satisfies
the access structure AS.
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Note that rkS→AS is associated with the attribute set S and may contain a description
of it.
• OnEncrypt(params,rkS→AS, IntC)→CAS. On inputs the public parameters params,
a re-encryption key rkS→AS and an intermediate ciphertext IntC, output a ciphertext
CAS under AS.
We assume that the access structure AS is included in the ciphertext CAS.
• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and a ciphertext CAS, output m if
S satisfies AS; output ⊥ otherwise, indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not
satisfy AS.
Correctness. We require that an on-line/off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy
re-encryption scheme is correct if for any λ ∈ N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,U ), skS←
KeyGen(params,msk,S), IntC←OffEncrypt(params,m), rkS→AS←ReKeyGen(params,
S,skS,AS) and CAS← OnEncrypt(params,rkS→AS, IntC), and if S satisfies AS, we have
that Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS) = m.
N.B. Note that in our protcol defintion, the output rkS→AS of the algorithm ReKeyGen
is not a conventional re-encryption key. Indeed, in a classic CP-AB-PRE system, the re-
encryption key serves to transform a ciphertext under AS′ to another ciphertext under AS
such that S satisfies AS′ and the two access structures AS and AS′ are disjoint. Observe
that in our case, rkS→AS can be used to transform an intermediate ciphertext to a ciphertext
under AS, such that the attribute S satisfies the access structure AS, since the intermediate
ciphertext is not linked to any access structure.
6.1.3 Security Models
Selective Indistinguishability against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
In the following, we define the security notion for selective indistinguishability against
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). An OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is selectively IND-
CCA secure if no PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advan-
tage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the adversary A as follows:
Initialization. The adversary A outputs a challenge access structure AS∗ to the chal-
lenger B.
Setup. The challenger B runs the algorithm Setup and gives the public parameters params
to the adversary A .
Query Phase 1. The adversary A is given access to the following oracles:
1. Private Key Query < S >. On input an attribute set S, the challenger B runs
KeyGen(params,msk,S) to obtain skS and returns it to the adversary.
2. Re-Encryption Key Query < S,AS >. On inputs an attribute set S and an
access structure AS, B runs ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,AS) to obtain rkS→AS
and returns it to A , where skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S).
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3. Online Encryption Query < S,AS, IntC >. On inputs an attribute set S, an
access structure AS and an intermediate ciphertext IntC, B runs OnEncrypt(
params,rkS→AS, IntC) to obtain CAS and returns it to A , where rkS→AS ←
ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,AS) and skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S).
4. Ciphertext Decryption Query < S,CAS >. On inputs an attribute set S and a
ciphertext CAS, the challenger B returns m←Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS) to
the adversary A , where skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S) and S satisfies AS.
Note that if the queries to the ciphertext decryption oracle are invalid, then the
challenger simply outputs ⊥. In this phase, the following queries are forbidden to
issue: private key queries for any S satisfying AS∗ and re-encryption key queries
for any S satisfying AS∗.
Challenge. The adversary A submits two messages m0 and m1 of equal length. The
challenger B chooses a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and encrypts mµ under AS∗. The
ciphertext C∗AS∗ is given to the adversary A .
Query Phase 2. The query phase 1 is repeated except that the following queries are for-
bidden to issue:
• private key queries for any S satisfying AS∗,
• re-encryption key queries for any S satisfying AS∗,
• online encryption queries for any invalid intermediate ciphertext or invalid
ciphertext where S satisfies AS∗,
• ciphertext decryption queries for any invalid ciphertext or CAS =C∗AS∗ , where
S satisfies AS∗.
Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ . If µ ′ = µ , then the adversary
A wins.
The advantage of the adversary A is defined as AdvS−IND−CCAOO−CP−AB−PRE,A (λ ,U ) = |Pr[µ ′ =
µ]−1/2|.
Selective Collusion Resistant
We consider insider attacks which deal with selective collusion resistance. The collusion
resistance is also known as the master key security in the literature [52, 145, 146, 149].
In this security model, we omit the descriptions of the online encryption and cipher-
text decryption oracles since they are straightforward: any re-encryption key could be
correctly generated from the re-encryption key oracle.
In the following, we define the security notion for selective collusion resistance. An
OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is selectively collusion resistant if no PPT adversary A can win
the game below with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game
with the adversary A as follows:
Initialization. A outputs an attribute set S∗ to B.
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup and gives the public parameters params to A .
Query Phase. A is given access to the following oracles:
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1. Private Key Query < S >. On input an attribute set S 6= S∗, B runs KeyGen(
params,msk,S) to obtain skS and returns it to A .
2. Re-Encryption Key Query < S,AS >. On inputs an attribute set S and an
acces structure AS, B runs ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,AS) to obtain rkS→AS
and returns it to A , where skS← KeyGen(params,msk,S).
Output. A submits a private key sk∗S∗ for the attribute set S
∗.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvS−CollResOO−CP−AB−PRE,A (λ ,U ) = Pr[A succeeds].
6.1.4 Construction
Our scheme is based on the OO-CP-ABE system developped by Hohenberger and Waters
[115] and the CP-AB-PRE system proposed by Liang et al. [145]. One can now create an
intermediate ciphertext during the off-line phase and then translate it to a ciphertext for a
hitherto unknown access structure, under a re-encryption key generated from the sender’s
private key. The Hohenberger and Waters’ scheme [115] is based on the unbounded CP-
ABE construction implemented by Rouselakis and Waters [195]. We assume the existence
of a bound P on the maximum number of rows in the LSSS access structure that will be
used to encrypt messages in our construction.
Following Boneh and Boyen’s IBE system [36], we proceed as follows during the off-
line phase. A ciphertext is generated by encrypting a message using an exponent x ∈R Zp
chosen at random with another random element c ∈R Zp. This ciphertext has elements
C1 = gc and C2 = (uxh)c. Moreover, the public parameters are a description of the bilin-
ear group G1 of order p, along with the tuple (g,u,h,e(g,g)α), and the encapsulated key
is K = e(g,g)αc. The intermediate ciphertext IntC = (C1,C2,x,c) is stored by the off-line
algorithm. During the on-line phase, given an identity id ∈ Zp, the encryptor adds a “cor-
rection factor” equal to c · (id− x) ∈ Zp to the components C1 and C2.
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). Let λ be the security parameter and U be the
attribute universe viewed as Zp. Choose two bilinear cyclic groups G1 and GT of
prime order p, along with a bilinear map e : G1×G1→GT . Select at random some
generators g,h,u,v,w ∈R G1 and an exponent α ∈R Zp. Define five hash functions
H1 : GT →{0,1}2λ , H2 : {0,1}2λ → Zp, H3 : {0,1}λ → Zp, H4 : {0,1}∗→G1 and
H5 : {0,1}∗→G1.
Eventually, set the public parameters params as (p,G1,GT ,e,g,h,u,v,w,e(g,g)α ,H1,
H2,H3,H4, H5) and the master secret key msk as α .
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. Let S= {A j} j∈[1,k]⊆Zp be an attribute set. Choose
at random values r,r1,r2, · · · ,rk ∈R Zp. Compute K0 = gαwr, K1 = gr and K j,2 = gr j ,
K j,3 = (uA jh)r jv−r for j ∈ [1,k]. The private key skS is (S,K0,K1,{K j,2,K j,3} j∈[1,k]).
• OffEncrypt(params,m)→ IntC. We assume there exists a maximum bound of P
rows in any LSSS access structure used to generate a (intermediate) ciphertext.
First, pick at random β ∈R {0,1}λ and compute c = H2(β ,m), B1 = (m‖β )⊕
H1(e(g,g)αc), C0,1 = gc and C0,2 = hc. Then, for j ∈ [1,P], choose at random
λ ′j, t j,x j ∈R Zp and compute C j,1 = wλ
′
jvt j , C j,2 = (ux jh)−t j and C j,3 = gt j . This
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process can be seen as encrypting a random attribute x j with a random “share” λ ′j
of c, and it will be corrected in the on-line phase with the attributes defined in the
algorithm ReKeyGen. We notice that the work done in this off-line phase is almost
equivalent to the one of the regular encryption algorithm in [195]. Moreover, com-
pute D = H4(B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(CP,1,CP,2,CP,3))c. Eventually, the
intermediate ciphertext IntC is (c,B1,C0,1,C0,2, {λ ′j, t j,x j,C j,1,C2, j,C3, j} j∈[1,P],D).
• ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,(M,ρ))→ rkS→(M,ρ). Let (M,ρ) be a LSSS access struc-
ture, where M is a l×n matrix and l ≤ P.
First, pick at random β̃ ,δ ∈R {0,1}λ and compute c̃ = H2(β̃ ,δ ), B̃1 = (δ‖β̃ )⊕
H1(e(g,g)α c̃), and C̃0 = gc̃. Select at random ỹ2, · · · , ỹn ∈ Zp, set the vector ~̃y =
(c̃, ỹ2, · · · , ỹn)T , where T denotes the transpose of the matrix, and compute a vec-
tor of shares of c̃ as (λ̃1, · · · , λ̃l)T = M ·~̃y. Then, for j ∈ [1, l], choose at ran-
dom t̃ j ∈ Zp and compute C̃ j,1 = wλ̃ jvt̃ j , C̃ j,2 = (uρ( j)h)−t̃ j and C̃ j,3 = gt̃ j . More-
over, compute D̃=H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3), (M,ρ))c̃. Even-
tually, the intermediate ciphertext IntC̃ for the re-encryption key is ((M,ρ), B̃1,C̃0,
{C̃ j,1,C̃ j,2,C̃ j,3} j∈[1,l], D̃).
Second, select at random an exponent θ ∈R Zp and compute RK0,1 = KH3(δ )0 hθ ,
RK0,2 = gθ , RK1 = K
H3(δ )
1 and RK j,2 = K
H3(δ )
j,2 , RK j,3 = K
H3(δ )
j,3 , for j ∈ [1,k].
The re-encryption key rkS→(M,ρ) is (S,RK0,1,RK0,2,RK1,{RK j,2,RK j,3} j∈[1,k], IntC̃).
• OnEncrypt(params,rkS→(M,ρ), IntC)→C(M,ρ). First, check the validity of the in-




∀ j ∈ [1,P], e(C j,1,g) ?= e(w,g)λ
′
j · e(v,C j,3)
∀ j ∈ [1,P], e(C j,2,g) ?= e(u,C−1j,3 )x j · e(h,C−1j,3 )
e(C0,1,H4(B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(CP,1,CP,2,CP,3))) ?= e(g,D)
(6.1)
and the validity of the re-encryption key rkS→(M,ρ) as follows:
e(C̃0,H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ))) ?= e(g, D̃).
Then, take the element c from IntC and pick at random y2, · · · ,yn ∈R Zp, set the
vector ~y = (c,y2, · · · ,yn)T , where T denotes the transpose of the matrix, and com-
pute a vector of shares of c as (λ1, · · · ,λl)T = M ·~y. Let I ⊂ [1, l] be defined as
I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}, and {wi}i∈I be a set of constants in Zp such that ∑i∈I wi ·λi = c.
For j ∈ [1, l], compute C j,4 = λ j− λ ′j and C j,5 = t j · (ρ( j)− x j). Intuitively, this




e(w∑i∈I Ci,4·wi,RK1) ·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,RK1) · e(Ci,2 ·uCi,5 ,RK j,2) · e(Ci,3,RK j,3))wi
,
where j is the index of the attribute ρ(i) in S (it depends on i).
Eventually, set the ciphertext C(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),C0,1,B2, IntC̃).
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• Decrypt(params,S,skS,C(M,ρ))→m/⊥. Parse the ciphertext C(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),C0,1,
B2, IntC̃) for an access structure (M,ρ) and a private key skS as (S,K0,K1,{Ki,2,
Ki,3}i∈[1,k]) for an attribute set S. If S does not satisfy (M,ρ), then output ⊥. Other-
wise, proceed as follows. Set I ⊂ [1, l] as I = {i}ρ(i)∈S and find the set of constants
{w̃i}i∈I in Zp such that ∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = c̃ (let Mi be the i-th row of the matrix M, thus
we have that ∑i∈I w̃i ·Mi = (1,0, · · · ,0)). Then, check that:
S satisifies (M,ρ)?
e(C̃0,H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ))) ?= e(g, D̃)
(6.2)
If the above equations hold, then proceed; otherwise, output ⊥.
To recover the message m, first recover the value e(g,g)α c̃ by calculating:
e(C̃0,K0)
∏i∈I(e(C̃i,1,K1) · e(C̃i,2,K j,2) · e(C̃i,3,K j,3))w̃i
where j is the index of the attribute ρ(i) in S (it depends on i). Afterwards, com-
pute H1(e(g,g)α c̃)⊕ B̃1 = H1(e(g,g)α c̃)⊕ (δ‖β̃ )⊕H1(e(g,g)α c̃) = δ‖β̃ . If C̃0 =
gH2(β̃ ,δ ), then proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. Finally, compute H1(B1/H3(δ )2 )⊕B1 =
H1(e(g,g)α·c)⊕m‖β⊕H1(e(g,g)α·c) =m‖β , and if C0,1 = gH2(β ,m), output m; oth-
erwise, output ⊥.
Correctness. If the attribute set S of the ciphertext satisfies the access structure (M,ρ),
then ∑i∈I wi ·λi = c and ∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = c̃. We recall that ρ(i) = A j. Therefore, the value B2
is recovered as follows:
B2 =
e(C0,1,RK0,1)/e(C0,2,RK0,2)






e(w∑i∈I Ci,4·wi,KH3(δ )1 ) ·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,K
H3(δ )
1 ) · e(Ci,2 ·u−Ci,5,K
H3(δ )





(e(gc,gαwr)H3(δ ) · e(gc,hθ ))/e(hc,gθ )
∏i∈I(e(wλ
′






e(g,g)αc·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)cr·H3(δ )
∏i∈I(e(g,w)λ
′






e(g,g)αc·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)cr·H3(δ )
(∏i∈I e(g,w)λ
′
i r · e(g,w)∑i∈I(λi−λ ′i )r)H3(δ )·wi
=
e(g,g)αc·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)cr·H3(δ )
e(g,w)r·H3(δ )∑i∈I λiwi
= e(g,g)αc·H3(δ )
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and the value e(g,g)α c̃ is recovered as follows:
e(C̃0,K0)
∏i∈I(e(C̃i,1,K1) · e(C̃i,2,K j,2) · e(C̃i,3,K j,3))w̃i
=
e(gc̃,gαwr)
∏i∈I(e(wλ̃ivt̃i,gr) · e((uρ(i)h)−t̃i,gr j) · e(gt̃i,(uA jh)r jv−r))w̃i
=
e(g,g)α c̃ · e(g,w)c̃r
(∏i∈I e(g,w)λ̃ire(g,v)t̃ire(g,u)−ρ(i)t̃ir je(g,h)−t̃ir je(g,u)A j t̃ir je(g,h)t̃ir je(g,v)−t̃ir)w̃i
=
e(g,g)α c̃ · e(g,w)c̃r
∏i∈I e(g,w)λ̃irw̃i
=




Selective IND-CCA Security Proof
Theorem. Suppose that the s-type assumption holds in (G1,GT ) and the hash functions
H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are seen as random oracles, then the OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is
selectively IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Suppose that there is an adversary A who breaks the selective IND-CCA security of
the OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme. We then construct a challenger B to decide whether Z is
either equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·c or to a random element in GT . The challenger B plays the
IND-CCA game with A as follows.
B takes as inputs (p,G1,GT ,e)← G (λ ), a generator g of G1 and a s-type problem
instance
gc
∀i, j ∈ [1,s], gai,gb j ,gc·b j ,gai·b j ,gai/b2j
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j ∈ [1,s], i 6= s+1, gai/b j
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j,k ∈ [1,s], j 6= k, gaib j/b2k
∀i ∈ [1,2s], j,k ∈ [1,s], j 6= k, gc·aib j/bk ,gc·aib j/b2k
and Z which is either equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·c or to a random element in GT .
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to B, where
M∗ has l rows and n columns such that l ≤ P,s and n≤ s.
Setup. The challenger chooses at random α ′ ∈R Zp and implicitly sets α = α ′+ as+1
by letting e(g,g)α = e(ga,ga
s
) · e(g,g)α ′ (α = α ′+ as+1 cannot be computed by
B). We note that the element α is correctly distributed. B also picks at random
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v̂, û, ĥ ∈R Zp and gives the following public parameters to A :
w = ga




















Since a is information-theoretically hidden from A ’s view, the value w is properly
uniformly random in G1. The values v,u,h are properly distributed due to v̂, û, ĥ
respectively. We note that all these values are calculated by B using terms from the
assumption instance and from (M∗,ρ∗) given by A .
Then, the challenger chooses the hash functions H1,H2,H3,H4,H5 as in the real
scheme, and sends the public parameters params=(p,G1,GT ,e,g,h, ,u,v,w,e(g,g)α ,
H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) to A . We note that the public parameters are identical to those
given in the real scheme for the adversary.
At any time, A can adaptively query the random oracles H j for j ∈ [1,5], which are
controlled by B as follows. The challenger maintains the lists LH j , for j ∈ [1,5],
which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the random oracles as follows.
• H1: on receipt of an H1 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ LH1 , B
forwards the predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B
sets H1(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to LH1 , where
δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H2: on receipt of an H2 query on (β ,m), if there is a tuple (β ,m,c) ∈ LH2 ,
B forwards the predefined value c to A , where c ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H2(β ,m) = c, responds c to A and adds the tuple (β ,m,c) to LH2 , where
c ∈R Zp.
• H3: on receipt of an H3 query on δ ∈ {0,1}λ , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ1) in LH3 ,
B forwards the predefined value ξ1 to A , where ξ1 ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H3(δ ) = ξ1 to A and adds the tuple (δ ,ξ1) to LH3 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
• H4: on receipt of an H4 query on (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,
Cl,3)), if there is a tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,
δ2) ∈ LH4 , B forwards the predefined value δ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ Zp,δ2 ∈G1.
Otherwise, B sets δ2 = gξ2 , responds δ2 to A and adds the tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2,
(C1,1, C1,2,C1,3), · · · , (Cl,1, Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) in LH4 , where ξ2 ∈R Zp.
• H5: on receipt of an H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),
(M,ρ)), if there is a tuple (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),
ξ3,δ3) ∈ LH5 , B forwards the predefined value δ2 to A , where ξ3 ∈ Zp,δ3 ∈
G1. Otherwise, B sets δ3 = gξ3 , responds δ3 to A and adds the tuple (B̃1,C̃0,
(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) in LH5 , where ξ3 ∈R Zp.
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In addition, B maintains the lists Lsk, Lrk and Lone which are initially empty as
follows:
• Lsk records the tuples (S,skS) which are the results of the queries to the private
key oracle.
• Lrk records the tuples (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ), tag1, tag2, tag3) which are
the results of the queries to the re-encryption key oracle, where tag1, tag2
and tag3 denote that the re-encryption key is randomly chosen, generated as
an online encryption query or generated as a re-encryption key query respec-
tively.
• Lone records the tuples (S,(M,ρ),C(M,ρ), tag1, tag2, tag3) which are the results
of the queries to the online encryption oracle, where tag1, tag2 and tag3 de-
note that the ciphertext is generated under a valid re-encryption key, under
a randomly chosen re-encryption key or generated without any re-encryption
key respectively.
Query Phase 1. The challenger answers to A ’s queries as follows.
• Private Key Query < S >. B has to produce private keys for attribute sets that
do not satisfy (M∗,ρ∗) requested by A . B proceeds in creating a key for an
attribute set S = {A j} j∈[1,|S| as follows.
Since S does not satisfy (M∗,ρ∗), there exists a vector ~w= (w1, · · · ,wn)T ∈Znp
such that w1 =−1 and M∗i ·~w = 0 for all i∈ I = {i}ρ∗(i)∈S ⊆ [1, l] (if S satisfies
(M∗,ρ∗), then the challenger outputs a random bit in {0,1} and aborts the
simulation). B then picks at random r̂ ∈R Zp and implicitly sets





(note that this is properly distributed due to r̂) by computing


























Moreover, for all j ∈ [1, |S|], B calculates the values K j,2 = gr j and K j,3 =
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(uA jh)r jv−r as follows:


































































The value Q can be calculated by B using the problem instance and since
∏ j′∈[1,l],ρ( j)/∈S g
−~w·M∗j′a
s+1/b j′ should be wiped out by (uA jh)r j . Therefore, for
all attribute A j ∈ S, B implicitly computes













such that r̂ j is randomly chosen in Zp and thus, r j is properly distributed. The
values bi at the numerator cancel out with the values b2i at the denominator,
and thus cancel out the unknown part of v−r.
Moreover, we note that r j is well defined only for the attributes in the set S
(that does not satisfy (M∗,ρ∗)) or the unrelated attributes (not in the policy),
since the sum is over the i′’s such that ρ∗(i′) /∈ S. Thus, for all A j ∈ S or all
A j /∈ {ρ∗(i)}i∈[1,l], the denominators A j− ρ∗(i′) are non-zero. If B tries to
put more attributes in the policy, and possibly create a key for an unauthorised
set, then it would have to divide by zero. Then, we obtain K j,3 = (uA jh)r jv−r
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such that











































































The values Q′ and K j,2 can be calculated using the values from the problem
instance. The second part of (uA jh)r j cancels out with the unknown part of
v−r. Thus, B can compute K j,2 and K j,3 for all the attributes A j in S and
returns the private key skS = (S,K0,K1,{K j,2,K j,3} j∈[1,|S|]) to A .
• Re-Encryption Key Query < S,(M,ρ)>. If (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),∗,0,1)∈
Lrk, then the challenger returns rkS→(M,ρ) to the adversary. Otherwise, B pro-
ceeds as follows.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,skS) ∈ Lsk, then B returns a random bit in
{0,1} and aborts the simulation.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,skS) /∈Lsk, then B verifies whether (S,(M,ρ),
δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),1,1,0) ∈ Lrk. If yes, B returns skS to the adversary and
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resets tag2 = 0, tag3 = 1. Otherwise, the challenger selects at random
θ ,σ , σ1, · · · ,σ|S| ∈R Zp, β̃ ,δ ∈R {0,1}λ , K̄0, K̄1, · · · , K̄|S| ∈R G1. It then
sets RK0,1 = K̄0 ·hθ , RK0,2 = gθ , RK1 = gσ and for j ∈ [1, |S|], RK j,2 = gσ j
and RK j,3 = K̄
σ j
j · v−σ , and constructs IntC̃ using β̃ and δ as in the real
scheme. Eventually, B outputs rkS→(M,ρ) to A , and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,
rkS→(M,ρ),1,0,1) to Lrk.
– Otherwise, if (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),0,1,0) ∈ Lrk, B gives rkS→(M,ρ)
to A , and resets tag2 = 0, tag3 = 1. Otherwise, B first constructs the
private key skS for the attribute set S as for the private key queries. The
challenger then generates rkS→(M,ρ) as in the real scheme, gives it to the
adversary, and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),0,0,1) to Lrk.
• Online Encryption Query < S,(M,ρ), IntC >. The challenger checks whether
the equation 6.1 holds. If not, meaning that either the intermediate ciphertext
IntC is invalid or S does not satisfy (M,ρ), then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, B
works as follows.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,skS) /∈ Lsk, then the challenger first con-
structs the re-encryption key as the second case for the re-encryption
key queries, re-encrypts IntC and gives it to the adversary. It then adds
(S,(M,ρ), δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),1,1,0) to Lrk and (S,(M,ρ),C(M,ρ),0,1,0) to
Lone.
– Otherwise, the challenger first constructs rkS→(M,ρ) as the third case for
the re-encryption key queries, re-encrypts IntC and gives it to the adver-
sary. It then adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),0,1,0) to Lrk and (S,(M,ρ),
C(M,ρ),1,0,0) to Lone.





∗( j)M∗j,k·c. If no such tuple exists, then the challenger re-
turns ⊥. Otherwise, it verifies whether (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,⊥,⊥,1,⊥) ∈ Lrk
such that S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗). If no, the challenger selects at random
β̃ ,δ ∈{0,1}λ , generates IntC̃ as in the real scheme, in order to hide δ and
β̃ . It then constructs B2 = (e(ga,ga
q
) · e(g,gα ′))c·ξ1 where ξ1 = H3(δ ).
Eventually, B outputs C(M,ρ) = ((M,ρ),C0,1,B2, IntC̃), gives it to the ad-
versary, and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,⊥,⊥,1,⊥) to Lrk and (S,(M,ρ),C(M,ρ),
0,0,1) to Lone.
• Ciphertext Decryption Query < S,C(M,ρ) >. B first checks if there are tuples
(β̃ ,δ , c̃) and (β ,m,c) in LH2 such that C̃0 = g
c̃ and C0,2 = hc. If not, the
challenger outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it checks whether the equation 6.2 holds. It
not, meaning that either IntC̃ is invalid or S does not satisfy (M,ρ), then it
outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B proceeds as follows:
– If (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,rkS→(M,ρ),1,0,1) ∈ Lrk or (S,(M,ρ),C(M,ρ),0,1,0) ∈
Lone, it verifies
∀ j ∈ [1, l], e(C̃ j,1,g) ?= e(w,g)λ̃ j · e(v,C̃ j,3)
∀ j ∈ [1, l], e(C̃ j,2,g) ?= e(u,C̃−1j,3 )x̃ j · e(h,C̃−1j,3 ) (6.3)
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where given I = {i}ρ(i)∈S and M, it can find the vector ~̃w = {w̃i}i∈I of
constants in Zp such that ∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = c̃. If the above equations do not
hold, then the challenger returns ⊥. Otherwise, it sets C0,1 = gc and
checks the equation 6.1. If the equation does not hold, then it returns
⊥. Otherwise, B recovers the random re-encryption key rkS→(M,ρ) =
(S,RK0,1,RK0,2,RK1,{RKi,2, RKi,3}i∈[1,k], IntC̃) from Lrk and verifies the





e(w∑i∈I Ci,4·wi,RK1) ·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,RK1) · e(Ci,2 ·uCi,5 ,RK j,2) · e(Ci,3,RK j,3))wi
where I and wi are defined in the re-encryption phase. If the previous
equation does not hold, then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the challenger veri-
fies whether (R,δ1) ∈ LH1 such that B1 = (β‖m)⊕δ1 and R = e(g,g)α·c.
If no such tuple exists, B returns ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs m and gives it
to A .
– Otherwise, if (S,skS)∈Lsk, the challenger recovers m as in the real scheme
using skS. Otherwise, B verifies whether both equations 6.2 and 6.3 hold.
If not, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it verifies whether (R,δ1) ∈ LH1 such that
B1 = (β‖m)⊕ δ1 and R = e(g,g)α·c, and B2 = e(g,g)α·c·ξ1 . If no such
tuple exists and the equations do not hold, B returns ⊥. Otherwise, it
outputs m and gives it to A .
Challenge. The challenge ciphertext is constructed as follows. The adversary gives two
messages m0 and m1 of equal length to the challenger. B chooses a bit µ ∈R {0,1}
and answers to A as follows. IntC is generated as in the real scheme, meaning
that IntC = (c,B1,C0,1,C0,2,{λ ′j, t j,x j,C j,1,C2, j,C3, j} j∈[1,l],D) We suppose that the
value C0,2 is not necessarily output.
Then, B chooses at random β̃ ∗,δ ∗ ∈R {0,1}λ , issues an H3 query on δ ∗ to obtain
ξ ∗1 . We notice that in the previous step, (β ,mµ) must be issued to H2 such that the
tuple (β ,mµ ,c) is already stored in LH2 , where β ∈R {0,1}λ and c ∈R Zp. Thus, it





) · e(g,gα ′))c·ξ ∗1 . More-
over, B chooses at random B̃∗1 ∈R {0,1}2λ and implicitly sets H1(Z · e(gc̃,gα
′
)) =
B̃∗1⊕ (δ ∗‖β̃ ∗) and C̃∗0 = gc̃.
B can choose the secret that is splitted in order to cancel out the terms. For
that, it chooses at random ỹ′2, · · · , ỹ′n and shares the secret using the vector ~̃y =
(c̃, c̃a+ ỹ′2, · · · , c̃an−1+ ỹ′n)∈Znp. We note that the secret c̃ and the vector ~̃y are prop-
erly distributed since c̃ is information-theoretically hidden from A and the ỹ′j’s are






i−1+ λ̃ ′j for each row j∈ [1, l]. We note that the values




i are known to B.
For each row, B implicitly sets t̃ j = −c̃b j, which is properly distributed since the
b j’s are information-theoretically hidden from A . Then, B computes the follow-
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ing:
C̃∗j,1 = w
















































ρ∗( j)h)t̃ j = (gc̃b j)−(ûρ














t̃ j = (gc̃b j)−1
Since t̃ j =−c̃b j, we “raised” the exponents of the value so that they cancel out with









· · · ,(C̃∗l,1,C̃∗l,2,C̃∗l,3),(M∗,ρ∗)) to obtain (B̃∗1,C̃∗0 , (C̃∗1,1,C̃∗1,2,C̃∗1,3), · · · ,(C̃∗l,1,C̃∗l,2,C̃∗l,3),
(M∗,ρ∗),ξ ∗3 ,δ
∗
3 ), and sets D̃
∗ = (gc̃)ξ
∗




Finally, B returns the ciphertext C∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M
∗,ρ∗),C0,1,B∗2, IntC̃) to A .
If Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·c, then C∗(M∗,ρ∗) is a valid ciphertext. Indeed, the components
corresponding to IntC are valid. Since IntC is encrypted to C∗(M∗,ρ∗) under a valid
re-encryption key rkS→(M,ρ), the on-line encryption must be valid, meaning that the
construction of B∗2 is valid. Moreover, it is easy to see that the rest of the components
are valid too. Nevertheless, if Z is a random element in GT , then the challenge
ciphertext is independent of the bit µ for A .
Query Phase 2. Same as in the query phase 1, except that we consider the constraints
defined in Section 6.1.3.
Guess. A outputs a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ . If µ ′ = µ , then B outputs 0, meaning that it
claims that the challenge Z is equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·c; otherwise, it outputs 1.
If Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·c, then A played the proper security game, since B1 =(mµ‖β )⊕H1(e(g,
gc)α
′ ·Z) = (mµ‖β )⊕H1(e(g,g)α·c). If Z is a random term in GT , then all the information
about the message mµ is lost in the challenge ciphertext. Thus, the advantage of A is ex-
actly 0. Therefore, if A breaks the proper security game with a non-negligible advantage,
then B has a non-negligible advantage in breaking the s-type assumption.
Analysis. The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except for H1, H2 and H3.
Let H∗1 and H
∗
2 be the events that A has queried R
∗ = e(g,g)αc to H1 (with probability of
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a successful query equal to qH1/2
2λ ) and (β ∗,mµ) to H2 (with probability of a successful
query be equal to qH2/p) before the challenge phase. Let H
∗
3 denotes the event that A has
queried δ ∗ to H3 before the challenge phase (this happens with probability qH3/p). In the
simulation of private key oracle, the responses to A are perfect.
In the simulation of ciphertext decryption oracle, it might be possible that the chal-
lenger cannot provide a decryption for a valid ciphertext. Suppose the adversary can
generate a valid ciphertext without querying e(g,g)αc to H1, where c = H2(β ,m). Let
Valid be the event that the ciphertext is valid, QueryH1 be the event that the adversary has
queried e(g,g)αc to H1 and QueryH2 be the event that the adversary has queried (β ,m) to
H2. From the simulation, Pr[Valid | ¬QueryH1] ≤ Pr[QueryH2 | QueryH1]+Pr[Valid |
QueryH1 ∧¬QueryH2] ≤ qH2/22λ + 1/p and Pr[Valid | ¬QueryH2] ≤ qH1/22λ + 1/p,
where qH1,qH2 are the total numbers of queries to the random oracles H1 and H2. Let
Pr[ErrDec] be the probability that the event Valid | (¬QueryH1 ∨¬QueryH2) occurs,
then Pr[ErrDec]≤ (qH1+qH2
22λ
+ 2p)qd , where qd is the total number of decryption queries.
Let Bad denote the event that (H∗2 | ¬H∗1 )∨H∗1 ∨H∗3 ∨ErrDec, then























Selective Collusion Resistance Security Proof
Theorem. Suppose that the BDH assumption holds in (G1,GT ) and the hash functions
H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are seen as random oracles, then the OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is
selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model.
Suppose there is an adversary A who breaks the collusion resistance of the OO-CP-
AB-PRE scheme with advantage AdvS−CollResOO−CP−AB−PRE,A greater than ε . We then construct
a challenger B that should output e(g,g)abd playing the selectively collusion resistance
game with A as follows.
B takes as inputs (p,G1,GT ,e), a generator g of G1 and a BDH problem instance
(ga,gb,gd) for some unknown exponents a,b,d ∈ Zp. The goal of the challenger is to
output e(g,g)abd .
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge set S∗ to B.
Setup. The challenger sets w = gb and e(g,g)α = e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab. It also chooses at
random u,h,v ∈R G1. It gives these public parameters to A .
We note that the public parameters are identical to those in the real scheme for
the adversary. At any time, A can adaptively query the random oracles H j, for
j ∈ [1,5], which are controlled by B as follows. The challenger maintains the lists
HListj , for j ∈ [1,5], which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the random
oracles as follows.
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• H1: on receipt of an H1 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ LH1 , B
forwards the predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B
sets H1(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to LH1 , where
δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H2: on receipt of an H2 query on (β ,m), if there is a tuple (β ,m,c) ∈ LH2 ,
B forwards the predefined value c to A , where c ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H2(β ,m) = c, responds c to A and adds the tuple (β ,m,c) to LH2 , where
c ∈R Zp.
• H3: on receipt of an H3 query on δ ∈ {0,1}λ , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ1) in LH3 ,
B forwards the predefined value ξ1 to A , where ξ1 ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H3(δ ) = ξ1 to A and adds the tuple (δ ,ξ1) to LH3 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
• H4: on receipt of an H4 query on (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,
Cl,3)), if there is a tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,
δ2) ∈ LH4 , B forwards the predefined value δ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ Zp,δ2 ∈G1.
Otherwise, B sets δ2 = gξ2 , responds δ2 to A and adds the tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2,
(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) in LH4 , where ξ2 ∈R Zp.
• H5: on receipt of an H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),
(M,ρ)), if there is a tuple (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),
ξ3,δ3) ∈ LH5 , B forwards the predefined value δ2 to A , where ξ3 ∈ Zp,δ3 ∈
G1. Otherwise, B sets δ3 = gξ3 , responds δ3 to A and adds the tuple (B̃1,C̃0,
(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) in LH5 , where ξ3 ∈R Zp.
Query Phase. The challenger answers to A ’s queries as follows.
• Private Key Query < S >. Let S = {Ai}i∈[1,k] be an attribute set such that
S 6= S∗. We suppose there is an attribute j such that either ( j ∈ S∧ y /∈ S∗) or
( j /∈ S∧ y ∈ S∗). Without loss of generality, we assume that ( j /∈ S∧ y ∈ S∗).
For i ∈ [1,k], B randomly chooses r′i ∈R Zp and implicitly sets the elements r
and ri as follows:
ri = r′i, for i ∈ [1,k], i 6= j






Therefore, the components of the private key skS can be computed as follows:
















i , for i ∈ [1,k], i 6= j
Ki,3 = (uAih)r
′
i · va−∑ki=1 r′i , for i ∈ [1,k], i 6= j
K j,2 = g
−a+r′j
K j,3 = (uA jh)
−a+r′j · va−∑ki=1 r′i
• Re-Encryption Key Query < S,(M,ρ) >. Let S be an attribute set. If S 6= S∗,
then A gets the private key skS from KeyGen(params,msk,S) and the re-
encryption key rkS→(M,ρ) from ReKeyGen(params,S,skS,(M,ρ)). Otherwise,
the adversary proceeds as follows.
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First, B computes IntC̃: it picks at random β̃ ,δ ∈R {0,1}λ and issues a H2
query on (β̃ ,δ ) to obtain c̃ and a H1 query on e(g,g)α·c̃ = e(g,g)ab·c̃ to obtain
δ1. It then computes B̃1 = (δ‖β̃ )⊕ δ1 and C̃0 = gc̃. It also picks at random
ỹ2, · · · , ỹn ∈R Zp, sets the vector ~̃y = (c̃, ỹ2, · · · , ỹn)T , and computes a vector
of shares of c̃ as (λ̃1, · · · , λ̃l)T = M ·~̃y, where M is a l× n matrix and l ≤ P.
Then, for j ∈ [1, l], it chooses at random t̃ j ∈R Zp and computes C̃ j,1 = wλ̃ jvt̃ j ,
C̃ j,2 = (uρ( j)h)−t̃ j and C̃ j,3 = gt̃ j .
Moreover, it issues a H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),
(M,ρ)) to obtain (B̃1, C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3),
and sets D̃=(gc̃)ξ3 . Eventually, the intermediate ciphertext for the re-encryption
key is IntC̃ = ((M,ρ), B̃1,C̃0,{C̃ j,1,C̃2, j,C̃3, j} j∈[1,l], D̃).
It then issues a H3 query on δ to obtain ξ1 and randomly chooses θ ∈R












i)ξ1 . It also chooses an index j in [1,k] and computes RKi,2 and RKi,3










i · va−∑ki=1 r′i)ξ1 , for i ∈ [1,k], i 6= j









j · va−∑ki=1 r′j)ξ1
B returns the re-encryption key rkS→(M,ρ)=(S,RK0,1,RK0,2,RK1,{RKi,2,RKi,3
}i∈[1,k], IntC̃) to A .
Output. The challenge private key sk∗S∗ = (S
∗,K∗0 ,K
∗
1 ,{K∗i,2,K∗i,3}i∈[1,k∗]) for the attribute
set S∗ = {A∗i }i∈[1,k∗] is constructed as follows. If sk∗S∗ is a valid key, then it should





e(wv,K∗1 ) · e(g,K∗i,3)






e((wv)d,K∗1 ) · e(gd,K∗i,3)
= e(g,g)d·α = e(g,g)abd
and solves the BDH problem.
Analysis. In the simulation of private key oracle, the responses to A are perfect. The
simulations of the random oracles are perfect except for H3. Let H∗3 be the event that A
has queried δ to H3 before the output phase (this event happens with probability qH3/p).




In the following table, we evaluate the efficiency of our OO-CP-AB-PRE symmetric
pairing-based scheme. We use results of cryptographic operation implementations (group
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exponentiation of a random group element with a random exponent and pairing opera-
tions on random group elements) using the MIRACL framework [203, 196] for a 128-bit
security level. All the following experiments are based on a dual core IntelR XeonR CPU
W3503@2.40GHz with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04. The elliptic curve utilised
for all the benchmarks was the super-singular symmetric curve y2 = x3 + 1 mod p with
embedding degree 2 for suitable primes p.
We do not take into account multiplication/division in G1 and GT as well as expo-
nentiation in GT as these operations have timings negligible compared to the ones for
exponentiation in G1 and pairing operation.








Table 6.1: Timings for our OO-CP-AB-PRE symmetric pairing-based system. Times
are in milliseconds. We assume that there are up to 10 attributes involved in the protocol.
The algorithms Setup and KeyGen should be run only once to generate the public
parameters and the static private keys for all the users. The execution of the algorithm
KeyGen depends on the number of attributes of a given user. Attributes are also involved
in algorithms OffEncrypt, ReKeyGen, OnEncrypt and Decrypt, and timings significantly
result from their number. For each algorithm execution, we consider a maximum number
of 10 attributes: such number seems realistic to allow users to find specifications and re-
quirements decribing other users (when generating private keys) and medical information
(when generating ciphertexts). Finally, timings are substancial in algorithms ReKeyGen,
OnEncrypt and Decrypt due to the verification process in each of them. We can propose
to pre-compute the values needed for the verification of the components. Indeed, if the
verification process is skipped, we notice that the computation of the ciphertext compo-
nents in the algorithm OnEncrypt only requires 6,550.2 milliseconds. In the algorithm
Decrypt, it only takes 5,676.4 milliseconds to recover the message when not processing
the verification part.
6.1.7 Conclusion
We proposed the notion of on-line/off-line ciphertext attribute-based proxy re-encryption
(OO-CP-AB-PRE) to directly solve the e-Health scenario. We provided a clear definition
of this primitive along with the corresponding security models. The OO-CP-AB-PRE
construction is efficient and practical, and is built in the random oracle model. We offered
a selective access structure and chosen-ciphertext security game for the OO-CP-AB-PRE
system, to cover the attacks taken by an outsider. We also showed that the OO-CP-AB-
PRE scheme is selectively collusion resistant, to cover the attacks triggered by an insider.
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6.2 Ciphertext-Policy DNA-Based Encryption
Consider the following scenario. A patient, Alice, has the possibility to make her Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHRs) reachable only to her descendents in case of unability to
access them (because of illness, disability or death for instance). Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that Alice has only one son, Charles. To do so, the hospital suggests her
to encrypt the EHR using her DNA sequences as a key, and to send the ciphertext to the
cloud server of the hospital, acting as a proxy.
Let us suppose now that Alice is unable to access her EHR herself. Thus, she can
ask Charles to use his DNA to conduct a successful decryption and retrieve her EHR in
order to take decisions about her health situation. The decryption is successful if and
only if Charles is a true descendent of Alice, meaning that he passes the DNA parentage
test. Nevertheless, a random individual, Bob, will not be able to conduct a successful
decryption, even if he colludes with other people who are not Alice’s relatives, since Bob
does not have the required DNA sequences, and hence, he will fail the DNA parentage
test. Additionally, Bob will not learn anything else, except that the decryption process is
unsuccessful. We depict the scenario in Figure 6.2.
If enough elements match
When is released
Figure 6.2: Ciphertext-Policy DNA-Based Encryption. A patient, Alice, encrypts a document
m using her DNA and sends the resulting ciphertext C to a cloud server, acting as a proxy. The
latter has to keep C on its local storage until a token is released (when Alice becomes unable
to proceed for instance). When this happens, the proxy forwards the ciphertext C to the patient
Charles, Alice’s son. Charles uses his DNA (close enough to Alice’s one) to retrieve m.
DNA Parentage Test. Ostrowski [177] gave some definitions and explanations related
to the paternity indices. DNA parental test is currently the most advanced and accurate
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technology to determine parental relationship. It uses genetic fingerprints to determine
whether two individuals have a biological parentchild relationship. Hence, it establishes
genetic evidence whether a man (respectively woman) is the biological father (respec-
tively mother) of an individual. When testing parental relationship, the result, called
“probability of parentage”, is 0 if the parent is not biologically related to the child, and is
typically close to 1 otherwise.
Some but rare individuals are called “chimeras“ due to the fact that they have at least
two different sets of genes. Nevertheless, almost all individuals have a single and distinct
set of genes. Therefore, we meet several cases of DNA profiling that falsely “proved” that
a mother was unrelated to her children. Since this has a negligible probability, we assume
that these exceptions are not applicable in our protocol.
In the following, we give some useful definitions to explain the vocabulary on genet-
ics that will be used throughout this section:
• DNA. The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic in-
formation found in all human organisms as a sequence of nucleotides using letters
G, A, T, and C, corresponding to guanine, adenine, thymine, and cytosine respec-
tively. The molecule is formed as double-stranded helices, consisting of two long
polymers of simple units called nucleotides (i.e. the molecules with backbones
made of alternating sugars and phosphate groups). These characters allow the DNA
to be well-suited for biological information storage.
• Chromosome. A chromosome is an organized structure of DNA found in cells. This
single piece of coiled DNA contains many genes, regulatory elements and other
nucleotide sequences. It also holds DNA-bound proteins, which serve to package
the DNA and control its functions.
• Allele. An allele is the alternative forms of the same gene for a character, producing
different effects. For instance, different alleles can result in different observable
phenotypic traits, such as a different pigmentation. However, many variations at
the genetic level result in little or no observable variation.
• Minisatellites. The minisatellites or also called variable number tandem repeats
(VNTR), are repeated combined sequences, such that the size of one sequence is
from 10 to 60 nucleotides. They are present in all species, are particularly studied
in humans, and largely found in the genome. We can easily observe replication
errors in these minisatellites, including replication slippage, which are at the origin
of interindividual on the number of repetition variations. This variability has many
applications, such as the DNA parentage test.
Next, we explain the principle of the DNA parentage test. Each individual has, in
his/her chromosomes, some portions of DNA that encode genes and other portions for
which no usefulness has yet been discovered. This last part has an interesting character-
istic: some sequences of nucleotide pairs follow on from each other, identically repeated.
These repeated sequences are called minisatellites. The size of these minisatellites, cor-
responding to the number of repetitions of DNA sequences, highly varies from person to
person, comprised from 5 to 55.
This size is a characteristic of the chromosome. Therefore, it inherits in the same way
than for its alleles: for each chromosome pair of an individual, there will be one that will
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match the characteristics of the father and another one that will match with those of the
mother.
Thus, parental testing is to assess the size of some specific minisatellites. For each
chromosome, we need to compare these characteristics between the chromosomes of the
child and those of the prospective parents. We illustrate the aforementioned idea in the







Figure 6.3: DNA Parentage Tes. In case 1, the father and the mother have biological parent-
child relationship with the child since the child’s chromosomes match one chromosome of each
parents’ pair. However, in case 2, the father is not the biological father of the child since they do
not share any common chromosome.
Example. Let us consider the following example. The table contains genetic maps of
three people: the mother Alice and two presumed sons, labelled as Bob and Charles re-
spectively. In the table, the size of the minisatellite ACGCC is indicated for each chromo-
some pair. For instance, Alice has the sequence ACGCCACGCCACGCCACGCCACGC-
CACGCCACGCC (number of repetitions is equal to 7) on its first chromosome 14.
Size of the minisatellite
Analyzed chromosome pair - left, right Alice Bob Charles
Chromosome pair 1 18, 15 5, 15 18, 13
Chromosome pair 8 13, 14 17, 20 55, 14
Chromosome pair 13 34, 15 34, 9 34, 14
Chromosome pair 14 7, 24 5, 14 12, 7
We note that for each chromosome pair, Alice and Charles have one element in common.
However, Alice and Bob have only one element in common for the chromosome pair
number 1 and the chromosome pair number 13, thus Bob is not Alice’s biological son.
Moreover, we can conclude with a high probability that Charles is the biological son of
Alice.
6.2.1 Contributions
Motivated by the above scenario, we provide a new primitive called ciphertext-policy
DNA-based encryption (CB-DBE), to encrypt documents using the DNA information of
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an individual. We allow the receiver to use his/her DNA information to decrypt the cipher-
text, if and only if his/her DNA sequences match the original DNA sequences embedded
in the ciphertext. The matching criteria is done via the parentage test since the DNA has
an interesting and useful characteristic, namely the number of sequence repetitions is spe-
cific for each individual. The size of the minisatellites of each pair of chromosomes will
be treated as attributes and used in the encryption and decryption processes. Furthermore,
the solution is privacy preserving, which means that a party learns nothing else regarding
the DNA information.
Note that the CP-DBE primitive is closely related to the well-known CP-ABE prim-
itive, such that the DNA elements are seen as attributes. We carefully define the security
models for this cryptosystem, and we propose a CP-DBE construction that satisfies these
security models. More precisely, we prove that the CP-DBE scheme is selectively IND-
CCA secure and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle.
6.2.2 Protocol Definition
A ciphertext-policy DNA-based encryption (CP-DBE) scheme consists of the following
four algorithms:
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). On inputs a security parameter λ and an attribute
universe U , output the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. On inputs the public parameters params, the mas-
ter secret key msk and an attribute set S, output a private key skS, such that skS is
associated with the attribute set S.
• Encrypt(params,AS,S′,m)→ CAS. On inputs the public parameters params, an
access structure AS for attributes over U , an attribute set S′ satisfying the access
structure AS and a message m, output a ciphertext CAS.
We assume that the access structure AS is included in the ciphertext CAS.
• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. On inputs the public parameters params, an
attribute set S, the corresponding private key skS and a ciphertext CAS, output m if
S satisfies AS, where S is defined as the intersection set between the attribute set
S from the algorithm KeyGen and the attribute set S′ from the algorithm Encrypt;
output ⊥ otherwise, indicating either CAS is invalid or S does not satisfy AS.
Correctness. We require that a ciphertext-policy DNA-based encryption scheme is cor-
rect if for any λ ∈N, (params,msk)← Setup(λ ,U ), skS←KeyGen(params,msk,S) and
CAS←Encrypt(params,AS,S′,m), and if S satisfies AS, we have that Decrypt(params,S,
skS,CAS) = m, where S is defined as the intersection set between the attribute set S from
the algorithm KeyGen and the attribute set S′ from the algorithm Encrypt.
6.2.3 Security Models
Selective Indistinguishability against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
In the following, we define the security notion for selective IND-CCA. A CP-DBE scheme
is selectively IND-CCA secure if no PPT adversary A can win the game below with non-
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negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the adversary A as
follows.
Initialization. The adversary A outputs a challenge access structure AS∗ to the chal-
lenger B.
Setup. The challenger B runs the algorithm Setup and gives the public parameters params
to the adversary A .
Query Phase 1. The adversary A is given access to the following oracles:
1. Private Key Query < S >. On input an attribute set S, the challenger B runs
KeyGen(params,msk,S) to obtain skS.
2. Ciphertext Decryption Query < S,CAS >. On inputs an attribute set S and a
ciphertext CAS, the challenger B returns m←Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS) to
the adversary A , where skS ← KeyGen(params,msk,S) and S satisfies AS
such that S is defined as the intersection set between the attribute set S from
the algorithm KeyGen and the attribute set S′ from the algorithm Encrypt.
3. Set Intersection Query < S,S′,CAS >. On inputs an attribute set S, another
attribute set S′ from the algorithm Encrypt and a ciphertext CAS← Encrypt(
params,AS,S′,m), the challenger B returns the intersection set S = S∩S′ to
the adversary A .
Note that if the queries to the ciphertext decryption oracle are invalid, then the
challenger simply outputs ⊥. In this phase, the following query is forbidden to
issue: private key queries for any S satisfying AS∗.
Challenge. The adversary A submits two messages m0 and m1 of equal length. The
challenger B chooses a random bit µ ∈R {0,1} and encrypts mµ under AS∗. The
ciphertext C∗AS∗ is given to the adversary A .
Query Phase 2. The query phase 1 is repeated except that the following queries are for-
bidden to issue:
• private key queries for any S satisfying AS∗,
• ciphertext decryption queries for any S satisfying AS∗, where S is defined
as the intersection set between the attribute set S from the algorithm KeyGen
and the attribute set S′ from the algorithm Encrypt.
Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ . If µ ′ = µ , then the adversary
A wins.
The advantage of the adversary A is defined as AdvS−IND−CCACP−DBE,A (λ ,U ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]−
1/2|.
Selective Collusion Resistance
In the following, we define the security notion for selective collusion resistance. A CP-
DBE scheme is selectively collusion resistant if no PPT adversary A can win the game
below with non-negligible advantage. Let B be a challenger that plays the game with the
adversary A as follows:
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Initialization. A outputs an attribute set S∗ to B.
Setup. B runs the algorithm Setup and gives the public parameters params to A .
Query Phase. A is given access to the following oracles:
1. Private Key Query < S >. On input an attribute set S 6= S∗, B runs KeyGen(
params,msk,S) to obtain skS and returns it to A .
2. Set Intersection Query < S,S′,CAS >. On inputs an attribute set S 6= S∗,
another attribute set S′ 6= S∗ from the algorithm Encrypt and a ciphertext
CAS← Encrypt(params,AS,S′,m), the challenger B returns the intersection
set S = S∩S′ to the adversary A .
Output. A submits a private key sk∗S∗ for the attribute set S
∗.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvS−CollResCP−DBE,A (λ ,U ) = Pr[A succeeds].
6.2.4 Construction
We now present a CP-DBE construction in the random oracle model. To build this CP-
DBE construction, we start from the Waters’ ABE scheme [237], that is proven selectively
IND-CCA secure and collusion resistant. In Waters’ scheme, the encryption algorithm
takes as input a LSSS access matrix M and distributes a random exponent c ∈ Zp accord-
ing to M. The main advantage is the possibility to realize expressive functionality.
Then, we extend it to obtain a CP-DBE scheme with the same levels of security,
namely IND-CCA security and collusion resistance in the random oracle model. Now,
the receiver owns an attribute set S and is performs a set intersection operation on the
sender’s attribute set S′, without learning any extra information except the output of the
operation.
Let U be the attribute universe and n′ ·U be its cardinality (such that n′ ·U is assumed
to be a large public number and n′≥ 2 an integer). Let S be an attribute set such that S⊆U
and |S|= 2 ·U .
• Setup(λ ,U )→ (params,msk). Given a security parameter λ , run (p,G1,GT ,e)←
G (λ ). Choose two random values α,a ∈R Zp, two random generators g,g1 ∈R G1
and compute h = ga. Pick at random U values q1, · · · ,qU ∈R Zp, and compute
Q1 = gq1, · · · ,QU = gqU . Moreover, set the following TCR hash functions H1 :
{0,1}2λ → Zp, H2 : GT → {0,1}2λ , H3 : {0,1}∗ → G1, H4 : {0,1}∗ → G1 and
H5 : GT →G1.
Finally, set the public parameters as params=(p,G1,GT ,e,g,g1,h,e(g,g)α ,Q1, · · · ,
QU ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) and the master secret key as msk = (gα ,q1, · · · ,qU).
• KeyGen(params,msk,S)→ skS. Choose t, t̃ ∈R Zp, compute K = gαht , L = gt and
Kx = H3(x)t for all x ∈ S. Then, compute Q̃ = gt̃ , Q̃1 = g−q1ht̃ , · · · , Q̃U = g−qU ht̃
and set the private key skS = (K,L,{Kx}x∈S, Q̃, Q̃1, · · · , Q̃U).
• Encrypt(params,AS,S′,m)→ CAS. Let (M,ρ) be a LSSS access structure where
M is a l× n-matrix and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes. Let the
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attribute set S′ = {(x1,1,x1,2) · · · ,(xU,1,xU,2)} satisfy (M,ρ) and the message m be
in {0,1}λ .
First, pick at random N j,0 and N j,1,N j,2 in Zp for j ∈ [1,U ] (for i ∈ [1,2], we sup-
pose that the elements N j,i are not equal each other and not equal to x j,1,x j,2). For
j ∈ [1,U ], construct the polynomials Pj(x) = N j,0(x− x j,1)(x− x j,2)(x−N j,1)(x−
N j,2) = ∑4i=0 ν j,ix
i. Then, for j ∈ [1,U ], i ∈ [0,4], compute g j,i = gν j,iQ j = gν j,i+q j
and X j,i = H5(e(gν j,i,g))⊕gν j,i .
Second, choose β ∈R {0,1}λ , set c=H1(m ‖ β ) and a random vector~v= (c,y2, · · · ,
yn) ∈R Znp, where y2, · · · ,yn ∈R Zp. For i = [1, l], set λi = v ·Mi, where Mi is the
vector corresponding to the i-th row of M and choose r1, · · · ,rl ∈R Zp. Then, set
A1 = (m ‖ β )⊕H2(e(g,g)αc)
A2 = gc
A3 = gc1,
(B1 = hλ1H3(ρ(1))−r1,C1 = gr1), · · · ,(Bl = hλl H3(ρ(l))−rl ,C1 = grl)
D = H4(A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ))c
Finally, output the ciphertext C(M,ρ) = ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,
g1,0,X1,0),((g1,1,X1,1),(g1,2,X1,2),(g1,3,X1,3),(g1,4,X1,4), · · · ,(gU,0,XU,0),(gU,1,XU,1),
(gU,2,XU,2),(gU,3,XU,3),(gU,4,XU,4)).
Note that {ρ(i)}i∈[1,l] are the attributes used in the access structure (M,ρ). As in
[237], we allow an attribute to be associated with multiple rows of matrix M, i.e.
the function ρ is not injective.
• Decrypt(params,S,skS,CAS)→m/⊥. Parse the ciphertext C(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),A1,A2,
A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0),(g1,1,X1,1),(g1,2,X1,2),(g1,3,X1,3),(g1,4,X1,4),
· · · ,(gU,0,XU,0),(gU,1,XU,1),(gU,2,XU,2),(gU,3,XU,3),(gU,4,XU,4)) and the private
key skS for the attribute set S as (K,L,{Kx}x∈S, Q̃, Q̃1, · · · , Q̃U).
Let S′ be the attribute set used in the algorithm Encrypt. First, start by setting
the intersection set S = S∩ S′. If |S| > 2U , then output ⊥; otherwise proceed as








Finally, for j∈ [1,U ] and i∈ [0,4], output H5(Y )⊕X j,i =H5(e(gν j,i,g))⊕H5(e(gν j,i,
g))⊕gν j,i = gν j,i .
Second, for j ∈ [1,U ], compute gPj(x) = gν j,0 · (gν j,1)x · (gν j,2)x2 · (gν j,3)x3 · (gν j,4)x4 .
For j ∈ [1,U ], for any pair (x̂ j,1, x̂ j,2) in S,
– compute gPj(x̂ j,1): if gPj(x̂ j,1) = 1 then x̂ j,1 ∈ S′ and stop; otherwise x̂ j,1 /∈ S′ and
proceed.
– compute gPj(x̂ j,2): if gPj(x̂ j,2) = 1 then x̂ j,2 ∈ S′ and stop; otherwise x̂ j,2 /∈ S′ and
output ⊥.
This process is repeated for all j ∈ [1,U ] until finally obtaining S = S′∩ S. If S
satisfies (M,ρ) and |S | ≥U such that for all j ∈ [1,U ], (x̂ j,1 ∈S ∨ x̂ j,2 ∈S ), then
proceed; otherwise output ⊥.
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We recall that I = {i}ρ(i)∈S ⊆ [1, l] and let {wi}i∈I be the set of constants in Zp




e(A3,H4(A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ))) ?= e(g1,D)









If the equations 6.4 do not hold, then output ⊥; otherwise, proceed as follows.
Compute T = e(A2,K)/∏i∈I(e(Bi,L) · e(Ci,Kρ(i)))wi and m ‖ β = H2(T )⊕A1. If
A3 = g
H1(m‖β )
1 , then output m; otherwise, output ⊥.
Correctness. We first check the correctness of the intersection set. Let S′ be the attribute
set from the algorithm Encrypt and S be the attribute set from the algorithm KeyGen. For
j ∈ [1,U ], for any pair (x̂ j,1, x̂ j,2) ∈ S′, if gPj(x̂ j,i) = 1, then Pj(x̂ j,i) = 0 which means that
x̂ j,i is a root of Pj and there is an attribute x j,i′ ∈ S such that x̂ j,i = x j,i′ , for i′ ∈ [1,2], and
so we conclude that x̂ j,i ∈ S. Reciprocally, if x̂ j,i ∈ S, then there is an attribute x j,i′ ∈ S
such that x̂ j,i = x j,i′ , for i′ ∈ [1,2], and Pj(x̂ j,i) = 0, and so we conclude that gPj(x̂ j,i) = 1.
We then check the validity of the value T . Let I = {i}ρ(i)∈S ⊆ [1, l] and {wi}i∈I be















Therefore, H2(T )⊕A1 = H2(e(gc,gα))⊕ (m ‖ β )⊕H2(e(gc,gα)) = m ‖ β .
6.2.5 Security Proofs
Selective IND-CCA Security Proof
We start this section by giving an overview of the formal security analysis presented be-
low. Note that this proof follows the one given in [145]. Let the challenge message be mµ
for a bit µ ∈R {0,1}, and the challenge ciphertext be C∗(M∗,ρ∗) = ((M∗,ρ∗),A∗1,A∗2,A∗3,(B∗1,
C∗1), · · · ,(B∗l∗,C∗l∗),D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)). Let A be an adversary that attacks
the above scheme, following the constraints defined in the security model. A tries to
guess the value of the bit µ by calling the ciphertext decryption oracle. To do so, A
will modify the challenge ciphertext C∗(M∗,ρ∗) and submit the resulting ciphertext to the






1), · · · , (B∗l∗,C∗l∗) are bound by the ele-
ment D∗, as well as the description of (M∗,ρ∗), modifying the ciphertext is noticeable
with non-negligible probability from the equations 6.4. Indeed, note that we can view D∗
as a signature on these components. In addition, observe that the integrity of A∗2 is bound
by A∗3. Hence, if the ciphertext is modified, then the equations 6.4 do not hold. Therefore,
A is not given any special advantage in guessing the bit µ .
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Theorem. Suppose that the s-DPBDHE assumption holds in (G1,GT ) and H1, H2, H3,
H4 and H5 are TCR hash functions, then the CP-DBE scheme is selectively IND-CCA
secure in the random oracle model.
Suppose there is an adversary A who can break the selective IND-CCA security of
the CP-DBE scheme. We then construct a challenger B that can decide whether Z is
either equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·c or to a random element in GT . The simulator B plays the
selective IND-CCA game with A as follows.
B takes as inputs (p,G1,GT ,e)← G (λ ), a generator g of G1, and a s-DPBDHE
instance




, · · · ,ga2s
∀ j ∈ [1,s], gc·b j ,ga/b j , · · · ,gas/b j ,gas+2/b j , · · · ,ga2s/b j
∀ j,k ∈ [1,s],k 6= j, ga·c·bk/b j , · · · ,gas·s·bk/b j
and Z which is either equal to e(g,g)a
s+1·c or to a random element in GT .
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to B, where
M∗ has l∗ rows and n∗ columns such that l∗,n∗ ≤ s.
Setup. The challenger chooses at random α ′,γ ∈R Zp, sets g1 = gγ and implicitly sets




(α = α ′+ as+1 cannot be
computed by B).
Then B chooses the five TCR hash functions H1,H2,H3,H4,H5 and the expo-
nents q1, · · · ,qU as in the real scheme. It sends the public parameters params =
(p,G1,GT ,e, g,g1,h = ga,e(g,g)α ,Q1 = gq1, · · · ,QU = gqU ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) to
A . We note that the public parameters are identical to those in the real scheme, for
the adversary’s view. At any time, A can adaptively query the random oracles H j,
for j ∈ [1,5], which are controlled by B. The challenger maintains the lists HListj for
j ∈ [1,5], which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the aforementioned
random oracles as follows:
• H1: on receipt of a H1 query on (m,β ), if there is a tuple (m,β ,c) ∈ LH1 ,
B forwards the predefined value c to A , where c ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H1(m,β ) = c, responds c to A and adds the tuple (m,β ,c) to LH1 , where
c ∈R Zp.
• H2: on receipt of a H2 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ LH2 , B
forwards the predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B
sets H2(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to LH2 , where
δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H3: on receipt of a H3 query on x ∈ U , if there is a tuple (x,zx,δ2,x) ∈ LH3 ,
B forwards the predefined value δ2,x to A , where zx ∈ Zp and δ2,x ∈ G1.
Otherwise, B constructs δ2,x as follows. Let X denote the set of indices i such
that ρ∗(i) = x where i ∈ [1, l∗]. Namely, X contains the indices of rows of
matrix M∗ that corresponds to the same attribute x. B chooses zx ∈R Zp and
sets
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If X = /0, B sets δ2,x = gzx . B responds δ2,x to A and adds the tuple (x,zx,δ2,x)
to LH3 .
• H4: on receipt of a H4 query on (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ)), if there
is a tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ),ξ1,δ3) ∈ LH4 , B forwards the
predefined value δ3 to A , where ξ1 ∈Zp and δ3 ∈G1. Otherwise, B sets δ3 =
gξ1 , responds δ3 to A and adds the tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ),
ξ1,δ3) in LH4 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
• H5: on receipt of a H5 query on δ ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ2) ∈ LH5 , B
forwards the predefined value ξ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ G1. Otherwise, B sets
H5(δ ) = ξ2 to A and adds the tuple (δ ,ξ2) to LH5 , where ξ2 ∈R G1.
In addition, B maintains the list Lsk which is initially empty as follows: Lsk records
the tuples (S,skS) which are the results of the queries to the private key oracle.
Query Phase 1. The challenger answers to A ’s queries as follows.
• Private Key Query < S >. We suppose that a private key skS for an attribute
set S is given to B, where S does not satisfy M∗ (if S satisfies M∗ then B
outputs a random bit µ in {0,1} and aborts the simulation).
First, the challenger chooses r ∈R Zp at random. Then, B finds a vector ~w =
(w1, · · · ,wn∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p such that w1 = −1 and for all i such that ρ∗(i) ∈ S, we
have that ~w ·M∗i = 0. By the definition of a LSSS, such a vector must exist.
We note that if such a vector did not exist, then the vector (1,0, · · · ,0) would
be in the span of S.
Second, B defines implicitly the exponent t as r + w1as + w2as−1 + · · ·+
wn∗as−n




)wi = gt . By definition of the ex-
ponent t, ht = gat contains a term of g−a
s+1
. This term will cancel out with the



























= gαLa = gαgat = gαht
Third, the simulator calculates Kx for all x ∈ S. There is x ∈ S for which there
is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, and so we compute Kx = Lzx . Therefore, we obtain
that Kx = Lzx = δ t2,x = H3(x)
t .
Nevertheless, it remains more difficult to compute the key components Kx for
attributes x ∈ S for which there is one i such that ρ∗(i) = x (note that x is used
in the access structure). We need to check that there is no term of the form
ga
s+1/bi that cannot be simulated; if we have M∗i ·~w = 0, then all of these terms
will cancel out.
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We define X as {i}ρ∗(i)=x. Thus, B creates Kx as follows:




















































































We recall that if S does not satisfy (M∗,ρ∗), then w ·M∗i = 0.















= g0 = 1.
In addition, the challenger chooses t̃ ∈R Zp, and computes Q̃ and Q̃1, · · · , Q̃U
as in the real scheme. Finally, B adds the tuple (S,skS) to Lsk and returns skS
to the adversary.
• Ciphertext Decryption Query < S,CT(M,ρ) >. The challenger checks whether
the equation 6.4 holds. If not, then either the ciphertext is invalid or S = S∩S′
does not satisfy (M,ρ), such that S′ is the attribute set from the algorithm
Encrypt, and B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B proceeds as follows.
– If (S,skS) ∈ Lsk for any S such that S = S∩ S′ satisfying (M,ρ), B re-
covers m as in the real scheme using skS.
– Otherwise, B verifies whether (m,β ,c)∈ LH1 and (R,δ1)∈ LH2 such that
A3 = gc1, A1 = (m ‖ β )⊕δ1 and R = e(g,g)αc. If no such tuple exists, the
challenger outputs ⊥; otherwise, it outputs m.
• Set Intersection Query < S,S′,C(M,ρ) >. The challenger parses the ciphertext
C(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0), · · · ,(gU,4,XU,4)).
– If S does not satisfy (M,ρ) then the B outputs ⊥. Note that S′ is the
attribute set used to define (M,ρ) in the algorithm Encrypt.
– Otherwise, B constructs S as in the real scheme. If S = S∩ S′ does
not satisfy (M,ρ), then the challenger outputs ⊥. If |S | ≥U , then the
challenger outputs S.
Challenge. The adversary gives two messages m0 and m1 of equal length to the chal-
lenger. B picks at random a bit µ ∈R {0,1}. For each row i of the matrix M∗, B
sets x∗ = ρ∗(i) and issues a H3 query on x∗ to obtain the tuple (x∗,zx∗,δ2,x∗).
Let us focus on the simulation of the values Bi since the terms that must be canceled
out are contained in them. Nevertheless, B can choose a secret c to be split in order
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to cancel out these terms. In other words, B chooses at random y′2, · · · ,y′n∗ and
shares the secret c using the vector ~v = (c,ca+ y′2, · · · ,can−1 + y′n∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p . More-
over, values r′1, · · · ,r′l are randomly chosen.
For i ∈ [1,n∗], let Ri be {k 6= i such that ρ∗(k) = ρ∗(i)}. Intuitively, Ri is the set of
all other row indices that have the same attribute as row index i. Then, we generate


























Then, B chooses β ∗ ∈R {0,1}λ and A∗1 ∈R {0,1}2λ and sets H2(Z · e(gc,gα
′
)) =
A∗1⊕ (mµ ‖ β ∗). It finally computes A∗2 = gc and A∗3 = (gc)γ .













1), · · · ,(B∗l∗,C∗l∗),(M∗,ρ∗),ξ ∗1 ,δ ∗3 ) , and sets D∗ = (gc)ξ
∗
1 .
Thereafter, the challenger computes the values g∗j,i as follows. From the attribute
set S∗ = {(x∗1,1,x∗1,2), · · · ,(x∗U,1,x∗U,2)}, it picks at random N∗j,0 and N∗j,1,N∗j,2 in Zp,
for j ∈ [1,U ]. Then, for j ∈ [1,U ], it computes the polynomials P∗j (x) = N∗j,0(x−
x∗j,1)(x− x∗j,2)(x−N∗j,1)(x−N∗j,2) = ∑4i=0 ν∗j,ixi. Finally, for j ∈ [1,U ] and i ∈ [0,4],
it computes g∗j,i = g
ν∗j,iQ j, issues an H5 query on δ ∗ = e(g
ν∗j,i,g) to obtain (δ ∗,ξ ∗2 )













1), · · · ,(B∗l∗,C∗l∗), D∗,(g∗1,0,X∗1,0), · · · ,(g∗U,4,X∗U,4)) and gives it to the adver-
sary.
Observe that if Z = e(g,g)a
s+1·c, then C∗(M∗,ρ∗) is a valid ciphertext. By letting
CHAPTER 6. ENSURING PRIVACY AND SAVING RESOURCES FOR STORED EHR171
H1(mµ ,β ∗) = c and ri = r′i + cbi, we can check:
A∗1 = A
∗
1⊕ (mµ ‖ β ∗)⊕ (mµ ‖ β ∗) = H2(Ze(gc,gα
′
))⊕ (mµ ‖ β ∗)
















































































































= gaδiH3(ρ∗(i))−ri = hδiH3(ρ∗(i))−ri
C∗i = g
r′i+cbi = gri
Nevertheless, if Z ∈R GT , then the challenge ciphertext is independent of the bit µ
for A ’s view.
Query Phase 2. Same as in the query phase 1, except that we consider the constraints
defined in Section 6.2.3.
Guess. The adversary will eventually output a guess µ ′ ∈ {0,1} for µ . If µ ′ = µ , the
challenger then outputs 0 to guess that Z = e(g,g)a
s+1c; otherwise, it outputs 1 to
indicate that it believes Z is a random group element in GT .
Analysis. The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except for H1 and H2. Let
H∗1 and H
∗
2 be the events that A has queried (mµ ,β
∗) to H1 (with probability of successful
query AdvTCRH∗1 ,A ) and R
∗ = e(g,g)αc to H2 (with probability of successful query AdvTCRH∗2 ,A )
before the challenge phase.
In the simulation of the private key oracle, the responses to A are perfect. In the sim-
ulation of the ciphertext decryption oracle, it might be possible that the challenger cannot
provide a decryption for a valid ciphertext. Suppose that the adversary can generate a valid
ciphertext without querying e(g,g)αc to H2 such that c =H1(m,β ). Let Valid be the event
that the ciphertext is valid, QueryH1 be the event that the adversary has queried (m,β )
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to H1 and QueryH2 be the event that the adversary has queried e(g,g)αc to H2. From
the simulation, we get that Pr[Valid | ¬QueryH2]≤ Pr[QueryH1 | QueryH2]+Pr[Valid |
QueryH1 ∧¬QueryH2] ≤ qH1/22λ + 1/p and Pr[Valid | ¬QueryH1] ≤ qH2/22λ + 1/p,
where qH1 and qH2 are the total numbers of queries to the random oracles H1 and H2 re-
spectively. Let Pr[DecErr] be the probability that the event Valid | (¬QueryH1∨¬QueryH2)
occurs, then we obtain that Pr[DecErr]≤ (qH1+qH2
22λ
+ 2p)qd , where qd is the total number
of queries to the ciphertext decryption oracle.
Let Bad denote the event that (H∗1 | ¬H∗2 )∨H∗2 ∨DecErr, then


























Selective Collusion Resistance Security Proof
As in Waters ABE scheme [237], one of the main challenges in designing our scheme is
to prevent its security against colluding user attacks.
The receiver owns a private key which is associated with an attribute set S. This
receiver can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the access structure associated with the
ciphertext is satisfied by his/her attributes. In order to avoid collusions in our construc-
tion, each key should be randomized with a freshly chosen exponent t in Zp. During the
decryption process, each share of the secret is multiplied by t in the exponent. This factor
should bind the components of one receiver’s key together, and so combining them with
another receiver’s key components is not possible. Thus, these randomized shares are
only useful for one given key.
In addition, other collusion attacks could occur when constructing the intersection
set of attributes S : several receivers could combine their sets in order to find enough
elements to determine S . For instance, we may imagine that some grandchildren try to
decrypt the message of their grandparent (instead of a relation child-parent). In order to
avoid such attacks, a receiver’s private key receives extra elements that are randomized
with another freshly chosen exponent t̃ in Zp. These elements will be useful to construct
S during the decryption process, since they should enable tone receiver to recover the
coefficients of the polynomials constructed from the sender’s attributes set and to test
whether the elements in the receiver’s attribute set are roots of these polynomials.
Theorem. Suppose that the BDH assumption holds in (G1,GT ) and H1, H2, H3, H4 and
H5 are TCR hash functions, then the CP-DBE scheme is selectively collusion resistant in
the random oracle model.
Suppose there is an adversary A who breaks the collusion resistance of the CP-DBE
scheme with advantage AdvS−CollResCP−DBE,A greater than ε . We then construct a challenger B
to output Z equal to e(g,g)abc. The challenger B plays the collusion resistance game with
A as follows.
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B takes as inputs (p,G1,GT ,e), a generator g of G1 and a BDH problem instance
(ga,gb,gc) for some unknown exponents a,b,c ∈ Zp. The goal of the challenger is to
output gab.
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge set S∗ to B.
Setup. The challenger sets h = ga and e(g,g)α = e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab. It also chooses at
random g1 ∈R G1.
Then B chooses the five TCR hash functions H1,H2,H3,H4,H5 and the expo-
nents q1, · · · ,qU as in the real scheme. It sends the public parameters params =
(p,G1,GT ,e, g,g1,h = ga,e(g,g)α ,Q1 = gq1, · · · ,QU = gqU ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) to
A . We note that the public parameters are identical to those in the real scheme, for
the adversary’s view. At any time, A can adaptively query the random oracles H j
for j ∈ [1,5], which are controlled by B. The challenger maintains the lists HListj for
j ∈ [1,5], which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the aforementioned
random oracles as follows:
• H1: on receipt of a H1 query on (m,β ), if there is a tuple (m,β ,c) ∈ LH1 ,
B forwards the predefined value c to A , where c ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets
H1(m,β ) = c, responds c to A and adds the tuple (m,β ,c) to LH1 , where
c ∈R Zp.
• H2: on receipt of a H2 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ LH2 , B
forwards the predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B
sets H2(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to LH2 , where
δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H3: on receipt of a H3 query on x ∈ U , if there is a tuple (x,zx,δ2,x) ∈ LH3 ,
B forwards the predefined value δ2,x to A , where zx ∈ Zp and δ2,x ∈ G1.
Otherwise, B constructs δ2,x as follows. B sets δ2,x = gzx , responds δ2,x to A
and adds the tuple (x,zx,δ2,x) to LH3 .
• H4: on receipt of a H4 query on (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ)), if there
is a tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ),ξ1,δ3) ∈ LH4 , B forwards the
predefined value δ3 to A , where ξ1 ∈Zp and δ3 ∈G1. Otherwise, B sets δ3 =
gξ1 , responds δ3 to A and adds the tuple (A1,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),(M,ρ),
ξ1,δ3) in LH4 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
• H5: on receipt of a H5 query on δ ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ2) ∈ LH5 , B
forwards the predefined value ξ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ G1. Otherwise, B sets
H5(δ ) = ξ2 to A and adds the tuple (δ ,ξ2) to LH5 , where ξ2 ∈R G1.
In addition, B maintains the list Lsk which is initially empty as follows: Lsk records
the tuples (S,skS) which are the results of the queries to the private key oracle.
Query Phase. The challenger answers to A ’s queries as follows.
1. Private Key Query < S >. Let S be an attribute set such that S 6= S∗. We
suppose there is an attribute y such that either (y ∈ S∧ y /∈ S∗) or (y /∈ S∧ y ∈
S∗). Without loss of generality, we assume that (y /∈ S∧ y ∈ S∗). Then, B
picks at random {t ′x}x∈S, t̃ in Zp and implicitly sets the elements {tx}x∈S, t as
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follows:
tx = t ′x, for x ∈ S, x 6= y






Therefore, the components of the private key skS can be computed as follows:
K = gαht = gabga(−b+∑x∈S t
′
x) = g∑x∈S t
′
x
L = gt = g−b+∑x∈S t
′
x




Q̃ j = g−q jht̃ = g−q jgat̃ , for j ∈ [1,U ]
such that Kx = Lzx = δ t2,x = H3(x)
t .
2. Set Intersection Query < S,S′,C(M,ρ) >. The challenger parses the ciphertext
C(M,ρ) as ((M,ρ),A1,A2,A3,(B1,C1), · · · ,(Bl,Cl),D,(g1,0,X1,0), · · · ,(gU,4,XU,4)).
• If S does not satisfy (M,ρ) then the B outputs ⊥. Note that S′ is the
attribute set used to define (M,ρ) in the algorithm Encrypt.
• Otherwise, B constructs S as in the real scheme. If S = S∩ S′ does
not satisfy (M,ρ), then the challenger outputs ⊥. If |S | ≥U , then the
challenger outputs S.
Output. The challenge private key sk∗S∗ = (K
∗,L∗,{K∗x }x∈S∗, Q̃∗, Q̃∗1, · · · , Q̃∗U) for the at-
















= e(g,g)c·α = e(g,g)abc
and solves the BDH problem.
Analysis. In the simulation of the private key oracle, the responses to A are perfect.
The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except for H3. Let H∗3 be the event that







In the above construction, we observe that the size of the parameters is linear in the value
U . We recall that U is made public and assumed to be large enough to support DNA
properties that our scheme requires. Indeed, the minisatellites are found in more than
1,000 locations in the human genome. In the following table, we give details about the
parameter sizes:
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Parameters Components in G1 Maximum size (U = 1,000)
params U +2 1,000
skS 3U +2 3,000
C(M,ρ) 8U + l +3 9,000
where l is the number of rows in the matrix M. We suppose that l = O(U). We only count
the number of elements in G1 since considering the other ones is not relevant. Indeed, we
just find one element in GT in params and one element in {0,1}2λ in C(M,ρ). For instance,
for an elliptic curve of 220-bit length, our scheme is of almost 3,000,00-bit length. Thus,
the size of our construction is less than 400 kilobytes, meaning that its implementation
seems realistic and practical.
In Table 6.2, we evaluate the efficiency of our CP-DBE symmetric pairing-based scheme.
We use results of cryptographic operation implementations (group exponentiation of a
random group element with a random exponent and pairing operations on random group
elements) using the MIRACL framework [203, 196] for a 128-bit security level. All the
following experiments are based on a dual core IntelR XeonR CPU W3503@2.40GHz
with 2.0GB RAM running Ubuntu R10.04. The elliptic curve utilised for all the bench-
marks was the super-singular symmetric curve y2 = x3+1 mod p with embedding degree
2 for suitable primes p.
We do not take into account multiplication/division in G1 and GT as well as expo-
nentiation in GT as these operations have timings negligible compared to the ones for
exponentiation in G1 and pairing operation.






Table 6.2: Timings for our CP-DBE symmetric pairing-based system. Times are in
milliseconds. We assume U = 1000.
We note that the total time in the algorithms Setup and KeyGen is substantial, but we
recall that these algorithms should be run only once to generate the public parameters and
the static private keys for all the users. Finally, in the algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt, it
takes 947,514.2 milliseconds and 1,616,047.2 milliseconds respectively, mainly due to
the cost of pairing computations and to the number l of rows in the matrix M that can be
up to U . In particular, the time for the execution of the algorithm Decrypt derives from
the verification process.
Since we gave a consequent value for U , it results that the protocol takes a significant
time to be executed. For the performance section, we decided to give the approximate
value of U = 1000 from the fact that the minisatellites are found in more than 1,000
locations in the human genome. Nevertheless, since our scheme is proven secure for any
value U , one can decide to choose a smaller integer and thus obtain a faster protocol
execution.
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6.2.7 Conclusion
We introduced a solution to encrypt documents using the DNA sequences of an indi-
vidual and to decrypt them using the DNA sequences of another individual. Focusing
on the principle of the DNA parentage test, we provided the primitive ciphertext-policy
DNA-based encryption (CP-DBE). Based on Waters ABE scheme [237], we extended it
by adding one extra feature to allow the decryption of the ciphertext, that the set of in-
tersection operation. We proved that the CP-DBE construction is selectively IND-CCA
secure and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model.
Chapter 7
Managing Electronic Health Records in
Cloud Computing
Nowadays, Electronic health records (EHRs) are mostly stored on cloud servers. Given
the EHR of a patient, the documents may be often changed by adding, deleting and/or
modifying the contents. Thus, we must find a solution that allows each user accessing the
EHR to easily and efficiently change the EHR. To make the process easier for both the
patient and the cloud server, we propose to let the EHR be stored in plain instead of under
their encrypted form. However, this brings critical security and privacy issues. Therefore,
we have to ensure that the cloud server honestly acts by verifying the stored data integrity,
as well as that the party who audits the cloud server learns nothing on the contents of the
stored EHR.
A simple solution lets a clinician following a patient download each necessary time
the entire contents that have to be added, deleted or modified, and then upload the up-
dated contents on the server. Observe that such solution is cumbersome since we require
the clinician to have enough resources on his/her side to be able to proceed (regarding the
storage and computational resources for instance). The primitive that we suggest avoids
the aforementioned situation by permitting the clinician to change some medical doc-
uments without downloading them. More precisely, the medical documents will be up-
loaded only once, and then each authorised user will add, delete and/or modify documents
without retrieving them by actually requesting the cloud server to do so. As mentioned
above, the cloud server will be audited periodically to ensure that it correctly stores and
updates the stored EHR.
7.1 Dynamic Provable Data Possession with Public Veri-
fiability and Data Privacy
The ability to check the integrity of the data is one of the most essential difficulty in
storing data on an untrusted server. A data integrity verification ensures that the server
will always keep the data intact. There exist various systems to prevent this issue, such
as peer-to-peer storage systems, network file systems, long-term archives, web-service
object stores and database systems. More precisley, these storage auditing systems enable
a user (seen as a client from the server’s point of view) to check that his/her stored data
on an untrusted server are available and ready to collect, and so reassure the client.
The client, that is the data owner, requires to be sure that the server really possesses
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the claimed stored data. Numerous proof-of-storage solutions have been proposed, such
as proofs of retrievability (POR) [127, 205] and provable data possessions (PDP) [12, 13].
In particular, a POR system allows a client to verify the integrity of his/her data stored
on an untrusted server (using spot checking), to correct the possible errors (using error-
correcting code) and to retrieve the entire document; while a PDP system enables the
client to check that a server has stored his/her data without retrieving them from the
server and without letting the server to access the entire data document. Both systems
should satisfy the main property of efficiency in terms of computational and communi-
cation complexities and the storage overhead on the server’s side should be as small as
possible. The properties of unbounded uses on the number of proof-of-storage interac-
tions and statelessness of the client are required to obtain systems with public verifiability,
in which anyone can verify the integrity of the stored data [230, 112].
More recently, an idea emerged as delegating the data integrity check to a third party
auditor (TPA) [225, 224]. More precisely, the client retains his/her data on an untrusted
server and asks a TPA to verify the authenticity of the stored data. This concept is named
public verifiability.
At the same time, another idea arised as dynamically updating the stored data [77,
232, 252]. In other words, the client is able to insert, delete and modify his/her stored
data blocks and the server should then update these blocks on its side.
Observe that a storage service is susceptible to attacks or failures and leads to possi-
ble non-retrievable losses of the client’s stored data. These attacks and failures are due to
the fact that the storage system is vulnerable to internal and external attacks that harm the
data integrity even being more powerful and reliable than the client’s personal computing
devices. A solution is to construct a system that offers an efficient, frequent and secure
data integrity check process to the client. Nevertheless, the frequency of data integrity
verification and the percentage of checked data are often limited because of the compu-
tational and communication costs on both server’s and client’s sides, although these two
properties are really essential for storage service.
We consider the following scenario. A medical institute provides cloud servers to
all the citizens, as a storage for their EHRs, as well as a TPA to check that the servers
correctly stores these EHRs.
A patient, Bob, has his EHR stored on a cloud server. His EHR were first uploaded by
a medical institute (for instance, belonging to the government). Bob is able to manage his
EHR by adding, removing and deleting medical documents. For instance, Bob can add
some medical test results when they are performed overseas and no automatic medical
document transfer exists between Bob’s country and the visited country.
Moreover, the practionners following Bob can also manage his medical documents.
For instance, we consider that case that Bob comes to the medical office for a checkup,
and meets his GP Greg. The latter has the ability to read and write Bob’s records. In more
details, we let Greg be able to create a new chekup report and add i to Bob’s stored EHR,
to delete or to modify an existing stored record.
7.1.1 Contributions
In this section, we provide a dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) system with pub-
lic verifiability and data privacy. There are three entities in the system: a client who is the
owner of the data to be stored, an untrusted server that stores the data (e.g. a cloud), and
CHAPTER 7. MANAGING EHR IN CLOUD COMPUTING 179
Figure 7.1: Dynamic Provable Data Possession with Public Verifiability and Data Privacy.
A patient, Bob, has uploaded his EHR in plain on a cloud server (this task can be done by a
medical institute chosen by the government and applied to all the citizens). A TPA is selected by
the medical institute to regularly check that the server correctly stores Bob’s medical data at all
time.
a semi-honest TPA who can be required when the client wants to check the integrity of
his/her data stored on the server.
The client gets a large amount of data that s/he wants to store on the server with-
out retaining a local copy. The server gets an important storage space and computation
resources, and supplies services for the client. The system is public verifiable, meaning
that anyone is enabled to check the integrity of the data, not only the TPA on behalf of
the client or the client itself. Indeed, we stress that the client may be able to perform
integrity checking by itself. However, the TPA can be requested to judge whether the data
integrity is maintained by checking the proof of data possession provided by the server.
For instance, in case of conflict between the client and the server or of the client’s limited
resources. Since this often happens in practice, we only consider the case of the TPA
acting on behalf of the client.
The system is also data dynamic at the data block level supporting three operations:
insertion, deletion and modification. Finally, the system is secure at the untrusted server,
meaning that a server cannot successfully generate a correct proof of data possession
without storing all the data blocks, and data private, meaning that the TPA learns nothing
about the data of the client from all available information.
The main contribution is the practicality of our scheme. The first refinement is a better
efficiency due the use of asymmetric pairings. The second amelioration is a decrease of




Figure 7.2: Dynamic Provable Data Possession with Public Verifiability and Data Privacy.
The patient Bob has the possibility to insert new documents, and delete and modify existing
documents. To do so, he sends a request to the cloud server with the necessary information to let
the latter proceed. Bob asks for a help to the TPA to check that the server has correctly updated
his data.
the number of group exponentiation and pairing computations. In particular, the TPA
needs to compute no exponentiation and only three pairings in order to verify the proof
of data possession generated by the server. This implies that the latter can be requested
by the client through the TPA to create the proof on any percentage of the stored data,
without any computational constraints. The result of these improvements is clear in terms
of performance evaluation.
7.1.2 Protocol Definition
We recall the definition of the primitive given in Section 3.1.7.
Let m be a data document to be stored. First, m is divided into n blocks mi and then
each block mi is divided into s sectors mi, j. We assume that all the blocks and sectors are
elements in Zp, where p is a large prime. For instance, p should be λ -bit long, where λ
is the security parameter such that n >> λ .
To illustrate, we refer to an example given in [205]. We suppose that m is a b-bit doc-
ument. Thus, m is split into n blocks such that n = db/s · log(p)e. Morever, each block is
composed of s sectors, where 1 ≤ s. The tradeoff between the storage overhead and the
communtication overhead is a follows: the communication complexity increases by s+1
elements of Zp. Thus, a larger value of s yields less storage overhead at cost of a high
communication.
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A dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) scheme with public verifiability and
data privacy is composed of the following six algorithms:
• KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk). This algorithm is run by the client to setup the scheme. On
input the security parameter λ , output a pair of public and private keys (pk,sk).
• TagGen(pk,sk,mi)→ Tmi . This algorithm is run by the client to generate the veri-
fication metadata. On inputs the public key pk, the private key sk and a data block
mi (for i ∈ [1,n] before data operations, and for i ∈ (0,n+1)∩Q after data opera-
tions, where mi are the data blocks that form the document m), output a verification
metadata Tmi . Then, the client sets all the data blocks mi in an ordered collection F
and all the corresponding verification metadata Tmi in an ordered collection E. S/he
sends the collections F and E to the server and removes them from his/her local
storage.
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o = (operation, l,ml,Tml))→ (F′,E′,ν ′). This algorithm is run
by the server in response to a data operation requested by the client. On inputs the
public key pk, the previous collection F of all the data blocks, the previous collec-
tion E of all the corresponding verification metadata, the type of the data operation
to be performed (insertion, deletion or modification at block level), the index l de-
noting the rank where the data operation is performed (in the ordered collections F
and E such that l = i1+i22 for insertion and l = i for deletion and modification), the
data block ml to be inserted, deleted or modified (ml = m i1+i2
2
for insertion, ml is not
required for deletion and ml = m′i for modification), and the corresponding verifica-
tion metadata Tl to be inserted, deleted or modified (Tml = Tm i1+i2
2
for insertion, Tml
is not required for deletion and Tml = Tm′i for modification), for l ∈ (0,n+ 1)∩Q.
We give more precisions for several operation options:
– insertion: m i1+i2
2
is inserted between the two consecutive blocks mi1 and mi2
and Tm i1+i2
2
is inserted between the two consecutive verification metadata Tmi1
and Tmi2 . For i1 = 0 (i.e. we append a block at the beginning of the document),
m i2
2
is appended before mi2 and Tm i2
2
is appended before Tmi2 . For i2 = n+ 1
(i.e. we append a block at the end of the document), m i1+n+1
2
is appended after
mi1 and Tm i1+n+1
2
is appended after Tmi1 .
We assume that the data block m i1+i2
2
and the corresponding verification meta-
data Tm i1+i2
2
were provided by the client to the server, such that Tm i1+i2
2
was
correctly computed by running the algorithm TagGen.
– deletion: mi is deleted, meaning that mi1 is followed by mi2 and Tmi is deleted,
meaning that Tmi1 is followed by Tmi2 , for three consecutive blocks mi1 , mi and
mi2 . For i1 = 0 (i.e. we remove a block at the beginning of the document), mi
is removed, and so the document now begins with mi2 , and Tmi is removed, and
so the collection of verification metadata now begins with Tmi2 . For i− 2 =
n+1 (i.e. we remove a block at the end of the document), mi is removed, and
so the document now ends with mi1 , and Tmi is removed, and so the collection
of verification metadata now ends with Tmi1 .
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– modification: m′i replaces mi and Tm′i replaces Tmi . We assume that the data
block m′i and the corresponding verification metadata Tm′i were provided by
the client to the server, such that Tm′i was correctly computed by running the
algorithm TagGen.
Note that the set of block indices is [1,n] when the document is uploaded for the
first time, and the is included in (0,n+1)∩Q after insertions.
Finally, output the updated data block collection F′ containing ml for insertion and
modification and not containing it for deletion, the updated verification metadata
collection E′ containing Tml for insertion and modification and not containing it for
deletion and an updating proof ν ′.
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ true/ f alse. This algorithm is run by the TPA on behalf of the
client to validate the updating proof. On inputs the public key pk and the updating
proof ν ′ sent by the server, output true if ν ′ is a correct updating proof; output f alse
otherwise. We suppose that the resulting answer may be then sent to the client.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν . This algorithm is run by the server in order to gen-
erate a proof of data possession. On input the public key pk, an ordered collection
F ⊂ F of blocks, a challenge chal and an ordered collection Σ ⊂ E which are the
verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in F , output a proof of data pos-
session ν for the data blocks in F that are determined by the challenge chal.
We assume that a first challenge chalC may be generated by the client and forwarded
to the TPA. Then, the TPA will generate a challenge chal from chalC and will send
it to the server. In particular, if the client wants to check the integrity of his/her data
without the help of the TPA, then chalC = chal. We omit the process done by the
client at this point.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ true/ f alse. This algorithm is run by the TPA in order
to validate the proof of data possession. On inputs the public key pk, the challenge
chal and the proof of data possession ν , output true if ν is a correct proof of data
possession for the blocks determined by chal; output f alse otherwise. We suppose
that the resulting answer may be then sent to the client.
Correctness. We require that a dynamic provable data possession scheme with public
verifiability and data privacy is correct if for any λ ∈ N, (pk,sk)← KeyGen(λ ), Tmi ←
TagGen(pk,sk,mi) (for i ∈ [1,n] before data operations, and for i ∈ (0,n+ 1)∩Q after
data operations, where mi are the data blocks that form the document m), and
• if (F′,E′,ν ′)← PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o), we have that CheckOp(pk,sk,ν ′) = true;
• if ν ← GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ), we have that CheckProof(pk,sk,chal,ν) = true.
Remarks.
• PDP versus POR: When examining data storage practicality concerns, POR sys-
tems can be seen as the “right” choice. Indeed, a POR system supplies successful
audit guarantees that all the data can be extracted from the server. However, it
requires erasure codes that are a cost for both storage and communication.
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One solution is to consider PDP systems that can be seen as “weaker” than the
aforementioned one. Indeed, we only want to guarantee that a certain percentage
(e.g. 90%) of data blocks are available, not all of them. Using this model, the
overhead from erasure code applications is avoided.
Suppose that 10% of a client’s data has just been lost. The data integrity verification
can still pass as 90% of the data are still available. But the probability that the
available 90% are chosen to run the audit process is really low. Thus, a client has
more chances to learn about the 10% loss and that the data integrity verification
fails. Moreover, to ensure a positive result, the audit process can be performed an
unlimited number of times.
• About the proof of data possession: The set of stored data blocks (following a
certain percentage of blocks, e.g. 90%) that are checked are chosen by the TPA on
behalf of the client. The server has to generate a proof of data possession based on
this set. We notice that sometimes in the literature [112, 245], the TPA just sends
a challenge chal without specifying which blocks have to be checked, which leads
to the fact that the server must generate a proof of data possession based on all the
stored data blocks, at the cost of the communication overhead.
• About the data operations: We assume that the frequency of checking the integrity
of the stored data is much higher than the frequency of performing data operations.
To generate an updating proof, no challenge is required, meaning that the updating
proof is only based on the recently updated data block and the corresponding ver-
ification metadata. Therefore, one can think that this proof is not strong enough;
however we suppose that the TPA on behalf of the client regularly asks to the server
to check the integrity of the data by generating a challenge that can include the
recently updated data blocks.
Moreover, when the server is generating the updating proof ν ′, it can include an
element in f o′ ∈ {insertion,deletion,modification} in this proof to enable the TPA
to know which operation was performed. A solution to check that the server has
correctly updated the collection F′ of the data blocks and the collection E′ of the
verification metadata after a given operation is to order the data into a Merkle hash
tree (MHT) [230] or rank-based authenticated skip lists [77].
Similarly to [77], we have to include the entity TPA in the process to let it act
on behalf of the client. Therefore, in the algorithm CheckOp, the private key sk
cannot be taken as input in order to allow the TPA proceed. In addition, since we
assume that the client does not store neither the data blocks nor the corresponding
verification metadata on his/her local storage and so does not the TPA, the ordered
collections F and E cannot be outputs of the algorithm PerfOp. Laslty, the algorithm
TagGen can be seen as a preparation of the data operation to be performed, meaning
that extra output could be the element in f o to be sent to the server.
7.1.3 Security Models
Model for the Security against the Server
The definition of the security game given below follows the ones found in [12] and [77].
We consider a DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,
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TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof). Let a data possession game between
a challenger B and an adversary A be as follows.
Setup. B runs the algorithm KeyGen on input the security parameter λ to obtain (pk,sk).
The element pk is given to A while the element sk is kept secret.
Adaptive Queries. A makes adaptive queries by calling two oracles, namely a verifi-
cation metadata generation oracle OT G and a data operation performance oracle
ODOP.
First, A is given access to a verification metadata generation oracle OT G as follows.
A chooses several blocks mi and gives them to B, for i ∈ [1,n]. B generates the
corresponding verification metadata Tmi←TagGen(pk,sk,mi) and forwards them to
A . Then, A creates an ordered collection F = {m1, · · · ,mn} of data blocks along
with an ordered collection E = {Tm1, · · · ,Tmn} of the corresponding verification
metadata.
Thereafter, A is given access to a data operation performance oracle ODOP as fol-
lows. A gives to B a block mi, for i ∈ [1,n], and the corresponding value in f oi
about the data operation that A wants to perform. A also submits a new ordered
collection F′ of data blocks, a new ordered collection E′ of verification metadata,
and the corresponding updating proof ν ′. B verifies the value ν ′ by running the al-
gorithm CheckOp(pk,ν ′) and replies by giving back to A the resulting answer that
is either true or f alse. If the answer is f alse, then B aborts; otherwise, it proceeds.
The above interaction between A and B can be repeated.
Challenge. A chooses some data blocks m∗i along with the corresponding values in f o∗i ,
for i ∈I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q. Adaptive queries can be again made by A , such that the
first value in f o∗i specifies a full re-write update (this corresponds to the first time
that the client sends a document to the server). B still checks the data operations.
The final version of the blocks m∗i for i ∈ I is considered such that these blocks
were created according to the data operations requested by A , and verified and
accepted by B beforehand. B sets F = {m∗i }i∈I of these data blocks and E =
{Tm∗i }i∈I of the corresponding verification metadata. It then chooses an integer
k ≤ |I | and sets an ordered collection F = {mi∗1, · · · ,mi∗k} ⊂ F and the ordered
collection Σ = {Tmi∗1 , · · · ,Tmi∗k } ⊂ E of the corresponding verification metadata, for
i j ∈I and j ∈ [1,k]. It computes a resulting challenge chal for F and Σ and sends
it to A .
Forgery. A computes a proof of data possession ν on chal. Then, B runs CheckProof(pk,
chal,ν) and replies by giving back the answer to A that is either true or f alse. If
the answer is true then A wins.
The DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,TagGen,
PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof) is secure against the server if for all probabilis-
tic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A that wins the above game, there exists another
polynomial-time algorithm E , denoted as a knowledge extractor, that is capable of ex-
tracting the data blocks. The rationale of the model is that for any adversary that can win
the data possession game, it can employ E to compute the data blocks in polynomial time.
In other words, any algorithm that can answer the challenge must be in possession of the
underlying data blocks stored in one form or another.
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Note that the above security model follows the definition of the extractor in proofs of
knowledge. The goal is to extract at least the challenged parts of a document m from the
adversary’s approving responses.
Model for the Data Privacy against the TPA
We present two security models to prove data privacy against the TPA in our protocol.
The first model is the weakest one; however, this is still clever enough to ensure security.
We follow the weak security model to prove that the basic DPDP construction DPDP and
the index hash table (IHT)-based DPDP construction are data private.
The second model is the strongest one, based on indistinguishability. We use this
strong security model to prove that the Merkle hash tree (MHT)-based DPDP construction
is data private.
Note that the IHT-based and the MHT-based DPDP systems are presented in Sections
7.3 and 7.4. Both systems follow the DPDP protocol definition as well as the security
models here.
Weak Security Model. Despite the fact that this model is not based on the indistin-
guishability property, it closely follows the adversarial reality. Indeed, we can wish that
even if the TPA is able to distinguish two documents, it still does not learn anything about
the contents of these documents. Moreover, it may have to check the same blocks several
times during different challenge-response audits. For instance, even if the TPA notices
that it has verified the same block during two consecutive challenge-response audits, it
only knows that this block appeared twice, however it does not know more information
about it. We recall that the task of the TPA is to check that the server correctly performs
the data operations at block level and stores the whole data. Therefore, for a given opera-
tion, the TPA is aware of which block is considered and so, it may be able to differentiate
it with another one given another operation. Yet again, it does not have access to more
details about contents of these two blocks.
In addition, note that such security model is found in the literature [230, 227] to
show that public auditing systems preserve data privacy. The requirement is to introduce
a TPA that checks that the server correclty stores the data of a user, without bringing
new vulnerabilities toward the data privacy. To prove that the schemes are data private,
the authors in [230, 227] revealed the existence of a challenger that can produce a valid
proof of data possession without the knowledge of the challenged blocks, by using a
backpatching technique in the random oracle model as in [205].
Thus, we argue that a security model based on one-wayness is sufficient for most of
the cases In the case of one-wayness, an adversary can not obtain the whole data con-
tained in a given verification metadata by assuming that the public parameters are at its
disposal.
We consider a DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP =
(KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof). Let a weak data privacy game
between a challenger B and an adversary A be as follows.
Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm KeyGen to generate the pair of public and pri-
vate keys (pk,sk) and gives pk to the adversary. The element sk is kept secret.
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Queries. A is allowed to make verification metadata generation queries as follows. The
adversary sends a file m = (m1, · · · ,mn) to B. The latter computes the correspond-
ing verification metadata Tm = (Tm1, · · · ,Tmn) and gives it back to A . Then, two
ordered collectections F = {m1, · · · ,mn} of file blocks and E = {Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn} of
the corresponding verification metadata are created.
Challenge. A sumits a challenge chal containing k ≤ n indices, along with the k corre-
sponding file blocks in F and their k verification metadata in Σ.
Generation of the Proof. The challenger computes a proof of data possession ν∗ ←
GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ) such that the blocks in F are determined by the challenge
chal and Σ contains the corresponding verification metadata.
A succeeds in the weak data privacy game if F *F and Σ *E, and CheckProof(pk,chal,
ν∗)→ true. The advantage of the adversary A in winning the weak data privacy game is
defined as AdvWPDPDP,A (λ ) = Pr[A succeeds].
The DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,
TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof) is weakly data private if there is no
PPT adversary A who can win the above weak data privacy game with non-negligible
advantage AdvWPDPDP,A (λ ). Informally, this means that there is no adversary A who can
recover the document from a given verification metadata tuple with non-negligible prob-
ability.
Strong Security Model. The definition of the security game described below follows
the one proposed by Fan et al. [80]. They defined data privacy using an indistinguisha-
bility game between a challenger B (palying the role of the server) and an adversary A
(playing the role of the TPA). A similar definition for data privacy has been presented in
[245] as an enhancement of the model given in [112].
We consider a DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP =
(KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof). Let a strong data privacy
game between a challenger B and an adversary A be as follows.
Setup. B runs the algorithm KeyGen on input the security parameter λ to obtain (pk,sk).
The element pk is given to A while the element sk is kept secret.
Queries. A is allowed to make verification metadata generation queries as follows. The
adversary sends a file m = (m1, · · · ,mn) to B. The latter computes the correspond-
ing verification metadata Tm = (Tm1, · · · ,Tmn) and gives it back to A . Then, two
ordered collectections F = {m1, · · · ,mn} of file blocks and E = {Tm1, · · · ,Tmn} of
the corresponding verification metadata are created.
Challenge. A submits two different documents m0 and m1 of equal length, such that they
have not be chosen in the query phase, and sends them to B. The latter generates
Tm0 and Tm1 by running the algorithm TagGen. Then, B randomly chooses a bit
µR ∈ {0,1} and forwards Tmµ to A . Then, A sets a challenge chal and sends it to
B. The latter generates a proof of data possession ν∗ based on mµ , Tmµ and chal,
and replies to A by giving ν∗.
Guess. A chooses a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} and wins the game if µ ′ = µ .
CHAPTER 7. MANAGING EHR IN CLOUD COMPUTING 187
The advantage of the adversary A in winning the above strong data privacy game is
defined as AdvSPDPDP,A (λ ) = |Pr[µ ′ = µ]− 12 |. A proof of data possession ν∗ has indis-
tinguishability if for any PPT adversary A , AdvSPDPDP,A (λ ) is a negligible function in the
security parameter λ .
The DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,
TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof) is strongly data private if there is no
PPT adversary A who can win the above data privacy game with non-negligible advan-
tage AdvSPDPDP,A (λ ).
7.1.4 Construction
We now give the constrution of the basic DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data
privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof).
The document to be stored is split into n blocks, and each block is split into s sectors.
We let each block and sector be elements of Zp for some large prime p. For instance, let
the document be b bits long. Then, the document is split into n = db/s · log(p)e blocks.
The aforementioned intuition comes from [205]. Therefore, a tradeoff exists between
the storage overhead and the communtication overhead. More precisely, the communi-
cation complexity rises as s+ 1 elements of Zp. Finally, a larger value of s yields less
storage overhead at cost of a high communication. Observe that the size of the verifica-
tion metadata should be much smaller than the size of the data documents: in our case,
|Tm| = |m| = O(p). Moreover, p should be λ bits long, where λ is the security param-
eter such that n >> λ . The curve to be chosen should be such that the discrete log is
2λ -secure.
• KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk). Let G (λ ) be an algorithm that, on input the security pa-
rameter λ , generates the cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of prime order p along
with a bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT . Let g1 and g2 be two generators of G1
and G2 respectively. Then, the client randomly chooses s elements h1, · · · ,hs ∈R
G1. Moreover, s/he selects at random α ∈R Zp and sets his/her public key pk =
(p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2, h1, · · · ,hs,gα2 ) and his/her private key sk = α .
• TagGen(pk,sk,m)→ Tm. A document m is split into n blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n].
Each block mi is then split into s sectors mi, j ∈ Zp, for j ∈ [1,s]. We suppose
that |m|= b and n = db/s · log(p)e. Therefore, the document m can be seen a n× s






−sk = (∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−α = (∏sj=1 h
−α·mi, j
j ) for i ∈ [1,n]. Then, it sets
Tm = (Tm1, · · · ,Tmn) ∈Gn1.
Moreover, the client stores all the data blocks mi in an ordered collection F and
the corresponding verification metadata Tmi in an ordered collection E. It forwards
these two collections to the server and deletes them from his/her local storage.




))→ (F′,E′,ν ′). After re-




from the client, such that mi1 and mi2
are two consecutive data blocks, the server prepares the updating proof as follows. It
first selects at random u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,Us = h
us
s . It also
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chooses at random w i1+i2
2




+u j ∈Zp and C j = hc jj ,





. Finally, it returns ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d) ∈
G2s+11 to the TPA.
To append data blocks at the beginning or at the end of the document, the client
sends the tuple (insertion, i,mi,Tmi) to the server, for i ∈ (Q∩ (0,1])∪ (Q∩ [n,n+
1)). The latter then selects at random u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,
Us = h
us
s . It also chooses at random wi ∈R Zp and sets c j =mi, j ·wi+u j and C j = hc jj ,
for j ∈ [1,s], and d = T wimi . Finally, it returns ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d) to the
TPA.
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o= (deletion, i))→ (F′,E′,ν ′). After receiving an index i from
the client, the server prepares the updating proof as follows. It first selects at random
u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,Us = h
us
s . It also chooses at random
wi ∈R Zp and sets c j = mi, j ·wi +u j ∈ Zp and C j = hc jj , for j ∈ [1,s], and d = T wimi ,
where mi and Tmi are the existing data block and verification metadata to be deleted
respectively. Finally, it returns ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs, d) ∈G2s+11 to the TPA.
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o = (modification, i, m′i,Tm′i))→ (F
′,E′,ν ′). After receiving
the elements i, m′i and Tm′i from the client, the server prepares the updating proof as
follows. It first selects at random u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,Us =
huss . It also chooses at random wi ∈R Zp and sets c j =m′i, j ·wi+u j ∈Zp and C j = h
c j
j ,
for j ∈ [1,s], and d = T wim′i . Finally, it returns ν
′= (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d)∈G2s+11
to the TPA.
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the following equa-
tion holds:











If the equation 7.1 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν . After possibly receiving a challenge chalC from the
client, the TPA prepares a challenge chal to send to the server as follows. First, it
chooses a subset I ⊆ (0,n+ 1)∩Q, randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and
sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . Second, after receiving the challenge chal which indicates
the specific blocks for which the client, through the TPA, wants a proof of data
possession, the server sets the ordered collection F = {mi}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks and
an ordered collection Σ = {Tmi}i∈I ⊂ E which are the verification metadata corre-
sponding to the blocks in F . It then selects at random r1, · · · ,rs ∈R Zp and computes
R1 = h
r1
1 , · · · ,Rs = h
rs
s . It also sets b j =∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j ·vi+r j ∈Zp and B j = h
b j
j , for
j ∈ [1,s], and c = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi . Finally, it returns ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) ∈
G2s+11 to the TPA.
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• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the follow-
ing equation holds:











If the equation 7.2 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
Correctness. If all the algorithms are correctly generated, then the above scheme is
correct. For the updating proof, we have:




U j,g2) = e(T wimi ,g
α








































For the proof of data possession, we have:































































Proof for the Security against the Server
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the security of the
basic DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP= (KeyGen,TagGen,
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PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof). Then, there is a challenger B that solves the
DHI and DL problems in G and G1 respectively with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that interacts
with the adversary A to break the DHI and DL problems in G and G1 as follows.
Setup. B runs GroupGen(λ )→ (p,G,GT ,e). Then, it is given the DHI instance tuple
(g,ga) such that g is a generator of G and a ∈ Z∗p, chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp
and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy. It also sets G1 =< g1 > and G2 =< g2 >. Note
that (ga)x = ga1 and (g
a)y = ga2. B then chooses β j ∈R Zp and sets h j = g
β j
1 for
j ∈ [1,s]. B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2,H) and
forwards it to A . It keeps ga1 secret. The private key sk is implicitly set as equal to
a.
Adaptive Queries. A has access to the tag generation oracle OT G as follows. It first
adaptively selects several blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. B splits each block mi into s






















for i ∈ [1,n], and gives them to A . The adversary sets an ordered collection F =
{m1, · · · ,mn} of blocks and an ordered collection E= {Tm1, · · · ,Tmn} which are the
verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in F.
A has access to the data operation performance oracle ODOP as follows. Repeat-
edly, the adversary selects a block ml and the corresponding element in f ol and
forwards them to the challenger. The index l denotes the rank where A wants
the data operation to be performed. More precisely, l is equal to i1+i22 for an in-
sertion and to i for a deletion or a modification. Moreover, ml =⊥ in the case
of a deletion, since only the rank is needed to perform this kind of operation.
Then, A outputs a new ordered collection F′ (containing the updated version of
the block ml), a new verification metadata ordered collection E′ (containing the
updated version of the verification metadata Tml ) and a corresponding updating
proof ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d,wl), such that wl is randomly chosen from Zp,
d = T wlml , and u j is randomly chosen from Zp, U j = h
u j
j , c j = ml, j ·wl + u j and
C j = h
c j
j , for j ∈ [1,s]. B runs the algorithm CheckOp on the value ν ′ and sends
the answer to A . If the answer is f alse, then the challenger aborts; otherwise, it
proceeds.
Challenge. The adversary selects some blocks m∗i and the corresponding elements in f o∗i ,
for i∈I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q, and forwards them to the challenger who checks the data
operations. In particular, the first in f o∗i indicates a full re-write.
Then, the challenger chooses a subset I ⊆I , randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R
Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . It forwards chal as a challenge to A .
Forgery. Upon receiving the challenge chal, the resulting proof of data possession on
the correct stored document m should be ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) and pass




1 for random exponents r j ∈R Zp, B j =
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hb jj = g
β jb j
1 = g
β j(∑(i,vi)∈chal vi·mi, j+r j)
1 and c = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi . However, A gener-
ates a proof of data possession on an incorrect stored document m̃ set as ν̃ =
(R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃), where R̃ j = hr̃ jj = g
β j r̃ j
1 for random exponents r̃ j ∈R Zp,





β j(∑(i,vi)∈chal vi·m̃i, j+r̃ j)
1 , as well as c̃ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m̃i . Finally,
the adversary returns ν̃ to the challenger. If the proof of data possession still pass
the verification, then A wins. Otherwise, it fails.
Analysis. We define ∆r j = r̃ j − r j, ∆b j = b̃ j − b j and ∆τ j = b̃ j − b j − (r̃ j − r j) =
∑(i,vi)∈chal vi(m̃i, j−mi, j), for j ∈ [1,s]. At least one element of {∆τ j} j∈[1,s] is non-zero.
We prove that if the adversary can win the game, then solutions to the DHI and
the DL problems are found, which contradicts the assumption that the DHI and the DL
problems are hard in G and G1 respectively. Let assume that the adversary (playing
the role of the server) wins the game. We recall that if A wins then B can extract the
actual blocks {mi}(i,vi)∈chal in polynomially-many interactions with A . Without loss of
generality, suppose that chal = {(i,vi)} (i.e. the challenge contains only one block).

























h∆τ jj ,g2) = e(g
∑
s
j=1 β j·∆τ j
1 ,g2)































j=1 β j ·∆τ j
a
1 ,g2)








j=1 β j ·∆τ j
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice
that not all of the ∆τ j can be zero (indeed, if τ j = mi, j ·vi = τ̃ j = m̃i, j ·vi for each j ∈
[1,s], then c = c̃ which contradicts the hypothesis, and the values β j are information
theoretically hidden from A (Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero
only with probability 1/p, which is negligible. Finally, since B knows the exponent
x such that g1 = gx, it can directly compute










j=1 β j ·∆τ j
)1/x
CHAPTER 7. MANAGING EHR IN CLOUD COMPUTING 192
and obtains g1/a. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the DHI problem
can be found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
Second case (c̃ = c): According to the equation 7.2, we have e(c̃,ga2) · e(∏sj=1 R̃ j,g2) =
e(∏sj=1 B̃ j,g2). Since the proof ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) is a correct one, we
also have e(c,ga2) · e(∏sj=1 R j,g2) = e(∏sj=1 B j,g2). We recall that chal = {(i,vi)}.
From the previous analysis step, we know that c̃ = c. Therefore, we get that
∏
s















j = 1. For two elements g1,h∈G1,
there exists ξ ∈ Zp such that h = gξ1 since G1 is a cyclic group. Without loss of
generality, given g1,h ∈ G1, each h j should randomly and correctly be generated
by computing h j = g
y j
1 ·hz j ∈G1 such that y j and z j are random values in Zp. Then,






1 · hz j)∆τ j = g
∑
s
j=1 y j·∆τ j
1 · h∑
s
j=1 z j·∆τ j . Clearly, we
can find a solution to the DL problem. More specifically, given g1,h = g
ξ
1 ∈G1, we
can compute h = g
∑
s
j=1 y j ·∆b j
∑
s
j=1 z j ·∆τ j
1 = g
ξ
1 unless the denominator is zero. However, as we
suggested earlier, at least one element of {∆τ j} j∈[1,s] is non-zero. Since z j is a ran-
dom element of Zp, the denominator is zero with probability equal to 1/p, which is
negligible. Thus, if the adversary wins the game, then a solution of the DL problem
can be found with probability equal to 1− 1p , which contradicts the fact that the DL
problem is assumed to be hard in G1.
Therefore, for the adversary, it is computationally infeasible to win the game and generate
an incorrect proof of data possession which can pass the verification.
The simulation of the verification metadata generation oracle OT G is perfect. The
simulation of the data operation performance oracle ODOP is almost perfect unless B
aborts. This happens when the data operation was not correclty performed. As previ-
ously, we can prove that if A can pass the updating proof, then solutions to the DHI and
DL problems are found in G and G1 respectively. Following the above analysis and ac-
cording to Equation 7.1, if A generates an incorrect updating proof which can pass the
verification, then solutions to the DHI and DL problems can be found with probabilities
both equal to 1− 1p . Therefore, for A , it is computationally infeasible to generate an
incorrect updating proof which can pass the verification. The proof is completed.
Proof for the Data Privacy against the TPA
We start by giving the privacy proof following the strong security model. Note that this
proof is actually wrong; indeed, we will explain later that the basic scheme DPDP is not
strongly data private since it is threatened by an attack against the data privacy given in
Section 7.2. We will then present a correct data privacy proof following the weak security
model.
Based on the Strong Model.
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that interacts with a challenger B in breaking
the strong data privacy property of the basic DPDP scheme with public verifiability and
data privacy DPDP = (KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof) with
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advantage ε .
For any probabilistic PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B
that interacts with the adversary A as follows.
Setup. B runs G on input λ to obtain the tuple (p,G1,G2,GT ,e), and selects two gen-
erators g1 and g2 belonging to G1 and G2 respectively. Then, it randomly chooses
s elements h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1 and an element α ∈R Zp. It sets the public key pk =
(p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,gα2 ) and forwards it to A . It sets the private key
sk = α and keeps it.
Queries. A gives to the challenger two documents m0 = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,n) and m1 =
(m1,1, · · · ,m1,n) of equal length. B randomly selects a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and for




−sk = (∏sj=1 h
mµ,i, j
j )
−α , for i ∈ [1,n], and gives them to A .
Challenge. The adversary chooses a subset I ⊆ [1,n], randomly chooses |I| elements
vi ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . It forwards chal as a challenge to B.
Upon receiving the challenge chal, the challenger selects an ordered collection
F = {mi}i∈I of blocks and an ordered collection Σ = {Tmi}i∈I which are the verifi-









−α , for i ∈ I. It then randomly chooses r1, · · · ,rs ∈R Zp and com-
putes R∗1 = h
r1
1 , · · · ,R∗s = h
rs
s . It also randomly selects b1, · · · ,bs ∈ Zp and computes
B∗1 = h
b1
1 , · · · ,B∗s = h
bs
s . It sets c∗ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi as well. Finally, the challenger
returns ν∗ = (R∗1, · · · ,R∗s ,B∗1, · · · ,B∗s ,c∗).
Guess The adversary returns a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} as a guess for µ . The adversary wins if
µ ′ = µ .
Analysis. The probability Pr[µ ′ = µ] must be equal to 12 since the verification metadata
Tmµ,i , for i ∈ [1,n], and the proof ν∗ are independent regarding the bit µ . We now prove
that the verification metadata and the proof of data possession given to the adversary









Since sk = α is kept secret from A , the above simulation is perfect. For a document
mµ , there exists vµ,i, for (i,vµ,i) ∈ chalµ , such that bµ, j = ∑(i,vµ,i)∈chalµ mµ,i, j · vµ,i + rµ, j.
In addition, Rµ,1, · · · ,Rµ,s,Bµ,1, · · · ,Bµ,s are statically indistinguishable with the actual
outputs corresponding to m0 or m1. Thus, the answers given to the adversary are correctly
distributed. The proof is completed.
N.B. The above analysis is wrong: the affirmation “The probability Pr[µ ′ = µ] must
be equal to 12 since the verification metadata Tmµ,i , for i ∈ [1,n], and the proof ν∗ are
independent regarding the bit µ .” is incorrect: Tmµ,i and ν
∗ actually depend on µ .
A solution to correct the above security proof is to follow the weak security model
instead of the strong one that is based on indistinguishability. Since unfortunately, the
basic DPDP system with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP does not satisfy such
property.
Based on the Weak Model.
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Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the weak data pri-
vacy property of the DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP =
(KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof,CheckProof). Then, there is a challenger
B that solves the DHI problem in G with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants to
break the DHI assumption in G by interacting with A as follows.
Setup. B runs GroupGen(λ )→ (p,G,GT ,e). Then, it is given the DHI instance tuple
(g,ga) such that g is generator of G and a ∈ Z∗p, chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp
and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy. It also sets G1 =< g1 > and G2 =< g2 >. Note
that (ga)x = ga1 and (g
a)y = ga2. B chooses β j ∈R Zp and sets h j = g
β j
1 for j ∈ [1,s].
B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2,H) and forwards
it to A . It keeps ga1 secret. The private key sk is implicitly set as equal to a.
Queries. A makes queries to the verification metadata generation oracle as follows. It
first adaptively selects blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. B splits each block mi into s sectors

















−β j·mi, j .
B gives the blocks and the verification metadata to A . The latter sets an ordered
collection F= {m1, · · · ,mn} of blocks and an ordered collection E= {Tm1, · · · ,Tmn}
which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in F.
Challenge. The adversary submits a challenge chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . Without loss of gen-
erality, we suppose there is only element i in I. As a shorthand, we write chal =
{(i,vi)}. Moreover, A gives an ordered collection F = {m̃i}∩F = /0 of the data
block determined by chal, and an ordered collection Σ = {Tm̃i}∩E= /0 of the cor-
responding verification metadata. Note that there are only one element m̃i in F and
one element Tm̃i in Σ.
Generation of the Proof. Upon receiving the challenge chal = {(i,vi)}, the collection
F = {m̃i} and the collection Σ = {Tm̃i}, the challenger generates the proof of data
possession ν̃ = (R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃), such that r̃ j is randomly chosen from
Zp, R̃ j = h
r̃ j
j , b̃ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal m̃i, j · vi + r̃ j and B̃ j = h
b̃ j
j , for j ∈ [1,s]. It also sets
c̃ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m̃i .
Finally, the challenger runs CheckProof on ν̃ . If the proof of data possession still
pass the verification, then A wins. Otherwise, it fails.
Analysis. Given an actual data block mi and the corresponding verification metadata
Tmi , let ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) be a honest proof of data possession that pass the
verification. Both ν and ν̃ pass the verification, and so verify the equation 7.2.
We define ∆r j = r̃ j− r j, ∆b j = b̃ j− b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi +∆r j and ∆τ j =
∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi = (m̃i, j−mi, j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that r j and b j are the ele-
ments of a honest proof of data possession ν such that r j ∈R Zp and b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j ·
vi + r j = mi, j · vi + r j where mi, j are the sectors blocks (not the ones that the adversary
claims to have).
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We prove that if the adversary can win the game, then a solution to the DHI problem
is found, which contradicts the assumption that the DHI problem is hard in G. Let assume
that the adversary (playing the role of the TPA) wins the game.

























h∆τ jj ,g2) = e(g
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j=1 β j·∆τ j
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j=1 β j ·∆τ j
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice that not
all of the ∆τ j can be zero (indeed, if τ j = mi, j · vi = τ̃ j = m̃i, j · vi for each j ∈ [1,s], then
c = c̃ which contradicts the hypothesis, and the values β j are information theoretically
hidden from A (Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero only with probability
1/p, which is negligible. Finally, since B knows the exponent x such that g1 = gx, it can
directly compute










j=1 β j ·∆τ j
)1/x
and obtains g1/a. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the DHI problem can be
found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
7.1.6 Performance
We evaluate the efficiency of our scheme CBEKS in Table 7.1. We consider cryptographic
operations such as group multiplication on random group elements, group exponentiation
of a random group element with a random exponent, as well as pairing operation on ran-
dom group elements. We use implementation results of these operations in the CHARM
framework [4, 152] based on Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT) [162] curves. We do
not take into account multiplication in Zp as this operation has timings negligible com-
pared to the ones for exponentiation and pairing. The benchmarks were executed on a
quad core processor AMD A10-5800K with 16GB of RAM running Fedora 18.
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We evaluated the protocol algorithms on the asymmetric bilinear group based on the
MNT elliptic curve provided by CHARM. Complex multiplication is required in order
to find curves of a certain embedding degree with a specified order. In particular, MNT
curves have an embedding degree k = 6.
We assume that 2GB data are stored. The document is split into one million blocks
of size 2KB, such that the size of the index is |n|= 20 bits. We assume that the number of
sectors in each data block is s= 100 and the number of blocks determined in the challenge
chal is |I| = 460. Note that the challenge requires 460 blocks to allow the detection of
1% fraction of incorrect data with 99% probability of detecting misbehavior [12]. More
precisely, the probability of detecting corrupted block is 1− (1−|X |)|I|, where |X | is the
number of corrupted blocks.
Mult. in G1 Mult. in GT Exp. in G1 Exp. in G2 Exp. in GT Pairing




CheckOp 0.5116 0.006992 11.394
GenProof 1.17668 118.4895
CheckProof 0.5116 0.006992 11.394
Table 7.1: Timings for our DPDP asymmetric pairing-based system. Times are in mil-
liseconds. Time/op. refers to Time/operation, Mult. refers to the multiplication operation
and Exp. refers to the group exponentiation operation.
The algorithm KeyGen is executed only once and does not require much computation.
Similarly, the algorithm TagGen is run only once per file. The timing is mainly due to the
file being split into s = 100 blocks. The algorithms PerfOp and GenProof differentiate
since only one block is considered in PerfOp while chal = 460 blocks are counted in
GenProof. Running times are equal for the algorithms CheckOp and CheckProof since
these algorithms execute the same process.
7.1.7 Computational and Communication Costs: Comparison with
Existing Schemes
In Table 7.2, we compare the computational costs of our scheme with the ones in [224,
251]. We choose the schemes presented in [224, 251] since they are recent and offer
similar features to our scheme.
In all the schemes, during the execution of the algorithm KeyGen, the number of
exponentiations in G1 and G2 is constant. The algorithm TagGen in [251] and in ours re-
quires O(s) exponentiations in G1, where s is the number of sectors in each data block. In
[224], TagGen needs only a constant number of exponentiations in G1, however there is
an extra computational cost with the generation of the verification metadata, which is the
cost of computing three exponentiations in GT and three pairings. Moreover, the number
of multiplications in G1 is constant in [224, 251], whereas it is linear in s in our case. In
[251] and in our scheme, the generation of the proof of prossession in GenProof needs the
computation of O(s+ |I|) exponentiations in G1; whereas in [224], the generation of the
proof of prossession only involves the computation of O(|I|) exponentiations in G1. In
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addition, the number of multiplications in G1 is linear in |I| in our scheme and in [224],
while it is linear in both |I| and s in [251]. The computational cost due to the check of
the proof in CheckProof differs in the three schemes. In [224], the algorithm CheckProof
requires O(|I|) exponentiations in G1 and GT and four pairings. In [251], the algorithm
CheckProof needs O(s+ |I|) exponentiations in G1 and a constant number of pairings
equal to three. Moreover, the number of multiplications in both Zp and G1 varies be-
tween the three systems. In [224], O(s+ |I|) and O(|I|) multiplications are required in Zp
and G1 respectively. In [251], O(s+ |I|) multiplications in G1 are computed, while O(s)
multiplications in G1 are needed in our case. Finally, in our scheme, the computation cost
is lighter; more precisely, it is only the cost of computing three pairings (no exponentia-
tion is required).
The communication cost of our protocol is mostly due to two factors: the chal-
lenge and the proof of data possession. The communication cost of a challenge chal =
{(i,vi)}i∈I is |I|(|n|+ |p|) bits, where |I| is the number of selected data blocks, |n| is the
length of an index and |p| is the length of an element in Zp. The communication cost of a
proof of data possession ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) is (2 · s+1)|p| bits, where s is the
number of sectors in each block. An additional cost can be the communication cost of an
updating proof ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d), which is (2 · s+1)|p| bits. However, this
happens only when the client wants to update his/her data. We assume that the frequency
of checking the integrity of the data is much higher than the frequency of performing data
operations. Therefore, we leave out this additional cost.
In Table 7.3, we evaluate the computational cost of the verification of the proof and
communication costs of the verification request and of the proof of data possession in our
scheme and compare them with the ones in the DPDP scheme proposed in [251]. We
note that the communication costs are equivalent in both schemes. These incurred costs
are negligible compared to the 2GB total size of the stored data. The time required to
create the proof of data possession on the server side is very efficient, even if the client
has to perform some work for the verification. The latter observation is likeable; since
the server should be the entity that has more workload. Moreover, the more noticeable
difference between the two DPDP protocols appears in the verification of the proof of data
possession. Actually, the computational cost to generate the proof in our case is constant
whereas this cost is linear in parameters related to the number of blocks (and of sectors)
in [251]. The overall result demonstrates the practicality of our scheme in comparison to
the existing scheme from [251].
7.2 Replace Attack, Replay Attack and Attack against
Data Privacy
In this section, we carefully describe how the three attacks threaten the DPDP scheme
with public verifiability and data privacy in Section 7.1.
7.2.1 Replace Attack
We explain the first attack on the basic scheme DPDP given in Section 7.1. Informally,
the attack works as follows. Let us assume that the server stores only one block, say m1
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DPDP in [251] Our DPDP
Communication cost of 30.59 30.59
the verification request
Communication cost of 6.464 12.864
the proof of data possession
Computational cost of 36.334 0.43
the verification of the proof
Table 7.3: Costs in kilobytes (KB) of the verification request sent by the TPA (on behalf
of the client) to the server, the proof of data possession generated by the server for the
TPA, and the verification of the proof of data possession done by the TPA.
without loss of generality, instead of n blocks as the client believes. The TPA on behalf of
the client regularly audits the server by sending it a challenge chal for blocks with indices
in a set I ⊆ [1,n], such that |sub|= k≤ n. The server generates a proof of data possession
on the k blocks m1 (instead of the blocks defined by chal). In other words, the server uses
k times the block m1 to obtain the proof of data possession according to the size of the
index set used for the challenge. The attack is successful if the server manages to pass the
verification process and has its proof of data possession being accepted by the TPA.
We recall how the client generates the verification metadata for a document m that
s/he wants to upload on the server.
• TagGen(pk,sk,m)→ Tm. A document m is split into n blocks mi, for i∈ [1,n]. Each
block mi is then split into s sectors mi, j ∈Zp, for j ∈ [1,s]. Therefore, the document
m can be seen as a n× s matrix with elements denoted as mi, j. The client computes





−sk = (∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−α = ∏sj=1 h
−α·mi, j
j
for i ∈ [1,n]. Then, s/he sets Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn) ∈Gn1.
Moreover, the client stores all the data blocks mi in an ordered collection F and the
corresponding verification metadata Tmi in an ordered collection E. S/he forwards
these two collections to the server and deletes them from his/her local storage.
Yet, the server is asked to generate a proof of data possession. However, let us
assume that it only stores the first block m1 of the document m (it has deleted all
other blocks) and we show that it can still pass the verification process.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν . The TPA prepares a challenge chal to send to the
server as follows. First, it chooses a subset I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q, randomly chooses |I|
elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . Second, after receiving the chal-
lenge chal which indicates the specific blocks for which the client through the
TPA wants a proof of data possession, the server sets the ordered collection F =
{m1}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks (instead of F = {mi}i∈I) and an ordered collection Σ =
{Tm1}i∈I ⊂ E which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in
F (instead of Σ = {Tmi}i∈I). It then selects at random r1, · · · ,rs ∈R Zp and com-
putes R1 = h
r1
1 , · · · ,Rs = h
rs
s . It also sets b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal m1, j · vi + r j ∈ Zp for
j ∈ [1,s] (instead of b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j · vi + r j), then B j = h
b j
j , for j ∈ [1,s],
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along with c = ∏(i,vi)∈chal Tm1
vi (instead of c = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi). Finally, it returns
ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) ∈G2s+11 to the TPA.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the follow-
ing equation holds:











If the equation 7.3 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
Correctness. For the proof of data possession:






























































Therefore, the equation 7.3 holds, although the server is actually storing one block only.
N.B. This attack is not due to the dynamicity property of the DPDP scheme with public
verifiability and data privacy DPDP given in Section 7.1. Such attack could happen even
on static data.
7.2.2 Replay Attack
We explain the second successful attack on the basic scheme DPDP given in Section 7.1.
Informally, the attack works as follows. The server is storing some data blocks of a client,
such that the latter regularly requests the server to updates his/her data according to the
three available operations (insertion, deletion and modification). For instance, the client
asks the server to modify the block mi into the block m′i. However, the server does not
proceed and keeps the data block mi on its storage. Then, the TPA has to check that the
operation has been correctly done and asks the server for an updating proof on m′i. The
server generates the updating proof as requested, but using the data block mi. The attack
is successful if the server manages to pass the verification process and has its updating
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proof being accepted by the TPA.
In more details, a client asks the server to modify the data block mi by sending the
new version of the block m′i and the corresponding verification metadata Tm′i . However,
the server does not follow the client’s request and decides to keep the old version of the
block mi and the corresponding verification metadata Tmi , and deletes m
′
i and Tm′i .
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o=(modification, i,m′i,Tm′i))→ (F
′,E′,ν ′). After receiving the
elements i, m′i and Tm′i from the client, the server prepares the updating proof as fol-
lows. It first retrieves the block mi and the verification metadata Tmi corresponding
to the index i, and once it gets these elements, it deletes m′i and Tm′i . It then selects
at random u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,Us = h
us
s . It also chooses at
random wi ∈R Zp and sets c j =mi, j ·wi+u j ∈Zp (instead of c j =m′i, j ·wi+u j ∈Zp)
and C j = h
c j
j , for j ∈ [1,s], and d = Tmiwi (instead of d = T wim′i ). Finally, it returns
ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d) ∈G2s+11 to the TPA.
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the following equa-
tion holds:











If the equation 7.4 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
Correctness. For the updating proof:




U j,g2) = e(Tmi








































Therefore, the equation 7.4 holds, although the server has not updated the block m′i and
the corresponding verification metadata Tm′i .
N.B. This attack is due to the dynamicity property of the basic scheme given in Section
7.1.
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7.2.3 Attack against Data Privacy
We explain the third successful attack on the DPDP scheme with public verifiability and
data privacy DPDP given in Section 7.1. Informally, the TPA (as the adversary) and the
server (as the challenger) play the strong data privacy game such that the TPA gives two
equal-length blocks m0 and m1 to the server and the latter replies to the TPA by sending
the verification metadata Tmµ of the data block mµ , after choosing a bit µ ∈R {0,1}. Then,
the TPA also selects a bit µ ′ ∈ {0,1} The attack is successful if using mµ ′ , the TPA can
discover which block mµ ∈ {m0,m1} was chosen by the server.
More formally, the data privacy attack on the basic scheme given in Section 7.1
works as follows. The TPA, who plays the role of the adversary, provides two equal-
length blocks m0 and m1 to the challenger, such that m0 = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,n) and m1 =
(m1,1, · · · ,m1,n). The challenger randomly chooses a bit µ ∈R {0,1}, computes Tmµ,i ←



























The computation of the last pairing requires only public elements. Therefore, for µ ′ ∈






−1), given the public
key pk and the data block that it gave to the challenger, as well as the pairing e(Tmµ,i,g2),
given the verification metadata sent by the challenger, and finally compares them. If these
two pairings are equal, then µ ′ = µ; otherwise µ ′ 6= µ .
N.B. This attack is due to the public verifiability of the basic scheme DPDP given in
Section 7.1, based on the definition of the strong data privacy game.
7.3 IHT-Based Dynamic Provable Data Possession with
Public Verifiability and Data Privacy
A solution to avoid the replace attack mentioned in the previous section is to embed the
index i of the data block mi into the verification metadata Tmi . When the TPA on behalf
of the client checks the proof of data possession generated by the server, it requires to use
all the indices of the challenged data blocks to process the verification. Such idea was
proposed for the publicly verifiable scheme in [205].
A solution to avoid the replay attack mentioned in the previous section is to embed
the version number vnbi of the data block mi into the verification metatdata Tmi . The first
time that the client sends the data block mi to the server, the number vnbi is set to be equal
to 1 (meaning that the first version of the data block is uploaded) and is appended to the
index i. When the client wants to modify the data block mi with m′i, it specifies the number
vnbi = 2 (meaning that the second version of data block is uploaded) and generates the
verification metadata Tm′i accordingly. When the TPA on behalf of the client checks that
the block was correctly updated by the server, it has to use both the index i and the version
number vnbi of the data block.
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We stress that the index i of the data block mi is unique. More precisely, when a block
is inserted, a new index is created that has not been used and when a block is modified,
the index does not change. However, when a block is deleted, its index does not disappear
in order to let the scheme remain secure. To explain why, we consider that the index of a
deleted block is removed. Let m = (m1, · · · ,m10) be a document stored on the server. The
client first requests to the server to delete the data block m5. Thus, the index 5 disappears.
Later, the client asks to insert a block m′4+6
2
= m′5 between the data blocks m4 and m6.
However, the server might have not properly deleted the previous data block m5 when the
client asked for, and so the server may not replace the not-yet-deleted block m5 by the
block m′5 that the client wants to insert, and can still pass the data integrity verification
using the not-yet-deleted block m5. In order to elude this situation, the index i is kept
as “used” even if the block mi has been deleted, and when a data block should be added
between mi1 and mi2 , then the client can choose either an index equal to
i1+i




2 for m i+i2
2
. In addition, we should explicit the insertion process when one or both of
the involved indices are not natural numbers. More precisely, let us consider the blocks
mi such that i ∈N and m 2i+1
2
that has been inserted earlier (and 2i+12 /∈N). We wish to add
a block ml between the two aforementioned blocks: its index l should be set as the mean




4 . Such mean method should be
kept in mind when inserting a new data block.
In our construction, we specify that the client deletes the data blocks and the corre-
sponding verification metadata from his/her local storage once these elements are sent to
the server. We also implicitly let the TPA know the indices of the data blocks that are
currently stored on the server in order to challenge the server on a certain data amount of
the stored data. To be quite clear, we let the client conserve a table of indices of the data
blocks mi kept on the server along with their version numbers vnbi. Such table is then
forwarded to the TPA. Refering to the aforementioned example with m = (m1, · · · ,m10),










have been added, and the block m6 has been modified twice. Let the table stored on the
client’s local storage be as follows:
Index i Version Number vnbi Comments
1 1 -







· · · · · · · · ·
10 1 -
The above index hash table (IHT) is composed of several columns: one for the block
index, one for the version number and one for some auxiliary comments. A column for
random values can be added, if the verification metadata should be randomized to enhance
the data privacy against the TPA. We stress that each record in the IHT is different from
another one to ensure that the data blocks and their corresponding verification metadata
cannot be forged. An example of an IHT-based PDP scheme can be found in [251].
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The IHT framework gives better security level against the untrusted server while the
security level against the TPA is lowered. In addition, we have to consider the random or-
acle model instead of the standard model. The IHT framework also leads into an increase
of the complexity of the system; indeed, the communication and the computational costs
grow for all the entities involved in the protocol. We recall that the TPA is required to help
the client that does not have the necessary resources to audit the server efficiently and reg-
ularly. However, the task of the TPA should remain simple in verifying that the proof of
data possession is consistent with the given challenge and that the updating proof is con-
sistent with the requested data operation. Nevertheless, adding IHTs obliges the TPA to
provide more local storage and more communication burden. Such additional costs make
that the intervention of the TPA is not necessarly advantageous One may think that the
TPA becomes a bigger threat since it keeps more sensitive information elements; however,
note that the TPA already has access to the indices of the data blocks in the basic DPDP
scheme DPDP given in Section 7.1.
Finally, we show later that such changes only slightly affect the efficiency and the
practicality of the IHT-based protocol compared to the basic one presented in Section 7.1.
7.3.1 IHT-based Construction
The IHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy construction is as
follows:
• KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk). Let G be an algorithm that, on input the security parameter
λ , generates the cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of prime order p along with a bilinear
map e : G1×G2→GT . Let g1 and g2 be two generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
Let the hash function H : Q×N→G1 be seen as a random oracle. Then, the client
randomly chooses s elements h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1. Moreover, s/he selects at random
α ∈R Zp and sets his/her public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,gα2 ,H)
and his/her private key sk = α .
• TagGen(pk,sk,m)→ Tm. A document m is split into n blocks mi, for i∈ [1,n]. Each
block mi is then split into s sectors mi, j ∈ Zp, for j ∈ [1,s]. We suppose that |m|= b
and n = db/s · log(p)e. Therefore, the document m can be seen a n× s matrix with
elements denoted as mi, j. The client computes the verification metadata










Yet, it sets Tm = (Tm1, · · · ,Tmn) ∈Gn1.
Then, the client stores all the data blocks mi in an ordered collection F and the
corresponding verification metadata Tmi in an ordered collection E. S/he forwards
these two collections to the server and deletes them from his/her local storage.
Moreover, the client creates an IHT to record the information necessary for the TPA
to proceed on behalf of the client.
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, in f o = (operation, l,ml,Tml))→ (F′,E′,ν ′). After receiving the
elements l, ml and Tml from the client, the server prepares the updating proof as fol-
lows. It first selects at random u1, · · · ,us ∈R Zp and computes U1 = hu11 , · · · ,Us =
huss . It also chooses at random wl ∈R Zp and sets c j = ml, j ·wl +u j ∈ Zp and C j =
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hc jj , for j∈ [1,s], and d =T
wl
ml . Finally, it returns ν
′=(U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d,wl)∈
G2s+11 to the TPA.
More precisely, for the operation:






) and vnbl = vnb i1+i2
2
= 1.
– deletion: (l,ml,Tml) = (i, , ) and vnbl = vnbi = , meaning that the elements
ml , Tml and vnbl are not required. Indeed, the server uses the block ml =mi and
the corresponding verification metadata Tml = Tmi that are kept on its storage
to generate ν ′.
– modification: (l,ml,Tml) = (i,m
′
i,Tm′i) and vnbl = vnb
′
i = vnbi +1.
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the following equa-
tion holds:











If the equation 7.5 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν . The TPA on behalf of the client prepares a challenge
chal that is then sent to the server. First, it chooses a subset I ⊆ (0,n+ 1)∩Q,
randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I .
Second, after receiving the challenge chal provided by the TPA, the server sets
the ordered collection F = {mi}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks and an ordered collection Σ =
{Tmi}i∈I ⊂ E which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in
F . It then selects at random r1, · · · ,rs ∈R Zp and computes R1 = hr11 , · · · ,Rs = h
rs
s .
It also sets b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j · vi + r j ∈ Zp and B j = h
b j
j , for j ∈ [1,s], and c =
∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi . Finally, it returns ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c)∈G2s+11 to the TPA.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ true/ f alse. The TPA has to check whether the follow-
ing equation holds:














If the equation 7.6 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
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Correctness. We prove the correctness of the proof of data possession as follows:











































































 · e( s∏
j=1
B j,g2)
We prove the correctness of the updating proof as follows:




U j,g2) = e(T wlml ,g
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7.3.2 Security Proofs
Proof of the Security against the Server
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the security of the
IHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy. Suppose that A
makes a total of qH > 0 queries to H. Then, there is a challenger B that solves the CDH
and DL problems G and G1 respectively, with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants
to break the CDH and DL problems G and G1 respectively, by interacting with A as
follows.
Setup. B runs G on input λ to obtain the tuple (p,G,GT ,e). Then, it is given the CDH
instance tuple (g,ga,gb) such that g is a generator of G and a,b are unknown expo-
nents in Zp, chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy. It
also sets G1 =< g1 > and G2 =< g2 >. Note that (ga)x = ga1, (g
b)x = gb1, (g
a)y = ga2
and (gb)y = gb2. B chooses β j,γ j ∈R Zp and sets h j = g
β j
1 · (gb1)γ j for j ∈ [1,s]. Let
a hash function H : Q×N→ G1 be controlled by B as follows. Upon receiving a
query (il′,vnbil′ ) to the random oracle H for some l
′ ∈ [1,qH ]:
• If ((il′,vnbil′ ),θl′,Wl′) exists in LH , return Wl′ .
• Otherwise, choose β j,γ j ∈R Zp and set h j = gβ j1 · (gb1)γ j for j ∈ [1,s]. For each












j=1 γ jmil′ , j
for a given block mil′ = (mil′ ,1, · · · ,mil′ ,s). Put ((il′,vnbil′ ),θl′,Wl′) in LH and
return Wl′ as answer.
B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2,H) and forwards




2 secret. The private key sk is implicitly set as equal to a.
Adaptive Queries. A has first access to the verification metadata generation oracle OT G
as follows. It first adaptively selects blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. B splits each block mi
into s sectors mi, j. Then, it computes Tmi = (W ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )




for i ∈ [1,n], such that if ((i,vnbi),θ ,W ) exists in LH , then the value W is used to











j=1 γ jmi, j
is computed for an element h j = g
β j
1 · (gb1)γ j , ((i,vnbi),θ ,W )
is put in LH and W is used for the generation of Tmi .













j=1 β jmi, j
1 · (gb1)∑
s















j=1 β jmi, j
1 · (gb1)∑
s
j=1 γ jmi, j
= gθ1
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and so, Tmi = (H(i,vnbi) ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )





B gives the blocks and the verification metadata to A . The latter sets an ordered
collection F= {m1, · · · ,mn} of blocks and an ordered collection E= {Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn}
which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in F.
A has also access to the data operation performance oracle ODOP as follows. Re-
peatedly, A selects a block ml and the corresponding element in f ol and forwards
them to B. Here, l denotes the rank where A wants the data operation to be per-
formed. More precisely, l is equal to i1+i22 for an insertion and to i for a deletion
or a modification. Moreover, ml = in the case of a deletion, since only the rank
is needed to perform this kind of operation. The version number vnbl increases by
one in the case of a modification. Then, A outputs a new ordered collection F′
(containing the updated version of the block ml), a new ordered collection E′ (con-
taining the updated version of the verification metadata Tml ) and a corresponding
updating proof ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d,wl), such that wl is randomly chosen
from Zp, d = T wlml , and for j ∈ [1,s], u j is randomly chosen from Zp, U j = h
u j
j ,
c j = ml, j ·wl +u j and C j = hc jj . B runs the algorithm CheckOp on the value ν ′ and
sends the answer to A . If the answer is f alse, then the challenger aborts; otherwise,
it proceeds.
Challenge. A selects some blocks m∗i and the corresponding elements in f o∗i , for i∈I ⊆
(0,n+1)∩Q, and forwards them to the challenger who checks the data operations.
In particular, the first in f o∗i indicates a full re-write.
B chooses a subset I ⊆I , randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal =
{(i,vi)}i∈I . It forwards chal as a challenge to A .
Forgery. Upon receiving the challenge chal, the resulting proof of data possession on
the correct stored document m should be ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) and pass
the equation 7.6. However, A generates a proof of data possession on an incorrect
stored document m̃ as ν̃ = (R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃), such that r̃ j is randomly cho-
sen from Zp, R̃ j = h
r̃ j
j , b̃ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal m̃i, j ·vi+ r̃ j and B̃ j = h
b̃ j
j , for j ∈ [1,s], along
with c̃ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m̃i . Finally, it returns ν̃ to B. If the proof of data possession
still pass the verification, then A wins. Otherwise, it fails.
Analysis. We define ∆r j = r̃ j− r j, ∆b j = b̃ j−b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi +∆r j and
∆τ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j −mi, j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that r j and b j are the elements of
a honest proof of data possession ν such that r j ∈R Zp and b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j · vi + r j
where mi, j are the actual sectors (not the ones that the adversary claims to have).
We prove that if the adversary can win the game, then solutions to the CDH and DL
problems are found, which contradicts the assumption that the CDH and DL problems
are hard in G and G1 respectively. Let assume that the adversary (playing the role of the
server) wins the game. We recall that if A wins then B can extract the actual blocks
{mi}(i,vi)∈chal in polynomially-many interactions with A . Without loss of generality, sup-
pose that chal = {(i,vi)}, meaning that the challenge contains only one block.
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(gβ j1 · (gb1)γ j)∆τ j ,g−a2 )
= e(g1,g2)
−a∑sj=1 β j∆τ j · e(g1,g2)−ab∑
s
j=1 γ j∆τ j











j=1 γ j∆τ j
meaning that we have found the solution to the CDH problem, that is
(gb1)









j=1 γ j∆τ j
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice
that not all of the ∆τ j can be zero (indeed, if τ j = mi, j ·vi = τ̃ j = m̃i, j ·vi for each j ∈
[1,s], then c= c̃ which contradicts the hypothesis), and the values γ j are information
theoretically hidden from A (Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero
only with probability 1/p, which is negligible. Finally, since B knows the exponent










j=1 γ j∆τ j )
1
x
and obtains gab. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the CDH problem
can be found with probability equal to 1−1/p.






















We recall that chal = {(i,vi)}. From the previous analysis step, we know that
c̃ = c. Therefore, we get that ∏sj=1 B̃ j · (∏sj=1 R̃ j)−1 = ∏sj=1 B j · (∏sj=1 R j)−1. We















For two elements g1,h ∈ G1, there exists ξ ∈ Zp such that h = gξ1 since G1 is a
cyclic group. Without loss of generality, given g1,h ∈G1, each h j could randomly
and correctly be generated by computing h j = g
y j
1 · hz j ∈ G1 such that y j and z j
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j=1 y j·∆τ j
1 · h∑
s
j=1 z j·∆τ j . Clearly, we can find a solution to the DL problem. More
specifically, given g1,h = g
ξ
1 ∈G1, we can compute h = g
∑
s
j=1 y j ·∆τ j
∑
s




denominator is zero. However, not all of the ∆τ j can be zero and the values z j
are information theoretically hidden from A , so the denominator is only zero with
probability 1/p, which is negligible. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to
the DL problem can be found with probability equal to 1− 1p .
Therefore, for A , it is computationally infeasible to win the game and generate an incor-
rect proof of data possession which can pass the verification.
The simulation of the verification metadata generation oracle OT G is perfect. The
simulation of the data operation performance oracle ODOP is almost perfect unless B
aborts. This happens when the data operation was not correclty performed. As previously,
we can prove that if A can pass the updating proof, then solutions to the CDH and DL
problems are found. Following the above analysis and according to Equation 7.5, if A
generates an incorrect updating proof which can pass the verification, then solutions to the
CDH and DL problems can be found with probabilities both equal to 1− 1p . Therefore,
for A , it is computationally infeasible to generate an incorrect updating proof which can
pass the verification. The proof is completed.
Proof of the Data Privacy against the TPA
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the weak data pri-
vacy property of the IHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy.
Suppose that A makes a total of qH > 0 queries to H. Then, there is a challenger B that
solves the CDH problem in G with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants to
break the CDH assumption in G by interacting with A as follows.
Setup. B runs GroupGen(λ )→ (p,G,GT ,e). Then, it is given the CDH instance tuple
(g,ga,gb) such that g is a generator of G and a,b are unknown exponents in Zp,
chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy. It also sets
G1 =< g1 > and G2 =< g2 >. Note that (ga)x = ga1, (gb)x = gb1, (ga)y = ga2 and
(gb)y = gb2. B chooses β j,γ j ∈R Zp and sets h j = g
β j
1 · (gb1)γ j for j ∈ [1,s]. Let a
hash function H : Q×N→ G1 be controlled by B as follows. Upon receiving a
query (il,vnbil) to the random oracle H for some l ∈ [1,qH ]:
• If ((il,vnbil),θl,Wl) exists in LH , return Wl .
• Otherwise, choose β j,γ j ∈R Zp and set h j = gβ j1 ·(gb1)γ j for j ∈ [1,s]. For earch












j=1 γ jmil , j
for a given block mil = (mil ,1, · · · ,mil ,s). Put ((il,vnbil),θl,Wl) in LH and re-
turn Wl as answer.
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B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2,H) and forwards




2 secret. The private key sk is implicitly set as equal to a.
Queries. A makes queries to the verification metadata generation oracle as follows. It
first adaptively selects blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. B splits each block mi into s sectors
mi, j. Then, it computes Tmi = (W ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−sk = (W ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−a, for i ∈ [1,n],
such that if ((i,vnbi),θ ,W ) exists in LH , then the value W is used to compute Tmi .












j=1 γ jmi, j
is
computed for an element h j = g
β j
1 · (gb1)γ j , ((i,vnbi),θ ,W ) is put in LH and W is
used for the generation of Tmi .













j=1 β jmi, j
1 · (gb1)∑
s















j=1 β jmi, j
1 · (gb1)∑
s
j=1 γ jmi, j
= gθ1
and so, Tmi = (H(i,vnbi) ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )





B gives the blocks and the verification metadata to A . The latter sets an ordered
collection F= {m1, · · · ,mn} of blocks and an ordered collection E= {Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn}
which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in F.
Challenge. The adversary submits a challenge chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . Without loss of gen-
erality, we suppose there is only one element i in I. As a shorthand, we write
chal = {(i,vi)}. Moreover, A gives an ordered collection F = {m̃i}∩F= /0 of the
data blocks determined by chal, and an ordered collection Σ = {Tm̃i}∩E= /0 of the
corresponding verification metadata. Note that there are only one element m̃i in F
and one element Tm̃i in Σ.
Generation of the Proof. Upon receiving the challenge chal = {(i,vi)}, the collection
F = {m̃i} and the collection Σ = {Tm̃i}, the challenger generates the proof of data
possession ν̃ = (R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃), such that r̃ j is randomly chosen from
Zp, R̃ j = h
r̃ j
j , b̃ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal m̃i, j · vi + r̃ j and B̃ j = h
b̃ j
j , for j ∈ [1,s]. It also sets
c̃ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m̃i .
Finally, the challenger runs CheckProof on ν̃ . If the proof of data possession still
pass the verification, then A wins. Otherwise, it fails.
Analysis. Given an actual block mi and the corresponding verification metadata Tmi , let
ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) be a honest proof of data possession that pass the verifica-
tion.
We define ∆r j = r̃ j− r j, ∆b j = b̃ j− b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi +∆r j and ∆τ j =
∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi = (m̃i, j−mi, j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that r j and b j are the ele-
ments of a honest proof of data possession ν such that r j ∈R Zp and b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j ·
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vi + r j = mi, j · vi + r j where mi, j are the actual sectors (not the ones that the adversary
claims to have).
We prove that if the adversary can win the game, then a solution to the CDH problem
is found, which contradicts the assumption that the CDH problem is hard in G. Let assume
that the adversary (playing the role of the TPA) wins the game.




























(gβ j1 · (gb1)γ j)∆τ j ,g−a2 )
= e(g1,g2)
−a∑sj=1 β j∆τ j · e(g1,g2)−ab∑
s
j=1 γ j∆τ j











j=1 γ j∆τ j
meaning that we have found the solution to the CDH problem, that is
(gb1)









j=1 γ j∆τ j
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice that not
all of the ∆τ j can be zero (indeed, if τ j = mi, j · vi = τ̃ j = m̃i, j · vi for each j ∈ [1,s], then
c = c̃ which contradicts the hypothesis), and the values γ j are information theoretically
hidden from A (Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero only with probability











j=1 γ j∆τ j )
1
x
and obtains gab. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the CDH problem can be
found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
7.3.3 Performance of the IHT-based DPDP Scheme
We compare the IHT-based DPDP scheme with the basic DPDP scheme DPDP proposed
in Section 7.1. First, the client and the TPA obviously have to store more information by
keeping the IHT. Nevertheless, we stress that in any case, the client and the TPA should
maintain an index list. Indeed, they need some information about the stored data in or-
der to select some data blocks to be challenged. We recall that the challenge consists of
pairs (index, random element). By appending an integer and sometimes an auxiliary com-
ment (only in case of deletions) to each index, the extra burden does not seem excessive.
Therefore, such table does slightly affect the client’s local storage as well as the TPA’s
local storage. The communication between the client and the TPA rather increases since
the client should send more elements to the TPA in order to keep the table updated.
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Second, the client has to perform extra computation when generating the verification
metatdata: for each data block mi, s/he has to compute H(i,vnbi). However, the overhead
of the communication between the client and the server does not inscrease.
Third, the TPA needs to compute an extra pairing e(H(i,vnbi)wi,g2) in order to check
that the server correclty performed a data operation requested by the client. The TPA also
has to compute |I|multiplications in G1 and one extra pairing when checking the proof of
data possession: for each challenge chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I , it calculates ∏(i,vi)∈chal H(i,vnbi)
as well as the pairing e(∏(i,vi)∈chal H(i,vnbi)vi,g2). This gives a constant total of four
pairings in order to verify the data integrity instead of three as in the basic scheme given
in Section 7.1, that is not a big loss in term of efficiency and practicality.
Finally, apart the storage of a light table and the computation of an extra pairing by
the TPA for the verification of both the updating proof and the proof of data possession,
the new construction for the DPDP protocol with public verifiability and data privacy is
still practical by adopting asymmetric pairings to gain efficiency and by still reducing the
group exponentiation and pairing operations. In addition, this scheme still allows the TPA
on behalf of the client to request the server for a proof of data possession on as many data
blocks as possible at no extra cost, as in the basic cheme given in Section 7.1.
7.4 MHT-Based Dynamic Provable Data Possession with
Public Verifiability and Data Privacy
The second solution to avoid the replace and replay attacks and the attacks against data
privacy is to implement a Merkle hash tree (MHT) for each document such that the data
blocks are ordered. The MHT [157] is similar to a binary tree in the way that each node
nd has at most two children. Following the update algorithm, each internal (non-leaf)
node has always two children. The construction of a MHT is as follows. For leaf node ndi
based on the data block mi, the assigned value is equal to H ′(mi), where the hash function
H ′ : {0,1}∗→ G1 is seen as a random oracle. Note that the hash values are affected to
leaf nodes in the increasing order of the blocks, i.e. nd1 corresponds to the hash of the
first block m1, nd2 corresponds to the hash of the first block m2, and so on. A parent node
of ndi and ndi+1 has a value computed as H ′(H ′(mi)||H ′(mi+1)), where || is the concate-
nation sign (for an odd index i). The auxiliary authentication information (AAI) Ωi of a
leaf node ndi for the data block mi is a set of hash values chosen from its upper levels, so
that the root value rt can be computed through (mi,Ωi).
When the client desires to add, remove or change a data block on his/her stored data,
s/he has first to inform the server of such wish. The client’s request R contains the type
of operation that has to be performed (insertion, deletion or modification) as well as the
position where the operation will be done. Using such information, the server is able to
select the appopriate elements from the current version of the MHT and set the AAI Ωi as
the tuple of all these elements. More precisely, the elements are the hash values assigned
on the nodes of the MHT: the elements can be found either on the leaves or the internal
nodes, at different level, in function of what needs the client to create the updated version
of the MHT according to the data operation.
Let m = (m1, · · · ,m8) be a document stored on the server. In Figure 7.3, we highlight
which leaves and internal nodes are required in order to insert a data block m′3 after the
data block m2, to delete the block m3 and to modify the block m3 by replacing it with
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m′3. Each hash value H
′(mi) is assigned to a leaf node ndi, for i ∈ [1,n], in the increasing
order. The blocks that sustain the operations are alloted to leaf nodes with a disk inside.
The hash values that should be included into Ω3 are affected to leaves or internal nodes
with a cross inside. Such values will allow the client to compute the new version of the
MHT, including the new root rt ′ that will be then signed.
nd1 nd2 nd3 nd4 nd5 nd6 nd7 nd8
rt
nd1 nd2 nd3 nd4 nd5 nd6 nd7 nd8
rt′
ModificationInitialization
nd3 → H ′(m3)
nd1 nd2
nd3








nd2 → H ′(m2) nd4 → H ′(m4)
H ′(H ′(m1)








nd2 → H ′(m2)
nd3 → H ′(m′3)
nd4 → H ′(m3)
nd5 → H ′(m4)
nd3 → H ′(m′3)
nd2 → H ′(m2) nd4 → H ′(m4)
nd3 → H ′(m4)
nd2 → H ′(m2)
nd4 → H ′(m5)
Figure 7.3: MHTs for the data document m = (m1, · · · ,m8) at the initialization phase, at the
modification phase (changing the block m3 into m′3), at the deletion phase (removing the block
m3), and at the insertion phase (adding the block m′3 after the block m2).
The AAI Ωi is also required by the TPA to check the proof of data possession. More
precisely, in addition to the proof of data possession ν , the server also forwards the values
rtserver, H ′(mi) and Ωi for i ∈ I, according to the blocks indicated by chal. With such
elements, the TPA is able to construct the current MHT and verifies that the root that it
obtained is equal to rtserver. If such verification is successful, then the TPA proceeds to
validate the proof of data possession.
We recall that the client generates the verification metadata for each block of a docu-
ment m = (m1, · · · ,mn), and sends both the data blocks and the corresponding verification
metadata to the server. Now, the client has to also construct a MHT for such a docu-
ment: given a hash function H ′ : {0,1}∗→ G1, s/he computes H ′(mi) for i ∈ [1,n], and
assigns the values H ′(mi) to each leaf of the MHT in the increasing order. Then, s/he
calculates the hash values of the internal nodes until computing the root rt of the MHT,
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following the construction definition of such a tree. Given a digital signature scheme
SS = (SS.KeyGen,SS.Sign,SS.Verify), s/he signs the root rt using the signing private
key SS.sk← SS.KeyGen(λ ) and obtains the signature σrt ← SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt). Finally,
s/he sends H ′ and σrt to the server. The client also computes the verifying public key
SS.pk← SS.KeyGen(λ ) and shares it with the TPA.
Upon receiving the ordered collection F= {mi}i∈[1,n] of the data blocks, the ordered
collection E = {Tmi}i∈[1,n] of the corresponding verification metadata, the hash function
H ′ and the signature σrt , the server first constructs the MHT such that each hash value
H ′(mi) is assigned to each leaf of the MHT in the increasing order. It then obtains a
root rtserver and sends it to the client. The latter then runs SS.Verify(SS.pk,σrt ,rtserver)
and gets an answer either equal to true or f alse. If the answer is equal to true, then the
client knows that the server correctly downloaded his/her documents (the roots of their
respective MHTs are identical), and proceeds. Otherwise, then the client knows that the
server has not obtained the same MHT thus does not correctly stores the data, and aborts.
Data Operations. When the client wants to add a block mi′ after the block mi, remove
mi or modify mi by replacing it with m′i, for i∈ [1,n], s/he first sends a request to the server
containing information such as the type of operation to be performed and its location
(index of the block).
Upon each request, the server needs to return the AAI Ωi of the block to be updated
(in order to reconstruct the current MHT and build the new one after the data update) and
the last signed root value σrt provided by the client. The latter is so able to authenticate the
AAI Ωi by verifying the given signed root value σrt with the root rt of the reconstructed
MHT. If the AAI are successfully authenticated, then the client proceeds; otherwise, s/he
aborts.
Thereafter, in order to get the new MHT, the client computes the value H ′(mi′) for
insertion or H ′(m′i) for modification. Note that s/he does not need to compute H(mi) for
deletion. In the new MHT, for the operation:
• insertion: the block mi′ takes the position of and becomes the block mi+1, the block
mi+1 takes the position of and becomes the block mi+2 and so on, until the block
mn that has a new position and becomes the block mn+1.
• deletion: the block mi+1 takes the position of and becomes the deleted block mi,
the block mi+2 takes the position of and becomes the block mi+1 and so on, until
the block mn that takes the position of and becomes the block mn−1.
• modification: m′i simply takes the position of mi.
The client then signs the updated root rt ′ obtained in the new MHT by running
SS.Sign, gets the signature σrt ′ and forwards it to the server, in addition to (mi′,Tmi′ )
for insertion and (m′i,Tm′i) for modification. The server builds the MHT following the
client’s operation request and gives the resulting root rt ′server to the client. Yet, the client
runs SS.Verify(SS.pk,σrt ′,rt ′server) to get an answer either equal to true or f alse. If the
answer is equal to true, then the client knows that the server has correctly updated the
data (the roots of their respective MHTs are identical), and proceeds (in particular, s/he
can delete from his/her local storage (mi′,Tmi′ ,Ωi,σrt ′) for insertion, (Ωi,σrt ′) for deletion
or (m′i,Tm′i,Ωi,σrt ′) for modification). Otherwise, then the client knows that the server has
not obtained the same MHT thus has not correctly performed the operation on the data,
and thus aborts.
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Note that the client may ask the TPA to challenge the server after each update process
in order to check the server’s behavior.
7.4.1 MHT-based Construction
Let DPDP = (KeyGen,TagGen,PerfOp,CheckOp,GenProof, CheckProof) be a DPDP
scheme with public verifiability and data privacy such as the basic scheme given in Sec-
tion 7.1. Let SS = (SS.KeyGen,SS.Sign,SS.Verify) be a strongly unforgeable digital sig-
nature scheme. The MHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy
construction is as follows:
• MHT.KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk). The client first runs KeyGen(λ )→ (pk,sk) and SS.Key-
Gen(λ )→ (SS.pk,SS.sk). More precisely, let G be an algorithm that, on input the
security parameter λ , generates the cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of prime order p
along with a bilinear map e : G1×G2→ GT . Let g1 and g2 be two generators of
G1 and G2 respectively. Then, s elements h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1, as well as α ∈R Zp are
choosen randomly.
The client sets his/her public key pk=(pk,SS.pk)= (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,
hs,gα2 ,SS.pk) and his/her private key sk = (sk,SS.sk) = (α,SS.sk).
• MHT.TagGen(pk,sk,m)→Tm. The client runs TagGen(pk,sk,m)→T ′m =(T ′m1, · · · ,
T ′mn) ∈ Gn1 such that T ′mi = (∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−sk = (∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−α = ∏sj=1 h
−α·mi, j
j for
i ∈ [1,n]. S/he also chooses a hash function H ′ : {0,1}∗ → G1 seen as a ran-
dom oracle. Then, s/he creates the MHT according to the document m as fol-
lows. For i ∈ [1,n], the client computes H ′(mi) and assigns this value to the i-th
leaf. Once the n leaves refer to the n hash values, the client starts to construct
the resulting MHT, and obtains the root rt. Finally, the client signs the root by
running SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt)→ σrt . Using the hash values, s/he computes the ver-
ification metadata as follows: Tmi = H




(H ′(mi) ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )
−α = H ′(mi)−α ·∏sj=1 h
−α·mi, j
j , for i ∈ [1,n].
Then, the client stores all the data blocks mi in an ordered collection F and the
corresponding verification metadata Tmi in an ordered collection E. S/he forwards
these two collections as well as (H ′,σrt) to the server.
Once the server received (F,E,H ′), it generates the MHT corresponding to the data
uploaded by the client. It sends the resulting root rtserver to the client.
Upon getting the root rtserver, the client runs SS.Verify(SS.pk,σrt ,rtserver)→ answer.
If answer = f alse, then the client stops the process. Otherwise (i.e. answer = true)
s/he proceeds and deletes (F,E,σrt) from his/her local storage and keeps H ′ for
further data operations.
• MHT.PerfOp(pk,F,E,R = (operation, i), in f o = (mi,Tmi,σrt ′))→ (F′,E′,rtserver).
First, the client sends a request R to the server. Such request R = (operation, i)
should contain at least the type of operation and the position where such operation
will be performed.
Upon receiving the request R, the server selects the AAI Ωi from the MHT that the
client needs in order to generate the root rt ′ of the updated MHT. It sends Ωi to the
client.
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Once the client received Ωi, s/he first authenticates it: if Ωi is not the current AAI,
then s/he aborts; otherwise, s/he constructs the updated MHT following the update
that s/he wants the server to perform on his/her stored data. S/he calculates the new
root rt ′ and signs it by running SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt ′)→ σrt ′ . Then, the client sends
in f o = (mi,Tmi,σrt ′) (note that mi and Tmi are not necessary in case of deletion).
After receiving the element in f o from the client, the server first updates the MHT,
calculates the new root rt ′server and sends this value to the client.
Upon getting the root rt ′server, the client runs SS.Verify(SS.pk,σrt ′,rt
′
server)→ answer.
If answer = f alse, then the client stops the process. Otherwise (i.e. answer = true),
s/he proceeds and deletes (mi,Tmi,σrt ′) from his/her local storage.
• MHT.GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ (ν ,rtserver,{H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I). After a time period
to be agreed between the client and the TPA, the latter prepares a challenge chal
to be sent to the server as follows: it chooses a subset I ⊆ [1,nmax] (nmax is the
maximum number of blocks after operations), randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R
Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I .
Then, after receiving the challenge chal which indicates the specific blocks for
which the TPA on behalf of the client wants a proof of data possession, the server
runs GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν such that ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c)∈G2s+11 .
More precisely, it sets the ordered collection F = {mi}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks and an or-
dered collection Σ = {Tmi}i∈I ⊂ E which are the verification metadata correspond-
ing to the blocks in F . It then selects at random r1, · · · ,rs ∈R Zp and computes
R1 = h
r1
1 , · · · ,Rs = h
rs
s . It also sets b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j · vi + r j ∈ Zp and B j = h
b j
j ,
for j ∈ [1,s], as well as c = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
mi .
Moreover, the server prepares the latest version of the stored root’s signature σrt
provided by the client, the root rtserver of the current MHT as well as the hash values
H ′(mi) and the AAI Ωi for the challenged blocks, such that the current MHT can be
constructed using {H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I . Finally, it returns (ν ,σrt ,rtserver,{H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I)
to the TPA.
• MHT.CheckProof(pk,chal,ν ,σrt ,rtserver,{H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I)→ true/ f alse. After re-
ceiving the set {H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I from the server, the TPA first constructs the MHT
and calculates the root rtT PA. It then checks that rtserver = rtT PA: if not, then it
aborts; otherwise, it runs SS.Verify(SS.pk,σrt ,rtserver) → answer. If answer =
f alse, then the TPA stops the process. Otherwise (i.e. answer = true), it proceeds
and checks whether the following equation holds:














If the equation 7.7 holds, then the TPA returns true to the client; otherwise, it returns
f alse to the client.
Correctness. Supposing that the correctness holds for the systems DPDP and SS, if all
the algorithms of MHT.DPDP are correctly generated, then the above scheme is correct.
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We check the correctness of the proof of data possession:
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j=1
B j,g2)
Comments on the MHT-based Construction. Let SS=(SS.KeyGen,SS.Sign,SS.Verify)
be a secure digital signature scheme. One concrete and simple example in the random or-
acle model is SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt) = (H ′(rt))α = σrt , where H ′ : {0,1}∗→ G1 is the hash
function used to construct the MHT, α = sk← KeyGen(λ ) is the private key from the
basic DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy DPDP, and rt is the root of
the current MHT..
A possible security concern is the non-authentication of the TPA. We treat our scheme
as publicly verifiable, meaning that everyone has the possibility to check that the server
correctly stores the data. Therefore, a malicious user (not necessarly a client of the server)
is able to proceed such verification. To avoid such experience, the client can choose and
authenticate a particular TPA, and the server is then able to verify that the person who
wants to audit it is the TPA selected by the client [233]. More precisely, client, TPA and
server proceed as follows. When the client is uploading the data on the server, s/he also
chooses a TPA to check the integrity of his/her data, and asks the TPA its identity. The
latter encrypts its identity IDT PA under the client’s public key pk and sends the resulting
ciphertext to the client. Then, the client decrypts the latter to recover IDT PA and includes
SS.Sign(SS.sk, IDT PA) into the other elements (namely the data, the verification meta-
data, the signature of the MHT root and the hash function H ′) that are sent to the server.
Later, during each challenge-response process, the TPA encrypts its identity IDT PA un-
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der the server’s public key pkserver and sends the resulting ciphertext to the server. Then,
the server uses its associated private key skserver to recover the identity IDT PA and runs
SS.Verify(SS.pk,SS.Sign(SS.sk, IDT PA), IDT PA) to check the validity of the identity. We
assume that the server and a malicious non-authenticated TPA cannot collude together,
i.e. the server does not accept to communicate with a non-authenticated TPA.
Note that the updating proof is no longer needed since the client has to authenticate
the AAI sent by the server anyway, and has to verify that the updated MHT root rt ′server is
identical to the client’s one rt ′. We also argue that the TPA can be required to challenge
the server after each update requested by the client.
7.4.2 Security Proofs
Proof of the Security against the Server
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the security of the
MHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy, given a collision re-
sistant hash function H ′ and a strongly unforgeable digital signature scheme SS. Suppose
that A makes a total of qH ′ > 0 queries to H ′. Then, there is a challenger B that solves
the CDH and DL problems G and G1 respectively, with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants
to break the CDH and DL problems in G and G1 respectively, by interacting with A as
follows.
Setup. B runs G on input λ to obtain the tuple (p,G,GT ,e). Then, it is given the CDH
instance tuple (g,ga,gb) such that g is a generator of G and a,b are unknown expo-
nents in Zp, chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy.
It also chooses two generators g1 and g2 of G1 and G2 respectively. Note that
(ga)x = ga1, (g
b)x = gb1, (g
a)y = ga2 and (g
b)y = gb2. B chooses β j,γ j ∈R Zp and sets
h j = g
β j
1 · (gb1)γ j for j ∈ [1,s]. Let a hash function H ′ : {0,1}∗→ G1 be controlled
by B as follows. Upon receiving a query mil to the random oracle H
′ for some
l ∈ [1,qH ′]:
• If (mil ,θl,Wl) exists in LH ′ , return Wl .
• Otherwise, choose β j,γ j ∈R Zp and set h j = gβ j1 ·(gb1)γ j , for j ∈ [1,s]. For each












j=1 γ jmil , j
for a given block mil = (mil ,1, · · · ,mil ,s). Put (mil ,θl,Wl) in LH ′ and return Wl
as answer.
Note that H ′ is supposed to be collision resistant and the digital signature scheme SS
is supposed to be strongly unforgeable. B gives A the public key pk that contains
the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2) as well as the public key
SS.pk← SS.KeyGen(λ ). It keeps ga1,gb1,gb2 and SS.sk← SS.KeyGen(λ ) secret. The
private key sk is implicitly set as equal to a.
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Adaptive Queries. A has first access to the verification metadata generation oracle OT G
as follows. It adaptively selects several blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. B splits each
block mi into s sectors mi, j. Then, it computes Tmi = (W ·∏sj=1 h
mi, j
j )






−a, for i ∈ [1,n], such that if (mi,θ ,W ) exists in LH ′ , then the value W is
returned. Otherwise, an element θ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, W = gθ is computed,
and (mi,θ ,W ) is put in LH ′ .
B also creates the MHT resulting from the blocks mi and gets the corresponding
root rt. It signs rt by running σrt ← SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt). It gives the verification
metadata Tmi and their corresponding hash values W , along with σrt to A . The latter
sets an ordered collection F = {m1, · · · ,mn} of blocks and an ordered collection
E= {Tm1, · · · ,Tmn} which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks
in F.
A has also access to the data operation performance oracle ODOP as follows. Re-
peatedly, A selects a block mi and the corresponding elements (Ri, in f oi), and
forwards them to B. The signature of the root σrt ′ is included in in f oi, as the
output of the signature algorithm SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt ′). More precisely, i denotes the
rank where A wants the data operation to be performed. Note that only the rank is
needed to perform a deletion. Then, A outputs a new ordered collection F′ (con-
taining the updated version of the block mi), a new ordered collection E′ (containing
the updated version of the verification metadata Tmi) and a new root rt
′
A correspond-
ing to the updated MHT. B runs the algorithm SS.Verify on the values σrt ′ and rt ′A
and aborts if the answer is equal to f alse; it proceeds otherwise.
Challenge. A selects blocks m∗i and the corresponding elements in f o∗i and R∗i for i ∈
I = [1,n′] for n′ ≥ n, and forwards them to the challenger who checks the data
operations. In particular, the first in f o∗i indicates a full re-write.
B chooses a subset I ⊆I , randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal =
{(i,vi)}i∈I . It forwards chal as a challenge to A .
Forgery. Upon receiving the challenge chal, the resulting proof of data possession on
the correct stored document m should be ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs,c) and pass
the equation 7.7. However, A generates a proof of data possession on an incorrect
stored document m̃ as ν̃ = (R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃), such that r̃ j is randomly cho-
sen from Zp, R̃ j = h
r̃ j
j , b̃ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal m̃i, j · vi + r̃ j and B̃ j = h
b̃ j
j , for j ∈ [1,s], as
well as c̃ = ∏(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m̃i . Finally, it returns ν̃ = (R̃1, · · · , R̃s, B̃1, · · · , B̃s, c̃) to B. If
the proof of data possession still pass the verification, then A wins. Otherwise, it
fails.
Analysis. We define ∆r j = r̃ j− r j, ∆b j = b̃ j−b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j−mi, j)vi +∆r j and
∆τ j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal(m̃i, j −mi, j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that r j and b j are the elements of
a honest proof of data possession ν such that r j ∈R Zp and b j = ∑(i,vi)∈chal mi, j · vi + r j
where mi, j are the actual sectors (not the ones that the adversary claims to have).
We prove that if the adversary can win the game, then solutions to the CDH and DL
problems are found, which contradicts the assumption that the CDH and DL problems
are hard in G and G1 respectively. Let assume that the adversary (playing the role of the
server) wins the game. We recall that if A wins then B can extract the actual blocks
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{mi}(i,vi)∈chal in polynomially-many interactions with A . Without loss of generality, sup-
pose that chal = {(i,vi)}, meaning that the challenge contains only one block.




























(gβ j1 · (gb1)γ j)∆τ j ,g−a2 )
= e(g1,g2)
−a∑sj=1 β j∆τ j · e(g1,g2)−ab∑
s
j=1 γ j∆τ j











j=1 γ j∆τ j
meaning that we have found the solution to the CDH problem, that is
(gb1)









j=1 γ j∆τ j
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice
that not all of the ∆τ j can be zero (indeed, if τ j = mi, j ·vi = τ̃ j = m̃i, j ·vi for each j ∈
[1,s], then c= c̃ which contradicts the hypothesis), and the values γ j are information
theoretically hidden from A (Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero
only with probability 1/p, which is negligible. Finally, since B knows the exponent










j=1 γ j∆τ j )
1
x
and obtains gab. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the CDH problem
can be found with probability equal to 1−1/p.






















We recall that chal = {(i,vi)}. From the previous analysis step, we know that c̃ = c.
Therefore, we get that ∏sj=1 B̃ j · (∏sj=1 R̃ j)−1 = ∏sj=1 B j · (∏sj=1 R j)−1. We can
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For two elements g1,h ∈ G1, there exists ξ ∈ Zp such that h = gξ1 since G1 is a
cyclic group. Without loss of generality, given g1,h ∈G1, each h j could randomly
and correctly be generated by computing h j = g
y j
1 · hz j ∈ G1 such that y j and z j










j=1 y j·∆τ j
1 · h∑
s
j=1 z j·∆τ j . Clearly, we can find a solution to the DL problem. More
specifically, given g1,h = g
ξ
1 ∈G1, we can compute h = g
∑
s
j=1 y j ·∆τ j
∑
s




denominator is zero. However, not all of the ∆τ j can be zero and the values z j
are information theoretically hidden from A , so the denominator is only zero with
probability 1/p, which is negligible. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to
the DL problem can be found with probability equal to 1− 1p .
Therefore, for A , it is computationally infeasible to win the game and generate an incor-
rect proof of data possession which can pass the verification.
Finally, the simulations of the tag generation oracle OT G and the data operation per-
formance oracle ODOP are perfect. The proof is completed.
Proof of the Data Privacy against the TPA
Theorem. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ε against the strong data pri-
vacy property of the MHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy,
given a collision resistant hash function H ′ and a strongly unforgeable digital signature
scheme SS. Suppose that A makes a total of qH ′ > 0 queries to H. Then, there is a chal-
lenger B that solves the (s+1)-DDHE problem in (G1,G2) with advantage ε ′ = O(ε).
We presume that the digital signature scheme SS is strongly unforgeable and the hash
function H ′ is collision resistant. For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is
a challenger B that wants to break the (s+1)-DDHE assumption by interacting with the
adversary A as follows.
Setup. B runs G on input λ to obtain the tuple (p,G1,G2,GT ,e) and receives the (s+1)-




2) where g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a
generator of G2. B sets µ̃ = 0 when the output Z of the (s+1)-DDHE assumption
is equal to ga
s+2
1 ; otherwise, it sets µ̃ = 1 when the output Z of the (s+1)-DDHE as-
sumption is a random element in G1. Then, it randomly chooses ξ1, · · · ,ξs,ξs+1 ∈R







fixes the private key sk = a. B also controls the hash function H ′ : {0,1}∗→G1 as
follows. Upon receiving a query mil to the random oracle H
′ for some l ∈ [1,qH ′]:
• If (mil ,θl,Vl,Wl) exists in LH ′ , return Vl and Wl .





1 . Put (mil ,θl,Vl,Wl) in LH ′ and return Wl as an-
swer.
It sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2). The challenger
has also access to a secure digital signature scheme SS and runs the algorithm
SS.KeyGen(λ ) to obtain the public and private key pair (SS.pk,SS.sk). B sets
the public key pk = (pk,SS.pk) and forwards it to A . It keeps the private keys sk
and SS.sk, as well as the hash function H ′.
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Query Phase. A makes verification metadata generation queries as follows: A first se-
lects a document m = (m1, · · · ,mn) and sends it to B. Then, the challenger splits
each block mi into s sectors mi, j. Then, it computes Tmi =W ·∏sj=1 g
a j·(−a)·ξ j·mi, j
1 =
W ·∏sj=1 g
−a j+1·ξ j·mi, j
1 , such that if (mi,θ ,V,W ) exists in LH ′ , then the value W is
used to compute Tmi; otherwise, an element θ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, V = g−θ1
and W = h−θ/ξ11 are computed, (mi,θ ,V,W ) is put in LH ′ and W is used for the
generation of Tmi . B also creates the MHT resulting from the document m using
the values V such that if (mi,θ ,V,W ) exists in LH ′ , then the value V is returned;
otherwise, an element θ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, V = g−θ1 and W = h
−θ/ξ1
1 are
computed, and (mi,θ ,V,W ) is put in LH ′ . It finally gets the corresponding root rt. It
gives the verification metadata Tm = (Tm1, · · · ,Tmn) along with the root’s signature
σrt ← SS.Sign(SS.sk,rt) to A .
Challenge. A first gives to the challenger two documents m0 = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,n) and
m1 = (m1,1, · · · ,m1,n) of equal length and that have not been queried beforehand.
B randomly selects a bit µ ∈R {0,1} and for i ∈ [1,n], splits each block mµ,i into
s sectors mµ,i, j. Then, it computes Tmµ,i = Wµ ·∏sj=1 g
−a j+1·ξ j·mµ,i, j
1 , such that if
(mµ,i,θµ ,Vµ ,Wµ) exists in LH ′ , then the value Wµ is returned; otherwise, an ele-
ment θµ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, Vµ = g−θµ1 and Wµ = h
−θµ/ξ1
1 are computed,
and (mµ,i,θµ ,Vµ ,Wµ) is put in LH ′ . B also creates the MHT resulting from the
document mµ using the values Vµ such that if (mµ,i,θµ ,Vµ ,Wµ) exists in LH ′ ,
then the value Vµ is returned; otherwise, an element θµ ∈R Zp is chosen at ran-
dom, Vµ = g
−θµ
1 and Wµ = h
−θµ/ξ1
1 are computed, and (mµ,i,θµ ,Vµ ,Wµ) is put in
LH ′ . It finally gets the corresponding root rtµ . It gives the verification metadata
Tmµ = (Tmµ,1, · · · ,Tmµ,n) along with the root’s signature σrtµ ← SS.Sign(SS.sk,rtµ)
to A .
Without loss of generality, A generates a challenge on one block only. It chooses
a subset I = {i∗} ⊆ [1,n], randomly chooses an element vi∗ ∈R Zp and sets chal =
{(i∗,vi∗)}. It forwards chal as a challenge to B. Upon receiving the challenge chal,
B selects an ordered collection Fµ = {mµ,i∗} of blocks and an ordered collection
Σµ = {Tmµ,i∗} which are the verification metadata corresponding to the blocks in Fµ
such that Tmµ,i∗ =Wµ ·∏sj=1 g
−a j+1·ξ j·mµ,i∗, j
1 . It then randomly chooses r1, · · · ,rs ∈R




















ξs·rs . It implicitly fixes
b1 = a2 · (mµ,i∗,1 · vi∗+ r1), · · · ,bs−1 = a2(·mµ,i∗,s−1 · vi∗+ rs−1)










































and B∗s = Z
ξs·mµ,i∗,s·vi∗ ·Zξs·rs . It sets c∗ = T vi∗mµ,i∗ = W
vi∗
µ ·∏sj=1 g
−a j+1·ξ j·mµ,i∗, j·vi∗
1 as
well.
Finally, B returns ν∗ = (R∗1, · · · ,R∗s ,B∗1, · · · ,B∗s ,c∗) along with (Vµ ,Ωµ,i∗), where
Ωµ,i∗ is the AAI needed to create the MHT based on Vµ . Note that Ωµ,i∗ is generated
by calling successively the random oracle H ′. This means that, in the list LH ′ , we
can find tuples of the form (z,θ ,V,W ) such that the query z can be either a data
block mi as we defined above (meaning that mi is appended to a leaf node) or a
value H ′(y) that is attached to an internal node, where y is calculated according to
the MHT construction rules.
If µ̃ = 0 then Z = ga
s+2
1 . Therefore, the proof of data possession is a valid random
proof for the document mµ . Otherwise, if µ̃ = 1, then Z is random value in G1.
Since Z is random, the values R∗s and B
∗
s will be random elements of G1 from the
adversary’s view and the proof of data possession contains no information about
mµ .
Guess. A returns a bit µ ′. If µ = µ ′, B will output µ̃ ′ = 0 to indicate that it was given a
(s+1)-DDHE tuple; otherwise it will output µ̃ ′ = 1 to indicate that it was given a
random tuple.
Analysis. We first recall that the digital signature scheme SS is assumed to be strongly
unforgeable and the hash function H ′ is supposed to be collision resistant. We prove
that the verification metadata and the proof of data possession given to A are correctly
distributed. In the case where µ̃ = 1, A gains no information about µ . Therefore, we
have Pr[µ 6= µ ′|µ̃ = 1] = 1/2. Since B guesses µ̃ ′ = 1 when µ 6= µ ′, we have Pr[µ̃ =
µ̃ ′|µ̃ = 1] = 1/2. If µ̃ = 0, then A sees an upload of mµ . The adversary’s advantage
in this situation is negligible by definition, i.e. equal to a given ε . Therefore, we have
Pr[µ 6= µ ′|µ̃ = 0] = 1/2+ ε . Since B guesses µ̃ ′ = 0 when µ = µ ′, we have Pr[µ̃ =




is implicitly set as equal to a and the h j’s are correclty distributed as in the real game.
We recall that the elements SS.sk and H ′ are kept secret from A . Note that A does not
have access to the random oracle H ′ and the AAI given to the adversary with the proof of
data possession results from calls to H ′. In addition, R∗1, · · · ,R∗s ,B∗1, · · · ,B∗s are statically
indistinguishable with the actual outputs corresponding to m0 or m1. Thus, the answers
given to A are correctly distributed. The proof is completed.
N.B. Such security level is reached for data privacy since the hash function H ′ is kept
secret by the server and the client and so, the adversary as the TPA does not have access
to it.
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7.4.3 Performance of the MHT-based DPDP Scheme
We compare the MHT-based DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy with
the basic scheme DPDP presented in Section 7.1. In the MHT-based construction, the
client is able to verify the first upload and the updates without the help of the TPA. S/he
authenticates the AAI given by the server, uses his/her MHT root and compares it with
the one provided by the server. The TPA is required for data integrity checks: it regularly
challenges the server to prove that the latter correctly stores the data of the client. The
client and the TPA share a list containing block indices (or at least the maximum number
nmax of blocks given after the operations that the client wanted the server to perform on
his/her data) and the server stores the data, the verification metadata, the signature of the
client’s root (also regularly updated after the data operations) and the hash function H ′.
The server might construct the MHT each time this is needed or stores the latest version
of the entire tree.
Obviously, the communication and the computational overheads grow. First of all,
when the client is uploading the document for the first time, s/he has to compute all the
elements in order to construct the MHT resulting from the document and compare the
root with the one from the server’s MHT. However, such elements are hash values, that
are elements easily computable.
Moreover, the server stores more elements: the MHT and the signature of the client’s
root for each document, along with the document itself and the corresponding verification
metadata as in Section 7.1. Note that for each time the server is asked to perform an
operation, it has to update the MHT accordingly. Nevertheless, as suggested in Section
7.1, the server has huge computational and storage resources, thus this should not be a
constraint for it. Note that the server can only store mi, Tmi , σrt and H
′ and constructs the
MHT whenever necessary; however, this option does not seem more attractive.
Then, the communication burden increases between the client and the server, espe-
cially for the data operation process. More precisely, the client has first to inform the
server that s/he wants to make an operation on his/her data and asks the necessary infor-
mation. From this request, the server sends some AAI to the client in order to start the data
operation process. Upon receiving such information, the client has to authenticate it and
then create the MHT according to the data update to be performed. Then, as for the first
upload, the client sends the resulting information back to the server. Using such elements,
the server can perform the operation on the stored data and on the MHT, and obtain a new
version of the root that is forwarded back to the client. Such root is compared with the
one given by the client (under the form of a signature) on the client’s side. However, we
no longer need the help of the TPA to check the updates. Thus, the server no longer has
to generate an updating proof through the algorithm PerfOp and the TPA no longer has to
run the algorithm CheckOp to verify the correctness of the updating proof, compared to
the scheme in Section 7.1. Overall, implementing a MHT-based scheme seems to fairly
affect the computation and communication overheads.
In the MHT-based system, we assume that the client deletes all the elements related
to the document (blocks, verification metadata, root signatures, MHTs) from his/her local
storage, except a list containing the block indices that are needed for requesting a data
integrity verification. Such list may be shared with the TPA since the latter works on be-
half of the client in the challenge-response process. In order to reduce the communication
overhead between the client and the server when the former prepares an update operation,
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we can force the client to store on his/her local storage the current MHT or a list of the
hash values corresponding to all the leaves of the current MHT. Doing this, the client does
not need to ask for the AAI before updating the data and so, the server does not need to
send it back to the client. Note that the latter no longer needs to authenticate it, since s/he
keeps the current version of the MHT.
If the client keeps the entire MHT, the hash values at internal nodes and the root are
already computed; however s/he has to store 2k+1− 1 elements for n = 2k. Moreover,
when an operation is performed, the client does not need to calculate all the hash values
at internal nodes, but only the ones on the path from the modified leaves until the root, as
well as the root itself. If the client keeps only a list of hash values corresponding to all
the leaves of the MHT, meaning that s/he stores only n elements, s/he has to compute all
the intermediary hash values at upper levels and the root each time s/he inserts, deletes or
modifies data blocks. This option is possible if the client possesses enough resources for
storage and computation.
The MHT-based construction seems less practical and efficient. Communication and
computational burdens appear in order to obtain the desired security standards against
the server and the TPA. The communication overheads increase between the client and
the server. The computational overheads for the client raises also, although the client is
supposed to be limited in resources. The storage space of the server should be bigger,
since the server has to create and possibly stores MHTs for each client it has. The TPA
has to provide more computational resources for each client in order to ensure valid data
integrity checks. Nevertheless, experiments might show that the time gap between the
algorithms in the scheme proposed in Section 7.1 and the ones in the MHT-based scheme
is acceptable.
Comparison with the Existing Schemes. The MHT is an authenticated data structure
(ADS) that allows the client and the TPA to check that the server correctly stores and
updates the data blocks.
Erway et al. [77] proposed the first DPDP scheme. The verification of the data
updates is based on a modified ADS, called rank-based authentication skip list (RASL).
This provides authentication of the data block indices, which ensures security in regards
to data block dynamicity. However, public verifiability is not reached. Note that such
ADS with bottom-up levelling limits the insertion operations. For instance, if the leaf
nodes are at level 0, any data insertion that creates a new level below the level 0 will bring
necessary updates of all the level hash values and the client might not be able to verify.
Wang et al. [232] first presented a DPDP with public verifiability using MHT. How-
ever, security proofs and technical details lacked. The authors revised the aforementioned
paper [232] and proposed a more complete paper [233] that focuses on dynamic and
publicly verifiable PDP systems based on BLS signatures. To achieve the dynamicity
property, they employed MHT. Nevertheless, because the check of the block indices is
not done, the server can delude the client by corrupting a challenged block as follows: it
is able to compute a valid proof with other non-corrupted blocks. Thereafter, in a subse-
quent work [230], Wang et al. suggested to add randomization to the above system [233],
in order to guarantee that the server cannot deduce the contents of the data documents
from the proofs of data possession.
Liu et al. [148] constructed a PDP protocol based on MHT with top-down levelling.
Such protocol satisfies dynamicity and public verifiability. They opted for such design to
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let leaf nodes be on different levels. Thus, the client and the TPA have both to remember
the total number of data blocks and check the block indices from two directions (leftmost
to rightmost and vice versa) to ensure that the server does not delude the client with
another node on behalf of a data block during the data integrity checking process.
In this section, the dynamic and publicly verifiable PDP scheme is based on MHT
with bottom-up levelling, such that data block indices are authenticated. Such tree-based
construction guarantees security for both dynamicity and public verifiability properties.
We have explained how we can ensure that the server cannot successfully generate a
correct proof of data possession without storing all the data blocks and the TPA cannot
get any information about the challenged data blocks.
7.5 Conclusion
We first proposed a basic DPDP system with public verifiability and data privacy in the
standard model. Unfortunately, the construction appeared to be vulnerable to three at-
tacks.
We thus provided two solutions to solve the adversarial issues found in the basic
scheme. These solutions manage to overcome replay attacks, replace attacks and attacks
against data privacy by embedding index hash tables (IHT) or Merkle hash trees (MHT)
into the basic construction. We proved that our two new schemes are both secure against
the server and data private in the random oracle and we also showed that the practicality
of these two new constructions is just slightly affected compared to the one of the basic
DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Summary of the Contributions
Numerous solutions about the storage and access management of EHRs have been pro-
posed in the literature. For instance, the issues related to EHR access control have been
well studied and partially solved. In addition, problems arisen with EHRs stored on cloud
servers have been carefully described and almost overcome. Nevertheless, since e-Health
is a wide topic, this is difficult to approach it as one all and give an satisfactory solution
that embeds all the problems that EHR management can encounter.
In this thesis, we focused on information security and cryptography in the perspective
of e-Health. We decided to approach the EHR-based context by dividing it into subcases
in order to present successful and effective solutions. In particular, we separated access
control and cloud computing environments since these two aspect of EHR management
do not necessarily bring the same kinds of security and efficiency concerns. We studied
various healthcare environment-based scenarios, while these scenarios remained applica-
ble to situations involving other kind of personal information. In summary, we met the
following problematic aspects:
• Efficiency and practicality in terms of computation and communication;
• Security and privacy for both users’ identities and data.
These issues need to be overcome since EHRs have been chosen as the option to archive
sensitive personal medical information and would be propagated worldwide.
In each chapter, we first described the problematic aspects met in an e-Health en-
vironment, and we then presented EHR-based cryptographic primitives to answer them.
The following cryptographic features and tools have been used to design our primitives:
• The definitions of our schemes followed the public-key encryption setting. This
means that users receive a public and private key pair, where the public key is used
for message encryption and the corresponding private key is required for successful
decryption.
• Pairings were used in our constructions. More precisely, we used maps with domain
and range in cyclic groups of the form e : G1×G2→ GT , where G1, G2 and GT
are multiplicative cyclic groups of order the prime p. We recall that e is said to be
a symmetric pairing map when G1 =G2; e is said to be an asymmetric pairing map
otherwise.
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• We sometimes required the random oracle model to prove our schemes secure at a
satisfactory level. To do so, we used hash functions seen as random oracles.
• We tried as much as possible to rely the security proofs of our schemes on simple
algorithmic problems, such that these problems are shown to be hard to solve.
We now summarise our work in each chapter. In Chapter 4, we presented the follow-
ing cryptographic primitives to broadcast and share EHRs among the invovled users in a
secure and efficient way.
Broadcast Encryption with Membership. The broadcast encryption with membership
(BEM) primitive has been presented as a solution to allow the medical institute
to forward encrypted medical information such that only hospital staff members
selected by the hospital can retrieve the original information while the medical in-
situte does not know the identities of these authorised staff members.
We gave the definition of such BEM primitive along with the security models that
should be satisfied. We then proposed a BEM construction and proved it semi-
statically IND-CCA (indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attack) secure,
privacy preserving and maximum number accountability secure in the standard
model. In addition, we achieved constant size for the ciphertexts and the tokens.
We also suggested a technique to transform a semi-statically IND-CCA secure BEM
scheme into an adaptively secure BEM scheme.
Certificate-Based Broadcast Encryption. We presented the certificate-based broadcast
encryption (CBBE) primitive as a solution to let the hospital to send encrypted
medical information to all the staff members while only members authorised by
the hospital and holding valid licenses delivered by medical legislators are able to
successfully recover the information in plain.
We carefully defined such CBBE primitive and its security models. We gave a first
CBBE construction that is adaptively IND-CCA secure in the standard model, with
components having size linear in the number of both the legislators and the staff
members. We presented a second efficient CBBE scheme that is selectively IND-
CCA secure and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model, with
short ciphertexts, private keys and certificates.
In Chapter 5, we presented the following cryptographic primitive to access and re-
trieve EHRs stored on cloud servers in a secure and efficient way.
Certificate-Based Encryption with Keyword Search. We proposed a solution that we
called certificate-based encryption with keyword search (CBEKS), to let a cloud
server to check the requests sent by the hospital staff members when they wish to
access medical information. To do so, the cloud server verifies two components:
the keyword as a description of the searched information and the label as a repre-
sentation of the access right held by the staff members.
We properly gave a definition for such CBEKS primitive along with the secu-
rity models for computational consistency, IND-CKCA (indistinguishability against
chosen keyword and ciphertext attack) security, IND-KGA (indistinguishability
against keyword-guessing attack) security and collusion resistance. We constructed
a CBEKS scheme that is provably secure regarding the aforementioned security
models, in the standard model. We also managed to get all the components with
constant size.
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In Chapter 6, we presented the following cryptographic primitives to ensure patient
privacy and save computational and communication resources in EHR-based storage in a
secure and efficient way.
On-line/Off-line Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption. The on-line/
off-line ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE)
appeared to be a solution to enable hospital staff members to pre-encrypt medical
information off-line and to complete the encryption online later, regarding require-
ments (credentials) that members should satisfy in order to retrieve the original
information.
We provided the definition of such OO-CP-AB-PRE and its security models. Our
OO-CP-AB-PRE construction is efficient and practical with components’ size lin-
ear in the number of credentials, and proved selectively IND-CCA secure and se-
lectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model.
Ciphertext-Policy DNA-Based Encryption. The cipertext-policy DNA-based encryp-
tion (CP-DBE) is a solution to a particular case, that is, encrypting and decrypting
information using DNA sequences. We noticed that DNA properties are interesting
to design public-key cryptography since the DNA of an individual is unique but has
some parts shared with relatives. We recall that we considered the repetition of the
minisatellites as the feature to base on our primitive.
We proposed a definition for such CP-DBE primitive and the security models that
this primitive should meet. We constructed a CP-DBE scheme and proved it se-
lectively IND-CCA secure and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle
model. This construction has components with size linear in the number of min-
isatellites.
In Chapter 7, we presented the following cryptographic primitive to manage EHRs in
cloud computing in a secure and efficient way.
Dynamic Provable Data Possession with Public Verifiability and Data Privacy. A so-
lution to allow hospital staff members and patients to upload, share and update med-
ical information stored on a cloud server is the dynamic provable data possession
(DPDP) primitive with public verifiability and data privacy.
We first defined the DPDP primitive with public verifiability and data privacy and
the security models that are security against the cloud server and data privacy
against the third party auditor (TPA). We then suggested a basic construction for
a DPDP scheme with public verifiability and data privacy in the standard model.
Unfortunately, the construction appeared to be vulnerable to three attacks, namely
the replay attack, the replace attack and the attack against strong data privacy.
We thus provided two other constructions for a DPDP scheme with public verifi-
ability and data privacy to solve the adversarial issues found in the basic scheme.
These solutions manage to overcome the three aforementioned attacks by embed-
ding IHT and MHT into the basic construction respectively. We finally showed that
these two constructions are secure against the server and data private in the random
oracle.
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8.2 Future Work
Future work includes the improvement of the above primitives in terms of better efficiency
and practicality, as well as in terms of stronger security level. For instance, all the con-
structions taking place in the random oracle model should be extended into the standard
model in order to achieve a more realistic security goal. Future work also includes the
design of new primitives as answers to existing and non-existing scenarios. Indeed, we do
not argue that a primitive proposed in this thesis is the unique solution to a given scenario.
Indeed, another primitive can be proposed as another solution to the same scenario.
Since EHRs will be propagated worldwide, current issues may become more preva-
lent while new scenarios will be formed and so, new issues may arise. In addition, we
observe that EHRs will be information with the need of big data framework. Indeed, we
imagine that most of the nations will end up by adopting EHRs as the option to archive
their medical information, therefore the quantity of data that contain sensitive personal
information about human beings will be huge from an earch point of view. Therefore,
works on access control and cloud computing in the perspective of big EHR data have to
be done.
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[77] Chris Erway, Alptekin Küpçü, Charalampos Papamanthou, and Roberto Tamassia.
Dynamic provable data possession. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2009, pages 213–222, New York,
NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[78] Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich, and Silvio Micali. On-line/off-line digital signa-
tures. Journal of Cryptology, 9(1):35–67, March 1996.
[79] Chun-I Fan, Pei-Jen Tsai, Jheng-Jia Huang, and Wen-Tsuen Chen. Anonymous
multi-receiver certificate-based encryption. In CyberC, pages 19–26. IEEE, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 239
[80] Xinyu Fan, Guomin Yang, Yi Mu, and Yong Yu. On indistinguishability in remote
data integrity checking. The Computer Journal, 58(4):823–830, April 2015.
[81] Liming Fang, Willy Susilo, Chunpeng Ge, and Jiandong Wang. A secure channel
free public key encryption with keyword search scheme without random oracle. In
Cryptology and Network Security, volume 5888 of LNCS, pages 248–258. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[82] Liming Fang, Willy Susilo, Chunpeng Ge, and Jiandong Wang. Public key encryp-
tion with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random
oracle. Information Science, 238:221–241, 2013.
[83] Ana Ferreira, Ricardo Cruz-Correia, Luis Antunes, and David Chadwick. Access
control: how can it improve patients’ healthcare? In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Council on Medical and Care Compunetics, ICMCC 2007, pages 182–196,
2007.
[84] Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. Broadcast encryption. In Proceedings of the 13th
Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1993, pages 480–491.
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1994.
[85] Neil S. Fleming, Steven D. Culler, Russell McCorkle, Edmund R. Becker, and
David J. Ballard. The financial and nonfinancial costs of implementing electronic
health records in primary care practices. Health Affairs, 30(3):481–489, 2011.
[86] Alejandro Enrique Flores Zuniga, Khin Than Win, and Willy Susilo. Secure ex-
change of electronic health records. User-Driven Healthcare: Concepts, Method-
ologies, Tools, and Applications, pages 1403–1424, 2013.
[87] Francis. H. Roger France, Marc Bangels, and Etienne De Clercq. Purposes of
health identification cards and role of a secure access platform (be-health) in bel-
gium. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 76:84–88, 2007.
[88] Gerhard Frey, M. Muller, and Hans Georg Ruck. The tate pairing and the discrete
logarithm applied to elliptic curve cryptosystems. IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Theory, 45(5):1717–1719, September 2006.
[89] Thomas Fuhr and Pascal Paillier. Decryptable searchable encryption. In Proceed-
ings of the First International Conference on Provable Security, ProvSec 2007,
pages 228–236, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer.
[90] Randike Gajanayake, Renato Iannella, and Tony R. Sahama. Privacy oriented ac-
cess control for electronic health records. In Proceedings of the International World
Wide Web Workshop on Data Usage Management on the Web. ACM, 2012.
[91] Steven D. Galbraith. Supersingular curves in cryptography. In Proceedings of the
7th International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Infor-
mation Security, ASIACRYPT 2001, pages 495–513, London, UK, 2001. Springer-
Verlag.
[92] Steven D. Galbraith, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Nigel P. Smart. Pairings for cryp-
tographers. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 156(16):3113–3121, September 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 240
[93] Craig Gentry. Certificate-based encryption and the certificate revocation problem.
In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2003, pages 272–293, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2003. Springer-Verlag.
[94] Craig Gentry. Practical identity-based encryption without random oracles. In Pro-
ceedings of the 24th Annual International Conference on Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2006, pages 445–464, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2006. Springer-Verlag.
[95] Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi. Hierarchical identity based encryption with polyno-
mially many levels. In Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference
on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2009, pages 437–456, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009.
Springer-Verlag.
[96] Craig Gentry and Alice Silverberg. Hierarchical id-based cryptography. In Pro-
ceedings of the 8th International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptol-
ogy and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2002, pages 548–566. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2002.
[97] Craig Gentry and Brent Waters. Adaptive security in broadcast encryption systems
(with short ciphertexts). In Proceedings of the International Conference on Theory
and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2009, pages 171–
188. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[98] Oded Goldreich. A uniform-complexity treatment of encryption and zero-
knowledge. Journal of Cryptology, 6(1):21–53, March 1993.
[99] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York, NY, USA, 2000.
[100] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications.
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2004.
[101] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption and how to play men-
tal poker keeping secret all partial information. In Proceedings of the 14th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1982, pages 365–377. ACM,
1982.
[102] Michael T. Goodrich, Roberto Tamassia, and Andrew Schwerin. Implementation of
an authenticated dictionary with skip lists and commutative hashing. In Proceed-
ings of the DARPA Information Survivability Conference, DISCEX 2001, pages
68–82 vol.2, 2001.
[103] Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain, Omkant Pandey, and Amit Sahai. Bounded ciphertext
policy attribute based encryption. In Proceedings of the 35th International Collo-
quium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2008, pages 579–591,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[104] Vipul Goyal, Omkant Pandey, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Attribute-based en-
cryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data. In Proceedings of the
13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2006,
pages 89–98, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 241
[105] Matthew Green and Giuseppe Ateniese. Identity-based proxy re-encryption. In
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Net-
work Security, ACNS 2007, pages 288–306, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer-
Verlag.
[106] Chunxiang Gu, Yuefei Zhu, and Heng Pan. Efficient public key encryption with
keyword search schemes from pairings. In Proceedings of the Third SKLOIS Con-
ference on Information Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2007, pages 372–383,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer.
[107] Tracy D. Gunter and Terry Nicholas P. The emergence of national electronic health
record architectures in the united states and australia: Models, costs, and ques-
tionss. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 7(1):e3, 2005.
[108] Fuchun Guo, Yi Mu, and Zhide Chen. Mutative identity-based signatures or dy-
namic credentials without random oracles. In Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2007, pages 1–14, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2007. Springer.
[109] Fuchun Guo, Yi Mu, and Zhide Chen. Identity-based online/offline encryption. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference, volume 5143 of FC 2008, pages
247–261. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[110] Fuchun Guo, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, and Vijay Varadharajan. Membership encryp-
tion and its applications. In Proceedings of the 18th Australasian Conference on
Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2013, pages 219–234. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2013.
[111] Sebastian Haas, Sven Wohlgemuth, Isao Echizen, Noboru Sonehara, and G˙ As-
pects of privacy for electronic health records. International Journal of Medical
Informatics, 80(2):e26 – e31, 2011.
[112] Zhuo Hao, Sheng Zhong, and Nenghai Yu. A privacy-preserving remote data in-
tegrity checking protocol with data dynamics and public verifiability. IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 23(9):1432–1437, September 2011.
[113] Guy C. Hembroff and Sead Muftic. Samson: Secure access for medical smart
cards over networks. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on
A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, WOWMOM 2010, pages
1–6, Washington, DC, USA, 2010. IEEE Computer Society.
[114] Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(301):13–30, 1963.
[115] Susan Hohenberger and Brent Waters. Online/offline attribute-based encryption.
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Practice and Theory in
Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2014, pages 293–310. Springer-Verlag, 2014.
[116] Monica M. Horvath, Stephanie Winfield, Steve Evans, Steve Slopek, Howard
Shang, and Jeffrey Ferranti. The deduce guided query tool: Providing simplified
access to clinical data for research and quality improvement. Journal of Biomedical
Informatics, 44(2):266 – 276, 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 242
[117] Jeremy Horwitz and Ben Lynn. Toward hierarchical identity-based encryption. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2002, pages 466–481, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2002. Springer-Verlag.
[118] Jie Huang, Mohamed Sharaf, and Chin-Tser Huang. A hierarchical framework for
secure and scalable ehr sharing and access control in multi-cloud. In Proceedings
of the 41st International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops, ICPPW
2012, pages 279–287, Washington, DC, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
[119] Lu-Chou Huang, Huei-Chung Chu, Chung-Yueh Lien, Chia-Hung Hsiao, and Tsair
Kao. Privacy preservation and information security protection for patients’ portable
electronic health records. Computers in Biology and Medicine, 39(9):743–750,
September 2009.
[120] Anca Ivan and Yevgeniy Dodis. Proxy cryptography revisited. In Proceedings of
the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2003, 2003.
[121] Mohammad Jafari, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Chad Saunders, and Nicholas Paul
Sheppard. Using digital rights management for securing data in a medical research
environment. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual ACM Workshop on Digital Rights
Management, DRM 2010, pages 55–60, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[122] Mohammad Jafari, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Nicholas Paul Sheppard. A rights
management approach to protection of privacy in a cloud of electronic health
records. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual ACM Workshop on Digital Rights
Management, DRM 2011, pages 23–30, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[123] Markus Jakobsson. On quorum controlled asymmetric proxy re-encryption. In Pro-
ceedings of the Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public
Key Cryptography, PKC 1999, pages 112–121, London, UK, UK, 1999. Springer-
Verlag.
[124] Ik Rae Jeong, Jeong Ok Kwon, Dowon Hong, and Dong Hoon Lee. Constructing
peks schemes secure against keyword guessing attacks is possible? Computer
Communications, 32(2):394–396, February 2009.
[125] Wen-Shan Jian, Hsyien-Chia Wen, Jeremiah Scholl, Syed Abdul Shabbir, Peisan
Lee, Chien-Yeh Hsu, and Yu-Chuan Li. The taiwanese method for providing pa-
tients data from multiple hospital ehr systems. Journal of Biomedical Informatics,
44(2):326–332, 2011.
[126] Antoine Joux and Kim Nguyen. Separating decision diffie–hellman from computa-
tional diffie–hellman in cryptographic groups. Journal of Cryptology, 16(4):239–
247, 2003.
[127] Ari Juels and Burton S. Kaliski, Jr. Pors: Proofs of retrievability for large files.
In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS 2007, pages 584–597, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[128] Stasia Kahn and Vikram Sheshadri. Medical record privacy and security in a digital
environment. IT Professional, 10(2):46–52, 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 243
[129] Atif Khan and Ian McKillop. Privacy-centric access control for distributed hetero-
geneous medical information systems. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Healthcare Informatics, ICHI 2013, pages 297–306, 2013.
[130] M. Fahim Ferdous Khan and Ken Sakamura. Security in healthcare informatics:
Design and implementation of a robust authentication and a hybrid access control
mechanism. In Proceedings of the Mosharaka International Conference on Com-
munications, Computers and Applications, MIC-CCA 2012, pages 159–164, 2012.
[131] Eike Kiltz. A tool box of cryptographic functions related to the diffie-hellman func-
tion. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in India,
INDOCRYPT 2001, pages 339–350, Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[132] Eike Kiltz and David Galindo. Direct chosen-ciphertext secure identity-based key
encapsulation without random oracles. In Proceedings of the 11th Australasian
Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2006, pages 336–347,
2006.
[133] Eike Kiltz and David Galindo. Direct chosen-ciphertext secure identity-based key
encapsulation without random oracles. Theoretical Computer Science, 410(47–
49):5093–5111, 2009.
[134] Hugo Krawczyk and Tal Rabin. Chameleon hashing and signatures. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 1998/010, 1998. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[135] Serge Lang. Elliptic Functions, chapter Elliptic Functions, pages 5–21. Springer,
New York, NY, 1987.
[136] Laurie Law, Alfred Menezes, Minghua Qu, Jerry Solinas, and Scott Vanstone.
An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement. Technical report, Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, 1998.
[137] Anh Le and Athina Markopoulou. Nc-audit: Auditing for network coding storage.
CoRR, abs/1203.1730, 2012.
[138] Edward D. Lemaire, Dan Deforge, Shawn Marshall, and Dorothyann Curran. A
secure web-based approach for accessing transitional health information for people
with traumatic brain injury. Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine,
81:213–219.
[139] Allison Lewko. Tools for simulating features of composite order bilinear groups in
the prime order setting. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual International Conference
on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2012,
pages 318–335, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
[140] Allison Lewko, Tatsuaki Okamoto, Amit Sahai, Katsuyuki Takashima, and Brent
Waters. Fully secure functional encryption: Attribute-based encryption and (hi-
erarchical) inner product encryption. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual Interna-
tional Conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EU-
ROCRYPT 2010, pages 62–91, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 244
[141] Allison Lewko, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Revocation systems with very
small private keys. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/309, 2008. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/.
[142] Allison Lewko and Brent Waters. Unbounded hibe and attribute-based encryption.
In Proceedings of the 30th Annual International Conference on Theory and Ap-
plications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT
2011, pages 547–567, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
[143] Allison Lewko and Brent Waters. New proof methods for attribute-based encryp-
tion: Achieving full security through selective techniques. In Proceedings of the
32th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2012, pages 180–
198. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[144] Ming Li, Shucheng Yu, Yao Zheng, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou. Scalable and
secure sharing of personal health records in cloud computing using attribute-based
encryption. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 24(1):131–
143, January 2013.
[145] Kaitai Liang, Liming Fang, Duncan S. Wong, and Willy Susilo. A ciphertext-policy
attribute-based proxy re-encryption with chosen-ciphertext security. In Proceed-
ings of the 5th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collabora-
tive Systems, INCoS 2013, pages 552–559, 2013.
[146] Xiaohui Liang, Zhenfu Cao, Huang Lin, and Jun Shao. Attribute based proxy re-
encryption with delegating capabilities. In Proceedings of the 4th International
Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security, ASIACCS
2009, pages 276–286, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[147] Benoı̂t Libert, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Elizabeth A. Quaglia. Anonymous broad-
cast encryption: Adaptive security and efficient constructions in the standard
model. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Practice and The-
ory in Public Key Cryptography, PKC 2012, pages 206–224, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2012. Springer-Verlag.
[148] Chang Liu, Rajiv Ranjan, Chi Yang, Xuyun Zhang, Lizhe Wang, and Jinjun Chen.
Mur-dpa: Top-down levelled multi-replica merkle hash tree based secure public
auditing for dynamic big data storage on cloud. IEEE Transactions on Computers,
64(9):2609–2622, September 2015.
[149] Song Luo, Jianbin Hu, and Zhong Chen. Ciphertext policy attribute-based proxy
re-encryption. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information
and Communications Security, ICICS 2010, pages 401–415, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2010. Springer-Verlag.
[150] Masahiro Mambo and Eiji Okamoto. Proxy cryptosystems: Delegation of the
power to decrypt ciphertexts. IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Elec-
tronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, E80-A(1):54–63, January 1997.
[151] Kenneth D. Mandl, Peter Szolovits, and Isaac S. Kohane. Public standards and
patients control: how to keep electronic medical records accessible but private.
British Medical Journal, 322(7281):283–287, 2001.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245
[152] Russell F. Martin. Group selection and key management strategies for ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption. Master’s thesis, Rochester Institute of Technol-
ogy, 2013.
[153] I. Mavridis, C. Georgiadis, G. Pangalos, and M. Khair. Access control based on
attribute certificates for medical intranet applications. Journal of Medical Internet
Research, 3(1):E9, March 2001.
[154] Nir Menachemi and Taleah H. Collum. Benefits and drawbacks of electronic health
record systems. Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 2011(4):47–55, May
2011.
[155] Alfred J. Menezes, Tatsuaki Okamoto, and Scott A. Vanstone. Reducing elliptic
curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite field. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 39(5):1639–1646, September 2006.
[156] Ralph C. Merkle. Secure communications over insecure channels. Communica-
tions of the ACM, 21(4):294–299, April 1978.
[157] Ralph Charles Merkle. Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems. PhD
thesis, Stanford, CA, USA, 1979.
[158] Silvio Micali. Novomondo: Scalable certificate validation and simplified pki man-
agement. In Proceedings of the first Annual PKI Research Workshop, 2002.
[159] Silvio Micali, Charles Rackoff, and Bob Sloan. The notion of security for proba-
bilistic cryptosystems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 17(2):412–426, April 1988.
[160] Victor S. Miller. Short programs for functions on curves. In IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center. Unplublised manuscript, 1986.
[161] Shigeo Mitsunari, Ryuichi Sakai, and M. Kasahara. A new traitor tracing. IEICE
Transactions On Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sci-
ences, E85-A(2):481–484, 2002.
[162] Atsuko Miyaji, Masaki Nakabayashi, and Shunzo Takano. Characterization of
elliptic curve traces under fr-reduction. In Proceedings of the Third International
Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2000, pages 90–108,
London, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[163] Atsuko Miyaji, Masaki Nakabayashi, and Shunzou Takano. New explicit condi-
tions of elliptic curve traces for fr-reduction. IEICE Transactions Fundamentals,
E84 A(5), May 2001.
[164] Takeo Mizuno and Hiroshi Doi. Hybrid proxy re-encryption scheme for attribute-
based encryption. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Infor-
mation Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2009, pages 288–302. Springer-Verlag,
December 2010.
[165] Gustavo H. M. B. Motta and Sérgio Shiguemi Furuie. A contextual role-based
access control authorization model for electronic patient record. IEEE Transactions
on Information Technology in Biomedicine, 7(3):202–207, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 246
[166] Tracey L. Murray, Mona Calhoun, and Nayna C. Philipsen. Privacy, confidentiality,
hipaa, and hitech: Implications for the health care practitioner. The Journal for
Nurse Practitioners, 7(9):747–752, 2016.
[167] Dalit Naor, Moni Naor, and Jeff Lotspiech. Revocation and tracing schemes for
stateless receivers. In Proceedings of the 21th Annual International Cryptology
Conference, CRYPTO 2001, pages 41–62. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.
[168] Moni Naor and Kobbi Nissim. Certificate revocation and certificate update. In
Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX 1998, 1998.
[169] Moni Naor and Omer Reingold. Number-theoretic constructions of efficient
pseudo-random functions. Journal of the ACM, 51(2):231–262, March 2004.
[170] Moni Naor and Moti Yung. Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against cho-
sen ciphertext attacks. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC 1990, pages 427–437. ACM, 1990.
[171] Shivaramakrishnan Narayan, Martin Gagné, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini. Privacy
preserving ehr system using attribute-based infrastructure. In Proceedings of the
2010 ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security Workshop, CCSW 2010, pages
47–52, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[172] Thomas Neubauer and Johannes Heurix. A methodology for the pseudonymization
of medical data. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 80(3):190 – 204,
2011.
[173] Lan Nguyen. Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications. In Proceed-
ings of the 2005 International Conference on Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA 2005,
pages 275–292, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. Springer-Verlag.
[174] Tatsuaki Okamoto and David Pointcheval. React: Rapid enhanced-security asym-
metric cryptosystem transform. In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA 2001, pages 159–174. Springer, Heidelberg, Berlin,
2001.
[175] Tatsuaki Okamoto and Katsuyuki Takashima. Fully secure functional encryption
with general relations from the decisional linear assumption. In Proceedings of
the 30th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2010, pages 191–
208. Springer-Verlag, August 2010.
[176] Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Attribute-based encryption with
non-monotonic access structures. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, pages 195–203, New York,
NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[177] Ronald Ostrowski. Paternity indices. In Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Conference
on Forensic Bioinformatics, Statistics and DNA Profiling, Wright State University,
2003.
[178] Mor Peleg, Dizza Beimel, Dov Dori, and Yaron Denekamp. Situation-based ac-
cess control: Privacy management via modeling of patient data access scenarios.
Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 41(6):1028–1040, December 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247
[179] Birgit Pfitzmann and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. Anonymous fingerprinting with direct
non-repudiation. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the The-
ory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2000,
pages 401–414, London, UK, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
[180] Duong-Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval, Siamak F. Shahandashti, and Mario Strefler.
Adaptive cca broadcast encryption with constant-size secret keys and ciphertexts.
In Proceedings of the 17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and
Privacy, ACISP 2012, pages 308–321. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[181] Matthew Pirretti, Patrick Traynor, Patrick McDaniel, and Brent Waters. Secure
attribute-based systems. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS 2006, pages 99–112, New York, NY, USA,
2006. ACM.
[182] Catherine Quantin, David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, Gouenou Coatrieux, Eric Ben-
zenine, and François-André Allaert. Medical record search engines, using
pseudonymised patient identity: An alternative to centralised medical records. In-
ternational Journal of Medical Informatics, 80(2):e6–e11, 2011.
[183] Charles Rackoff and Daniel R. Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual In-
ternational Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 1991,
pages 433–444. Springer-Verlag, 1992.
[184] Gianluigi Reni, Massimo Molteni, Stefano Arlotti, and Francesco Pinciroli. Chief
medical officer actions on information security in an italian rehabilitation centre.
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 73:271–279, 2004.
[185] Fatemeh Rezaeibagha, Khin Than Win, and Willy Susilo. A systematic literature
review on security and privacy of electronic health record systems: Technical per-
spectives. Health Information Management Journal, 44(3):23–38, 2015.
[186] Hyun Sook Rhee, Jong Hwan Park, and Dong Hoon Lee. Generic construction of
designated tester public-key encryption with keyword search. Information Science,
205:93–109, November 2012.
[187] Hyun Sook Rhee, Jong Hwan Park, Willy Susilo, and Dong Hoon Lee. Improved
searchable public key encryption with designated tester. In Proceedings of the 4th
International Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, ASIACCS 2009, pages 376–379, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[188] Hyun Sook Rhee, Jong Hwan Park, Willy Susilo, and Dong Hoon Lee. Trapdoor
security in a searchable public-key encryption scheme with a designated tester.
Journal of Systems and Software, 83(5):763–771, May 2010.
[189] Bernahard Riedl, Thomas Neubauer, Gernot Goluch, Oswald Boehm, Gert Rein-
auer, and Alexander Krumboeck. A secure architecture for the pseudonymization
of medical data. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Availabil-
ity, Reliability and Security, ARES 2007, pages 318–324, April 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 248
[190] Bernhard Riedl, Veronika Grascher, Stefan Fenz, and Thomas Neubauer.
Pseudonymization for improving the privacy in e-health applications. In Proceed-
ings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pages
255–255, January 2008.
[191] Bernhard Riedl, Veronika Grascher, and Thomas Neubauer. Applying a threshold
scheme to the pseudonymization of health data. In Proceedings of the 13th Pacific
Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, PRDC 2007, pages 397–
400, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[192] Lillian Røstad. An initial model and a discussion of access control in patient con-
trolled health records. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Avail-
ability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2008, pages 935–942, March 2008.
[193] Lillian Røstad and Ole Edsberg. A study of access control requirements for health-
care systems based on audit trails from access logs. In Proceedings of the 22nd An-
nual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2006, pages 175–186,
December 2006.
[194] Jolt Roukema, Renske K. Los, Sacha E. Bleeker, Astrid M. van Ginneken, Johan
van der Lei, and Henriette A. Moll. Paper versus computer: Feasibility of an
electronic medical record in general pediatrics. Pediatrics, 117(1):15–21, 2006.
[195] Yannis Rouselakis and Brent Waters. Practical constructions and new proof meth-
ods for large universe attribute-based encryption. In Proceedings of the ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2013, pages 463–474.
ACM, 2013.
[196] Yannis Rouselakis and Brent Waters. Efficient statically-secure large-universe
multi-authority attribute-based encryption. In Proceedings of the 19th Interna-
tional Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2015, pages
315–332, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015. Springer-Verlag.
[197] Karl Rubin and Alice Silverberg. The best and worst of supersingular abelian
varieties in cryptology. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/006, 2002. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2002/006.
[198] Karl Rubin and Alice Silverberg. Supersingular abelian varieties in cryptology. In
Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances
in Cryptology, CRYPTO 2002, pages 336–353, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2002. Springer.
[199] Pekka Ruotsalainen. A cross-platform model for secure electronic health record
communication. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 73:291–295.
[200] Pekka Ruotsalainen and Bryan Manning. A notary archive model for secure preser-
vation and distribution of electrically signed patient documents. International Jour-
nal of Medical Informatics, 76(5-6):449–453, 2007.
[201] Amit Sahai and Brent Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In Proceedings
of the 24th Annual International Conference on Theory and Applications of Cryp-
tographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2005, pages 457–473, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2005. Springer-Verlag.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
[202] Mike Scott. Authenticated id-based key exchange and remote log-in with simple
token and pin number. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/164, 2002. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2002/164.
[203] MIRACL CRYPTO SDK. https://certivox.com/solutions/
miracl-crypto-sdk/.
[204] Hovav Shacham and Brent Waters. Efficient ring signatures without random ora-
cles. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Public Key Cryptography,
PKC 2007, pages 166–180. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.
[205] Hovav Shacham and Brent Waters. Compact proofs of retrievability. In Pro-
ceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2008, pages 90–107, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[206] Adi Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In Proceedings
of the 4th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 1984, pages 47–
53, New York, NY, USA, 1985. Springer-Verlag.
[207] Adi Shamir and Yael Tauman. Improved online/offline signature schemes. In
Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO
2001, pages 355–367. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[208] Victor Shoup. Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems. In
Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Theory and Appli-
cation of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 1997, pages 256–266, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 1997. Springer-Verlag.
[209] Joseph H. Silverman. The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves. Springer-Verlag New
York, 1986.
[210] Ramkinker Singh, Vipra Gupta, and Mohan K. Dynamic federation in identity
management for securing and sharing personal health records in a patientcentric
model in cloud. Engg Journals Publications, pages 2201–2209, 2013.
[211] Dean F. Sittig and Hardeep Singh. Legal, ethical, and financial dilemmas in elec-
tronic health record adoption and use. Pediatrics, 127(4):1042–1047, 2011.
[212] Lindi A. Slevin and Alex Macfie. Role based access control for a medical database.
In Proceedings of the 11th IASTED International Conference on Software Engi-
neering and Applications, SEA 2007, pages 226–233, Anaheim, CA, USA, 2007.
ACTA Press.
[213] Michael Steiner, Gene Tsudik, and Michael Waidner. Diffie-hellman key distribu-
tion extended to group communication. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 1996, pages 31–37. ACM, 1996.
[214] Snezana Sucurovic. Implementing security in a distributed web-based ehcr. Inter-
national Journal of Medical Informatics, 76(5-6):491–496, 2007.
[215] Snezana Sucurovic. An approach to access control in electronic health record.
Journal of Medical Systems, 34(4):659–666, 2010.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 250
[216] Jinyuan Sun and Yuguang Fang. Cross-domain data sharing in distributed elec-
tronic health record systems. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Sys-
tems, 21(6):754–764, June 2010.
[217] Chul Sur, Chae Duk Jung, and Kyung-Hyune Rhee. Multi-receiver certificate-
based encryption and application to public key broadcast encryption. In Proceed-
ings of the ECSIS Symposium on Bio-inspired, Learning, and Intelligent Systems
for Security, BLISS 2007, pages 35–40. IEEE Computer Society, 2007.
[218] Manolis Tsiknakis, Dimitrios G. Katehakis, and Stelios C. Orphanoudakis. A
health information infrastructure enabling secure access to the life-long multime-
dia electronic health record. In Proceedings of the 18th International Congress
and Exhibition on Computer Assisted Radiology and Surgery, CARS 2004, pages
289–294, 2004.
[219] Frank Ueckert, Michael Goerz, Maximilian Ataian, Sven Tessmann, and Hans-
Ulrich Prokosch. Empowerment of patients and communication with health care
professionals through an electronic health record. International Journal of Medical
Informatics, 70(2–3):99–108, 2003.
[220] Frank K. Ueckert and Hans-Ulrich Prokosch. Implementing security and access
control mechanisms for an electronic healthcare record. Proceedings of the Annual
AMIA Symposium, page 825829, 2002.
[221] Minne van der Haak, Astrid Corinna Wolff, Ralf Brandner, Peter Drings, Michael
Wannenmacher, and Thomas Wetter. Data security and protection in cross-
institutional electronic patient records. International Journal of Medical Infor-
matics, 70(23):117 – 130, 2003.
[222] Helma van der Linden, Dipak Kalra, Arie Hasman, and Jan Talmon. Inter-
organizational future proof ehr systems: A review of the security and privacy re-
lated issues. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 78(3):141–160, 2009.
[223] Eric R. Verheul. Evidence that xtr is more secure than supersingular elliptic curve
cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology, 17(4):277–296, September 2004.
[224] Boyang Wang, Baochun Li, and Hui Li. Knox: Privacy-preserving auditing for
shared data with large groups in the cloud. In Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2012, pages
507–525, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
[225] Boyang Wang, Baochun Li, and Hui Li. Oruta: privacy-preserving public auditing
for shared data in the cloud. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 2(1):43–56,
2012.
[226] Boyang Wang, Baochun Li, and Hui Li. Panda: Public auditing for shared data with
efficient user revocation in the cloud. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing,
8(1):92–106, 2015.
[227] Cong Wang, Sherman S.M. Chow, Qian Wang, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou.
Privacy-preserving public auditing for secure cloud storage. IEEE Transactions
on Computers, 62(2):362–375, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 251
[228] Cong Wang, Qian Wang, Kui Ren, Ning Cao, and Wenjing Lou. Toward secure
and dependable storage services in cloud computing. IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.,
5(2):220–232, 2012.
[229] Cong Wang, Qian Wang, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou. Ensuring data storage se-
curity in cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 17th International Workshop on
Quality of Service, IWQoS 2009, 2009.
[230] Cong Wang, Qian Wang, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou. Privacy-preserving public
auditing for data storage security in cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 29th
Conference on Information Communications, INFOCOM 2010, pages 525–533.
IEEE Press, 2010.
[231] Huaqun Wang, Qianhong Wu, Bo Qin, and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Frr: Fair re-
mote retrieval of outsourced private medical records in electronic health networks.
Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 50:226 – 233, 2014.
[232] Qian Wang, Cong Wang, Jin Li, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou. Enabling public verifi-
ability and data dynamics for storage security in cloud computing. In Proceedings
of the 14th European Conference on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS
2009, pages 355–370, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-Verlag.
[233] Qian Wang, Cong Wang, Kui Ren, Wenjing Lou, and Jin Li. Enabling public au-
ditability and data dynamics for storage security in cloud computing. IEEE Trans-
actions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 22(5):847–859, May 2011.
[234] Samuel J. Wang, Blackford Middleton, Lisa A. Prosser, Christiana G. Bardon, Cyn-
thia D. Spurr, Patricia J. Carchidi, Anne F. Kittler, Robert C. Goldszer, David G.
Fairchild, Andrew J. Sussman, Gilad J. Kuperman, and David W. Bates. A cost-
benefit analysis of electronic medical records in primary care. The American Jour-
nal of Medicine, 114(5):397–403, 2003.
[235] Brent Waters. Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles. In Pro-
ceedings of the 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applica-
tions of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2005, pages 114–127, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2005. Springer.
[236] Brent Waters. Dual system encryption: Realizing fully secure ibe and hibe under
simple assumptions. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology
Conference, CRYPTO 2009, pages 619–636. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[237] Brent Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption: An expressive, effi-
cient, and provably secure realization. In Proceedings of the Conference on Public
Key Cryptography, PKC 2011, pages 53–70, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-
Verlag.
[238] Khin Than Win, Willy Susilo, and Yi Mu. Personal health record systems and their
security protection. Journal of Medical Systems, 30(4):309–315, 2006.
[239] Stefan Wolf. Information-Theoretically and Computionally Secure Key Agreement
in Cryptography. PhD thesis, ETH Zurich, 1999.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 252
[240] Ruoyu Wu, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu. Secure sharing of electronic health
records in clouds. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Collab-
orative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing, CollaborateCom
2012, pages 711–718, 2012.
[241] Kan Yang and Xiaohua Jia. Data storage auditing service in cloud computing:
Challenges, methods and opportunities. World Wide Web, 15(4):409–428, July
2012.
[242] Wei-Chuen Yau, Raphael C. W. Phan, Swee-Huay Heng, and Bok-Min Goi.
Keyword guessing attacks on secure searchable public key encryption schemes
with a designated tester. International Journal of Computer Mathematics (Ad-
vanced Computer Mathematics based Cryptography and Security Technologies),
90(12):2581–2587, December 2013.
[243] Shucheng Yu, Cong Wang, Kui Ren, and Wenjing Lou. Achieving secure, scalable,
and fine-grained data access control in cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 29th
Conference on Information Communications, INFOCOM 2010, pages 534–542.
IEEE Press, 2010.
[244] Weider D. Yu and Mark A. Chekhanovskiy. An electronic health record content
protection system using smartcard and pmr. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on e-Health Networking, Application and Services, pages 11–18, June
2007.
[245] Yong Yu, Man Ho Au, Yi Mu, Shaohua Tang, Jian Ren, Willy Susilo, and Liju
Dong. Enhanced privacy of a remote data integrity-checking protocol for secure
cloud storage. International Journal of Information Security, pages 1–12, 2014.
[246] Yong Yu, Jianbing Ni, Man Ho Au, Yi Mu, Boyang Wang, and Hui Li. On the
security of a public auditing mechanism for shared cloud data service. IEEE Trans-
actions on Services Computing, PP(99):1–1, 2014.
[247] Yong Yu, Lei Niu, Guomin Yang, Yi Mu, and Willy Susilo. On the security of au-
diting mechanisms for secure cloud storage. International Journal of Grid Comput-
ing on Future Generation Computer Systems (theory, methods and applications),
30(1):127–132, 2014.
[248] Rui Zhang and Ling Liu. Security models and requirements for healthcare appli-
cation clouds. In Proceedings of the IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cloud
Computing, CLOUD 2010, pages 268–275, Washington, DC, USA, 2010. IEEE
Computer Society.
[249] Rui Zhang, Ling Liu, and Rui Xue. Role-based and time-bound access and man-
agement of ehr data. Security and Communication Networks, 7(6):994–1015, 2014.
[250] Lidong Zhou, Michael A. Marsh, Fred B. Schneider, and Anna Redz. Distributed
blinding for distributed elgamal re-encryption. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2005, page
815824. IEEE Computer Society, June 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 253
[251] Yan Zhu, Gail-Joon Ahn, Hongxin Hu, Stephen S. Yau, Ho G. An, and Chang-Jun
Hu. Dynamic audit services for outsourced storages in clouds. IEEE Transactions
on Services Computing, 6(2):227–238, 2013.
[252] Yan Zhu, Huaixi Wang, Zexing Hu, Gail-Joon Ahn, Hongxin Hu, and Stephen S.
Yau. Dynamic audit services for integrity verification of outsourced storages in
clouds. In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC
2011, pages 1550–1557, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
